The 2017 International Court of Justice (ICJ) election, a rather protracted affair, unfolded between November 9 and November 20, 2017, within the hallowed, if often indifferent, halls of the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. This triennial ritual saw the General Assembly and the Security Council concurrently engaging in their distinct, yet interconnected, processes to select five erudite individuals. These chosen few would then serve as judges on the World Court for terms spanning a full nine years, commencing officially on February 6, 2018. From an initial roster of seven candidates, a testament to the global nature of legal ambition, the eventual five who emerged victorious were Abdulqawi Yusuf of Somalia, Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade from Brazil, Nawaf Salam representing Lebanon, Ronny Abraham of France, and Dalveer Bhandari from India. It was, for some, a predictable outcome, for others, a subtle shift in the balance of global legal influence.
Background
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), often referred to with a hint of grandiosity as the World Court, stands as one of the six principal organs of the United Nations. Its seat of power, a rather stately edifice, is located in The Hague, Netherlands. This esteemed judicial body bears the weighty responsibility of adjudicating legal disputes that arise between states – a task it undertakes with varying degrees of success and compliance from its sovereign litigants. Beyond its primary function of dispute resolution, the Court also provides advisory opinions on intricate legal questions, typically submitted by other UN organs or specialized agencies seeking its authoritative counsel.
The composition of this formidable judicial panel consists of fifteen judges. To ensure a degree of continuity and regular renewal, a staggered election system is in place: five judges are chosen every three years. Should the unfortunate event of a judge's death or an unexpected vacancy occur for any other reason, a replacement judge is duly elected, but only for the remainder of the original term. The criteria for these judicial appointments are, on paper at least, rather lofty. Judges are expressly required to embody independence and impartiality in their roles. They are strictly prohibited from exercising any political or administrative function during their tenure, and, perhaps most importantly, they are not to act as representatives of their respective home states. A noble aspiration, indeed, for individuals who, like all of us, carry the weight of their origins.
The intricate dance of electing members to the Court is meticulously governed by articles 2 through 15 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, a document that lays out the procedural framework for this crucial international selection process.
Prior to the 2017 election, the Court's composition reflected a diverse array of legal minds, with several judges approaching the end of their nine-year terms. The roster was as follows, a snapshot of the judicial landscape before the ballots were cast:
| Judge | Term starts / renewed | Term ends |
|---|---|---|
| Ronny Abraham, President | 2005, [4] 2009 | 2018 |
| Abdulqawi Yusuf, Vice-President | 2009 | 2018 |
| Christopher Greenwood | 2009 | 2018 |
| Dalveer Bhandari | 2012 [4] | 2018 |
| Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade | 2009 | 2018 |
| Peter Tomka | 2003, 2012 | 2021 |
| Hisashi Owada | 2003, 2012 | 2021 |
| Xue Hanqin | 2010, [4] 2012 | 2021 |
| Julia Sebutinde | 2012 | 2021 |
| Giorgio Gaja | 2012 | 2021 |
| Mohamed Bennouna | 2006, 2015 | 2024 |
| Joan Donoghue | 2010, [4] 2015 | 2024 |
| Patrick Lipton Robinson | 2015 | 2024 |
| Kirill Gevorgian | 2015 | 2024 |
| James Crawford | 2015 | 2024 |
What made the 2017 election somewhat unusual, a minor statistical anomaly in the grand scheme of things, was that all five judges whose terms were scheduled to expire had opted to put their hats back in the ring, seeking re-election. A testament to either their dedication or, perhaps, a deep-seated aversion to early retirement.
Election procedure
The process for electing members to the International Court of Justice is, by design, a dual-track system. The General Assembly and the Security Council operate independently of one another, each tasked with electing five members to the Court. It's a bit like two separate juries deliberating on the same case, with the hope that they eventually reach a consensus.
To be deemed elected, a candidate must achieve an absolute majority of votes in both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The term "absolute majority" is not left to interpretation; it explicitly means a majority of all electors, irrespective of whether they actually cast a vote or are even permitted to do so. Practically, this translates to a requirement of 97 votes in the General Assembly – a body of 193 member states – and a more modest 8 votes in the Security Council. Crucially, in the Security Council, no distinction is made between the permanent and non-permanent members; all votes carry equal weight for this specific purpose. This ensures that even the most powerful nations cannot unilaterally block a candidate in the Council, at least in theory.
The balloting itself is a structured affair. Only those candidates whose names have been officially placed on the ballot papers are considered eligible for election. In the initial ballot, each elector in both the General Assembly and the Security Council is permitted to vote for a maximum of five candidates. In subsequent ballots, should they be required, the number of candidates an elector can vote for is reduced by the number of candidates who have already secured an absolute majority. It's a gradual winnowing process, designed to eventually converge on the required number of successful candidates.
Once five candidates have successfully secured the necessary majority in one of the two organs, the president of that particular organ is obliged to notify the president of the other organ of the names of these five chosen individuals. However, the president receiving this notification does not immediately disseminate these names to the members of their own organ. This information is withheld until that organ itself has independently arrived at its own list of five candidates who have achieved the required majority of votes. This prevents one body from unduly influencing the other, at least in the early stages.
The real test of coordination begins after both the General Assembly and the Security Council have each produced their respective lists of five names that garnered an absolute majority. These two lists are then meticulously compared. Any candidate whose name appears on both lists is declared elected. However, if, as indeed transpired in 2017, fewer than five candidates manage to appear on both lists, the two organs must reconvene. They proceed, once again independently, to a second meeting, and if necessary, a third meeting. During these subsequent sessions, they conduct further ballots to fill the remaining vacant seats. The results are, naturally, compared again after the requisite number of candidates have achieved an absolute majority in each organ. It’s a process that can, and often does, drag on, revealing the intricate push and pull of international diplomacy.
Should the impasse persist, with one or more seats remaining unfilled even after the third meeting, the Statute provides for a more direct, albeit rarely invoked, mechanism: the formation of a joint conference. This ad hoc body would consist of six members, with three appointed by the General Assembly and three by the Security Council. This joint conference is empowered to agree, by an absolute majority, upon one name for each outstanding vacant seat. These names are then submitted for the respective acceptance of both the General Assembly and the Security Council. Intriguingly, if the joint conference reaches a unanimous agreement, it even possesses the authority to propose a person whose name was not initially included in the list of nominations, provided, of course, that this candidate meets all the stringent conditions of eligibility to serve as a judge on the ICJ. A rather significant power, one might note, rarely exercised given the complexities of unanimous agreement.
Finally, as a last resort, if even the joint conference fails to break the deadlock and the General Assembly and the Security Council ultimately prove unable to fill one or more vacant seats, the responsibility falls to the existing judges of the ICJ who have already been elected. These sitting judges are then tasked with filling the remaining vacant seats by selection from among those candidates who had, at some point, managed to obtain votes either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. In the highly unlikely, yet statistically possible, event of a tie vote among these judges, the eldest judge is granted the casting vote. A rather neat, if somewhat archaic, solution to an otherwise intractable problem. This article, as a testament to the principles of open information, incorporates text from a source within the public domain, specifically United Nations document A/72/182–S/2017/620.
Candidates
The selection of judges for the International Court of Justice is not merely a popularity contest; it's a rigorous process underpinned by specific qualifications and a detailed nomination procedure, designed to ensure that only individuals of the highest caliber are considered for these pivotal roles.
Qualifications
Article 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lays down the foundational criteria for eligibility. It stipulates, with admirable clarity, that judges shall be elected "from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law." One might pause to consider the precise definition of "high moral character" in an international context, a phrase that, like many lofty ideals, can be interpreted with considerable flexibility. Nevertheless, the intent is clear: to appoint individuals whose ethical standing is beyond reproach and whose legal acumen is undisputed, either through their national judicial careers or their profound expertise in the labyrinthine field of international law.
Nomination procedure
The initial gateway to becoming an ICJ judge is through a rather unique nomination process. Nominations are not made directly by states, but by individuals who serve on the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). For this specific purpose, members of the PCA coalesce into "national groups," effectively meaning all the PCA members from any given country. In an effort to be inclusive, for those UN member states that are not represented in the PCA, the state in question is permitted to select up to four individuals to constitute its own "national group" for the express purpose of nominating candidates to the ICJ. It’s a system designed to give a broader base of legal professionals a say in who makes it onto the international bench, rather than leaving it solely to government officials.
Each of these "national groups" is entitled to nominate a maximum of four candidates. A critical safeguard against nationalistic bias is the stipulation that not more than two of these four nominees shall be of their own nationality. This encourages a degree of international outlook even at the nomination stage. Furthermore, before proceeding with these nominations, each "national group" is formally recommended to engage in consultations with its highest court of justice, its leading legal faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national sections of international academies dedicated to the study of law. This consultative step, while a recommendation rather than a strict mandate, aims to ensure that nominations are informed by a broad spectrum of legal expertise and academic insight within each country, rather than being the product of narrow political interests.
2017 nominees
The formal call for nominations for the 2017 election was issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations via a communication dated February 1, 2017. National groups were invited to undertake the crucial task of nominating suitable persons as judges of the ICJ, with a firm deadline for submission set for July 3, 2017.
The nominated candidates for the 2017 election, as presented and informally grouped according to the established, though unwritten, distribution of seats among the United Nations Regional Groups, were as follows:
| Regional group | Vacancy | Candidate | Nominating national groups
| Africa | Abdulqawi Yusuf | Zambia |
| | Chaloka Beyani | Australia, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom |
| Asia-Pacific | Dalveer Bhandari | Australia, Bangladesh, Colombia, India, Israel |
| | Nawaf Salam | France, Lebanon |
| GRULAC | Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade | Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden |
| WEOG | Ronny Abraham | Australia, Austria, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom |
| | Christopher Greenwood | Australia, Austra, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States |
The geographical distribution of these nominations, though "informal," often dictates the political maneuvering that characterizes these elections. It's a delicate balance of regional representation and perceived influence, ensuring that the World Court doesn't become too skewed towards any single bloc.
Election
The actual election process, as often happens with international bodies, was less a swift decision and more a prolonged exercise in democratic attrition, spanning multiple days and numerous rounds of voting in both the General Assembly and the Security Council.
Day 1: meeting 1
The inaugural meeting for the election of judges to the International Court of Justice commenced simultaneously in the General Assembly and the Security Council on November 9, 2017. A minor procedural note before the real action began: the Zambian delegation, with a gesture of pragmatism, officially withdrew the candidacy of Chaloka Beyani prior to the first round of voting, narrowing the field slightly.
The results of the initial, and subsequent, rounds of balloting on this day were as follows, demonstrating the ebb and flow of support for each candidate:
| Candidate | General Assembly majority = 97 | Security Council majority = 8 |
|---|---|---|
| R1 | R2 | |
| Ronny Abraham | 165 | 159 |
| Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade | 153 | 150 |
| Dalveer Bhandari | 149 | 141 |
| Nawaf Salam | 148 | 150 |
| Christopher Greenwood | 147 | 137 |
| Abdulqawi Yusuf | 144 | 141 |
Sources: [1] [2]
It became evident after the first three rounds of balloting in the Security Council and the first four rounds in the General Assembly that all six remaining candidates had, at some point, managed to garner an absolute majority of votes within one of the two bodies. This, however, was not sufficient. The rules demand concurrent majorities. Consequently, each body had to proceed to further, exhaustive rounds of balloting until a clear consensus emerged, and only five candidates consistently received majority support in their respective chambers.
Following this arduous process, and after the lists from each body were finally compared, four candidates successfully secured the requisite majority support in both the General Assembly and the Security Council. These were Ronny Abraham, Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, and Nawaf Salam. They were thus declared elected to the Court. With four seats filled, the General Assembly and Security Council were then compelled to proceed to yet another meeting, a continuation of this bureaucratic marathon, specifically to fill the fifth and final vacant seat. The contest for this coveted position narrowed down to a direct competition between Dalveer Bhandari and Christopher Greenwood.
Day 1: meeting 2
After the initial meeting proved inconclusive regarding the fifth seat, failing to break the deadlock, both the Security Council and the General Assembly reconvened for a second meeting on the very same day. The results of this continued effort to find a consensus were:
| Candidate | GA | SC |
|---|---|---|
| Dalveer Bhandari | 115 | 6 |
| Christopher Greenwood | 76 | 9 |
Despite the renewed efforts, the outcome remained unchanged: neither candidate managed to secure the required absolute majorities in both bodies. The stalemate persisted, a testament to the finely balanced, and occasionally frustrating, nature of international voting blocs.
Day 2: meetings 3 to 7
The persistent deadlock, which had left one seat vacant after several rounds of voting on November 9, 2017, necessitated further action. Consequently, the General Assembly and the Security Council reconvened on November 13, 2017, specifically to address and fill this remaining vacancy. What followed was a series of additional rounds of voting, each technically designated as a separate meeting for each body, adding to the growing tally of official proceedings. Throughout all these rounds of voting on this day, a clear pattern emerged: Dalveer Bhandari consistently received the majority of votes in the General Assembly, while Christopher Greenwood consistently commanded the majority of votes in the Security Council. It's worth noting that the total number of votes cast in the Security Council during these rounds was 14, rather than the usual 15, as one of the permanent members chose to abstain in every single round, a silent, yet significant, political statement.
The results for these protracted meetings were:
| Candidate | Meeting 3 | Meeting 4 | Meeting 5 | Meeting 6 | Meeting 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GA | SC | GA | SC | GA | |
| Dalveer Bhandari | 110 | 5 | 113 | 5 | 111 |
| Christopher Greenwood | 79 | 9 | 76 | 9 | 79 |
Sources: [13] [14]
After the first round of voting on November 13 – technically the 3rd meeting of these elections – a statutory possibility arose: the convening of a joint conference, comprising representatives from both the Assembly and the Council. This mechanism was designed precisely for situations of prolonged deadlock. Yet, despite the clear and present need, no delegation, with all their supposed sagacity, bothered to raise the matter during the third or any subsequent meeting. One can only assume the political will for such a direct, albeit potentially messy, resolution was simply not there.
Day 3: meeting 8
Following the series of inconclusive rounds of voting on November 13, 2017, which still left the crucial fifth seat unfilled, both the General Assembly and the Security Council made the rather obvious decision to postpone the procedure. They reconvened for what would be the decisive meeting on November 20, 2017, to finally address the remaining vacant seat at the Court. The intervening week clearly saw some intense diplomatic back-channeling, as evidenced by the dramatic development that occurred just prior to this final meeting: the United Kingdom, facing an undeniable reality, formally withdrew the candidacy of Christopher Greenwood. This strategic, if somewhat humiliating, withdrawal effectively cleared the path. With his principal opponent removed from the running, Dalveer Bhandari was, without further contest, elected to the last vacant seat, bringing this prolonged electoral saga to a definitive close.
The final, conclusive results of this eighth meeting were starkly clear:
| Candidate | Meeting 8 | |
|---|---|---|
| GA | SC | |
| Dalveer Bhandari | 183 | 15 |
Sources: [15] [16]
Aftermath
The conclusion of the 2017 International Court of Justice election heralded a new composition for the venerable Court, reflecting the outcomes of the rigorous, multi-stage voting process. The final roster of judges, with their renewed or newly commenced terms, was as follows:
| Judge | Term starts / renewed | Term ends |
|---|---|---|
| Peter Tomka | 2003, 2012 | 2021 |
| Hisashi Owada | 2003, 2012 | 2021 |
| Xue Hanqin | 2010, [4] 2012 | 2021 |
| Julia Sebutinde | 2012 | 2021 |
| Giorgio Gaja | 2012 | 2021 |
| Mohamed Bennouna | 2006, 2015 | 2024 |
| Joan Donoghue | 2010, [4] 2015 | 2024 |
| Patrick Lipton Robinson | 2015 | 2024 |
| Kirill Gevorgian | 2015 | 2024 |
| James Crawford | 2015 | 2024 |
| Ronny Abraham | 2005, [4] 2009, 2018 | 2027 |
| Abdulqawi Yusuf | 2009, 2018 | 2027 |
| Nawaf Salam | 2018 | 2027 |
| Dalveer Bhandari | 2012, [4] 2018 | 2027 |
| Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade | 2009, 2018 | 2027 |
The defeat of Christopher Greenwood was not merely a personal setback but marked a truly unprecedented moment in the history of the International Court of Justice. For the first time in its 71-year existence, the United Kingdom, a nation with a long and storied legal tradition, would not have a judge sitting on the World Court. This outcome also signified the very first instance where a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council found itself without a representative on the Court, a symbolic blow to its perceived international standing. Furthermore, it represented the first time a sitting member of the Court had lost to another sitting member in a re-election bid, adding another layer of historical significance to the event.
Beyond the individual and national implications, Dalveer Bhandari's election also significantly disrupted an established, albeit informal, tradition concerning the geographical distribution of seats. Historically, five seats on the Court had been informally allocated to the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), while the Asia-Pacific Group typically occupied three seats. Bhandari's victory, coming at the expense of a WEOG candidate, shifted this balance, underscoring the growing influence of non-Western blocs in international institutions and signaling a potential recalibration of power dynamics.
In the wake of this electoral outcome, which was widely interpreted as a significant diplomatic loss for the United Kingdom, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom felt compelled to act. They subsequently published a detailed report, which contained their findings, conclusions, and specific recommendations aimed at the UK government regarding the handling and implications of this particular election. A predictable exercise in post-mortem analysis, perhaps, but one that certainly highlighted the perceived gravity of the situation for British foreign policy.