The Battle of Monmouth, a pivotal engagement fought near Monmouth Court House in what is now Freehold Borough, New Jersey, and stretching into Manalapan, unfolded on June 28, 1778. This clash was a significant part of the Philadelphia campaign during the American Revolutionary War. It pitted the formidable Continental Army, under the command of General George Washington, against the disciplined ranks of the British Army in North America, led by General Sir Henry Clinton.
The battle itself marked the final act of the Philadelphia campaign, a prolonged endeavor by the British to seize the rebel capital. During this campaign, the British had managed to inflict two substantial defeats upon Washington's forces and subsequently occupied Philadelphia. The Continental Army, meanwhile, had endured a brutal winter encampment at Valley Forge, a period dedicated to rebuilding strength and fending off internal political challenges. These challenges included the machinations of Major General Horatio Gates, whose alignment with the so-called "Conway Cabal" threatened Washington's position as commander-in-chief. However, the strategic landscape shifted dramatically in February 1778 with the signing of the Treaty of Alliance between France and the Americans. This alliance compelled the British to abandon their offensive ambitions and adopt a more defensive stance. General Clinton received orders to evacuate Philadelphia and consolidate his forces. The Continental Army shadowed the retreating British across New Jersey, aiming to intercept them before they could reach Sandy Hook for a naval evacuation to New York. While Washington's senior officers debated the merits of caution versus aggressive action, it was politically imperative for Washington to avoid allowing the British withdrawal to go unchallenged. Consequently, Washington detached approximately one-third of his army, placing it under the command of Major General Charles Lee, with the intent of delivering a significant blow to the British rear without committing to a full-scale engagement.
The initial stages of the battle proved disastrous for the Americans. Lee's attempt to engage the British rear guard near Monmouth Court House devolved into a disorganized retreat. A swift counter-attack by the main British column forced Lee to fall back until Washington arrived with the bulk of the Continental Army. Recognizing the strength of Washington's defensive position, Clinton disengaged and resumed his march towards Sandy Hook.
Clinton had divided his army into two distinct divisions for the arduous march from Philadelphia. The first division was composed of the majority of the combat troops, while the second carried the considerable baggage train, which included approximately 1,500 wagons. As the British traversed New Jersey, they faced increasing harassment from American forces. By June 27, 1778, Lee's vanguard was positioned to strike. When the British began their march from Monmouth Court House the following day, Lee launched his ill-fated assault on their rear guard. The attack, marred by poor coordination, quickly found itself outnumbered as the British first division returned to reinforce their beleaguered rear. Some of Lee's units began to withdraw, leading to a breakdown in command and control, which ultimately compelled Lee to order a general retreat. A tenacious rearguard action, however, bought Washington sufficient time to establish a formidable defensive line. British attempts to dislodge the vanguard from this position faltered. The infantry engagement evolved into a protracted artillery duel lasting two hours. This artillery exchange concluded when a Continental brigade successfully positioned cannons on a hill overlooking the British lines, forcing Clinton to withdraw his artillery. Washington then launched two targeted attacks on Clinton's withdrawing infantry, inflicting considerable casualties during the second assault. An attempt by Washington to probe the British flanks was halted by the setting sun, leading both armies to establish positions within a mile of each other. Under the cover of darkness, the British forces managed to slip away unnoticed, rejoining their baggage train. The remainder of their journey to Sandy Hook proceeded without further incident, and Clinton's army was successfully ferried to New York in early July.
The battle itself was tactically inconclusive and strategically of little consequence. Neither side achieved its primary objective of inflicting a decisive blow on the other. The Continental Army remained a viable fighting force, and the British successfully redeployed to New York. Both armies sustained considerable casualties, though the majority were attributed to heat-related illnesses and exhaustion rather than direct combat. The Continental Army is estimated to have inflicted more losses than it suffered, marking one of the few instances where it maintained possession of the battlefield. The battle demonstrated the significant improvement in the Continental Army's capabilities following their winter training, a fact widely acknowledged by the British. Washington skillfully leveraged the outcome to present the battle as a triumph, earning a formal vote of thanks from Congress for "the important victory of Monmouth over the British grand army." This victory solidified his position as commander-in-chief, silencing his detractors and leading to his widespread acclaim as the Father of his Country. In stark contrast, Lee faced widespread condemnation for his failure to press the attack on the British rear guard. His subsequent attempts to defend his actions, characterized by a lack of tact, led to his arrest and court-martial on charges of disobeying orders, conducting an "unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat," and showing disrespect towards the commander-in-chief. Lee's fatal error was turning the proceedings into a direct confrontation with Washington, ultimately resulting in his conviction on all charges, though his culpability on the first two was debatable.
Today, the historic grounds of the battle are preserved as Monmouth Battlefield State Park, a testament to the enduring significance of this engagement.
Background
The American Revolutionary War, then in its second year, saw General Sir William Howe, the British commander-in-chief, launch the ambitious Philadelphia campaign in 1777. His objective was to capture the rebel capital and compel the Continental Congress to sue for peace. Howe succeeded in inflicting two significant defeats on General George Washington and his army at Brandywine and Germantown, leading to the occupation of Philadelphia and forcing the Congress to relocate to York, Pennsylvania. Washington, facing criticism for his perceived reliance on a Fabian strategy rather than decisive pitched battles, opted to withdraw his army to winter quarters at Valley Forge in December 1777, despite congressional pressure to continue campaigning. This contrasted with the successes of his subordinate, General Horatio Gates, who had secured major victories at the Battles of Saratoga.
Rumors of a "Strong Faction" within Congress aiming to replace Washington with Gates began to surface in November 1777. The subsequent appointments of the outspoken critic General Thomas Conway as Inspector General of the Army and Gates to the Board of War and Ordnance in December solidified Washington's belief in a conspiracy, the Conway Cabal, to usurp his command. Throughout a harsh winter marked by scarce supplies and high mortality rates from disease, Washington fought a critical battle for his command and the army's survival. He navigated this political minefield with a calculated public image of disinterest and ambition, while privately working through allies to neutralize his critics. Nevertheless, doubts about his leadership persisted, underscoring the need for a decisive victory on the battlefield.
The British, despite considerable investment in North America, had failed to achieve a decisive end to the rebellion. This strained their resources and emboldened France, a long-standing rival, to exploit the situation. The Franco-American alliance of February 1778 signaled a strategic shift, drawing France into the conflict and leading to the Anglo-French War (1778–1783). Facing mounting pressure on multiple fronts, including a growing number of hostile European powers, Great Britain was forced to re-evaluate its strategy. The focus shifted from achieving a decisive military victory in North America to defending the homeland and more strategically vital colonial possessions in the Caribbean and India. The British abandoned their offensive strategy, repealed the punitive Intolerable Acts, and dispatched the Carlisle Peace Commission in an attempt to negotiate a settlement. In Philadelphia, the new British commander-in-chief, General Sir Henry Clinton, received orders to redeploy 8,000 troops to the West Indies and Florida, consolidate the remainder in New York, and adopt a defensive posture.
Continental Army
Washington's advocacy for a professional standing army, as opposed to relying solely on militia, had been a point of contention. He had witnessed the Continental Army's disintegration in late 1775 due to expiring enlistments and attributed his defeat at the Battle of Long Island in part to the unreliable performance of militia. To address this, Congress passed legislation between September and December 1776 to establish an army with enlistments for the duration of the war. However, recruitment fell short of expectations, and the army's effectiveness was further diminished by harsh discipline, prolonged separation from home, and the defeats of 1777, which led to widespread desertions and officer resignations.
Despite the presence of experienced officers and men, the army that endured the winter at Valley Forge was not yet a match for the tactical prowess of the British Army. The arrival of Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben in March 1778 marked a turning point. Under Washington's enthusiastic support, Steuben implemented standardized drill and training, transforming the Continental Army into a more professional force capable of competing on equal terms with its British adversaries.
On May 21, Major General Charles Lee, a former British officer, rejoined the Continental Army. Having been captured in late 1776 and released in an April prisoner exchange, Lee had been critical of Washington's leadership during the New York and New Jersey campaign. Despite Lee's insubordination, Washington regarded him as his most trusted advisor and the finest officer in the Continental Army, welcoming his return as second-in-command.
Sixteen months of captivity had done little to temper Lee's critical nature. While outwardly respectful to Washington, he continued to voice his criticisms of the commander-in-chief to others, information that likely reached Washington through his allies. Lee was dismissive of the Continental Army's progress and disparaged Steuben's training efforts. He even submitted a plan to Congress to reorganize the army on a militia basis, bypassing Washington and earning a reprimand. Nevertheless, Lee commanded the respect of many Continental officers and enjoyed considerable favor with Congress. Washington entrusted him with command of the vanguard division that would soon depart Valley Forge.
Prelude
Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, a Prussian military officer, played a crucial role in professionalizing the Continental Army.
In April, prior to receiving news of the French alliance, Washington solicited the opinions of his generals regarding the upcoming campaign. The options presented were: an attack on the British in Philadelphia, a shift of operations to New York, or maintaining a defensive posture at Valley Forge while continuing army development. Of the twelve responses, a consensus emerged that maintaining public support for the revolution hinged on the army's performance, especially after the setbacks of the previous year. While most favored offensive actions, Washington aligned with the minority, including Steuben, who argued that the Continental Army required further refinement at Valley Forge before engaging the British. The arrival of news regarding the Franco-American alliance and increased British activity around Philadelphia prompted Washington to convene another council of war on May 8. This time, the generals unanimously favored a defensive strategy, contingent on clearer intelligence regarding British intentions.
By May, it became apparent that the British were preparing to evacuate Philadelphia. However, Clinton's precise plans remained unknown to Washington, who worried about a potential overland withdrawal through New Jersey. The 2nd New Jersey Regiment, actively engaged in operations against British foraging parties in New Jersey since March, provided valuable intelligence. By the end of May, a land evacuation seemed increasingly probable. Washington reinforced the regiment with the entire New Jersey Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General William Maxwell, with orders to disrupt British movements. The Continentals were to coordinate with the New Jersey militia, led by Major General Philemon Dickinson, a highly capable militia commander and Washington's primary source of intelligence on British activities. On May 18, Washington dispatched the relatively inexperienced Major General Lafayette, aged 20, with 2,200 men to establish an observation post at Barren Hill, a mere eleven miles from Philadelphia. Lafayette's first significant independent command nearly ended in disaster two days later during the Battle of Barren Hill, with only the discipline of his troops preventing his entrapment by the British.
March from Philadelphia
General Henry Clinton by Andrea Soldi.
On June 15, the British commenced their withdrawal from Philadelphia, crossing the River Delaware into New Jersey. Three days later, the final troops made the crossing, and the army consolidated near Haddonfield, New Jersey. Clinton, still undecided on the precise route to New York, approximately ninety miles away, divided his army into two divisions. He set out for Allentown, New Jersey, about forty miles to the northeast, accompanying the first division, comprising roughly 10,000 troops under the command of Lieutenant General Charles Lord Cornwallis. The second division, led by Lieutenant General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, consisted of just over 9,000 personnel, of which more than 7,500 were combatants. This division carried the majority of the slow-moving, heavy transport comprising the 1,500-wagon baggage train.
The march was conducted in short segments, often during a severe heat wave where temperatures frequently exceeded 90°F (32°C). This extreme heat further impeded progress and led to casualties from heat exhaustion. Clinton, however, remained unconcerned by the slow pace. He was confident in his troops' superiority over Washington's forces and believed a decisive battle could redeem the humiliation of abandoning Philadelphia and potentially cripple the rebellion. The two divisions maintained mutually supporting positions whenever possible, utilizing parallel routes. Light troops and pioneers screened the route ahead, clearing obstacles, while combat units were embedded within the baggage train, and battalion-sized formations provided flank security. Despite frequent sniping and skirmishing by Maxwell's Continentals and Dickinson's militia, and their attempts to obstruct the British by destroying bridges and spoiling wells, their efforts did not significantly impede the British advance.
By June 24, the first division reached Allentown, while the second arrived at Imlaystown, New Jersey, four miles to the east. Clinton then decided to target Sandy Hook, New Jersey, as the embarkation point for evacuation by the Royal Navy. When the march resumed at 4:00 AM on June 25, the road network necessitated a single column formation, making it impossible for the two divisions to maintain supporting distance. Knyphausen's second division led the twelve-mile column on the road towards Monmouth Court House (modern Freehold). Cornwallis followed, with the Guards and Grenadiers at the rear, positioning his combat-heavy division between the baggage train and the likely direction of American attack. By the end of the day, Knyphausen camped in Freehold Township, New Jersey, about four miles from Monmouth Court House, while Clinton established his headquarters at Robin's Rising Sun Tavern, twelve miles from Knyphausen.
The following day, June 26, the British sustained nearly forty casualties in near-constant skirmishing, with one unit narrowly avoiding being overrun. Knyphausen reached Monmouth Court House early that morning, and by 10:00 AM, the entire column had concentrated there. Clinton recognized the growing American presence and the exhaustion of his troops after their sixty-seven-mile march from Philadelphia. Monmouth Court House offered a strong defensive position, and Clinton may have seen an opportunity for the battle he desired. He deployed his army to secure all approaches and decided to rest his troops for the next two days. The majority of his force, the first division, was positioned on the Allentown road, covering the second division in the village.
The American Revolution had ignited a brutal civil conflict within Monmouth County, New Jersey, a conflict that reflected poorly on both sides and continued even after the armies departed. This internecine struggle pitted Patriots, who supported the rebellion, against Loyalists, who remained faithful to Great Britain and even formed units like the Queen's American Rangers that fought alongside the British Army. The animosity extended beyond the battlefield, with an estimated fifty percent of Monmouth County families suffering significant personal or property damage during the war. By the spring of 1778, the formerly Loyalist Monmouth Court House had fallen under Patriot control. Upon the British arrival, they found a settlement largely deserted by its inhabitants. Despite Clinton's orders against pillaging, they were largely ignored by the rank and file and unenforced by officers. British and Hessian soldiers, driven by frustration and anger, and Loyalists fueled by rage and vengeance, engaged in widespread vandalism, looting, and arson. By the time Clinton resumed the march on June 28, thirteen of the village's approximately two dozen buildings, all privately owned by Patriots, had been destroyed.
Pursuit
Washington received intelligence of the British evacuation of Philadelphia on June 17. He promptly convened a war council, where only two of the seventeen generals present believed the Continental Army was capable of winning a pitched battle against the British. Lee, in particular, argued that attempting such a battle would be "criminal." Unsure of Clinton's exact intentions and with his officers urging caution, Washington resolved to pursue the British and maintain a position within striking distance. Lee's brigades led the Continental Army out of Valley Forge on the afternoon of June 18, and four days later, the final troops crossed the Delaware River into New Jersey at Coryell's Ferry. Washington divided his army into two wings, commanded by Lee and Major General [Lord Stirling](/William_Alexander, Lord Stirling), with a reserve under Lafayette. Traveling light, Washington reached Hopewell, New Jersey on June 23, less than twenty-five miles north of the British forces at Allentown. While the army established camp, Colonel Daniel Morgan was dispatched south with 600 light infantry to reinforce Maxwell and Dickinson.
On June 24, at the Joseph Stout House (Hunt House), Dickinson informed Washington that his and Maxwell's efforts to impede Clinton were proving largely ineffective. He suspected Clinton was deliberately lingering in New Jersey to provoke a battle. Washington convened another war council, where the twelve attending officers recommended varying degrees of caution. Lee reiterated his stance that a victory would offer little benefit, while a defeat would irrevocably damage the revolutionary cause. He favored allowing Clinton to proceed to New York unmolested, a view shared by four other generals. Even the more aggressive officers advocated for avoiding a major engagement. Brigadier General Anthony Wayne suggested dispatching an additional 2,500–3,000 troops to reinforce Maxwell and Dickinson, enabling them, with a third of the army, to make "an Impression in force." Ultimately, a compromise was reached: 1,500 picked men would reinforce the vanguard to "act as occasion may serve." To Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton, who attended as an aide, the council's deliberations were likened to those of "the most honorable society of midwives, and to them only." A disappointed Washington dispatched the token force under Brigadier General Charles Scott.
Soon after the council adjourned, Wayne – who had refused to endorse the compromise – along with Lafayette and Major General Nathanael Greene, individually appealed to Washington with the same request: a stronger vanguard action supported by the main body, while still avoiding a major battle. Lafayette assured Washington that Steuben and Brigadier General Louis Duportail concurred, stating it "would be disgraceful for the leaders and humiliating for the troops to allow the enemy to cross the Jerseys with impunity." Greene emphasized the political imperative, noting that the public expected an attack and expressing confidence in their chances of success even if a limited engagement escalated into a larger battle. This was all Washington, eager to vindicate himself after the previous year's defeats and silence his critics, needed to hear. By the early hours of June 25, he had ordered Wayne to follow Scott with another 1,000 picked men, signaling his intent to do more than merely harass Clinton. While still avoiding the risk of a major battle, he hoped to inflict a significant blow, surpassing his earlier success at the Battle of Trenton in 1776.
Reining in Lafayette
Major General [Lafayette](/Gilbert_du_Motier, Marquis de Lafayette) by Joseph-Désiré Court.
Washington offered Lee command of the vanguard, but Lee declined, deeming the force too small for an officer of his rank and standing. Washington appointed Lafayette instead, instructing him to attack "with the whole force of your command" if the opportunity arose. Lafayette struggled to maintain cohesive control over the disparate forces under his command. In his haste to intercept the British, he pushed his troops to their limits and outpaced his supply lines. Washington grew increasingly concerned and, on the morning of June 26, cautioned Lafayette against "an over hasty march" that would "distress your men." By that afternoon, Lafayette had reached Robin's Tavern, where Clinton had stayed the previous night, placing him within three miles of the British. He was too far from the main army for adequate support, and his men were exhausted and hungry. Still eager to engage, Lafayette discussed a night march with his officers, intending to strike Clinton the following morning.
That evening, Washington ordered Lafayette to leave Morgan and the militia behind as a screening force and proceed to Englishtown, New Jersey, bringing him back within range of both supplies and the main army. By this time, Lee, having reassessed the significance of Lafayette's force, had reconsidered and requested command of it. Washington ordered Lee to take Scott's former brigade and the brigade of Brigadier General James Varnum, link up with Lafayette in Englishtown, and assume command of all advance forces. Greene took over command of Lee's wing of the main body. By June 27, Lafayette had rejoined the main force with what was now Lee's vanguard of approximately 4,500 troops at Englishtown, six miles from the British at Monmouth Court House. Washington was with the main body of just over 7,800 troops and the bulk of the artillery at Manalapan Bridge, New Jersey, four miles behind Lee. Morgan's light infantry, now augmented to 800 men with a militia detachment, was positioned at Richmond Mills, slightly over two miles south of Monmouth Court House. Dickinson's 1,200-plus militia operated on Clinton's flanks, with a significant concentration located about two miles west of Monmouth Court House.
Battle
General overview of the battle
On the afternoon of June 27, Washington conferred with the senior officers of the vanguard at Englishtown but provided no specific battle plan. Lee believed he had full discretion regarding whether and how to attack, and convened his own war council after Washington's departure. His intention was to advance as soon as he learned Clinton was on the move, hoping to catch the British rearguard at its most vulnerable. Lacking intelligence on Clinton's intentions or the terrain, Lee considered a precise plan impractical. He instructed his commanders to remain ready for immediate action and await his orders. In response to a written directive from Washington received in the early hours of June 28, Lee ordered Colonel William Grayson to advance with 700 men. Their mission was to monitor British movements and, if any occurred, attempt to slow them, thus allowing the vanguard to close the distance.
Grayson did not depart Englishtown until 6:00 AM, a full hour after receiving word that Clinton was on the move. Both the vanguard and the main body broke camp immediately, but their movements were slow. The vanguard was delayed by brigades forming in the incorrect march order, and the main body was hampered by its artillery train. At 7:00 AM, Lee rode ahead to assess the situation personally. Following some confusion stemming from an erroneous report by a militia rider suggesting the British were preparing to attack rather than withdraw, Lee learned that the British had begun their movement at 2:00 AM, leaving only a small contingent of infantry and cavalry in the immediate vicinity.
Clinton's initial action was to deploy the Queen's Rangers northwest of Monmouth Court House to cover the planned departure of the second division. Although scheduled for an hour later, the second division's departure was delayed until 4:00 AM. By 5:00 AM, the first division had begun its march, and the last British troops left Monmouth Court House by 9:15 AM, heading northeast on the road to Middletown, New Jersey. The column's rear guard comprised a battalion of light infantry and a regiment of dragoons, which, combined with the Rangers, numbered between 1,550 and 2,000 troops.
Advance to contact
Lee's attack on the British rearguard.
The initial exchange of fire occurred around 8:00 AM in an engagement solely between a small detachment of Rangers and Dickinson's militia. Grayson arrived shortly thereafter, deploying his troops to support the militia near a bridge spanning a ravine. He observed the Rangers withdrawing. This bridge, located on the Englishtown–Monmouth Court House road, crossed the Spotswood Middle Brook. This brook was one of three ravines, bordered by marshy wetlands or 'morasses,' that dissected the terrain that would soon become the battlefield. These ravines were difficult for infantry to traverse and impassable for artillery, posing a grave danger to any unit caught on the wrong side or pinned against them. Upon joining Grayson near the bridge, Dickinson, still believing the British occupied Monmouth Court House in force, strongly advised Lee against crossing the brook. With conflicting intelligence regarding British activity, Lee lost an hour at the bridge. He did not advance until Lafayette arrived with the remainder of the vanguard.
Once the vanguard was concentrated at the bridge, Lee assigned Wayne to command the approximately 550-man lead element, which included detachments led by Colonel Richard Butler, Colonel Henry Jackson, and Grayson (commanding his original composite battalion of Virginians), supported by four artillery pieces. The vanguard advanced along the Englishtown road towards Monmouth Court House until reaching the junction with the road to Foreman's Mill around 9:30 AM. Lee accompanied Wayne to reconnoiter Monmouth Court House, where they discovered the British rearguard. Estimating the British strength at approximately 2,000 men, Lee devised a plan to envelop their rear. He instructed Wayne to fix the rearguard in place while he led the rest of the vanguard on a left flanking maneuver. Lee's reports back to Washington conveyed an air of confidence, implying "the certainty of success."
Following Lee's departure, Butler's detachment engaged mounted troops screening the rearguard, prompting the British to begin withdrawing northeast towards the main column. In the ensuing pursuit, Wayne repulsed a dragoon charge and launched a feint against the British infantry, causing the rearguard to halt and form up on a hill at the intersection of the Middletown and Shrewsbury, New Jersey roads. Meanwhile, Lee, leading the rest of the vanguard himself, failed to provide Scott and Maxwell with a detailed plan. After a two-mile march, he emerged from the woods around 10:30 AM, in time to witness Wayne's troops engaged to his left.
As it became apparent that the British forces were significantly larger than anticipated, Lee, in conjunction with Lafayette, worked to secure what he perceived as a vulnerable right flank. On the left flank, the appearance of another British force, numbering 2,000–3,000 strong, prompted Jackson to withdraw his regiment from its exposed position on the banks of Spotswood North Brook. In the vanguard center, Scott and Maxwell, positioned to Scott's left, were not in communication with Lee and were unaware of his plan. Observing Lee extending the right flank and with British troops marching towards Monmouth Court House to their south, they grew apprehensive about being cut off. They mutually agreed to adjust their positions: Scott fell back a short distance southwest across the Spotswood Middle Brook to a more defensible location, while Maxwell retreated with the intention of circling around and joining Scott's right flank.
Lee was astonished when the two staff officers he dispatched with orders for Scott returned with news that Scott was nowhere to be found. He was also disconcerted by their reports of the British returning in force. Witnessing part of Lafayette's force retreating after a failed attempt to silence British artillery, Lee perceived that the right flank was also withdrawing without orders. It became evident that he was losing control of the vanguard, and with his immediate command reduced to 2,500 men, he realized his plan to envelop the British rearguard was compromised. His priority shifted to ensuring the safety of his command in the face of superior numbers.
Counter-attack and retreat
A contemporary map drawn by Lafayette's aide.
Upon receiving word that his rearguard was being engaged, Clinton ordered Cornwallis to march the first division back towards Monmouth Court House. He believed Washington's main body was too distant to provide support and that the terrain would hinder Lee's maneuverability. Clinton's objective was not merely to defend his baggage train but to exploit the perceived vulnerability of the vanguard, aiming to turn its right flank and destroy it. After a brief halt at Monmouth Court House, Clinton advanced westward. He formed his elite troops into two columns: the Guards on the right, the Grenadiers on the left, with the Royal Artillery positioned between them, supported by a regiment of dragoons. The infantry of the 3rd and 4th Brigades followed in line, while the 5th Brigade remained in reserve at Monmouth Court House. The Queen's Rangers and the rearguard infantry operated on the British right flank. To the rear, a brigade of Hessian grenadiers maintained a defensive line as a fallback position for Clinton. In total, his force comprised approximately 10,000 troops.
Lee ordered a general retreat to a line about one mile west of Monmouth Court House, extending from Craig's House, north of Spotswood Middle Brook, to Ker's House, south of the brook. He encountered significant difficulties in communicating with his subordinates, exhausting his aides in the process. Although he reached the vicinity of Ker's House with a substantial force by noon, he was unable to exert unified command and control. Despite the disorganization of Lee's retreat, individual units generally maintained discipline, a testament to Steuben's training. The Americans suffered only about a dozen casualties during their withdrawal, indicating the limited extent of major combat. There were no organized infantry volleys, and only the artillery engaged in significant action. Lee maintained that he had executed a model "retrograde manoeuver in the face and under fire of an enemy," claiming his troops moved with "order and precision." While he remained composed during the retreat, his demeanor shifted at Ker's House. When two of Washington's aides informed Lee that the main body was still two miles away and inquired what to report back, Lee responded, "that he really did not know what to say." Crucially, he failed to keep Washington informed of the retreat.
Lee recognized that a knoll situated in front of his lines would grant the British, now deployed from column into line formation, command of the terrain and render his position untenable. Lacking knowledge of the main body's whereabouts and believing he had little alternative, Lee decided to fall back further, across the Spotswood Middle Brook bridge. He anticipated being able to hold the British at Perrine's Hill until the main body arrived. With his aides incapacitated, Lee pressed anyone available into service as messengers to organize the withdrawal. It was during this period that he dispatched the army auditor, Major John Clark, to Washington with news of the retreat. However, Washington was already aware, having been informed by Lee's troops who had already crossed the ravine.
Washington's arrival
The main body had reached Englishtown by 10:00 AM and was still some four miles from Monmouth Court House by noon. In the absence of recent intelligence from Lee, Washington had no cause for alarm. At Tennent's Meeting House, approximately two miles east of Englishtown, he ordered Greene to take Brigadier General William Woodford's brigade, comprising about 550 men and 4 artillery pieces, south then east to secure the right flank. The remainder of the main body continued east along the Englishtown–Monmouth Court House road. Within approximately ten minutes, Washington's initial confidence turned to alarm as he encountered stragglers bearing the first news of Lee's retreat, followed by entire units in disarray. None of the officers Washington met could provide clear information regarding their orders or destinations. As the commander-in-chief rode ahead, crossing the bridge and approaching the front lines, he observed the vanguard in full retreat but no sign of the British. Around 12:45 PM, Washington found Lee marshalling the last of his command across the middle morass, a marshy area southeast of the bridge.
Expecting commendation for a retreat he believed had been conducted in good order, Lee was uncharacteristically speechless when Washington, without preamble, demanded, "I desire to know, sir, what is the reason – whence arises this disorder and confusion?" Regaining his composure, Lee attempted to justify his actions, blaming faulty intelligence and his officers, particularly Scott, for withdrawing without orders, leaving him no choice but to retreat before a superior force. He also reminded Washington that he had opposed the attack in the first place. Washington remained unconvinced, replying, "All this may be very true, sir, but you ought not to have undertaken it unless you intended to go through with it." Washington made his displeasure with Lee clear and rode off to organize the battle he felt his subordinate should have fought. Lee followed at a distance, bewildered and under the impression that he had been relieved of command.
With the main body still arriving and the British no more than half a mile away, Washington began rallying the vanguard to establish the defensive positions Lee had been attempting to organize. The commander-in-chief directed Wayne to take three battalions and form a rearguard in the Point of Woods, south of the Spotswood Middle Brook, to delay the British. He issued orders for the 2nd New Jersey Regiment and two smaller Pennsylvanian regiments to deploy on the slopes of Perrine's Hill, north of the brook overlooking the bridge; this position would serve as the rallying point for the rest of the vanguard and the anchor for the main body's formation. Washington offered Lee a choice: remain and command the rearguard, or fall back and organize the main body. Lee opted for the former and, as Washington departed to attend to the latter, promised he would "be the last one to leave the field."
American rearguard action
Lee positioned himself with four artillery pieces, supported by two infantry battalions, on the crest of a hill to Wayne's right. As the British advanced – Guards on the right, Grenadiers on the left – they passed the Point of Woods, unaware of the Continentals concealed within. Wayne's troops inflicted up to forty casualties. The Guards reacted with disciplined precision, and with the support of dragoons and some Grenadiers, charged into the American lines. Within ten minutes, Wayne's three battalions were being pushed back towards the bridge. Meanwhile, the Grenadiers continued their advance towards Lee's position, forcing the Continental artillery back to a hedgerow where the two infantry battalions had already withdrawn. Another brief, intense engagement ensued until Lee, observing his flanks being turned, ordered his men to follow Wayne back across the bridge.
As Lee and Wayne fought south of the Spotswood Middle Brook, Washington was deploying the main body on Perrine's Hill, northwest of the bridge. Stirling's wing had just occupied positions on the American left flank when its artillery began engaging troops of the British 3rd Brigade. Clinton had previously ordered the brigade to move right, cross the brook, and cut off the vanguard's line of retreat at the bridge. After the infantry of the 42nd (Royal Highland) Regiment of Foot crossed the brook, they encountered three battalions of Scott's detachment retreating westward. Under pressure from the Highlanders, the Continentals continued through an orchard to the safety of Stirling's line, while Stirling's artillery forced the Highlanders back to the orchard. A second battalion of Highlanders and the 44th Regiment of Foot, which had swung right and crossed the Spotswood North Brook, were also compelled by the artillery to retreat. Even farther to the right, an attempt to outflank Stirling's position by the Queen's Rangers and the rearguard's light infantry lacked the strength to succeed, and they too fell back to rejoin the 3rd Brigade.
At 1:30 PM, Lee was among the last American officers to withdraw across Spotswood Middle Brook. The rearguard action lasted no more than thirty minutes, providing Washington sufficient time to complete the deployment of the main body. When a battalion of Grenadiers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Monckton, pursued Lee's troops across the bridge, the British encountered Wayne's detachment reforming approximately 350 yards away. As the Grenadiers advanced to engage Wayne, they came under heavy fire from Stirling's artillery, positioned another 350 yards behind Wayne. Monckton became the highest-ranking British casualty of the day. Faced with unexpectedly strong resistance, the Grenadiers retreated back across the bridge to the hedgerow from which they had previously driven Lee.
Washington had decisively established a strong defensive position anchored on the right, overlooking the bridge on the Englishtown road, and extending in a gentle curve up the slope of Perrine's Hill for half a mile. Upon Lee's return, Washington dispatched him with two battalions of Maxwell's New Jersey Brigade, approximately half of Scott's detachment, and several other units from the former vanguard to form a reserve at Englishtown. The remaining vanguard elements, including the other half of Scott's detachment and most of Wayne's, remained with Washington. The infantry battle transitioned into a two-hour artillery duel across the 1,200 yards of no-man's land on either side of the brook, during which both sides sustained more casualties from heat exhaustion than from enemy cannon fire.
British withdrawal
British withdrawal and American attacks. The 1st Grenadier Battalion was left behind during the general withdrawal and was caught by Wayne's Pennsylvania Brigade as it moved south to link up with the 4th Brigade (not shown). The 33rd Regiment of the 4th Brigade advanced in support, and together they forced the Pennsylvanians to retreat until Greene's artillery on Combs Hill compelled the British to withdraw in turn.
Clinton had lost the initiative. He saw no prospect of successfully assaulting the entrenched enemy position in the oppressive heat and decided to break off the engagement. His immediate priority was to extricate his exposed right flank – the 3rd Brigade, Rangers, and light infantry still sheltering in the orchard north of Spotswood Middle Brook. While the Highlanders of the 42nd Regiment remained in position to cover the withdrawal, the remainder fell back across the brook to rejoin the Grenadiers at the hedgerow. Around 3:45 PM, during the withdrawal, Greene arrived with Woodford's brigade at Combs Hill, overlooking the British left flank, and opened fire with his artillery. Clinton was compelled to withdraw his own artillery, ending the cannonade with Washington's guns on Perrine's Hill, and reposition the Grenadiers to sheltered ground at the northern end of the hedgerow.
At 4:30 PM, Washington learned of the 3rd Brigade's withdrawal and launched the first American offensive action in six hours. He ordered two battalions of picked men "to go and see what [you] could do with the enemy's right wing." Only one battalion, approximately 350 strong and led by Colonel Joseph Cilley, actually engaged. Cilley skillfully utilized cover along the Spotswood North Brook to close with and engage the 275–325 troops of the 42nd Regiment in the orchard. The Highlanders found themselves in a disadvantageous position and, with the rest of the British right flank already departed, had no reason to remain. They conducted a fighting retreat in good order with minimal casualties. To the British, the rebels' attempt was "unsuccessful in endeavouring to annoy." To the Americans, it represented a significant psychological victory over one of the British Army's most feared regiments.
As his right flank withdrew, Clinton issued orders for what he intended to be a phased general withdrawal back towards Monmouth Court House. His subordinates misunderstood. Instead of waiting for the 3rd Brigade to rejoin before pulling back, all units except the 1st Grenadier Battalion withdrew immediately, leaving it and the 3rd Brigade dangerously exposed. Washington, encouraged by Cilley's attack and noting the silence of the British artillery which suggested vulnerability, ordered Wayne to conduct an opportunistic advance with a detachment of Pennsylvanians.
Wayne's request for three brigades, approximately 1,300 men, was denied. At 4:45 PM, he crossed the bridge over Spotswood Middle Brook with only 400 troops from the Third Pennsylvania Brigade. The Pennsylvanians caught the 650–700 men of the lone Grenadier battalion in the process of withdrawing, giving the British little time to form up and receive the attack. The Grenadiers were "losing men very fast," Clinton later wrote, before the 33rd Regiment of Foot arrived with 300–350 men to provide support. The British counter-attacked, and the Pennsylvanian Brigade began to disintegrate as it retreated towards Parsonage farm. The longest infantry engagement of the day concluded when Continental artillery positioned on Combs Hill halted the British counter-attack and forced the Grenadiers and infantry to withdraw.
Washington planned to resume the battle the following day and, at 6:00 PM, ordered four brigades, previously sent to the reserve at Englishtown, to return. Upon their arrival, they assumed Stirling's positions on Perrine's Hill, allowing Stirling to advance across Spotswood Middle Brook and establish new positions near the hedgerow. An hour later, Washington ordered a reinforced brigade commanded by Brigadier General Enoch Poor to probe Clinton's right flank, while Woodford's brigade was to descend from Combs Hill and probe Clinton's left flank. Their cautious advance was halted by sunset before making contact with the British, and the two armies settled down for the night within one mile of each other, with the closest British troops at Ker's House. After Clinton's forces withdrew, American troops began looting British corpses for valuables, leading to several soldiers ransacking nearby homes occupied by civilians who had fled the battle. Upon learning of this, Washington ordered searches of the soldiers' packs.
While the battle raged, Knyphausen led the baggage train to safety. His second division, protected by the Hessian Jägers under Lieutenant Colonel Wurmb, endured only minor harassment from militia and eventually established camp about three miles from Middletown. With the baggage train secure, Clinton had no intention of resuming the battle. At 11:00 PM, he began withdrawing his troops. The first division slipped away unnoticed by Washington's forward units and, after an overnight march, rejoined Knyphausen's second division between 8:00 and 9:00 AM the following morning.
Aftermath
The Battle of Monmouth was tactically inconclusive and strategically irrelevant. Neither side inflicted a decisive blow on the other, the Continental Army remained in the field, and the British Army successfully redeployed to New York, achieving the same outcome as if the battle had never occurred. Clinton reported 358 total casualties following the battle: 65 killed, 59 died of fatigue, 170 wounded, and 64 missing.
| Unit | Killed | Died of Fatigue | Wounded | Missing | Deserted | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| British | 65 | 59 | 170 | 64 | N/A | 358 |
| Germans | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 256 | 256 |
| Total | 65 | 59 | 170 | 64 | 256 | 679+ |
Note: While there are no officially listed fatalities for the German auxiliaries during the retreat, a third of them succumbed to heat and lay by the roadside; 256 deserted. It is possible these 256 deserters were among the 440 German deserters (out of 600 prisoners) in Philadelphia on July 6, 1778. Washington estimated approximately 250 enemy dead, a figure later revised to just over 300. Using a typical 18th-century wounded-to-killed ratio of no more than four to one and assuming no more than 160 enemy dead caused by American fire, Lender and Stone calculate the number of Clinton's wounded could have reached up to 640. A study by the Monmouth County Historical Association estimates total British casualties at 1,134, comprising 304 dead, 770 wounded, and 60 captured. Washington reported his own casualties at 370, consisting of 69 dead, 161 wounded, and 140 missing. Applying the same wounded-to-killed ratio and assuming a proportion of the missing were fatalities, Lender and Stone estimate Washington's casualties could have exceeded 500.
Claims of victory
Clinton reported the successful redeployment of his army to Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, framing the counter-attack as a diversionary tactic to protect the baggage train. He asserted that the battle concluded on his terms, though private correspondence revealed his hope of inflicting a decisive defeat on Washington. Having marched his army through enemy territory without losing a single wagon, he congratulated his officers on the "long and difficult retreat in the face of a greatly superior army without being tarnished by the smallest affront." While some officers displayed a grudging respect for the Continental Army, their doubts stemmed less from battlefield performance and more from the realization that France's entry into the war had shifted the strategic balance against Great Britain.
For Washington, the battle occurred at a time of significant doubt regarding his effectiveness as commander-in-chief. Presenting the engagement as a victory was politically crucial. On July 1, in his first substantial communication to Congress from the field since the previous year's setbacks, he submitted a detailed report of the battle. The report was measured but unequivocally claimed a significant victory, noting the rare instance of the British withdrawing from the battlefield and leaving their wounded behind. Congress received the report enthusiastically, voting a formal commendation to Washington and the army for "the important victory of Monmouth over the British grand army."
In their accounts of the battle, Washington's officers consistently portrayed it as a major triumph. Many used the occasion to defend Washington's leadership. Hamilton and Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, another of Washington's aides, wrote to influential friends – including Laurens' father, Henry, President of the Continental Congress – praising Washington's command. The American press widely depicted the battle as a triumph centered on Washington. Governor William Livingston of New Jersey, who had not approached within twenty-five miles of Monmouth Court House, published an anonymous 'eyewitness' account in the New Jersey Gazette days after the battle, attributing the victory to Washington. Similar articles continued to appear through August.
Congressional delegates not aligned with Washington, such as Samuel Adams and James Lovell, were reluctant to credit Washington but acknowledged the battle's importance, keeping their reservations private. The Washington loyalist [Elias Boudinot] wrote that "none dare to acknowledge themselves his Enemies." Washington's supporters gained confidence in defending his reputation. In July, Major General John Cadwalader challenged Conway, the central figure in Washington's perceived conspiracy, to a duel in Philadelphia, resulting in Conway being wounded in the mouth. Thomas McKean, chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, was perhaps the only congressional delegate to express disapproval, but deemed it imprudent to prosecute Cadwalader. Faith in Washington was restored, Congress became largely deferential to him, public criticism waned, and he was hailed as the Father of his Country for the first time. This epithet became common by year's end, by which time most of his chief critics had faded into obscurity or experienced career ruin.
Lee's court martial
Major General Charles Lee.
Even before the day concluded, Lee was cast as the villain, and his vilification became an integral part of the narrative constructed by Washington's lieutenants in their praise of their commander-in-chief. Lee remained in his post as second-in-command immediately following the battle, and the issue might have subsided if he had not pursued it. However, on June 30, after protesting his innocence to numerous individuals, Lee penned an insolent letter to Washington, blaming "dirty earwigs" for turning Washington against him, claiming his decision to retreat had saved the army, and accusing Washington of "an act of cruel injustice." Instead of the apology Lee sought, Washington responded that the letter's tone was "highly improper" and announced an official inquiry into Lee's conduct. Lee's demand for a court-martial was again insolent, prompting Washington to order his arrest and proceed with the trial.
The court convened on July 4, presenting Lee with three charges: disobeying orders by failing to attack on the morning of the battle, contrary to "repeated instructions"; conducting an "unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat"; and disrespect towards the commander-in-chief. The trial concluded on August 12, with the verdict confirmed by Congress on December 5. Lee's defense was articulate but fatally undermined by his attempt to frame the proceedings as a personal contest with Washington. He disparaged Washington's role in the battle, labeling Washington's official account "from beginning to end a most abominable damn'd lie," and disingenuously portrayed his own decision to retreat as a "masterful manoeuvre" designed to lure the British onto the main body. Washington maintained a detached stance, but his allies depicted Lee as a traitor who had allowed the British to escape and linked him to the alleged conspiracy against Washington from the previous winter.
Although the first two charges were debatable, Lee was undeniably guilty of disrespect, and Washington held too much power to be challenged directly. As historian John Shy observed, "Under the circumstances, an acquittal on the first two charges would have been a vote of no-confidence in Washington." Lee was found guilty on all three counts, though the court removed the word "shameful" from the second charge and noted the retreat was "disorderly" only "in some few instances." Lee was suspended from the army for one year, a sentence so lenient that some interpreted it as a vindication on all counts except disrespect. Lee's downfall removed Washington's last significant critic from the army and the last plausible alternative to Washington as commander-in-chief, silencing the final advocate for a militia-based army. Washington's position as the "indispensable man" was now unassailable.
Assessing the Continental Army
Joseph Bilby and Katherine Jenkins posit that the battle marked the "coming of age" of the Continental Army, which had previously achieved success only in smaller engagements at Trenton and Princeton. Joseph Ellis echoes this sentiment, noting Washington's belief that "the Continental Army was now a match for British professionals and could hold its own in a conventional, open-field engagement." Mark Lender and Garry Stone point out that while the Continental Army had undoubtedly improved under Steuben's tutelage, the battle did not fully test its ability to confront a professional European army in European-style warfare involving the maneuver of brigades and divisions. The only significant offensive operation of the day was British; the Continental Army fought primarily a defensive battle from cover, with a substantial portion remaining off the field on Perrine's Hill. The few American attacks, such as Cilley's, were small-unit actions.
Steuben's influence was evident in the conduct of the rank and file. Half of the troops who marched onto the battlefield at Monmouth in June were new recruits, having joined the army only since January. The vast majority of Lee's vanguard consisted of ad hoc battalions drawn from numerous regiments. Lacking inherent unit cohesion, their effectiveness relied on officers and men who had never served together before, applying and following the drills they had been taught. Their competent performance was demonstrated throughout the battle, from the advance to contact, Wayne's repulse of the dragoons, the orderly retreat under a strong counter-attack, to Cilley's engagement with the Highlanders. The army was also well-served by its artillery, which earned high praise from Washington. The professional conduct of the American troops garnered widespread recognition, even among the British. Clinton's secretary noted, "the Rebels stood much better than ever they did," and Brigadier General Sir William Erskine, who had clashed with the Continentals as commander of the light infantry, characterized the battle as a "handsome flogging" for the British, adding, "We had not received such an one in America."
Legacy
A 90-foot monument commemorating the battle stands in front of the Monmouth County Courthouse in Freehold.
In keeping with a battle more significant politically than militarily, the first reenactment in 1828 was staged to support the presidential candidacy of Andrew Jackson. A subsequent reenactment in 1854 was canceled due to excessive heat, adding an authentic touch to the proceedings. As the battle receded into history, its brutal reality was softened by a sanitized romanticism. The public memory of the fighting became populated with dramatic images of heroism and glory, exemplified by Emanuel Leutze's painting, Washington Rallying the Troops at Monmouth.
This transformation was facilitated by the creative interpretations of 19th-century historians, notably Washington's step-grandson, George Washington Parke Custis, whose account of the battle was as artistic as Leutze's painting. Custis was predictably disparaging towards Lee, and Lee's subsequent calumny became entrenched in works such as Washington Irving's Life of George Washington (1855–1859) and George Bancroft's History of the United States of America, from the Discovery of the American Continent (1854–1878). The role Lee had championed for the militia in the revolution was ultimately enshrined in the poetic 19th-century popular narrative, which excised the Continental Army from the battle and replaced it with patriotic citizen-soldiers.
The battlefield remained largely undisturbed until 1853, when the Freehold and Jamesburg Agricultural Railroad opened a line that cut through the Point of Woods, crossed the Spotswood Middle Brook, and traversed the Perrine estate. The area became a tourist attraction, and the Parsonage, the site of Wayne's desperate stand against the Grenadiers and the 33rd Regiment, was a popular destination until its demolition in 1860. Throughout the 19th century, forests were cleared and marshes drained. By the early 20th century, traditional agriculture had given way to orchards and truck farms. In 1884, the Monmouth Battle Monument was dedicated outside the modern-day county courthouse in Freehold, near where Wayne's troops first encountered the British rearguard. In the mid-20th century, two battlefield farms were sold for development. However, lobbying efforts by state officials, Monmouth County citizens, the Monmouth County Historical Association, and the Monmouth County Chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution succeeded in initiating a preservation program. In 1963, the first tract of battlefield land was acquired by the state, a 200-acre farm. Monmouth Battlefield State Park was dedicated on the bicentennial of the battle in 1978, and a new visitor center opened in 2013. By 2015, the park encompassed over 1,800 acres, incorporating most of the land where the afternoon battle took place. The state park has played a crucial role in restoring a more accurate interpretation of the battle's history to public consciousness, and the Continental Army now features prominently in the annual reenactments held every June.
Legend of Molly Pitcher
Main article: Molly Pitcher
Five days after the battle, a surgeon treating the wounded reported a patient's account of a woman who had taken her husband's place operating a gun after he was incapacitated. Two accounts attributed to veterans of the battle, surfacing decades later, also describe the actions of a woman during the battle; one states she supplied ammunition to the guns, while another claims she brought water to the crews. The story gained prominence in the 19th century, becoming embellished into the legend of Molly Pitcher. The woman most often identified as the inspiration for Molly Pitcher is Mary Ludwig Hays, whose husband served with the Pennsylvania State Artillery. However, it is probable that the legend is an amalgamation of accounts from multiple women present on the battlefield that day; assisting in battles was not uncommon for camp followers in the 18th century, though their role was more likely to involve carrying ammunition and water than crewing guns. Late 20th-century research identified a location near Stirling's artillery line as the site of a well from which the legendary Molly drew water, and a historic marker was erected there in 1992.
In popular culture
- The Battle of Monmouth is referenced in the song "America Shall Aye Be Free" by A. W. Burns and George W. Hewitt.
- The battle is depicted in the 2012 video game Assassin's Creed III, where Charles Lee intentionally sabotages the battle to ruin George Washington's reputation and replace him as commander of the Continental Army. However, Lee's efforts are thwarted by the protagonist Connor, who repels the British forces and exposes Lee's betrayal to Washington, leading to Lee's court-martial.
- In her 2014 novel Written in My Own Heart's Blood, Diana Gabaldon features the Battle of Monmouth.
- The battle is mentioned in the song "Stay Alive" from the Broadway musical Hamilton: An American Musical by Lin-Manuel Miranda. The song portrays Lee as incompetent, issuing conflicting orders to his troops, resulting in heavy casualties until Lafayette is called in. The song concludes with John Laurens challenging Lee to a duel.
- The dramatized events surrounding Lee and the battle are depicted in the episode "Gunpowder, Treason and Plot" of the AMC series Turn: Washington's Spies.
- The battle serves as the climax of Charles Bracelen Flood's 1961 historical novel Monmouth, which details the Continental Army's time at Valley Forge and the British Army's presence in Philadelphia.