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Battle Of Wissembourg (1870)

The Battle of Wissembourg, a rather ignominious opening salvo in the grand, and ultimately catastrophic, Franco-Prussian War, unfolded on the 4th of August, 1870. It wasn't so much a battle as an abrupt, unwelcome awakening for the small French garrison stationed in the town of Wissembourg. Three German army corps, moving with a decisiveness that bordered on insolence, descended upon them. The French, caught off guard and woefully outnumbered, nonetheless managed to fight with a tenacity that, while ultimately futile, harked back to their storied military past. As one observer noted, their resistance was commendable, “especially considering they were surprised and greatly outnumbered, that the French sustained their old renown as fighting men and that the first defeat, although severe, reflected no discredit on the soldiers of the 1st Corps.” The swift fall of Wissembourg, this seemingly minor border town, was the first domino to topple, paving the way for the Prussian army to surge into France and forcing Marshal Patrice MacMahon into a disastrous confrontation at the Battle of Wörth just two days later.

Background

The stage for this grim affair was set in June of 1870, when Napoleon III, seemingly blinded by ambition, marched the French army into Lorraine. They occupied Saarbrücken on August 2nd, a move that suggested a desire for a decisive victory on enemy soil. Napoleon ordered Marshal Patrice MacMahon to consolidate the French I and V Corps, with the ultimate objective of reaching Wissembourg. A division, under the command of General Abel Douay, was already positioned there. MacMahon’s grand strategy involved concentrating his forces for a thrust into Germany. However, the German III Army, under the command of Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm and his exceptionally capable Chief of Staff, General von Blumenthal, was already on the move, its sights set on Wissembourg. In the chaotic prelude to war, neither side seemed to possess a clear, accurate understanding of the other's movements.

Meanwhile, at Strasbourg, General Ducrot, commanding the 6th French Division, issued orders to withdraw his forces from Wissembourg and Lauterbourg. This decision was met with considerable resistance from the sub-prefect of Wissembourg, who felt it weakened the frontier defenses. General Douay's 2nd French Division had already begun its march towards Haguenau on July 22nd, necessitating the reoccupation of Wissembourg to secure Douay's line of supply. A portion of his vital materiel was, rather precariously, stored in this small frontier town.

By early August, Marshal MacMahon had gathered his forces at Haguenau. His stated objective was to prevent any disruption to the crucial Strasbourg—Haguenau—Bitche—Metz rail lines. His deployment was as follows: Ducrot's 1st Division was to establish itself at Lembach on August 4th, ensuring a connection with General Failly's V Corps. Douay's 2nd Division was to reoccupy Wissembourg, Weiler, and the surrounding countryside, specifically the gentle slopes near the Col du Pigeonnier. To cap it off, the 1st Cavalry Brigade was tasked with patrol duties along the frontier east of Wissembourg, extending to Schleithal.

Prelude

General Ducrot, possessing a familiarity with the local terrain that perhaps bred a dangerous overconfidence, was entrusted with the deployment of the various units in the region, including General Abel Douay's 1st Division. His instructions to Douay emphasized securing the heights overlooking the Lauter valley. The primary defensive positions were to be established on the Geisberg plateau to the east and the Vogelsberg plateau to the west. A single battalion was to remain within the town of Wissembourg itself. Douay was also ordered to relieve the 96th Infantry Regiment in the village of Climbach. At this critical juncture, Ducrot received intelligence that was, to put it mildly, woefully inadequate. Based on a reconnaissance report from the colonel commanding the 96th Regiment, he concluded that the enemy forces in the vicinity were not substantial enough to pose a serious threat in the immediate future.

Meanwhile, an entirely different picture was emerging. Captured Prussian soldiers and a local police chief provided information suggesting that the Prussian Crown Prince's Third Army was alarmingly close, just 30 miles (50 km) from Saarbrücken, and positioned near Wissembourg. This alarming news prompted General Le Boeuf and Napoleon III to order a retreat to more defensible positions. General Frossard, acting without explicit orders, hastily withdrew the elements of the Army of the Rhine that were stationed in Saarbrücken, falling back to Spicheren and Forbach.

Marshal MacMahon, whose forces were the closest to Wissembourg, had spread his four divisions over a considerable 20-mile (30 km) stretch of territory. This wide dispersal was a direct consequence of a severe lack of supplies, forcing each division to fend for itself in securing basic provisions, often with little assistance from the army supply corps. What compounded this already precarious situation was the frankly baffling conduct of Ducrot, the commander of the 1st Division. On August 1st, he reassured Douay, the commander of the 2nd Division, with the astonishing statement that "the information I have received makes me suppose that the enemy has no considerable forces very near his advance posts, and has no desire to take the offensive."

Two days later, he further compounded his apparent delusion by informing MacMahon that he had not encountered "a single enemy post... it looks to me as if the menace of the Bavarians is simply bluff." Despite Ducrot's dismissive attitude towards the possibility of a German assault, MacMahon attempted to warn the other divisions of his army. His efforts, however, proved to be entirely unsuccessful.

Battle

The engagement itself saw General Douay's I Corps division, unsupported and tasked with border surveillance, along with some attached cavalry units, subjected to an overwhelming, albeit poorly coordinated, assault by the German 3rd Army. Elements of a Bavarian corps and two Prussian corps were drawn into the fray throughout the day, their efforts amplified by Prussian artillery, which systematically breached the town's defenses. Douay's initial position was remarkably strong, bolstered by the accurate long-range fire of the Chassepot rifles. However, his forces were stretched far too thin to maintain such a defense. Douay himself met his end late in the morning when a caisson belonging to the divisional mitrailleuse battery detonated near him. The encircling Prussian forces began to tighten their grip, threatening the French escape route.

The fighting within the town devolved into a brutal, street-by-street struggle for survival. Despite a relentless onslaught from Prussian infantry, the soldiers of the 2nd Division held their ground with remarkable tenacity. Eventually, the inhabitants of Wissembourg surrendered to the Germans. The French troops who did not surrender retreated westward, leaving behind approximately 1,000 dead and wounded, along with another 1,000 prisoners and all of their remaining ammunition. The final Prussian assault exacted a heavy toll on their own ranks as well, costing them around 1,000 casualties. The German cavalry, for reasons that remain unclear or perhaps simply due to a lack of initiative, failed to pursue the retreating French, losing contact with them entirely. While the attackers initially held a numerical advantage and their broad deployment made envelopment a distinct possibility, the effectiveness of the French Chassepot rifles inflicted costly repulses on infantry assaults until the French infantry positions were thoroughly bombarded by Prussian artillery.

Aftermath

This battle, such as it was, marked a decisive victory for the Germans, granting them the crucial impetus to advance into France. Not long after the engagement at Wissembourg, the German III Army was on the move again, heading towards Wörth, where they would encounter the main body of MacMahon's beleaguered army. The implications of this initial skirmish were far-reaching, setting a grim tone for the rest of the conflict. The fall of Wissembourg was not just a tactical defeat; it was a psychological blow, signaling the unpreparedness and disarray of the French command. The subsequent defeat at Wörth would only deepen this sense of impending disaster.

Notes

  • ^ The French name for the engagement was the Bataille de Wissembourg, while the Germans referred to it as the Schlacht bei Weißenburg.
  • ^ The spelling "Wissembourg" is the French rendition, while "Weissenburg" is the German, Weißenburg.

References

  • Clodfelter, M. (2008). Warfare and armed conflicts: a statistical encyclopedia of casualty and other figures, 1494-2007. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. ISBN 978-0786433193.
  • Hooper, G. (1887). The campaign of Sedan. London: Bell. OCLC 422215149. Retrieved 12 June 2014.
  • Howard, M. (1961). The Franco–Prussian War. London: Rupert Hart-Davis. ISBN 0-24663-587-8. {{cite book}} : ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
  • Moltke, Field Marshal Count Helmuth von (1892). The Franco-German War of 1870. New York: Harper and Brothers.
  • Wawro, G. (2002). Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-20317-183-7.
  • Wawro, G. (2003). The Franco–Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-58436-1.

Sources

  • Clodfelter, M. (2008). Warfare and armed conflicts: a statistical encyclopedia of casualty and other figures, 1494-2007. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. ISBN 978-0786433193.
  • Hooper, G. (1887). The campaign of Sedan. London: Bell. OCLC 422215149. Retrieved 12 June 2014.
  • Howard, M. (1961). The Franco–Prussian War. London: Rupert Hart-Davis. ISBN 0-24663-587-8. {{cite book}} : ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
  • Moltke, Field Marshal Count Helmuth von (1892). The Franco-German War of 1870. New York: Harper and Brothers.
  • Wawro, G. (2002). Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-20317-183-7.
  • Wawro, G. (2003). The Franco–Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-58436-1.

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Battle of Wissembourg (1870).

  • Battlefield pictures
  • Wissembourg