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Created Jan 0001
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a series, preamble and articles, preamble

Child Labor Amendment

“This article is part of a series on the Constitution of the United...”

Contents
  • 1. Overview
  • 2. Etymology
  • 3. Cultural Impact

This article is part of a series on the Constitution of the United States

Preamble and Articles

Amendments to the Constitution

Unratified Amendments :

History

Full text


The Child Labor Amendment (CLA) stands as a testament to the circuitous, often frustrating, path of social reform through constitutional means in the United States . This proposed, and remarkably, still-pending, amendment to the nation’s foundational document would grant the Congress explicit authority to legislate and regulate the “labor of persons under eighteen years of age.” It was formally proposed on June 2, 1924, a direct legislative response to a series of rather inconvenient Supreme Court decisions in 1918 and 1922. These rulings, with a clarity that must have vexed reformers of the era, had unequivocally declared previous federal attempts to regulate and tax goods produced by employees under the ages of 14 and 16 to be unconstitutional overreaches of federal power.

By the mid-1930s, a significant majority of state legislatures had, perhaps after much deliberation or simply a change in the prevailing winds, ratified the amendment. Yet, despite this surge of support, the CLA remains in a state of suspended animation, having never achieved the requisite approval from three-fourths of the states, as mandated by Article V of the Constitution . No additional state has seen fit to ratify it since 1937, leaving it in a peculiar constitutional limbo. Interest in this particular legal mechanism for controlling child labor largely waned following the landmark passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . This comprehensive legislation effectively established robust federal regulation of child labor , and, crucially, received the Supreme Court’s stamp of approval in 1941, effectively rendering the amendment’s original purpose somewhat redundant, at least for a time.

The amendment itself later found its way back into the Supreme Court’s docket, becoming the central subject of the 1939 decision in Coleman v. Miller (307 U.S. 433). This case addressed the rather pressing question of whether a proposed amendment, once submitted, could simply expire if not ratified within a certain timeframe. The Court, in its infinite wisdom (or perhaps just practicality), ruled that since Congress had neglected to impose a time limit for the CLA’s ratification, it was, technically, still viable and pending before the states. Consequently, it requires ratification by an additional 10 states to finally come into force and join the esteemed ranks of the other amendments. In a testament to the enduring, if often forgotten, nature of these constitutional specters, lawmakers in a handful of states have, in recent years, introduced resolutions to ratify the amendment, perhaps hoping to awaken this sleeping giant.

Text

The proposed text of the Child Labor Amendment is remarkably concise, a stark contrast to the sprawling debates and legal intricacies it provoked:

Section 1. The Congress shall have the power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.

Section 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by this article except that the operation of State laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress.

Background

See also: Child labor laws in the United States

The early 20th century, a period often romanticized, was in reality a grim landscape for many American children. Industrialization had ushered in an era where countless minors toiled in factories, mines, and fields, often under hazardous conditions for meager wages. Public outcry against these exploitative practices grew, leading to legislative attempts at reform.

One such attempt was the Keating–Owen Act of 1916. In a quintessential move of federal overreach, or perhaps simply a desperate attempt to address a pervasive national problem, Congress tried to use its power over interstate commerce to regulate the employment of minors. The Act prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced in factories that employed children under 14, or children 14-16 who worked more than eight hours a day, six days a week, or at night. For mines, the age limit was 16. It was, one might say, a rather direct approach, and predictably, the Supreme Court was not amused.

In 1918, the Court delivered a decisive blow to this federal initiative with its ruling in Hammer v. Dagenhart . The majority opinion, citing the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states, declared that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce did not extend to regulating production within states. The Court argued that child labor was a local issue, falling under the states’ police powers, and the federal government’s attempt to regulate it was an unconstitutional intrusion. It was a classic federalism clash, with children’s welfare caught in the crossfire.

Undeterred by this rather unambiguous rebuff, Congress, in a display of legislative tenacity, tried a different tactic. Later that year, it attempted to levy a tax on businesses that employed children under the ages of 14 or 16 (again, the specific age depended on the type of work). This, too, was met with the Supreme Court’s disapproval in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922). The Court, ever vigilant against what it perceived as disguised federal power grabs, ruled that this “tax” was actually a penalty, an attempt to regulate child labor through taxation rather than to genuinely raise revenue. It was, in their view, an infringement on states’ rights, making it clear that Congress could not achieve indirectly what it was forbidden to do directly.

After these two resounding judicial rejections, it became painfully apparent to proponents of child labor reform that simply tinkering with existing constitutional powers wouldn’t suffice. If the federal government was to effectively legislate on child labor, a direct amendment to the Constitution would be absolutely necessary to circumvent the Court’s objections and the entrenched interpretations of states’ rights. One might charitably call it a learning curve, or, less charitably, a slow realization of the obvious.

Legislative history

The journey of the Child Labor Amendment began in the halls of the 68th Congress . The amendment was formally introduced by Ohio Republican Congressman Israel Moore Foster on April 26, 1924. It took the form of House Joint Resolution No. 184, a rather unassuming title for a measure that aimed to fundamentally alter the balance of power between federal and state governments regarding the welfare of minors.

The legislative path, while not without its debates, proved relatively swift within Congress itself. House Joint Resolution No. 184 was successfully adopted by the House of Representatives on April 26, 1924. The vote count stood at 297 yeas to 69 nays, with 2 members absent and 64 not voting. This indicated a substantial, though not unanimous, consensus within the House that a constitutional amendment was the appropriate, or perhaps only remaining, course of action. Following its passage in the House, the resolution proceeded to the Senate . There, on June 2, 1924, it was also adopted, with a vote of 61 yeas to 23 nays and 12 not voting.

With both chambers of Congress having approved the proposed amendment, House Joint Resolution No. 184 was then, as per the established constitutional process, submitted to the individual state legislatures for their consideration and potential ratification. This submission was made pursuant to Article V of the Constitution , which outlines the precise, and often arduous, method for amending the nation’s supreme law. The ball, having rolled through Washington, was now in the states’ courts, setting the stage for decades of political and social maneuvering.

Ratification history

The ratification process for constitutional amendments is, by design, a slow and deliberate affair, a legislative marathon rather than a sprint. The Child Labor Amendment, having cleared Congress, embarked on this journey, facing immediate headwinds in some states and a more welcoming reception in others.

Ratification status of the Child Labor Amendment

  • Β Β Ratified the amendment
  • Β Β Rejected the amendment

The Child Labor Amendment as passed by Congress

Upon its approval by Congress, the proposed amendment was dispatched to the state legislatures for their consideration. Over the subsequent years, particularly during the 1920s and a renewed push in the 1930s, a total of 28 states formally ratified the amendment. This initial wave of support, though significant, was ultimately insufficient to reach the constitutionally mandated three-fourths threshold.

The states that ratified the amendment, along with their respective dates of approval, are as follows:

  • Arkansas – June 28, 1924
  • California – January 8, 1925
  • Arizona – January 29, 1925
  • Wisconsin – February 25, 1925
  • Montana – February 11, 1927
  • Colorado – April 28, 1931
  • Oregon – January 31, 1933
  • Washington – February 3, 1933
  • North Dakota – March 4, 1933 (Notably, this was after an initial rejection by the State Senate on January 28, 1925, illustrating the shifting political landscape.)
  • Ohio – March 22, 1933
  • Michigan – May 10, 1933
  • New Hampshire – May 17, 1933 (This also followed an earlier rejection on March 18, 1925.)
  • New Jersey – June 12, 1933
  • Illinois – June 30, 1933
  • Oklahoma – July 5, 1933
  • Iowa – December 5, 1933 (After an initial rejection by the State House on March 11, 1925.)
  • West Virginia – December 12, 1933
  • Minnesota – December 14, 1933 (Following a prior rejection on April 14, 1925.)
  • Maine – December 16, 1933 (Another state that reversed an earlier rejection from April 10, 1925.)
  • Pennsylvania – December 21, 1933 (This ratification came after a rejection on April 16, 1925.)
  • Wyoming – January 31, 1935
  • Utah – February 5, 1935 (After an initial rejection on February 4, 1925.)
  • Idaho – February 7, 1935 (Following a State House rejection on February 7, 1925.)
  • Indiana – February 8, 1935 (This state saw multiple rejections before ratification: State Senate on February 5, 1925, and State House on March 5, 1925.)
  • Kentucky – January 13, 1937 (After an earlier rejection on March 24, 1926.)
  • Nevada – January 29, 1937
  • New Mexico – February 12, 1937 (Following a rejection in 1935.)
  • Kansas – February 25, 1937 (After an initial rejection on January 30, 1925.)

During the 1920s and 1930s, the following fifteen state legislatures explicitly rejected the Child Labor Amendment and did not subsequently reverse their positions or ratify it. While the act of “rejecting” a proposed constitutional amendment carries no formal legal weight – states are only recognized for ratification or inaction – these rejections certainly held significant political ramifications, signaling strong opposition at the time.

  • Connecticut – February 11, 1925 (Both State Senate and State House rejected it on February 5, 1925, and February 11, 1925, respectively.)
  • Delaware – 1925 (Both chambers rejected it on January 28, 1925.)
  • Florida – 1925 (State Senate rejected it on April 15, 1925, and State House on April 29, 1925.)
  • Georgia – August 6, 1924
  • Louisiana – Rejected in 1924, 1934, and again in 1936, demonstrating persistent opposition.
  • Maryland – March 18, 1927
  • Massachusetts – Uniquely, this state saw the amendment rejected by voters in a referendum on November 4, 1924, highlighting a direct democratic opposition.
  • Missouri – 1925 (State Senate rejected it on March 20, 1925, and State House on March 3, 1925.)
  • North Carolina – August 23, 1924
  • South Carolina – 1925 (State Senate rejected it on January 27, 1925, and State House on January 21, 1925.)
  • South Dakota – Rejected in 1925, 1933, and 1937, indicating sustained resistance.
  • Tennessee – 1925
  • Texas – 1925 (State Senate rejected it on January 26, 1925, and State House on January 27, 1925.)
  • Vermont – 1925
  • Virginia – 1926

Of the 48 states that comprised the Union during the initial push for the CLA’s ratification in the 1920s and 1930s, two states, Alabama and Rhode Island , have no official record of taking any action whatsoever on the amendment. This inaction, in its own way, is a form of non-ratification. Meanwhile, some legislative chambers within other states did vote to ratify, even if the full state legislature did not complete the process: Nebraska ’s Senate voted to ratify in 1929 (though Nebraska’s legislature would not become unicameral until 1937); Mississippi ’s Senate voted to ratify in 1934; and New York ’s Senate voted to ratify in 1937. More recently, in 2024, the Connecticut House of Representatives voted to ratify the CLA, rekindling interest. Furthermore, with the admission of Alaska and Hawaii as states in 1959, the potential pool of ratifying states expanded. The Hawaii Senate voted to ratify the CLA in both 2021 and 2022, demonstrating a contemporary interest in this century-old proposal.

Renewed ratification attempts and expressions of support

Despite its venerable age and the shifting legal landscape, the Child Labor Amendment has seen a surprising resurgence of interest in recent years. This renewed attention reflects ongoing concerns about the adequacy of existing child labor protections, particularly as some states have moved to loosen their own regulations.

In 2021 and again in 2022, a concurrent resolution aimed at ratifying the Child Labor Amendment successfully passed in the Hawaii Senate with notable bipartisan support. However, its journey halted in the Hawaii House of Representatives , where it ultimately stalled, preventing Hawaii from becoming the 29th ratifying state. Similarly, in 2024, a resolution to ratify the amendment gained traction and passed in the Connecticut House of Representatives , but it was not brought to a vote in the Connecticut Senate , leaving the effort incomplete.

Beyond these near-misses, several other states have seen legislative efforts to revive the CLA. Since 2018, ratification resolutions have been introduced in the New York State Legislature , the Rhode Island General Assembly , the Nebraska Legislature , and the Maryland House of Delegates . In a different vein, the Minnesota Legislature introduced a resolution specifically reaffirming its state’s original ratification from 1933, underscoring the enduring validity of past actions.

A particularly interesting development occurred in 2024 when the New Hampshire House of Representatives adopted a unicameral House Resolution. This resolution, passed without action from the New Hampshire Senate , served to reaffirm the state’s support for the 1933 ratification of the Child Labor Amendment by the full New Hampshire General Court (the official name of New Hampshire’s legislature). This unicameral resolution was formally recorded as received by the United States Senate on November 14, 2024, as noted in the Congressional Record of that date, and was subsequently referred to the Senate’s Committee on the Judiciary for further consideration. Such procedural nuances highlight the long memory of the constitutional amendment process.

Proponents of ratification, including legal scholars like University of San Diego School of Law professor Jessica Heldman and journalists such as Los Angeles Times columnist Michael Hiltzik , argue that the amendment, despite the existence of current federal laws, could significantly bolster existing protections against child labor. Their arguments are often framed against a backdrop of recent trends where some states have, perhaps with a peculiar sense of historical amnesia, begun to weaken their own child labor laws. The CLA, they contend, would provide a robust constitutional floor, making it more difficult for states to erode these safeguards. Nebraska State Senator Carol Blood , who championed a resolution to ratify the amendment in her state, articulated this sentiment, suggesting ratification would not introduce novel law but rather affirm “what is already in law,” serving as a symbolic statement that Nebraska “missed an opportunity to do better” in the past. In Connecticut , the ratification resolution garnered strong backing from the state’s AFL-CIO chapter and various other labor union leaders, underscoring the enduring relevance of the issue to organized labor. The amendment also enjoys the explicit support of the Child Labor Coalition , a national advocacy group.

Presently, with 50 states now comprising the Union, the Child Labor Amendment remains inoperative. For it to finally take effect and become part of the supreme law of the land, it would necessitate ratification by the legislatures of an additional 10 states, bringing the total to 38, which is the necessary threshold of approval by three-fourths of the state legislatures. It’s a long shot, certainly, but in the realm of constitutional amendments, ’never’ is a word best used sparingly.

Judicial history

The initial slow pace of ratification for the Child Labor Amendment, with only five states adopting it in the 1920s, created a peculiar legal quandary. However, the subsequent decade, fueled by the Great Depression and a renewed sense of social urgency, saw a significant shift. Ten of the states that had initially hesitated or outright rejected the amendment re-examined their positions, ultimately deciding to ratify it during the 1930s. This delayed, sometimes decades-long, deliberation by states brought forth a critical constitutional question: could a proposed amendment, once submitted to the states, simply expire if not ratified within a “reasonable” timeframe?

This very question formed the crux of the 1939 Supreme Court case Coleman v. Miller (307 U.S. 433). The Court, in its ruling, determined that the Child Labor Amendment remained pending before the state legislatures indefinitely because the 68th Congress , in proposing it, had failed to specify any deadline for its ratification. This decision was pivotal, not just for the CLA, but for the broader understanding of the amendment process. It established the precedent that if Congress does not set a time limit, an amendment can theoretically remain open for ratification forever. This ruling, in fact, became the foundational basis for the extraordinary and highly belated ratification of the 27th Amendment . That amendment, originally proposed by Congress in 1789, was finally ratified more than two centuries later, in 1992, by the legislatures of at least three-fourths of the then-50 states, a testament to the enduring legal life granted by Coleman v. Miller.

However, while the CLA remained legally viable, its practical urgency began to dissipate. The legal and political landscape surrounding federal child labor regulation underwent a profound transformation in the 1930s. The prevailing judicial opinion, which had previously hamstrung federal efforts, began to shift significantly. This change culminated in the passage of the landmark Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938. This comprehensive federal statute directly regulated the employment of individuals under 16 or 18 years of age, setting minimum wages, maximum hours, and prohibiting oppressive child labor.

Crucially, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act in United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941). This ruling was a watershed moment, as it explicitly overturned Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) – one of the very key decisions that had initially motivated the proponents of the Child Labor Amendment to seek a constitutional fix. With Darby Lumber Co., the Court effectively reversed its earlier stance, acknowledging Congress’s broad power under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce, which included the power to prohibit the shipment of goods produced under substandard labor conditions.

After this dramatic shift in judicial interpretation, the Child Labor Amendment, though technically still pending, was widely described as “moot.” Its original purpose had been largely fulfilled by the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Supreme Court’s newfound willingness to uphold such federal legislation. Consequently, the momentum that had once propelled the amendment forward evaporated, and the movement for its full ratification has, for the most part, advanced no further.

Should the required number of U.S. state legislatures ever ratify it, the Child Labor Amendment would confer upon the Congress of the United States a specific, explicit power to legislate on the subject of child labor . This power would exist concurrently with, and potentially supersede, similar authority held by the individual states, creating a shared jurisdiction. It would, in essence, enshrine a federal role in preventing child exploitation directly in the nation’s supreme law, irrespective of future shifts in judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause.

Opposition

Even during its initial proposal, the Child Labor Amendment faced significant opposition, reflecting a complex tapestry of concerns ranging from states’ rights to religious and social anxieties. Opponents often viewed the amendment as an unwarranted expansion of federal power and a threat to traditional family structures.

A prominent voice against the CLA in the 1930s was J. Gresham Machen , a towering figure in Evangelical Fundamentalism and conservative politics of the era. Machen, known for his staunch defense of traditional values and his critique of modernizing trends, articulated his concerns in a paper titled “Mountains and Why We Love Them,” delivered before a group of ministers in Philadelphia on November 27, 1933. Within his broader discussion, Machen paused to rhetorically question the implications of the proposed amendment. He famously asked, “Will the so-called ‘Child Labor Amendment’ and other similar measures be adopted, to the destruction of all the decencies and privacies of the home?”

Machen’s argument encapsulated a significant strain of opposition. For many, the idea of the federal government dictating labor conditions for individuals under eighteen was not merely an economic or constitutional issue, but a profound infringement on parental authority and the sanctity of the family unit. The fear was that granting Congress such broad power would open the door to federal intrusion into the intimate sphere of the home, undermining the discretion of parents to decide how their children contributed to family income or received their upbringing. This perspective viewed child labor, when managed by parents, as a legitimate component of family life and economic survival, rather than an inherent evil to be eradicated by distant federal mandates. Critics also argued that such an amendment would centralize power in Washington, stripping states and local communities of their ability to address unique economic and social conditions. The debate, therefore, was not simply about protecting children, but about the very definition of federalism and the limits of governmental authority over private life.

See also