Consociationalism

Ah, Consociationalism. The delicate art of convincing warring factions to at least pretend to play nice. It’s a concept, a structure, a desperate attempt to keep deeply divided societies from imploding. Frankly, it sounds exhausting. But then again, so does breathing.

Consociationalism

Consociationalism, a rather grand term for a form of power sharing, is essentially a system where deeply fractured societies—be it along ethnic, religious, or linguistic fault lines—manage to remain stable. How? By the sheer, unadulterated effort of consultation among the elites of these disparate groups. It’s a political strategy, if you can call it that, for keeping the lid on a boiling pot. These states, unlike those with more straightforward majoritarian electoral systems, operate on a principle of careful, often grudging, agreement.

The stated objectives are as noble as they are precarious: governmental stability, the continuation of these power-sharing arrangements, the very survival of democracy, and, most importantly, the avoidance of outright violence. When the divisions are primarily religious, as is the case in Lebanon, the system is often referred to as confessionalism. It’s a fascinating, albeit fragile, equilibrium.

Now, some draw parallels between consociationalism and corporatism. They see them as kindred spirits, both aiming to manage societal forces. But there's a subtle, yet crucial, distinction. Corporatism, in its economic guise, was often designed to mediate class conflict, to smooth over the rough edges between labor and capital. Consociationalism, on the other hand, emerged from the necessity of reconciling deep-seated societal rifts, those fissures carved by ethnicity and religion. It’s less about economic classes and more about the fundamental identities that define groups.

A concept known as concurrent majority can sometimes serve as a precursor, a hint of what consociationalism might become. But don’t confuse it with consensus democracy, like that found in Switzerland. While consensus democracy aims for broad agreement across the entire electorate, consociational democracy operates on a consensus among representatives, each wielding a minority veto. It’s a subtle difference, but one that speaks volumes about who holds the ultimate power. The application of consociationalism, especially in the complex tapestry of democratic systems, has been met with significant criticism, particularly concerning its efficacy in genuine power-sharing.

Origins

The very notion of consociation, this idea of intergroup cooperation, can be traced back, surprisingly, to the 17th century and the New England Confederation. Here, self-governing Congregational churches from various colonial townships in the Massachusetts Bay Colony engaged in a form of interassociation and cooperation, their influence extending into the civil legislature and magistracy. This was debated, quite extensively, at the Boston Synod of 1662, a period when the Episcopalian Act of Uniformity 1662 was being imposed in England.

The term itself, however, gained academic traction thanks to the political scientist Arend Lijphart. Though, to his credit, Lijphart was quick to point out that he hadn't invented the wheel; he had merely recognized what practical politicians had been doing for years, often independently and without academic fanfare. His theoretical framework was largely derived from his observations of the Netherlands, a nation that had, over time, developed a remarkable capacity for political accommodation. Lijphart posited that this approach could be generalized as a strategy for managing ethnic conflict.

The Netherlands, indeed, served as a prime example of a consociational state. From 1857 to 1967, it was structured around four distinct, non-territorial pillars: the Calvinist, the Catholic, the socialist, and the general. While the electoral system until 1917 was a rather straightforward plurality ("first past the post") electoral system, it was the proportional representation that followed which truly solidified the consociational structure. During their zenith, these pillars were tightly knit entities, each with its own schools, universities, hospitals, and newspapers, creating a social structure that, from an outsider's perspective, might appear almost Balkanised. Lijphart's theory, in essence, hinges on the pivotal role of social elites—their ability to agree and cooperate—as the bedrock of a stable democracy. Building on this foundation, scholars like John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary trace the practical application of consociationalism back to 1917 in the Netherlands, while Gerhard Lehmbruch suggests that "precursors" of the concept could be found as far back as the 1555 Peace of Augsburg.

State-building

While Lijphart's initial foray into consociationalism was rooted in the study of established Western democracies, its application has dramatically expanded in recent decades, particularly in the complex and often volatile realm of post-conflict state-building. This shift has broadened the scope of what are considered "favourable conditions," extending beyond internal dynamics to encompass external influences. Many of these recent manifestations of consociationalism have not sprung organically from the soil of a nation but have been facilitated, or even imposed, by international actors. In the crucible of deeply divided societies, consociational arrangements have frequently been employed as a means to quell immediate violence and forge fragile peace settlements.

The very instability of the environments where these arrangements are implemented often necessitates external intervention, not just for their inception but for their continued survival. Consequently, a variety of international bodies have stepped in, acting as mediators and supporters, striving to uphold power-sharing agreements. Bosnia-Herzegovina stands as a prominent example, where an "international regulating body," in the form of a High Representative, has at times wielded significant power, intervening directly in domestic politics to enact legislation when domestic elites proved incapable of reaching an agreement.

The outcomes of these consociational projects in post-conflict settings have been, at best, mixed. Yet, proponents like O'Leary and McGarry argue that they often represent the most pragmatic path toward ending immediate conflict and establishing the foundational stability required for genuine peace-building. Its perceived strengths lie in its capacity for transformation, its inherent flexibility, and its "realist" acknowledgment of existing, often entrenched, identity formations—identities that can be exceedingly difficult to accommodate within a purely majoritarian framework.

Characteristics

Lijphart, in his seminal work, outlined four core characteristics that define consociational democracies:

Name	Explanation
Grand coalition	The elites from each distinct societal group (pillar) come together to govern, ostensibly for the common good, driven by a mutual recognition of the perils of non-cooperation.
Mutual veto	No single group can unilaterally impose its will. Consensus among the constituent groups is required for decisions, particularly on matters affecting their core interests. This mutual veto power prevents outright domination.
Proportionality	Representation and allocation of resources or positions are meticulously calibrated to reflect the demographic makeup of society. If a group constitutes 30% of the population, it should hold approximately 30% of key positions.
Segmental autonomy	Each distinct community is granted a degree of self-governance over its internal affairs, allowing for the preservation of its unique cultural laws and traditions, fostering a sense of individuality within the larger state structure.

Beyond these core characteristics, consociational policies often manifest in specific institutional arrangements:

Coalition cabinets: Executive power is shared, often broadly, among multiple parties, moving away from the concentration of power typical of single-party majorities. These cabinets can be "oversized," including parties not strictly necessary for a parliamentary majority, further ensuring broad representation.
Balance of power: A careful equilibrium is maintained between the executive and legislative branches, preventing either from becoming overly dominant.
Decentralization and federalism: Power is often devolved to regional or sub-national levels, granting significant autonomy to minorities and allowing them to manage their own affairs.
Incongruent bicameralism: A two-chamber legislature is structured in such a way that it is exceedingly difficult for any single party to secure a majority in both houses, thus promoting broader consensus-building. Typically, one chamber represents regional interests, while the other focuses on national concerns.
Proportional representation: Electoral systems are designed to ensure that even smaller minorities can gain representation, preventing their marginalization.
Organized interest groups: Formal, often corporatist-style, interest groups are established to represent the voices and interests of various minorities.
Rigid constitution: The fundamental law of the land is difficult to amend, requiring the consent of minorities to prevent unilateral changes by the majority.
Judicial review: An independent judiciary provides a mechanism for minorities to challenge laws they deem unjust or discriminatory.
Elements of direct democracy: Mechanisms like referendums or popular initiatives may be incorporated, allowing minorities to either enact or block legislation, though often with specific safeguards.
Proportional employment: The public sector is expected to reflect the diverse ethnic and social composition of the population.
Neutral head of state: This role is often filled by a monarch with purely ceremonial duties or an indirectly elected president who renounces party affiliation upon taking office, symbolizing unity above partisan division.
Referendums: Used cautiously, often as a tool for minorities to block legislation, requiring citizen initiatives and potentially foregoing compulsory voting to ensure genuine, rather than coerced, consent.
Ministerial equality: In the cabinet, the prime minister is typically considered primus inter pares – first among equals – rather than an all-powerful executive.
Independent central bank: Monetary policy is entrusted to experts rather than directly to politicians, aiming for stability and insulation from short-term political pressures.

Favourable conditions

Lijphart, in his exploration of consociationalism, identified several "favourable conditions" that contribute to its success. Over time, these conditions have been refined and debated. Michael Kerr summarized some of the most prominent factors identified by Lijphart:

Segmental isolation: A degree of physical or social separation between the different ethnic or religious communities.
Multiple balance of power: Power is distributed among several groups, preventing any single group from achieving dominance.
Common external threats: A shared external danger can foster a sense of solidarity and common purpose among internal groups.
Overarching loyalties: A sense of allegiance to the state that transcends group identities.
Tradition of elite accommodation: A history of leaders successfully negotiating and compromising.
Socioeconomic equality: Relative parity in economic standing among the groups, reducing potential grievances.
Small population size: A smaller population can reduce the complexity of policy-making and governance.
Moderate multi-party system: A party system that includes distinct segmental parties but avoids extreme fragmentation.

Lijphart himself cautioned that these conditions are neither absolute requirements nor guarantees of success. Rinus van Schendelen observed that this flexibility leads to a situation where "the conditions may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short conditions or no conditions at all." John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary emphasized three critical conditions for establishing democratic consociational power-sharing: elites must be motivated to regulate conflict; they must lead societies that are sufficiently deferential to their leadership; and there must be a stable balance of power among subcultures. Michael Kerr further added the importance of "positive external regulating pressures," suggesting that incentives from external actors can be crucial for internal elites to embrace consociationalism.

Arguments in favor

The primary argument in favor of consociationalism is its pragmatic approach to deeply divided societies. It asserts that, in contexts where ethnic, religious, or linguistic cleavages are profound, attempts at forced integration are less likely to succeed than systems that acknowledge and accommodate these divisions. By ensuring that all groups, including minorities, have a voice and representation in both the political and economic spheres, consociationalism offers a more realistic pathway to conflict management and stability.

Criticisms

Despite its theoretical appeal, consociationalism has faced substantial criticism, particularly regarding its application in state-building efforts. A recurring concern is that it may inadvertently institutionalize and even deepen existing societal divisions, rather than resolve them. Its frequent reliance on external support for survival has led some to characterize these arrangements as inherently unstable and dependent. Furthermore, while it may provide a temporary cessation of hostilities, critics argue that it often freezes conflicts rather than resolving them, merely papering over the cracks.

The necessity of external oversight in many consociational projects has been decried as an invasive practice. A significant worry is the potential erosion of accountability, where governing elites become more answerable to their international facilitators than to their own populations, fostering a climate of clientele politics. These dynamics, critics contend, can actively hinder the resolution of the very divisions that consociationalism is intended to address. The paradoxical outcome, in some cases, has been the creation or perpetuation of "fragile states," the very condition state-building aims to prevent.

Brian Barry

Brian Barry launched a pointed critique, questioning the very nature of the divisions Lijphart identified in his "classic cases" of consociational democracies. Barry argued that in places like Switzerland, political parties often transcended societal cleavages, fostering a sense of consensus rather than entrenched conflict. He posited that in the Netherlands, the drive for consociationalism stemmed less from genuine societal division and more from a certain Dutch inclination to care about the spiritual well-being of their neighbors. He contrasted this with societies like Northern Ireland, where religious differences were perceived as more intrinsically divisive, lacking the same level of mutual concern for eternal salvation. Barry concluded that in the Dutch context, consociationalism appeared almost tautological, and its applicability to other deeply divided societies was far from assured.

Rinus van Schendelen

Rinus van Schendelen echoed some of Barry's skepticism, suggesting that Lijphart's evidence was selective. He argued that the pillarisation in the Netherlands was already weakening by the 1950s, with increasing cross-denominational cooperation and dissolving political sub-cultures. Van Schendelen contended that Dutch elites were driven more by self-interest than by a genuine desire for societal harmony, forming coalitions to enhance their parties' power rather than to foster inter-segmental negotiation. He further questioned whether the Netherlands, or any supposed consociational state, could truly be considered a democracy, suggesting a definitional conflict. He also pointed out significant methodological flaws in Lijphart's identification of cleavages and their segmental nature.

Lustick on hegemonic control

Ian Lustick argued that the academic focus on consociationalism was partly a result of a lack of alternative theoretical frameworks for explaining stability in deeply divided societies. He accused Lijphart of employing an "impressionistic" methodology, flexible coding rules, and a "rhetorically seductive commitment" to consociationalism, leading to its misapplication in cases where it didn't truly fit. Lustick also critiqued Lijphart's definition of "accommodation," which he felt oversimplified the process by assuming leaders were inherently committed to finding settlements.

Horowitz and centripetal criticism of consociationalism

Donald L. Horowitz argued that consociationalism's focus on emphasizing diverging identities, such as ethnicity, actually entrenches these divisions rather than integrating them. He believed that the reliance on rival co-operation was inherently unstable and that consociationalism neglected inter-state relations. Horowitz posited that the very act of forming multi-ethnic coalitions could exacerbate intra-ethnic competition, a phenomenon he termed "flanking." Dawn Brancati's research on federalism and territorial autonomy, often elements of consociationalism, supports this, suggesting that such designs can strengthen ethnic divisions if they empower regional parties. James Anderson agreed, citing Northern Ireland as an example where consociational power-sharing around diverging identities reinforced those divisions. However, Anderson conceded the difficulty in simply dismissing these identities, especially when group rights are at stake. As an alternative, Horowitz proposed centripetalism, a model aimed at depoliticizing ethnicity and encouraging multi-ethnic parties.

Other criticisms

In 2022, Yascha Mounk argued that the empirical evidence supporting consociationalism had weakened considerably. He suggested that while it might offer short-term peace, it was ultimately a temporary solution that risked exacerbating tensions in the long run.

Critics also point out that consociationalism can be problematic in systems with deeply antagonistic ideologies, such as conservatism and communism. They argue that specific conditions are required for multi-group systems to function, and that the elite-dominated nature of consociationalism can leave the masses with less to lose in the event of conflict. Its applicability is questioned, with critics citing its failure in Lebanon, where the post-war consociational arrangement was allegedly exploited by elites, and its limited success outside of countries like Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The potential for a majority group to gain disproportionate power is also a concern.

The assumption that each group is cohesive and possesses strong leadership is also challenged. While minority vetoes exist, achieving 100% agreement is often impossible. Critics argue that group rights can lead to the over-representation of some individuals and the under-representation of others. The dynamics of ethnic competition can make grand coalitions unlikely, as each group prioritizes its own power. Furthermore, consociationalism is criticized for overemphasizing institutional design at the expense of addressing transitional issues. Finally, it is claimed that consociational institutions can inadvertently promote sectarianism and solidify existing identities.

Examples

Numerous countries have, at various points, operated or attempted to operate on a consociational basis. These include Belgium, Italy, Cyprus (specifically from 1960–1963), the First Czechoslovak Republic, Israel (in a de facto sense), Lebanon, the Netherlands (during the period 1917–1967), Northern Ireland, and Switzerland (though its consultation often transcends purely ethnic or religious lines, focusing more on ideological divides). Some scholars have even suggested that the European Union exhibits characteristics of a consociational democracy due to its emphasis on cross-ideological consultation.

Several peace agreements have also been built upon consociational principles:

The Dayton Agreement, which brought an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995), is frequently cited as a "classic example of consociational settlement" by scholars like Sumantra Bose and an "ideal-typical consociational democracy" by Roberto Belloni.
The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 in Northern Ireland, further solidified by the [2006's St Andrews Agreement], is described by Brendan O'Leary as "power-sharing plus."
The Ohrid Agreement in 2001 established the constitutional framework for power-sharing in North Macedonia.

The political system of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was also described as consociational, though it notably lacked explicit ethnic quotas. The debate around the Arab–Israeli conflict has seen proposals for a one-state solution based on consociational democracy in Israel, though this remains a less popular and rarely seriously discussed option in peace negotiations.

During the 1980s, South Africa's government attempted to reform apartheid by introducing elements of consociational democracy. The South African Constitution of 1983 implemented Lijphart's ideas through a Tricameral Parliament. Later, during the 1990s negotiations to end apartheid, the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party proposed a consociational settlement. However, the African National Congress advocated for a majoritarian democracy model. The National Party eventually abandoned the consociational approach after the U.S. Department of State signaled its preference for the majoritarian model in 1992.