The German spring offensive. A desperate gamble, a final, ragged breath exhaled onto the Western Front of the First World War. They called it Kaiserschlacht, the "Kaiser's Battle," or the Ludendorff offensive, after the man whose ambition, or perhaps desperation, fueled it. It began on March 21, 1918, a date etched in the mud and blood of northern France and western Belgium. The objective? To shatter the Allied lines before the Americans, those fresh-faced reinforcements from across the Atlantic, could fully commit their weight. The German Empire, sensing a fleeting advantage, a window of opportunity cracked open by Russia's collapse and its subsequent withdrawal from the war via the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, threw everything they had into the fray.
This wasn't a single, decisive blow, but a series of four distinct, yet interconnected, offensives. Codenamed Michael, Georgette, Gneisenau, and Blücher-Yorck, they were designed to bleed the Allies dry, to splinter their resolve, and to secure a victory that had eluded them for years. Michael, the main thrust, aimed to cleave through the Allied front, sever the British from the French, and push the British Army back towards the English Channel. The hope was that the defeated British would then force France to seek an armistice. The other operations, subsidiary but no less brutal, were intended to draw Allied reserves away, to stretch their defenses thin, and to create openings for the main effort. The target? It seemed to shift like sand, a testament to the chaotic, often desperate, nature of the planning. No clear strategic objective, just a relentless push, a hope that something would break.
The advance, when it came, was a terrifying spectacle. But the momentum, once gained, proved as slippery as oil on water. Logistics, the unglamorous skeleton of any military endeavor, began to creak and groan. The elite stormtrooper units, designed for rapid penetration, could only carry so much. Ammunition, food, even basic medical supplies – the army's supply lines, stretched taut, began to snap. Meanwhile, the Allies, with a grim, weary resilience, concentrated their forces where it mattered most: the approaches to the Channel ports, the vital rail junction at Amiens. Ground that had been churned into a desolate wasteland by years of fighting was left lightly defended, a calculated risk. Within weeks, the immediate danger of a complete German breakthrough had receded, though the fighting, a brutal, attritional grind, would continue its relentless march until July.
The German armies did achieve remarkable territorial gains, the deepest since 1914. They clawed back land lost in the brutal campaigns of 1916 and 1917, and even seized territory previously untouched. Yet, the cost was staggering. Heavy casualties, particularly among their most experienced troops, were exchanged for ground that offered little strategic advantage and proved devilishly hard to hold. Some historians, questioning the sanity of such a gamble, have labeled it a Pyrrhic victory. By July, the balance of power had shifted. The arrival of American troops, a steady, inexorable tide, restored the Allied numerical advantage. This, coupled with refined tactics, would soon lead to a devastating counteroffensive – the Hundred Days Offensive – which would shatter the Hindenburg Line and ultimately force Germany to capitulate in November.
German Preparations
Strategy
The German High Command, particularly General Erich Ludendorff, the influential Chief Quartermaster General at Oberste Heeresleitung, has faced considerable criticism from military historians for its failure to articulate a coherent and viable strategy. Ludendorff himself privately acknowledged that a protracted war of attrition was no longer winnable for Germany. Yet, he remained unwilling to relinquish the territorial gains made in the west and east, becoming a significant impediment to any potential peace settlement with the Western Allies.
Despite lingering uncertainty about the full impact of the American entry into the war in April 1917, Ludendorff resolved to launch an offensive. A pivotal meeting of the German army chiefs on the Western Front on November 11, 1917, cemented this decision. Notably, the German government and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, who held the nominal position of Chief of the General Staff, were not directly involved in the initial planning stages. The chosen course of action was Operation Michael, slated to commence near Saint-Quentin, strategically positioned at the hinge between the French and British armies. The offensive would then drive north towards Arras. The primary rationale behind this selection was tactical convenience. The terrain in this sector was expected to dry out more quickly after the winter and spring rains, facilitating troop movement. Furthermore, it represented a line of least resistance, with the British and French forces in this area considered weaker.
The ultimate aim was not necessarily to reach the English Channel coast, but rather to rupture the Allied defenses, outflank the British forces from the south, and compel them to retreat towards the Channel ports or face destruction if they chose to stand their ground. Subsequent operations, such as Operation Georgette and Operation Mars, were conceived to strike further north, targeting remaining Allied ports in Belgium and France, thereby diverting Allied attention and resources away from the main offensive. However, these were unequivocally secondary and less potent undertakings, subordinate to the overarching objective of Operation Michael.
The continuous alteration of operational targets once the offensive was in full swing created the unsettling impression of a German command lacking a unified strategic vision. The capture of critical objectives, such as the Channel ports or the crucial railway hub of Amiens, seemed more a matter of fortunate circumstance than deliberate planning.
Changes in Tactics
The German army had meticulously concentrated its most capable soldiers into specialized stormtrooper units. These elite formations were rigorously trained in infiltration tactics, designed to penetrate and bypass enemy front-line positions, leaving strongpoints to be dealt with by follow-up units. The stormtroopers' primary mission was to disrupt enemy command and communication centers, artillery positions, and supply depots in the rear areas, while simultaneously achieving rapid territorial gains. Each major formation "skimmed" its best and most physically fit soldiers to form these elite units; indeed, several complete divisions were constituted entirely from these troops. While this approach granted the German army an initial advantage in offensive operations, it also meant that these premier formations would sustain disproportionately heavy casualties. Concurrently, the quality of the remaining formations deteriorated as they were depleted of their best personnel to bolster the stormtrooper ranks. A significant tactical oversight was the failure to equip their forces with a mobile exploitation force, such as cavalry, capable of rapidly capitalizing on battlefield gains. This deficiency meant that the advancing infantry had to maintain an exhausting pace, often without adequate support. Despite the effectiveness of the stormtroopers themselves, the subsequent waves of German infantry frequently advanced in traditional, large formations, resulting in substantial losses.
To facilitate the initial breakthrough, Lieutenant Colonel Georg Bruchmüller, a distinguished German artillery officer, perfected the Feuerwalze (literally: rolling fire, rolling barrage). This tactic employed an effective and resource-efficient creeping barrage system, executed in three distinct phases: first, a brief, intense bombardment targeting the enemy's command and communication infrastructure (headquarters, telephone exchanges, etc.); second, the systematic destruction of their artillery emplacements; and finally, a concentrated assault on the enemy's front-line infantry defenses. The bombardment was deliberately kept short to maximize the element of surprise. Bruchmüller's innovative tactics were made possible by the substantial number of heavy artillery pieces – and the corresponding abundance of ammunition – that Germany possessed by 1918.
Allied Preparations
Defensive Tactics
In response to the evolving nature of warfare, the Allies had developed defensive strategies emphasizing depth. This involved reducing the number of troops stationed in the front line and repositioning reserves and supply depots beyond the range of German artillery. This strategic shift was a direct consequence of observing the successful implementation of defense-in-depth tactics by the Germans in 1917.
The theoretical model for these defenses comprised an "outpost zone" (later redesignated the "forward zone"), lightly manned by snipers, reconnaissance patrols, and machine-gun nests. Behind this lay the "battle zone," situated beyond the reach of German field artillery, where the offensive was intended to be firmly resisted. Furthest back was the "rear zone," designed to hold reserves ready for counter-attacks or to seal off any enemy penetrations, and located beyond the range of all but the heaviest German guns. In principle, a British infantry division, comprising nine infantry battalions, would deploy three battalions in the outpost zone, four in the battle zone, and the remaining two in the rear zone.
However, this defensive system had not been fully implemented across all Allied sectors. Notably, in the area held by the British Fifth Army, which had recently been transferred from French command, the defenses were incomplete. Insufficient troops were available to maintain the intended depth of the defensive line. The rear zone existed merely as outlined markings on maps, and the battle zone consisted of isolated battalion "redoubts" that were not mutually supporting, creating vulnerabilities that stormtroopers could exploit to penetrate between them.
Operation Michael
On March 21, 1918, the German forces unleashed a massive offensive targeting the British Fifth Army and the right flank of the British Third Army.
The artillery bombardment commenced at 4:40 AM on March 21st. It swept across an area of 150 square miles, unleashing over 1,100,000 shells in a mere five hours, representing the most intense barrage of the entire war.
A German A7V tank observed near Roye in March 1918.
The German formations involved, from north to south, were the Seventeenth Army under General Otto von Below, the Second Army led by General Georg von der Marwitz, and the Eighteenth Army commanded by General Oskar von Hutier. A supporting corps (Gruppe Gayl) from the Seventh Army bolstered Hutier's assault. Despite the Allies possessing some intelligence regarding the approximate timing and location of the offensive, the sheer ferocity of the attack and the preceding bombardment proved a devastating surprise. The German advance was further aided by a thick morning fog, which allowed the leading stormtrooper units to penetrate deep into the British lines undetected.
By the close of the first day, the British had sustained approximately 7,512 fatalities and 10,000 wounded. Crucially, the Germans had achieved significant breakthroughs at multiple points along the front of the British Fifth Army. After just two days, the Fifth Army found itself in a full-scale retreat. As they withdrew, numerous isolated "redoubts" were surrounded and overcome by the advancing German infantry. The right flank of the Third Army became separated from the retreating Fifth Army and was also forced to withdraw to avoid being outflanked.
Ludendorff's execution of the stormtrooper tactics deviated from the established doctrine. His strategic shortcomings were starkly illustrated by a remark made to Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, commander of one of his Army Groups: "We chop a hole. The rest follows." Ludendorff's central dilemma lay in the fact that the most strategically vital sectors of the Allied line were also the most heavily defended. Much of the German advance occurred in areas of lesser strategic importance. Consequently, Ludendorff repeatedly committed his forces to costly assaults against heavily entrenched British positions. On March 28, at Arras, he launched a hastily conceived attack (Operation Mars) against the left wing of the British Third Army, aiming to widen the breach. However, in this sector, the British defenses were robust, well-prepared, and fully manned. Some of the initial German bombardment fell on empty positions, and the absence of fog denied cover to the attacking stormtroopers. After a single day, the Germans had made only marginal gains at the cost of severe casualties. Operation Mars was promptly abandoned.
The German breakthrough occurred just north of the boundary separating the French and British armies. General Philippe Pétain, the French commander-in-chief, was perceived by his British counterpart, Field Marshal Douglas Haig, and the British government, to have deployed reinforcements to the sector too slowly. However, historian Elizabeth Greenhalgh disputes this, arguing that Pétain dispatched the six additional divisions more rapidly than agreed upon with Haig – in two days instead of the planned four – and arranged for further divisions on multiple occasions (twelve on March 23 and thirteen on March 25/26) before Haig formally requested them. In response to the crisis, the Allies appointed French General Ferdinand Foch to coordinate all Allied activities in France, and he was subsequently elevated to the position of commander-in-chief of all Allied forces.
The success of Operation Michael led to German infantry advancing too far, outstripping their supply bases and railheads. The stormtrooper units, prioritizing speed, carried only a few days' worth of supplies to avoid encumbrance, relying on rapid resupply from the rear. This advance was consequently slowed by critical supply shortages, which afforded Allied commanders precious time to reinforce threatened areas and further impede the German momentum. German logistical challenges were exacerbated by the direction of the advance, which crossed the devastated terrain of the Battle of the Somme in 1916 and the area affected by Operation Alberich, the German strategic withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line during February and March 1917.
German soldiers are depicted passing through a captured British trench.
After several days, the German advance began to falter. The infantry grew exhausted, and the task of moving artillery and supplies forward to sustain the assault became increasingly arduous. Fresh British and Australian formations were deployed to the crucial rail center of Amiens, and the Allied defense began to solidify. Following futile attempts to capture Amiens, Ludendorff called off Operation Michael on April 5. By the standards of the era, a substantial territorial advance had been achieved. However, its strategic value was questionable; it represented a Pyrrhic victory in terms of the casualties inflicted upon elite German troops, as the vital objectives of Amiens and Arras remained firmly in Allied hands. The newly acquired territory would prove difficult to defend against subsequent Allied counter-offensives.
The Allies suffered heavy losses, with nearly 255,000 British, British Empire, and French soldiers killed or wounded. They also lost 1,300 artillery pieces and 200 tanks – losses that could be replaced through Allied industrial capacity or American manpower. German troop losses amounted to 239,000 men, a significant proportion of whom were highly trained shock troops (Stoßtruppen), whose specialized skills were irreplaceable. In terms of morale, the initial German elation at the offensive's promising start soon dissolved into disappointment as it became evident that a decisive victory had not been achieved.
Georgette
A British Lewis gun team positioned on the bank of the Lys canal during the Battle of Hazebrouck on April 15, 1918. German prisoners are being guarded by Australian troops on April 23, 1918.
Operation Michael had succeeded in drawing significant British forces to defend Amiens, inadvertently leaving the crucial rail route through Hazebrouck and the approaches to the Channel ports of Calais, Boulogne-sur-Mer, and Dunkirk vulnerable. A German success in this sector could have been catastrophic, potentially forcing the British to sue for peace.
The offensive commenced on April 9, preceded by a devastating creeping barrage. The main assault was directed at an open and relatively flat sector defended by the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps. Having endured a full year in the trenches, the Portuguese forces were fatigued and had already sustained considerable losses. They were in the process of being relieved by fresh British divisions, a complex operation scheduled to conclude on April 9, the very day the German attack was launched. The relief in place was poorly managed by the command of the British First Army. The Portuguese 1st Division had been withdrawn to the rear on April 6, leaving the Portuguese 2nd Division to defend the entire sector alone. This division was tasked with holding an extensive 7-mile (11 km) front, notably lacking any natural defensive obstacles.
Severely impacted by the bombardment and subjected to the assault of eight German divisions, the Portuguese 2nd Division mounted a desperate defense, attempting to hold their positions. However, their lines were rapidly enveloped and overwhelmed by the sheer mass of German forces. The 2nd Division was virtually annihilated, suffering over 7,000 casualties. The British 40th Division, positioned on the northern flank of the Portuguese, also collapsed rapidly under the German onslaught, creating a gap that further facilitated the envelopment of the Portuguese forces. In contrast, the British 55th Division, situated on the southern flank of the Portuguese and facing less intense German pressure, benefited from strong defensive positions protected by the La Bassée Canal, allowing them to largely maintain their lines throughout the battle.
The following day, the Germans expanded their offensive northward, compelling the defenders of Armentières to withdraw to avoid encirclement. They also captured a significant portion of Messines Ridge. By the end of the day, the few British divisions held in reserve were struggling to maintain a cohesive defensive line along the River Lys.
In the absence of French reinforcements, there was a genuine fear that the Germans could advance the remaining 15 miles (24 km) to the ports within a week. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the British Expeditionary Force, issued a stirring "Order of the Day" on April 11, declaring: "With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end."
However, the German offensive eventually stalled due to persistent logistical problems and the exposure of their flanks. Determined counterattacks by British, French, and Anzac forces succeeded in slowing and ultimately halting the German advance. Ludendorff terminated Operation Georgette on April 29.
Similar to Operation Michael, the casualties were roughly balanced, with approximately 110,000 men wounded or killed on each side. Again, the strategic outcomes proved disappointing for the Germans. Hazebrouck remained under Allied control, and the Germans found themselves occupying a vulnerable salient, exposed to fire from three sides. The British strategically abandoned the relatively unimportant territory they had captured at great cost the previous year around Ypres, freeing up several divisions to reinforce the front against the German attackers.
Blücher–Yorck
French and British troops are seen marching back through Passy-sur-Marne on May 29, 1918.
• Main article: Third Battle of the Aisne
While Operation Georgette was grinding to a halt, a new attack was planned against French positions. The objective was to draw Allied forces further away from the Channel, thereby enabling renewed German progress in the north. The overarching strategic goal remained the severance of the British and French armies, aiming for a decisive victory before the substantial American forces could fully deploy their strength onto the battlefield. Initially, American troops were deployed in the relatively quiet Saint-Mihiel sector in Lorraine, where they experienced their first significant engagement defending Seicheprey on April 20. Following the British successful defense against the Michael offensive on the Somme, the US 1st Division was transferred to reinforce the line in that sector in mid-April and subsequently launched its first offensive action of the war at Cantigny on May 28, 1918.
The German attack commenced on May 27, situated between Soissons and Reims. This sector was partially defended by four depleted British divisions that were "resting" after their strenuous efforts earlier in the year. In this particular sector, the defensive preparations had not emphasized depth, largely due to the perceived obstinacy of the commander of the French Sixth Army, General Denis Auguste Duchêne. Consequently, the German creeping barrage proved exceptionally effective, and the Allied front line, with a few notable exceptions, collapsed rapidly. Duchêne's decision to mass his troops in the forward trenches also meant a lack of local reserves to delay the Germans once the front had been breached. Despite determined French and British resistance on the flanks, German troops advanced to the Marne River, and the capture of Paris appeared to be a tangible possibility. A palpable sense of urgency permeated Paris, which had been subjected to shelling from German long-range guns since March 21. Many citizens fled the city, and the government began formulating plans for an evacuation to Bordeaux.
Once again, the casualties were remarkably similar on both sides: approximately 127,000 Allied and 130,000 German casualties by June 6. The German losses, as before, primarily came from the difficult-to-replace assault divisions.
Gneisenau
Although Ludendorff had initially intended Blücher-Yorck to serve as a prelude to a decisive offensive (codenamed Hagen) aimed at defeating the British forces further north, he made a critical error by reinforcing mere tactical successes. He shifted reserves from Flanders to the Aisne, a move that contrasted sharply with the decisions of Foch and Haig, who did not overcommit their reserves to the Aisne sector. Ludendorff sought to expand the Blücher-Yorck salient westward through Operation Gneisenau, with the intention of drawing even more Allied reserves southward, widening the German salient, and linking it with the existing German salient at Amiens.
The French had received advance warning of this impending attack (known as the Battle of Matz, or in French: Bataille du Matz) through intelligence gathered from German prisoners. Their implementation of defense in depth significantly mitigated the impact of the artillery bombardment on June 9. Nevertheless, the German advance, involving 21 divisions attacking across a 23-mile (37 km) front along the Matz River, was indeed impressive, resulting in a gain of 9 miles (14 km) despite fierce French and American resistance. At Compiègne, however, a sudden French counter-attack on June 11, executed by four divisions and 150 tanks (under the command of General [Charles Mangin]), without any preliminary bombardment, caught the Germans by surprise and effectively halted their advance. Operation Gneisenau was consequently called off the following day.
The estimated casualties were approximately 35,000 Allied and 30,000 German soldiers.
Last German Attack (Marneschutz-Reims/Friedensturm)
• Main article: Second Battle of the Marne
Ludendorff, now compelled to postpone Hagen, launched the German Seventh, First, and Third Armies in the Friedensturm (Peace Offensive) on July 15. This represented a renewed attempt to draw Allied reserves southward from Flanders and to expand the salient created by Blücher-Yorck eastwards. An attack launched east of Reims was decisively thwarted by the French defense in depth. In numerous sectors, the Germans, having lost the element of surprise due to their fuel-deprived air force ceding air superiority to the Allies, advanced no further than the French Forward Zone. Critically, they failed to breach the French Battle (Second) Zone at any point.
Although German troops positioned southwest of Reims succeeded in crossing the River Marne, the French launched a significant counter-offensive on the western flank of the salient on July 18, posing a direct threat of cutting off the German forces within the salient. Ludendorff was forced to evacuate the majority of the Blücher-Yorck salient by August 7, and Hagen was definitively canceled. The strategic initiative had unequivocally passed to the Allies, who were poised to commence the Hundred Days Offensive, the campaign that would ultimately bring the war to an end.
Aftermath
The Kaiser is depicted on his way through a communication trench on April 4, 1918.
Analysis
The Kaiserschlacht offensives had undeniably yielded substantial territorial gains for the Germans, measured by the standards of the First World War. However, the ultimate objective of victory remained elusive, and the German armies were left severely depleted, exhausted, and in exposed positions. The territorial gains manifested as deep salients, which significantly lengthened the defensive lines that would need to be maintained once Allied reinforcements tipped the balance of power and restored the initiative to the Allies. In the span of six months, the strength of the German army had dwindled from 5.1 million combat personnel to 4.2 million. By July, the German numerical superiority on the Western Front had shrunk to a mere 207 divisions against 203 Allied divisions, a negligible advantage that was destined to be reversed as more American troops arrived. German manpower reserves were critically depleted. The German High Command estimated a monthly requirement of 200,000 men to compensate for ongoing losses. While returning convalescents could theoretically supply 70,000–80,000 men per month, only 300,000 recruits were available from the next cohort of eighteen-year-olds. Compounding these issues, Germany lost a significant number of its most highly trained soldiers; the stormtrooper tactics, by design, placed these elite troops at the forefront of the assaults. Furthermore, approximately one million German soldiers remained engaged on the Eastern Front until the war's conclusion.
The Allies, though severely wounded, had not been broken. The deficiency in a unified high command was partly addressed by appointing General Foch as supreme commander, leading to improved coordination in subsequent Allied operations. For the first time, American troops were deployed as independent formations, demonstrating their growing capacity.
Ironically, the initial success of the offensive may have inadvertently hastened Germany's defeat by undermining troop morale. The German leadership had consistently assured their soldiers that food and supply shortages were comparable on both sides. However, upon penetrating Allied lines, German soldiers discovered firsthand that the Allies were, in fact, significantly better fed and supplied. This stark realization led many to conclude that their leadership had been deliberately misleading them, fostering a deep sense of disillusionment.
This article is about the World War I German offensive of 1918. For other uses, see Spring offensive (disambiguation).
German spring offensive Part of the Western Front of World War I
Date: 21 March – 18 July 1918
Location: Northern France; West Flanders, Belgium 50°00′10″N 02°39′10″E / 50.00278°N 2.65278°E
Result: See Aftermath Territorial changes: German armies make gains along sections of the Western Front.
Belligerents: German Empire • France • British Empire • United Kingdom • Australia • New Zealand • Canada • South Africa • Newfoundland • United States • Portugal • Italy • Belgium
Commanders and leaders: Paul von Hindenburg [a] Erich Ludendorff [b] Crown Prince Wilhelm [c] Max von Gallwitz [d] Rupprecht of Bavaria [e] Albrecht of Württemberg [f] Ferdinand Foch [g] Philippe Pétain [h] [Émile Fayolle](/ %C3%89mile_Fayolle) [i] Louis d'Esperey [j] Paul Maistre [k] Noël Castelnau [l] Douglas Haig [m] King Albert I [n]
Casualties and losses: 688,341 casualties [1] • 433,000 [2] • 418,374 [3] • 7,000 [4] • 5,000 [5] Total: 863,374 casualties
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v • t • e German spring offensive • Michael • Lys • Seicheprey • Third Aisne • Belleau Wood • Montdidier-Noyon • Third Morlancourt • Hamel • Second Marne
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Associated articles: • 1914 Christmas truce • French Army mutinies • Western Front tactics, 1917
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