HGM-25A Titan I - Sarcasm Wiki

Contents

1. Overview
2. Etymology
3. Cultural Impact

The Martin Marietta SM-68A/HGM-25A Titan I, a name that echoes with the cold, hard ambition of a bygone era, was the United States’ inaugural foray into the realm of multistage intercontinental ballistic missiles . It served from 1959 to 1962, a fleeting but consequential period. Though its operational lifespan was a mere three years, the Titan I’s legacy is etched in the lineage of subsequent models that became integral to the U.S. arsenal and its burgeoning space launch capabilities. What set the Titan I apart from its successors was its reliance on liquid oxygen and RP-1 as propellants, a contrast to the more stable, storable propellants favored in later iterations.

Born from a contingency plan, the Titan I was conceived as a safeguard should the U.S. Air Force’s SM-65 Atlas missile development falter. Ultimately, the Atlas would precede Titan into service, but the Titan’s deployment was deemed necessary to rapidly bolster the number of alert missiles. Its missile silo basing offered a distinct advantage in survivability over the Atlas’s more exposed configuration. The lineage continued with the LGM-25C Titan II , a missile that maintained the U.S. nuclear deterrent until 1987, boasting enhanced capacity and range, though it adopted different propellants.

History

By January 1955, a significant miniaturization of nuclear weapons had occurred, making the prospect of fitting a deliverable bomb onto a reasonably sized missile a tangible reality. The genesis of the Titan I program can be traced back to the recommendations of the Scientific Advisory Committee . This committee presented a compelling case to the United States Air Force (USAF) regarding the technical feasibility of developing both the nuclear weapons and the intercontinental-range ballistic missiles necessary to deliver them, all while remaining invulnerable to a “surprise” attack.

The reduced size of nuclear warheads opened up the entire Sino-Soviet landmass as a potential target set, and missile guidance capabilities were simultaneously being upgraded. The Titan I was designed for fully independent controlled flight, from the moment of launch until the ballistic release of its warhead, which would then descend to its target under the sole influence of gravity and atmospheric resistance. In May 1955, the Air Materiel Command solicited proposals and bids from contractors for the two-stage Titan I ICBM, formally initiating the program. By September 1955, The Martin Company emerged as the chosen contractor for the Titan missile. Work commenced in early October under the purview of the Air Force’s Western Development Division. The Titan’s development proceeded in parallel with the Atlas (SM-65/HGM-16) ICBM program, acting as a crucial backup and simultaneously serving as a competitive spur for the Atlas contractor to accelerate its efforts. Martin’s selection was attributed to its proposed organizational structure and its innovative approach to igniting a liquid-fueled engine at high altitudes.

Initially designated as a bomber aircraft (B-68), the Titan I later received the designation SM-68 Titan and, in 1962, was redesignated HGM-25A.

Program Management

The Air Force’s prior strategic missile programs had largely adhered to the “single prime contractor concept,” a methodology later recognized as the weapon system concept. This approach had resulted in a series of rather dismal outcomes, with the programs for the Snark , Navaho , and RASCAL missiles experiencing delays averaging five years and cost overruns exceeding 300 percent. In response to these failures, the Teapot Committee was tasked with evaluating the requirements for ballistic missiles and devising strategies to expedite their development. Following their recommendations, the USAF established the Western Development Division, placing Brigadier General Bernard Schriever in command. Schriever then implemented a novel organizational framework for program management. The Air Force itself assumed the role of “prime contractor,” while the Ramo-Woolridge Corporation was contracted to provide systems engineering and technical direction for all ballistic missiles. The airframe contractor was then responsible for assembling the sub-systems supplied by other Air Force contractors. This new organizational paradigm was, at the time, a subject of considerable controversy.

The Titan I represented a technological leap forward compared to the Atlas missile program, yet it inherited many of the Atlas’s inherent challenges. The liquid oxygen oxidizer, being cryogenic, could not be stored for extended periods. This necessitated a pre-launch procedure where the missile had to be extracted from its silo and loaded with oxidizer, significantly increasing the response time. The primary advancements of the Titan I over the initial Atlas deployments included its vertical storage within a fully underground silo and an improved, fully internal inertial guidance system. Later variants of the Atlas E/F would eventually incorporate what was originally intended for the Titan I’s guidance system. The Titan I, however, was deployed with the Bell Labs radio-inertial guidance system.

Budgetary Problems

By December 1956, the Titan, initially conceived as a fallback, had been embraced by some as a “principal ingredient of the national ballistic missile force.” Simultaneously, however, there were persistent calls for the cancellation of the Titan program from its inception, citing redundancy with the Atlas. Despite arguments asserting the Titan’s superior performance and greater potential for growth as both a missile and a space launch vehicle, the program remained under relentless budgetary pressure. In the summer of 1957, budget cuts imposed by Secretary of Defense Wilson reduced the planned Titan production rate from seven missiles per month to two, effectively relegating the Titan to a research and development role. Nevertheless, the Sputnik crisis , which commenced on October 5, 1957, effectively silenced any further discussions of cancellation. The program regained its priority, and 1958 witnessed increased funding and plans for additional Titan squadrons.

Flight Testing

The flight testing regimen for the Titan I was structured into three series: Series I, focusing on the first stage alone; the ultimately canceled Series II; and Series III, which involved the complete, two-stage missile.

A total of 62 flight test missiles were manufactured across various batches. The inaugural successful launch occurred on February 5, 1959, with Titan I A3, and the final test flight took place on January 29, 1962, with Titan I M7. Of the missiles produced, 49 were launched, with two experiencing catastrophic failures. These included six A-types (four launched), seven B-types (two launched), six C-types (five launched), ten G-types (seven launched), 22 J-types (22 launched), four V-types (four launched), and seven M-types (seven launched). The testing and launch operations were conducted in Florida at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station , utilizing Launch Complexes LC15 , LC16 , LC19 , and LC20 .

The four launches of the A-type missiles, equipped with dummy second stages, all took place in 1959, on February 6, February 25, April 3, and May 4. The guidance system and stage separation mechanisms performed commendably, and aerodynamic drag was found to be less than anticipated. Titan I achieved a significant milestone by being the first program to have a new missile succeed on its initial launch attempt. This early success, however, left launch crews somewhat unprepared for the series of failures that followed. Missile B-4 suffered an explosion due to a liquid oxygen (LOX) pump failure during a static firing test at Martin’s Denver test stand in May, followed by a string of other mishaps in the subsequent two months.

Missile B-5 was slated for launch from LC-19 as the first production Lot B missile, incorporating most of the Titan I systems but fitted with a dummy warhead. A planned launch on July 31 was aborted due to issues within the fuel system. At approximately noon on August 5, B-5 was launched. The missile ascended roughly ten feet before its engines shut down, causing it to fall back onto LC-19 in a spectacular fiery explosion. Post-flight analysis revealed that the hold-down bolts had released prematurely, allowing B-5 to lift off before full engine thrust had been achieved. A still-attached umbilical cable then transmitted a shutdown command to the engines. The launch pad, LC-19, sustained significant damage and remained out of service for six months.

Further complications plagued the program over the ensuing months. Missiles continued to be damaged due to what appeared to be careless personnel errors. General Osmond Ritland expressed his displeasure in a stern letter to Martin, deeming their handling of the Titan program “inexcusable.” However, Ritland’s disciplinary action had little immediate effect. On December 10, the first attempt was made to launch a Lot C missile, which represented a complete Titan I configuration with all systems operational and a detachable warhead. Missile C-3 was prepared for launch, but, echoing the incident with B-5, a premature shutdown command was issued due to a failure of an umbilical to detach. Fortunately, the missile had not yet been released from the launch pad. The umbilical was swiftly repaired, but any relief from avoiding a near-catastrophe was short-lived.

At 1:11 PM EST on December 12, Missile C-3 launched from LC-16. The engines ignited, but the missile almost immediately erupted into a fireball. The incident was quickly traced to the Range Safety destruct charges on the first stage inadvertently firing. Martin technicians had relocated the activator relay to an area susceptible to vibration during repair work on the missile, and testing confirmed that the shock from the firing of the pad hold-down bolts was sufficient to trigger the relay. The launch pad sustained less damage than LC-19 had from the B-5 incident, as C-3 had not actually lifted off, and it was repaired within two months.

On February 2, 1960, LC-19 returned to operational status with Missile B-7A, marking the first successful flight of a Titan equipped with a live upper stage. This was a composite missile, as B-7’s original upper stage had been damaged in an accident months earlier and was replaced by the upper stage from Missile B-6, whose first stage had been damaged in a separate incident. On February 5, LC-16 resumed operations by hosting Missile C-4. The second attempt for a Lot C Titan ended in failure at T+52 seconds when the guidance compartment collapsed, leading to the separation of the RVX-3 reentry vehicle. The missile pitched downwards, and the first stage LOX tank ruptured under aerodynamic loads, causing the stage to disintegrate. Following the destruction of the first stage, the second stage separated and initiated engine ignition, mistakenly sensing a normal staging event. Lacking attitude control, it began to tumble end-over-end and rapidly lost thrust. The stage plunged into the Atlantic Ocean approximately 30–40 miles downrange. Following the successful flight of Missile G-4 on February 24, Missile C-1’s second stage failed to ignite on March 8 due to a stuck valve that prevented the gas generator from starting. The final Lot C missile, C-6, flew successfully on April 28. The Lot G missiles incorporated several design improvements to address problems encountered during previous Titan launches. On July 1, the newly commissioned LC-20 hosted its inaugural launch when Missile J-2, an operational prototype, was flown. Unfortunately, a fractured hydraulic line caused the Titan’s engines to gimbal sharply to the left almost immediately after clearing the launch tower. The missile pitched over and proceeded on a nearly horizontal trajectory, prompting Range Safety to issue the destruct command at T+11 seconds. The burning remnants of the Titan impacted 300 meters from the pad in an immense fireball. The faulty plumbing responsible for the missile’s failure was recovered; it had slipped out of its sleeve, resulting in a loss of first stage hydraulic pressure. The sleeve had not been sufficiently tightened to secure the hydraulic line in place, and the pressure exerted upon it during liftoff was enough to dislodge it. Examination of other Titan missiles revealed similar defects in hydraulic lines, and the Missile J-2 incident triggered a comprehensive review of manufacturing processes and enhanced parts testing protocols.

The subsequent launch at the end of the month (Missile J-4) experienced a premature first stage shutdown, landing far short of its intended impact zone. The failure was attributed to a LOX valve closing prematurely, which led to the rupture of a propellant duct and thrust termination. Missile J-6, launched on October 24, set a record by flying 6100 miles. The J series saw minor modifications implemented to mitigate issues such as the second stage shutting down prematurely or failing to ignite.

The series of failures during 1959–60 led to accusations from the Air Force that Martin–Marietta was not treating the Titan project with the seriousness it deserved, given its status as a backup to the primary Atlas ICBM program. This perceived indifference and carelessness resulted in easily preventable failures, such as the relocation of Range Safety destruct system relays for Missile C-3 into a vibration-prone area.

Titan I missile emerges from its silo at Vandenberg Operational System Test Facility in 1960.

In December, Missile V-2 was undergoing a flight readiness test within a silo at Vandenberg Air Force Base , California . The plan involved loading the missile with propellant, raising it to the firing position, and then lowering it back into the silo. Unfortunately, the silo elevator collapsed, causing the Titan to fall back down and explode. The blast was so powerful that it ejected a service tower from within the silo, launching it some distance into the air before it crashed back down.

A total of 21 Titan I launches were conducted throughout 1961, with five of them ending in failure. On January 20, 1961, Missile AJ-10 was launched from LC-19 at CCAS. The flight concluded in failure when an improper disconnection of a pad umbilical resulted in an electrical short in the second stage. The Titan performed adequately through the first stage burn, but after second stage separation, the fuel valve to the gas generator failed to open, preventing engine ignition. Missiles AJ-12 and AJ-15, launched in March, were lost due to turbopump malfunctions. Missile M-1’s second stage lost thrust when its hydraulic pump failed. Missile SM-2 experienced an early first stage shutdown; although the second stage burn was successful, it had to continue until propellant depletion rather than a timed cutoff. The added stress of this extended operation apparently led to a failure of either the gas generator or the turbopump, as the vernier solo phase concluded prematurely. Missile M-6’s second stage failed to start due to an electrical relay malfunction that reset the ignition timer.

With attention increasingly shifting towards the development of the Titan II, only six Titan I flights occurred in 1962, one of which resulted in failure. Missile SM-4 (January 21) suffered an electrical short in the second stage hydraulic actuator, causing it to gimbal sharply to the left at T+98 seconds. Staging was executed successfully, but the second stage engine failed to ignite.

Twelve additional Titan I missiles were launched between 1963 and 1965, culminating with Missile SM-33 on March 5, 1965. The sole complete failure during this final series of flights occurred when Missile V-4 (May 1, 1963) experienced a stuck gas generator valve and a subsequent loss of engine thrust at liftoff. The Titan toppled over and exploded upon impact with the ground.

Although the Titan I’s initial development challenges were largely overcome by 1961, the missile was already being eclipsed not only by the Atlas but also by its own successor, the Titan II. The Titan II was a larger, more potent ICBM that utilized storable hypergolic propellants . The launch pads at Cape Canaveral were rapidly reconfigured to accommodate the new vehicle. Vandenberg Launch Complex 395 continued to be utilized for operational test launches. The final Titan I launch originated from the LC 395A silo A-2 in March 1965. Following a brief tenure as an operational ICBM, it was officially retired from service in 1965, subsequent to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara ’s decision to phase out all first-generation, cryogenically fueled missiles in favor of newer hypergolic and solid-fueled models. While decommissioned Atlas (and later Titan II) missiles were repurposed and utilized for space launches, the Titan I inventory was stored and subsequently scrapped.

Characteristics

The Glenn L. Martin Company (which rebranded as “The Martin Company” in 1957) produced the Titan I. This two-stage, liquid-fueled ballistic missile possessed an effective range of 6,101 nautical miles (11,300 km). The first stage generated 300,000 pounds (1,330 kN) of thrust, while the second stage produced 80,000 pounds (356 kN). The fact that the Titan I, much like the Atlas, utilized Rocket Propellant 1 (RP-1 ) and liquid oxygen (LOX ) as propellants meant that the oxidizer had to be loaded onto the missile immediately prior to launch, drawn from underground storage tanks. The missile was then elevated above ground using a massive elevator system, leaving it exposed for a period before launch. This system, combined with its relatively slow reaction time – approximately fifteen minutes for fueling, followed by the time required for elevation and launch of the first missile – presented significant operational challenges. Following the launch of the initial missile, subsequent launches could reportedly be conducted at intervals of 7½ minutes. The Titan I employed a radio-inertial command guidance system. The inertial guidance system initially intended for the missile was instead ultimately deployed in the Atlas E and F models. Less than a year later, the Air Force contemplated equipping the Titan I with an all-inertial guidance system, but this modification never materialized. (The Atlas series was envisioned as the first generation of American ICBMs, while the Titan II, as distinct from Titan I, was designated as the second generation to be deployed.) The Titan 1’s flight was controlled by an autopilot that received attitude information from a rate gyro assembly comprising three gyroscopes. During the initial minute or two of flight, a pitch programmer guided the missile onto the correct trajectory. From that point forward, the AN/GRW-5 guidance radar tracked a transmitter aboard the missile. The guidance radar transmitted missile position data to the AN/GSK-1 (Univac Athena) missile guidance computer located in the Launch Control Center. The guidance computer utilized this tracking data to generate instructions, which were then encoded and transmitted back to the missile via the guidance radar. The exchange of guidance input and output between the guidance radar and the guidance computer occurred ten times per second. Guidance commands were issued throughout the first stage burn, the second stage burn, and the vernier burn, ensuring the missile maintained its correct trajectory and terminating the vernier burn at the desired velocity. The final function of the guidance system was to verify the missile’s trajectory and pre-arm the warhead, which then separated from the second stage. In the event of a guidance system failure at one site, the guidance system at another site could be utilized to guide the missiles belonging to the affected site.

The Titan I holds the distinction of being the first true multi-stage (two or more stages) design. The Atlas missile, in contrast, ignited all three of its main rocket engines at launch (with two being jettisoned during flight), a design choice stemming from concerns about igniting rocket engines at high altitudes and maintaining combustion stability. Martin was selected as the contractor, in part, due to its recognition of the significant challenge posed by high-altitude engine starts for the second stage and its development of a viable solution. The Titan I’s second-stage engines were sufficiently reliable to be ignited at altitude, after separation from the first stage booster. The first stage, in addition to housing the heavy fuel tanks and engines, also contained the launch interface equipment and the launch pad thrust ring. Upon depletion of its propellant, the first stage separated, thereby reducing the overall mass of the vehicle. This ability of the Titan I to jettison mass prior to second stage ignition resulted in a considerably greater total range (and a greater range per unit of second-stage fuel) compared to the Atlas, even if the Atlas had carried a larger total fuel load. As the Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation was the sole manufacturer of large liquid propellant rocket engines, the Air Force Western Development Division opted to establish a second source for their production. Aerojet -General was selected to design and manufacture the engines for the Titan. Aerojet produced the LR87 -AJ-3 (booster) and LR91-AJ-3 (sustainer) engines. George P. Sutton noted that Aerojet’s most successful series of large liquid propellant rocket engines were those developed for the booster and sustainer stages of the Titan vehicle variants.

The warhead carried by the Titan I was an AVCO Mk 4 re-entry vehicle, housing a W38 thermonuclear warhead with a yield of 3.75 megatons. It was designed for either air burst or contact burst detonation. The Mk 4 RV also deployed penetration aids in the form of mylar balloons designed to mimic the radar signature of the Mk 4 RV.

Specifications

Liftoff thrust: 1,296 kN
Total mass: 105,142 kg
Core diameter: 3.1 m
Total length: 31.0 m
Development cost: $1,643,300,000 in 1960 dollars.
Flyaway cost: $1,500,000 each, in 1962 dollars.
Total production missiles built: 163 Titan 1s; 62 R&D Missiles – 49 launched & 101 Strategic Missiles (SMs) – 17 launched.
Total deployed strategic missiles: 54.
Titan base cost: $170,000,000 (equivalent to US$ 1.81 billion in 2024)

First Stage:

Gross mass: 76,203 kg
Empty mass: 4,000 kg
Thrust (vacuum): 1,467 kN
Specific impulse (vacuum): 290 s (2.84 kN·s/kg)
Specific impulse (sea level): 256 s (2.51 kN·s/kg)
Burn time: 138 s
Diameter: 3.1 m
Span: 3.1 m
Length: 16.0 m
Propellants: liquid oxygen (LOX), kerosene
Number of engines: two Aerojet LR87-3

Second Stage:

Gross mass: 28,939 kg
Empty mass: 1,725 kg
Thrust (vacuum): 356 kN
Specific impulse (vacuum): 308 s (3.02 kN·s/kg)
Specific impulse (sea level): 210 s (2.06 kN·s/kg)
Burn time: 225 s
Diameter: 2.3 m
Span: 2.3 m
Length: 9.8 m
Propellants: liquid oxygen (LOX), kerosene
Number of engines: one Aerojet LR91-3

Athena Guidance Computer

The UNIVAC Athena computer was instrumental in calculating the ground commands transmitted to the Titan missile as part of Western Electric’s missile guidance system. The Athena is recognized as the “first transistorized digital computer to be produced in numbers.” It comprised ten cabinets plus a console, occupying a floor space of 13.5 by 20 feet (4.1 by 6 m). Utilizing radar tracking of the missile, it computed Titan flight data to the necessary burn-out point to initiate a ballistic trajectory toward the designated target. The missile’s on-board attitude control system rolled the missile to maintain alignment between its antenna and the ground antenna. Computer commands were transmitted to the missile from a ground transmitter located “a quarter mile out” (400 m). Completed in 1957, the Athena weighed 21,000 pounds (11 short tons; 9.5 t).

The Athena computer employed a Harvard architecture design, featuring separate data and instruction memories, conceptualized by Seymour Cray at Sperry Rand Corporation . Its cost was approximately $1,800,000.

Associated components included:

AN/GSK-1 Computer Set Console (OA-2654)
Friden, Inc. terminal with paper tape equipment
At remote locations, a “massive motor-generator set with 440 volt 3 phase AC input [that] weighed over 2 tons”
Input from one of two large AN/GRW-5 Western Electric radars located in silos, each equipped with a “20 foot (6 m) tall antenna” that was raised prior to launch and locked onto the raised Titan’s “missileborne antenna.”

The “battleshort ” mode, colloquially known as “melt-before-fail,” prevented fail-safe circuits, such as fuses, from deactivating the machine, particularly during critical operations like a missile launch. The final launch guided by the Athena occurred in 1972 from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, aboard a Thor-Agena missile. This marked the conclusion of over 400 missile flights that utilized the Athena system.

Service History

The production of operational missiles commenced during the final phases of the flight test program. An operational specification SM-2 missile was launched from Vandenberg AFB LC-395-A3 on January 21, 1962, with the M7 missile representing the final development flight from Cape Canaveral’s LC-19 on January 29, 1962. A total of 59 XSM-68 Titan I missiles were manufactured across seven developmental lots. One hundred and one SM-68 Titan I missiles were produced to equip six squadrons, each comprising nine missiles, stationed across the western United States. Fifty-four missiles were housed in silos at any given time, with one spare missile on standby at each squadron, bringing the total in service to 60 at any one time.

Titan was initially planned for a “soft” site configuration of 1x10 (one control center with ten launchers). In mid-1958, a crucial decision was made: the American Bosh Arma all-inertial guidance system intended for Titan would be allocated to Atlas due to insufficient production capacity. Consequently, Titan would transition to radio-inertial guidance. This led to a strategic decision to deploy Titan squadrons in a “hardened” 3x3 configuration (three sites, each with one control center and three silos) to minimize the number of required guidance systems. (Radio-inertial guided Atlas D squadrons were similarly configured.)

While the Titan I’s two-stage design provided true intercontinental range and foreshadowed future multistage rocket technology, its propellants presented significant handling and safety challenges. The cryogenic liquid oxygen oxidizer necessitated loading onto the missile just prior to launch, requiring complex infrastructure for storage and transfer. In its relatively brief operational career, a total of six USAF squadrons were equipped with the Titan I missile. Each squadron was deployed in a 3x3 configuration, meaning each squadron controlled nine missiles distributed among three launch sites. The six operational units were spread across the western United States in five states: Colorado (housing two squadrons, both located east of Denver ), Idaho , California , Washington , and South Dakota . Each missile complex maintained three Titan I ICBM missiles in a state of readiness for launch.

Map Of HGM-25A Titan I Operational Squadrons

568th Strategic Missile Squadron : April 1961 – March 1965, stationed at Larson AFB , Washington
569th Strategic Missile Squadron : June 1961 – March 1965, stationed at Mountain Home AFB , Idaho
724th Strategic Missile Squadron : April 1961 – June 1965, stationed at Lowry AFB , Colorado
725th Strategic Missile Squadron : April 1961 – June 1965, stationed at Lowry AFB , Colorado
850th Strategic Missile Squadron : June 1960 – March 1965, stationed at Ellsworth AFB , South Dakota
851st Strategic Missile Squadron : February 1961 – March 1965, stationed at Beale AFB , California

Silos

Weapon System 107A-2 represented a comprehensive weapon system, encompassing all the necessary equipment and infrastructure for the Titan I strategic missile, including its bases. The Titan I was the first American ICBM designed for deployment in underground silos, providing USAF managers, contractors, and missile crews with invaluable experience in constructing and operating vast complexes that housed everything required for missile and crew functionality and survival. These complexes typically consisted of an entry portal, a control center, a powerhouse, a terminal room, two antenna silos for the ATHENA guidance radar antennas, and three launchers. Each launcher was comprised of three equipment terminals, three propellant terminals, and three missile silos, all interconnected by an extensive network of tunnels. Both antenna terminals and all three launchers were protected by double-door blast locks, engineered so that both doors could not be opened simultaneously. This design feature ensured that in the event of an explosion within a missile launcher or an attack on the site, only the exposed antenna and/or missile silo would be compromised.

The launch crew consisted of a missile combat crew commander, a missile launch officer (MLO), a guidance electronics officer (GEO), a ballistic missile analyst technician (BMAT), and two electrical power production technicians (EPPT). Additionally, there was a cook and two Air Police. During normal duty hours, the site complement included a site commander, site maintenance officer, site chief, job controller/expediter, tool crib operator, power house chief, three pad chiefs, three assistant pad chiefs, another cook, and additional air police. During maintenance operations, a cadre of electricians, plumbers, power production technicians, air conditioning technicians, and other specialists would be present.

These early complexes, while offering protection from nearby nuclear detonations, possessed certain inherent drawbacks. Firstly, the fueling process for the missiles took approximately 15 minutes. Subsequently, they had to be individually raised to the surface via elevators for launching and guidance, a process that slowed down their reaction time. Rapid launching was a critical factor in avoiding potential destruction by incoming enemy missiles. Despite Titan complexes being engineered to withstand the effects of nearby nuclear blasts, antennas and missiles that were elevated for launch and guidance were highly vulnerable to even relatively distant detonations. The missile sites within a squadron were dispersed, situated at least 17 miles (usually 20 to 30 miles) apart, to prevent a single nuclear weapon from neutralizing two sites. However, the sites had to remain close enough to allow a guidance system at one site to “hand over” control of its missiles to another site within the squadron if its own system failed.

The distance between the antenna silos and the furthest missile silo ranged from 1,000 to 1,300 feet (400 m). These facilities represented the most complex, extensive, and costly missile launch infrastructure ever deployed by the USAF. Launching a missile necessitated fueling it within its silo, followed by raising the launcher and missile assembly out of the silo on an elevator. Prior to each launch, the guidance radar, which underwent periodic calibration by acquiring a specially designated target at a precisely known range and bearing, had to lock onto a radio signal emitted from the missile (via missile guidance sets AN/DRW-18, AN/DRW-19, AN/DRW-20, AN/DRW-21, or AN/DRW-22). As the missile ascended, the guidance radar tracked its trajectory, supplying precise velocity, range, and azimuth data to the guidance computer. This computer then generated guidance corrections that were transmitted back to the missile. Due to these procedures, the complex could only launch and track one missile at a time, although another missile could be elevated while the first was undergoing guidance.

Retirement

With the deployment of the storable-fueled Titan II and the solid-fueled Minuteman I in 1963, the Titan I and Atlas missiles rapidly became obsolete. They were retired from service as ICBMs in early 1965.

The final launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) occurred on March 5, 1965. At that time, the disposition of the 101 total production missiles was as follows:

17 were test launched from VAFB (September 1961 – March 1965)
One was destroyed in an explosion in the Beale AFB Site 851-C1 silo on May 24, 1962
54 were deployed in silos as of January 20, 1965
29 were in storage at SBAMA (three at VAFB, one at each of five bases, one at Lowry, and 20 in storage at SBAMA elsewhere).

The 83 surplus missiles remained in inventory at Mira Loma AFS . It was not economically viable to refurbish them, as Atlas SM-65 missiles with comparable payload capacities had already been converted into satellite launchers. Approximately 33 were distributed to museums, parks, and schools as static displays (see list below). The remaining 50 missiles were scrapped at Mira Loma AFS near San Bernardino, California; the last was dismantled in 1972, in accordance with the SALT-I Treaty signed on February 1, 1972.

By November 1965, the Air Force Logistics Command determined that the cost of modifying the widely dispersed sites to support other ballistic missiles was prohibitive, leading to attempts to find alternative uses for them. By the spring of 1966, several potential uses and users had been identified. On May 6, 1966, the Air Force expressed interest in retaining five Titan sites, and the General Services Administration had earmarked one for potential repurposing. The USAF removed equipment that it deemed useful, and the remainder was offered to other government agencies. Ultimately, no sites were retained, and all were salvaged. The method employed was a Service and Salvage contract, which required the contractor to remove government-specified equipment before proceeding with scrapping operations. This accounts for the varying degrees of salvage observable at the sites today. Most are sealed, with one site in Colorado that is accessible but considered highly unsafe. One site is open for public tours.

The 26 ATHENA guidance computers, upon being declared surplus by the federal government, were distributed to various United States universities. The computer at Carnegie Mellon University was utilized for undergraduate projects until 1971, when former electrical engineering undergraduate students (the Athena Systems Development Group) facilitated its donation to the Smithsonian Institution . One remained in service at Vandenberg AFB until it guided a final Thor-Agena launch in May 1972, having guided over 400 missiles in its operational life.

On September 6, 1985, a scrapped Titan I Second Stage was employed in a Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as the “Star Wars” program) missile defense test. The MIRACL Near Infrared Laser, located at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, was fired at the stationary Titan I second stage, which was fixed to the ground. The second stage ruptured and was destroyed by the laser blast. The second stage had been pressurized with nitrogen gas to 60 psi and contained no fuel or oxidizer. A follow-up test conducted six days later involved a scrapped Thor IRBM, the remnants of which are now housed at the SLC-10 Museum at Vandenberg AFB.

Titan-I ICBM SM vehicles being destroyed at Mira Loma AFS for the SALT-1 Treaty
Titan-I ICBM SM vehicles being destroyed at Mira Loma AFS for the SALT-1 Treaty
Titan-I ICBM SM vehicles being destroyed at Mira Loma AFS for the SALT-1 Treaty

Static Displays and Artifacts

Of the 33 Titan I Strategic Missiles and two (plus five potential) Research and Development Missiles that were not launched, destroyed, or scrapped, several examples survive to this day:

B2 57-2691: Cape Canaveral Air Force Space & Missile Museum , Florida. Displayed horizontally.
R&D (57–2743): Colorado State Capitol display, 1959 (Serial number belongs to a Bomarc). Displayed vertically.
R&D G-type: Science and Technology Museum, Chicago, June 21, 1963. Displayed vertically.
SM-5 60-3650: Lompoc? Displayed horizontally.
SM-49 60-3694: Cordele, Georgia (west side of I-75 , exit 101 at U.S. Route 280 ). Displayed vertically.
SM-53 60-3698: Site 395-C Museum, Vandenberg AFB, Lompoc, Ca. (originally from March AFB). Displayed horizontally.
SM-54 60-3699: Strategic Air Command & Aerospace Museum , Ashland , Nebraska . Displayed vertically.
SM-61 60-3706: Gotte Park, Kimball, NE (only the first stage is standing; reportedly damaged by winds in ‘96). Displayed vertically (damaged by winds July 1994?).
SM-63 60-3708: In storage at Edwards AFB (status uncertain). Displayed horizontally.
SM-65 61-4492: NASA Ames Research Center , Mountain View, California. Displayed horizontally.
SM-67 61-4494: Titusville High School, Titusville, Florida (located on Route US-1). Removed; was displayed horizontally.
SM-69 61-4496: (Full missile) Discovery Park of America in Union City, Tennessee . Restored to correct external appearance and displayed vertically on the grounds. Its upper stage engine has also been restored and is on display.
SM-70 61-4497: Veterans Home, Quincy, IL. Displayed vertically (removed and sent to DMAFB for destruction in May 2010).
SM-71 61-4498: U.S. Air Force Museum , now AMARC (scheduled for transfer to PIMA Museum). Displayed horizontally.
SM-72 61-4499: Florence Regional Airport Air and Space Museum, Florence, South Carolina. Displayed horizontally.
SM-73 61-4500: Former Holiday Motor Lodge, San Bernardino (status uncertain, potentially missing?). Displayed horizontally.
SM-79 61-4506: Former Oklahoma State Fair Grounds, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Displayed horizontally during the 1960s.
SM-81 61-4508: Kansas Cosmosphere, Hutchinson, Kansas. In storage.
SM-69 61-4496: Located at Discovery Park of America in Union City, TN .
SM-86 61-4513: Beale AFB (not on display; was horizontal, removed 1994). Displayed horizontally.
SM-88 61-4515: (First stage only) Pima Air & Space Museum , outside DM AFB, Tucson, Arizona, now at WPAFB. Displayed horizontally.
SM-89 61-4516: (Second stage only) Pima Air Museum, outside DM AFB, Tucson, Arizona, now at WPAFB. Displayed horizontally.
SM-92 61-4519: (First stage only) Kansas Cosmosphere, Hutchinson, Kansas. (Acquired November 1993 from MCDD). Displayed vertically (first stage mated to the first stage of SM-94).
SM-93 61-4520: (Second stage only) SLC-10 Museum, Vandenberg AFB, Lompoc, Ca. Displayed horizontally.
SM-94 61-4521: (First stage only) Kansas Cosmosphere, Hutchinson, Kansas. (Acquired June 1993 from MCDD). Displayed vertically (first stage mated to the first stage of SM-92).
SM-96 61-4523: South Dakota Air and Space Museum , Ellsworth AFB, Rapid City, South Dakota. Displayed horizontally.
SM-101 61-4528: Estrella Warbirds Museum, Paso Robles, CA (second stage damaged). Displayed horizontally. Features an LR87 engine.
SM-??: (Second stage only) Former SDI laser test target (current whereabouts unknown).
SM-??: (First stage only) Former Spaceport USA Rocket Garden, Kennedy Space Center, Florida. Displayed vertically (first stage mated to the first stage below).
SM-??: (First stage only) Former Spaceport USA Rocket Garden, Kennedy Space Center, Florida. Displayed vertically (first stage mated to the first stage above).
SM-??: (First stage only) Science Museum, Bayamon, Puerto Rico. Displayed vertically (first stage mated to the first stage below).
SM-??: (First stage only) Science Museum, Bayamon, Puerto Rico (upper half from Bell’s Junkyard). Displayed vertically (first stage mated to the first stage above).
SM-??: (Full missile) Former location outside the main gate of White Sands Missile Range, N.M. (reportedly false; displayed vertically).
SM-??: (Full missile) Spacetec CCAFS. Displayed horizontally.

Note: Two stacked Titan-1 first stages were used to create a convincing replica of a Titan-2 Missile for museums mentioned above.

Prospective Manned Flights

The Titan I was seriously considered as the booster for the first mission to place a man into space. Two of the firms that responded to an Air Force “Request for Proposal” for “Project 7969,” an early USAF initiative titled “Put a Man in Space Soonest (MISS),” proposed utilizing the Titan I as their booster. These firms were Martin and Avco.