Hoa People

The Hoa people, a distinct ethnic minority within Vietnam, are primarily of Han Chinese descent. The term “Hoa” itself is a Vietnamese transliteration of the Chinese word “Huárén,” meaning “Chinese person.” Historically, this designation primarily refers to ethnic Chinese who migrated from the southern provinces of China to Vietnam, with significant waves occurring around the 18th century. However, the roots of Chinese migration to the region stretch back much further, spanning millennia. While it’s true that many Vietnamese individuals may have distant Chinese ancestry due to prolonged periods of Chinese rule over Vietnam , the Hoa are specifically identified by their sustained connection to Chinese language , culture , and a cohesive community structure. They maintain a strong link to their broader Han Chinese identity, differentiating them from those of Chinese descent who have fully assimilated into Vietnamese society.

Historically, the Hoa have been instrumental in shaping Vietnam’s commercial landscape. During the era of French Indochina , their renowned commercial acumen led colonial authorities to favor them, granting them considerable influence in the private sector. From the late 19th century until the early 1970s, the Hoa were the undisputed economic backbone of Vietnam’s private enterprise. It’s estimated that between 70 and 80 percent of the businesses in Saigon prior to its fall in 1975 were owned by Hoa individuals. Following the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the Communist Party of Vietnam implemented policies that led to the confiscation of many Hoa businesses and properties. Accusations of disloyalty and collaboration with foreign powers were leveled against members of the Hoa community, a situation that escalated dramatically during the prelude to and throughout the Sino-Vietnamese War . This period of intense persecution triggered a mass exodus, with many Hoa fleeing Vietnam as boat people .

Vietnam’s subsequent embrace of economic liberalization policies, beginning in 1987, provided the Hoa with an avenue to re-establish their presence in the business sector. While their economic influence may not be as pervasive as it was before 1975, the Hoa have demonstrated remarkable commercial resilience. They remain a significant and dynamic force within Vietnam’s increasingly diversified economy, which is now more open to international corporations and global competition. The Hoa continue to embody a distinct Chinese identity within Vietnam, actively preserving their cultural traditions and community structures, thereby maintaining a separate cultural space from those who have assimilated and now identify solely as Vietnamese.

Migration History

Early History

The earliest recorded migrations into what is now Vietnam, predating even the period of Chinese domination , are steeped in folklore. Legends speak of kingdoms like Văn Lang , governed by Lạc kings, who were served by officials known as Lạc hầu and Lạc tướng. Around 257 BCE, legend has it that Văn Lang was absorbed by the Âu Việt state, then known as Nam Cương. The Âu Việt people were situated in the southern reaches of the Zuo River basin, encompassing the You River and the upper tributaries of the Lô , Gâm , and Cầu Rivers, according to the historian Đào Duy Anh. The leader of the Âu Việt, Thục Phán , is credited with overthrowing the last of the Hùng kings, uniting the two kingdoms, and establishing the Âu Lạc polity, proclaiming himself King An Dương (An Dương Vương ).

The year 179 BCE marked a pivotal shift when the Âu Lạc Kingdom was annexed by Nanyue , initiating over a millennium of Chinese influence and control. Zhao Tuo, the ruler of Nanyue, integrated these regions into his domain, yet he largely retained the indigenous chieftains to govern the local populations. This was the inaugural instance where the region became part of a political entity headed by a Chinese sovereign. Zhao Tuo appointed two officials, or legates, to oversee the Âu Lạc lords: one in the Red River Delta , designated as Giao Chỉ, and another in the regions of the Mã and Cả River , known as Cửu Chân. It remains unclear whether the local inhabitants readily accepted these designations or were even aware of them. The primary interest of these legates appeared to be trade, with their influence seemingly confined to established outposts.

In 111 BCE, the Han dynasty successfully conquered Nanyue, ushering in an era of Chinese rule that would endure for several centuries. The Han administration reorganized Nanyue, dividing it into seven southern commanderies, three of which were situated within present-day Vietnam: Giao Chỉ and Cửu Chân, alongside a newly established commandery named Nhật Nam. Local Lạc lords, much like under Nanyue rule, acknowledged Han suzerainty in exchange for a degree of autonomy. They were granted “seals and ribbons” as symbols of their status, and in return, they were expected to pay “tribute to a suzerain,” which the Han officials interpreted as taxes. During the initial century of Han governance, Vietnam experienced a period of relatively lenient and indirect rule, with minimal immediate disruption to indigenous policies. Initially, local administration was maintained by indigenous Lạc Việt officials, but gradually, these were supplanted by newly settled Han Chinese administrators. In fact, indigenous ways of life and the ruling class did not undergo significant Sinitic impact until the first century CE. Han imperial bureaucrats generally pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence with the indigenous population, focusing their administrative efforts on the prefectural headquarters and garrisons, and ensuring the security of river routes essential for trade.

However, by the first century AD, the Han dynasty intensified its efforts to extract revenue from its Vietnamese territories. This involved raising taxes and implementing reforms concerning marriage and land inheritance, all aimed at transforming Vietnam into a more patriarchal society that would be more amenable to political authority. The native chiefs were compelled to pay heavy tributes and imperial taxes to the Han mandarins to sustain local administration and the military. The ancient Chinese vigorously pursued policies of assimilation, seeking to “civilize” the Vietnamese through forced sinicization or direct political domination. The Han dynasty viewed this as a “civilizing mission ,” considering the Vietnamese as uncultured and backward barbarians , while their own “Celestial Empire ” was perceived as the supreme center of the universe . This endeavor met with considerable success. Nevertheless, the imposition of a foreign administrative system and the process of sinicization were far from smooth, as evidenced by frequent uprisings and rebellions that demonstrated the Vietnamese resistance to these changes. Han immigration into Northern Vietnam was not overwhelming during this period, and population levels were not significantly affected until after the middle of the second century. While enough immigrants arrived to form a distinct Han-Viet ruling class, their numbers were insufficient to administratively or culturally dominate the indigenous society. In reality, it appears that “[imperial law was never successfully imposed over the Vietnamese, and that during the post-Han era of the Six Dynasties, enfeebled imperial courts were repeatedly forced to compromise their authority and recognize the local power system in Vietnam]”. Concurrently, Han colonial officials and settlers found themselves adopting local customs.

A prefect of Giao Chỉ, Shi Xie , who was a sixth-generation descendant of ancestors who had migrated to Northern Vietnam during the Wang Mang era, governed Vietnam as an autonomous warlord for forty years. He was later posthumously deified by Vietnamese monarchs. In the words of Stephen O’Harrow, Shi Xie was essentially “the first Vietnamese.” His rule provided “formal legitimacy” to those who identified with the local society’s interests rather than those of the Chinese empire. While the Chinese viewed Shi Xie as a “frontier guardian,” the Vietnamese considered him the leader of their regional ruling class. According to Taylor (1983), he was “the first of many such people to emerge as strong regional leaders who nurtured the local society in the context of Chinese civilization.”

A revolt against China was initiated by Ly Bon in the fifth century, whose ancestors were among the Chinese who had fled south to escape the turmoil of Wang Mang’s usurpation. The attempts to sinicize the Vietnamese ultimately failed. Instead, there was a greater degree of “Vietnamization” of Chinese individuals of Vietnamese ancestry than the assimilation of the Vietnamese into Chinese culture during the first six centuries of Chinese rule. The Chinese of Vietnamese ancestry became integrated, while still maintaining their Chinese identity, and were absorbed into the “social, economic and political environment” of Northern Vietnam. The insights, skills, customs, and ideas introduced by the Chinese enabled the native population to develop a distinct identity, which in turn lowered the probability of their assimilation into Chinese culture and reduced the impact of Chinese intrusion. The strength of localization in ancient Vietnam has thus been widely acknowledged. The policy of assimilation was consistently enforced throughout the thousand years of Chinese rule in Vietnam until the Ngô dynasty , when the Vietnamese regained their independence from China. The Vietnamese rulers deported approximately 87,000 Chinese nationals, although a smaller minority chose to apply for permanent residency in Vietnam. Those Chinese who opted to remain in Vietnam ultimately assimilated. The Vietnamese population intermarried with the Chinese peasantry, who later formed the gentry of Vietnam.

After Independence

Sporadic Chinese migration into Vietnam continued between the 9th and 15th centuries AD. During the Lý and Trần dynasties, the Vietnamese court welcomed ethnic Chinese scholars and officials to fill its administrative and bureaucratic positions, but these migrants were required to renounce their Chinese identity and assimilate into Vietnamese society. The Vietnamese court also offered refuge to Chinese individuals fleeing unrest, including civilian and military officials with their families. However, these Chinese settlers were not permitted to change their place of residence without the court’s approval and were also obligated to adopt Vietnamese dress and customs. During the Early Lê dynasty , some Chinese were captured in 995 following Vietnamese raids across the border. Under the Lý dynasty , Vietnam conducted raids into Song dynasty China, capturing Chinese individuals who were then forced into service in the Vietnamese army as soldiers. In 1050, the Cham dedicated some of these Chinese slaves to their goddess Lady Po Nagar at the Po Nagar temple complex , alongside slaves from Thailand, Cambodia, and Burma. Professor Kenneth Hall has speculated that these slaves were war captives taken by the Cham from the port of Panduranga after they had conquered it and enslaved all its inhabitants, including any foreigners residing there. In the South, the Daoyi Zhilue also documented Chinese merchants who visited Cham ports in Champa , married Cham women, and to whom they consistently returned after their trading voyages. A notable instance of such intermarriage involved a Chinese merchant from Quanzhou , Wang Yuanmao, who engaged in extensive trade with Champa in the 12th century and married a Cham princess. Chinese prisoners were returned to China in exchange for captured districts in 1078 after China defeated Đại Việt and overran several districts in Cao Bằng Province .

The founder of the Lý dynasty, Lý Thái Tổ (Lý Công Uẩn, 李公蘊), is believed by some to have had ancestral origins in Fujian Province , though specific details about his maternal lineage are scarce, with the exception of his mother being named Phạm Thị. Very little direct information about his parents is known. However, the ethnic Chinese background of Lý Công Uẩn (Chinese: 李公蘊; Pe̍h-ōe-jī: Lí Kongùn), at least on his paternal side, has been accepted by the Vietnamese historian Trần Quốc Vượng .

The ancestors of the Trần clan originated from Fujian Province before migrating to Đại Việt under Trần Kinh (陳京; Tân Keng). There, their descendants, a mix of ethnicities due to intermarriages with the Lý royal family and court members, established the Trần dynasty, which subsequently ruled Đại Việt. Some of these mixed-ancestry descendants and certain clan members retained the ability to speak Chinese, as evidenced by a Yuan dynasty envoy meeting the Chinese-speaking Trần Prince Trần Quốc Tuấn in 1282. The first member of the Trần clan to reside in Đại Việt was Trần Kinh, who settled in Tức Mặc village (now Mỹ Lộc , Nam Định ) and supported himself through fishing.

Professor Liam Kelley has noted that individuals from the Song dynasty in China, such as Zhao Zhong and Xu Zongdao, sought refuge in Vietnam during the Trần dynasty following the Mongol invasion of the Song. Trần Kinh, the ancestor of the Trần dynasty, had origins in present-day Fujian Province, China, as did the Daoist cleric Xu Zongdao, who documented the Mongol invasion and referred to them as “Northern bandits.” Kelley quotes the Đại Việt Sử Ký Toàn Thư stating, “When the Song [Dynasty] was lost, its people came to us. Nhật Duật took them in. There was Zhao Zhong who served as his personal guard. Therefore, among the accomplishments in defeating the Yuan [i.e., Mongols], Nhật Duật had the most.”

Southern Song Chinese military officers and civilian officials fled to various overseas countries, including Vietnam, where they intermarried with the Vietnamese ruling elite. Others went to Champa to serve the government there, as recorded by Zheng Sixiao. Southern Song soldiers were incorporated into the Vietnamese army assembled by Emperor Trần Thánh Tông to defend against the second Mongol invasion.

Phạm Nhan (Nguyễn Bá Linh), whose parents were a Vietnamese woman and a Chinese man, fought against the Trần dynasty on behalf of the Yuan dynasty. His mother’s hometown was Dong Trieu.

Fujian province was the origin of the ethnic Chinese Trần clan, who migrated to Vietnam along with many other Chinese during the Lý dynasty, serving as officials. Distinct Chinese surnames are recorded in the official examination records of the Trần and Lý dynasties. Ethnic Chinese are documented in the official records of both the Trần and Lý dynasties. The clothing, food, and language in Vân Đồn , where the Trần had relocated after leaving their home province of Fujian, were heavily influenced by Chinese culture. The Trần people were still able to speak Chinese while in Vietnam. The coastal regions of Vietnam were settled by Chinese migrants from Fujian, including the Trần clan, and the Vân Đồn port emerged as a result of this interaction. Chinese from Guangdong and Fujian migrated to the coastal port of Vân Đồn during the reign of Lý Anh Tông to engage in commerce. The usurpation of the Lý dynasty followed their intermarriage with the fishing-oriented Trần family from Fujian.

The province of Zhejiang in China, around the 940s, was the origin of the Chinese Hồ/Hú family, from which the founder of the Hồ dynasty , Emperor Hồ Quý Ly , hailed. The Chinese elites descended from mixed marriages between Chinese and Vietnamese individuals often viewed others as inferior due to their perceived Chinese influence.

15th–18th Centuries

Lê Dynasty

Following the Fourth Chinese domination of Vietnam , it was recorded that the offspring of unions between Vietnamese women and Chinese (Ngô) men, who remained in Vietnam, along with individuals from the Cham, Cẩu Hiểm, and Laotian populations, and Vietnamese collaborators with the Ming dynasty, were enslaved by the Lê government, as detailed in the Complete Annals of Đại Việt .

There was no mandatory requirement for the repatriation of Ming Chinese who voluntarily remained in Vietnam. The return of these Ming Chinese to China was commanded by the Ming dynasty, not by Lê Lợi . The Trai people formed a significant portion of Lê Lợi’s supporters during the Lam Sơn uprising . He lived among the Trai in the border regions, acting as their leader, and eventually seized control of the lowland Kinh areas ruled by the Ming, having initially established his base in the southern highland regions. The Trai communities in the south and the Vietnamese in the Red River Delta were effectively engaged in a “civil war” during Lê Lợi’s anti-Ming rebellion.

In 1437, the leader Lưu Bác Công (Liu Bogong) commanded a Dai Viet military contingent composed of ethnic Chinese, indicating that Chinese individuals continued to reside in Vietnam even after the country regained its independence from China. Vietnam received Chinese defectors from Yunnan in the 1400s.

The Vietnamese Emperor Lê Thánh Tông imposed strict regulations on foreign contact and enforced an isolationist policy. Despite this, a considerable volume of trade occurred between Guangzhou and Vietnam. Early accounts mention Vietnamese capturing Chinese sailors whose ships had been blown off course and detaining them. Young Chinese men were reportedly selected by the Vietnamese for castration to serve as eunuch slaves. Modern historians have speculated that Chinese individuals captured and castrated by the Vietnamese may have been involved in regular trade between China and Vietnam, rather than merely being victims of unfortunate weather, and that they were punished as part of a Vietnamese crackdown on foreign trade.

A record from 1499 in the Ming Shilu details the capture of thirteen Chinese men from Wenchang , including a young man named Wu Rui, by the Vietnamese. Their ship had been blown off course while en route from Hainan to Guangdong ’s Qin subprefecture (Qinzhou ), and they landed near the coast of Vietnam in the 1460s, during the reign of the Chenghua Emperor (1464–1487). Twelve of the men were enslaved to work as agricultural laborers. The youngest, Wu Rui , was chosen by the Vietnamese court for castration due to his youth and became a eunuch in the Vietnamese imperial palace in Thang Long for nearly twenty-five years. After years of service as a eunuch slave, he was promoted to a position of significant influence following the death of the Vietnamese ruler in 1497, becoming a military superintendent in Northern Vietnam. However, a soldier named Dương Tam Tri (楊三知) from the Lạng Sơn guard informed him of an escape route back to China. Wu Rui managed to escape to Longzhou after a nine-day trek through the mountains. The local Tusi chief, Wei Chen, took him into custody, overriding objections from his family who wished to return him to Vietnam. Upon learning of his escape, Vietnam dispatched an agent to purchase Wu Rui back from Wei Chen for 100 Jin, fearing he might divulge state secrets to China. Wei Chen, intending to sell him back to the Vietnamese, demanded a higher price. However, before a deal could be struck, Wu Rui was rescued by the magistrate of Pingxiang , Li Guangning, and subsequently sent to Beijing to serve as a eunuch in the Ming palace at the Directorate of Ceremonial (司禮監太監). The Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư reports that in 1467, in the An Bang province of Dai Viet (now Quảng Ninh Province ), a Chinese ship ran aground. The crew was detained and forbidden from returning to China by order of Lê Thánh Tông. This incident may be the same one involving Wu Rui’s capture.

A 1472 entry in the Ming Shilu states that several Chinese individuals from Nanhai escaped back to China after their ship was blown off course into Vietnam, where they had been conscripted into the Vietnamese military. The escapees also reported that over 100 Chinese men remained captives in Vietnam, having been caught and castrated by the Vietnamese after their ships were similarly blown off course in other incidents. In response, China’s Ministry of Revenue ordered Chinese civilians and soldiers to cease overseas travel. These 100 men were taken prisoner around the same time as Wu Rui, and historian Leo K. Shin suggests they may have been involved in illegal trade rather than being victims of adverse weather. The over 100 Chinese men who were castrated and made eunuchs by the Vietnamese were still captives in Vietnam when the incident was reported. Both Wu Rui’s case and the castration of over 100 men suggest potential involvement in trade, according to historians John K. Whitmore and Tana Li, which was subsequently suppressed by the Vietnamese government, rather than them being genuinely lost at sea. China’s relations with Vietnam during this period were characterized by the practice of punishing prisoners through castration.

Northern and Southern Dynasties (1533–1597)

The Chinese population in the Mekong Delta region had established settlements there prior to any Vietnamese presence. When the Ming dynasty fell, several thousand Chinese refugees fled south, settling extensively in Cham territories and in Cambodia. The majority of these Chinese were young males, and they took Cham women as wives. Their descendants began to identify more strongly with Chinese culture. This migration wave occurred in the 17th and 18th centuries. In the 17th century, many Chinese men from southeastern Chinese provinces, such as Fujian , continued to migrate to Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. Many of these Chinese married local women after settling in places like Hội An .

In the 16th century, Lê Anh Tông of the Lê dynasty actively encouraged traders to visit Vietnam by opening up ports in Thăng Long (Hanoi ), Huế , and Hội An . The Chinese presence in the Huế/Hội An area dates back to at least 1444, when a monk from Fujian established the Buddhist temple, Chua Chuc Thanh. Hội An rapidly developed into a significant trading port from the 16th century onward, attracting a growing number of Chinese and Japanese traders. By the time an Italian Jesuit priest, Father Christofo Borri, visited the city in 1618, he described it as: “The city of Faifo is so vast that one would think it is two juxtaposed cities; a Chinese city and a Japanese city.” Japanese traders largely disappeared by the first half of the 17th century due to the Tokugawa shogunate’s policy of self-isolation . When Dutch traders like Francisco Groemon visited Hội An in 1642, the Japanese population had dwindled to no more than 50 individuals, while the Chinese community numbered approximately 5,000 people.

Nguyễn Lords (1533–1789)

Approximately 3,000 Han Chinese Ming dynasty refugees arrived in Vietnam at the close of the Ming dynasty. These refugees were staunchly opposed to the Qing dynasty and remained fiercely loyal to the Ming. Vietnamese women married these Han Chinese refugees, as most of them were soldiers and single men. Their descendants became known as Minh Hương and, despite the influence of their Vietnamese mothers, strongly identified as Chinese. They did not adopt the Manchu hairstyle, unlike subsequent Chinese migrants to Vietnam during the Qing dynasty.

Hội An also served as the initial point of arrival for refugees fleeing the Ming dynasty after the Manchu conquest. An association for these refugees, commonly known as “Ming-Huong-Xa” (明香社), was established between 1645 and 1653. Around this period, Hội An and the southern territories of Vietnam were under the control of the Nguyễn lords . The Nguyễn rulers permitted Vietnamese refugees to freely settle in disputed frontier lands bordering the remnants of the Champa kingdom and the Khmer empire. According to the Dai Nam Chronicle, a Chinese general from Guangxi , Yang Yandi (Dương Ngạn Địch), led a contingent of 3,000 Ming loyalists to Huế seeking asylum. The Ming loyalist Chinese pirate Yang Yandi and his fleet arrived in Vietnam in March 1682, seeking to escape the Qing dynasty, initially appearing off the coast of Tonkin in North Vietnam . According to the Vietnamese account by Vũ Duy Chí (武惟志), a minister of the Vietnamese Lê dynasty , a strategy was devised to defeat the Chinese pirates. This involved sending over 300 beautiful Vietnamese singing girls and prostitutes, carrying red handkerchiefs, to approach the Chinese pirate junks on small boats. The Chinese pirates engaged in sexual activity with the Vietnamese women, who then used their wet handkerchiefs to dampen the gun barrels of the pirate ships. The women then departed in the same boats. The Vietnamese navy subsequently attacked the Chinese pirate fleet, which was unable to fire its weapons due to the wet guns. The original fleet of 206 junks was reduced to between 50 and 80 junks by the time it reached South Vietnam’s Quảng Nam province and the Mekong delta . It is also suggested that the sexual encounters between the Chinese pirates and the North Vietnamese women may have transmitted a deadly epidemic from China to Vietnam, which severely impacted the Tonkin regime of North Vietnam. French and Chinese sources indicate that a typhoon, in addition to the disease, contributed to the loss of ships.

The Nguyễn court granted permission for Duong and his surviving followers to resettle in Đồng Nai , a territory recently acquired from the Khmers. Duong’s followers named their settlement “Minh Huong,” as a reminder of their allegiance to the Ming dynasty. More Chinese refugees subsequently settled in Hội An and the frontier territories of Cochinchina , including Mạc Cửu . Mạc Cửu had previously settled in the Kampot –Hà Tiên area in the 1680s under the patronage of the Cambodian king, Chey Chettha IV. However, Cambodia subsequently fell under Thai rule during the reign of Taksin . In 1708, Mạc Cửu shifted his allegiance to the Nguyễn lords, paying tribute to Huế. In return for his tribute, Mạc Cửu was granted autonomy to govern Ha Tien. Throughout the 18th century, his descendants implemented their own administrative policies, independent of Huế and Cambodia. The presence of these semi-autonomous fiefdoms, governed by Chinese refugees, encouraged further Chinese settlement in the South. In contrast, very few Chinese refugees chose to settle in territories controlled by the Trịnh lords , who maintained strict mandates for Chinese refugees to adhere to Vietnamese customs and refrain from interacting with the local Vietnamese population in urban areas.

Vietnamese women married Han Chinese Minh Hương men who relocated to Vietnam following the fall of the Ming dynasty. This resulted in the formation of a new demographic group within Vietnamese society, who served the Nguyễn government. Both Khmer and Vietnamese populations married Chinese men of the Minh Hương group. Hà Tiên came under the control of Mạc Cửu, a Chinese individual who was among the Ming migrants in the Mekong Delta. Lang Cau, Cam Pho, Chiem, and Cu Lao in Hội An were sites of settlement by the Minh Hương, who were the descendants of native women married to Fujianese Chinese men. This new migration established a distinct Chinese diaspora community in Vietnam, unlike in ancient times when the Vietnamese upper class absorbed ethnic Chinese migrants. The Minh Hương were ethnically mixed, of Chinese and Vietnamese descent, born from Chinese fathers and Vietnamese mothers. They resided in both rural and urban areas. Chinese citizens in Vietnam were categorized as Huaqiao by the French, while the Minh Hương were considered permanent residents of Vietnam of ethnic Chinese origin. To facilitate trade, Vietnamese female merchants married Chinese male merchants in Hội An. Trần Thượng Xuyên and Yang Yandi (Dương Ngạn Địch) were two Chinese leaders who, in 1679, led the Minh Hương to settle in South Vietnam under the Nguyễn lords.

Chinese trade and immigration saw a notable increase in the first half of the 18th century, driven by population growth and economic pressures that encouraged more Chinese men to seek trade opportunities in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. It was during this period that the descendants of the Ming Chinese refugees, often referred to as Ming Huong Chinese, began to cultivate a distinct ethnocultural identity for the newer Chinese immigrants, whom they called “Thanh nhân” (清人), or Qing people. The Thanh Nhan formed independent Chinese associations based on dialect groups or clans in cities and towns with significant Chinese populations, including Chợ Lớn , Hội An , and several towns in the Mekong Delta. The Minh Huong Chinese also established similar associations, with notable examples including the Đình Minh Hương Gia Thạnh in Cholon and the Dinh Tien Hien Lang Minh Huong in Hội An. Both groups of Chinese were actively involved in the internal affairs of Vietnamese society. Prominent Minh Huong Chinese individuals like Trinh Hoai Duc and Ngo Nhan Tinh served as ministers under the Nguyễn court during Gia Long’s reign. Many Thanh Nhan Chinese also participated as irregular militia during the Tây Sơn rebellion, with their loyalties often divided based on their place of residence. The Thanh Nhan Chinese in Gia Định and Biên Hòa supported Gia Long, while some Chinese in the Mekong Delta regions sided with the Khmers until the late 1790s.

The Nguyễn Lords of Vietnam facilitated the return of shipwrecked Chinese sailors, who had been blown off course to Vietnam, safely back to China. This was achieved either by escorting them on Vietnamese trading ships to Guangdong or via the land route from Vietnam’s Lạng Sơn province into China’s Guangxi province through Zhennan Pass , where Vietnamese tribute envoys traveled to China. In 1669, Liu Sifu, a fourth-rank Chinese Brigade Vice-Commander (Dushu), was shipwrecked in Quảng Nam Province after being blown off course by the wind and was subsequently returned to Guangzhou, China, by a Vietnamese Nguyễn ship. The Vietnamese dispatched Zhao Wenbin to lead the diplomatic delegation on the ship, requesting the establishment of commercial ties. However, this request was rejected, although Qing Chinese officials expressed gratitude to the Nguyễn for repatriating the shipwrecked military officer. On the coastal waters of Champa, in an area referred to as Linlangqian by the Chinese, a ship captained by Chang Xiaoguan and carrying a Chinese crew ran aground after departing from Cambodia on June 25, 1682. Their cargo was left in the waters, and Chen Xiaoguan traveled to Thailand (Siam). This event is recorded in the log of a Chinese trading junk bound for Nagasaki on June 25, 1683.

A shipwrecked Chinese sailor, Pan Dinggui, who was blown to Vietnam by the wind, documented in his book “Annan ji you” that the Trịnh lords restored the Lê dynasty to power after Vietnam experienced widespread disease, thunder, and winds. At the time, the Lê dynasty had been deposed, and initially, they could not locate any Lê or Trần dynasty royals to restore to the throne when Pan was in Vietnam in 1688. Pan also noted that only the Lê king received official diplomats from the Qing, not the Trịnh lord.

19th–20th Centuries

The Thanh Nhan Chinese were involved in the export of rice to other Southeast Asian countries, and their participation significantly increased during the early 18th century following the Tây Sơn rebellion. Under existing laws, rice exports were strictly regulated, but the Chinese largely disregarded these regulations, exporting rice in large quantities. This led to a price increase of 50–100% for rice in the 1820s, which displeased the Nguyễn court under Emperor Minh Mạng . Minh Mạng’s mandarin, Lê Văn Duyệt , observed the considerable autonomy the Chinese enjoyed in trade affairs in Gia Dinh, partly attributed to the patronage of Trinh Hoai Duc, who served as the province’s governor. Starting in 1831, Minh Mạng introduced a series of measures to curb Chinese trade, beginning with new restrictions on overseas travel. These measures culminated in a brief revolt among Gia Dinh’s residents in 1833. The Nguyễn court also experimented with assimilation policies for Chinese immigrants. In 1839, an edict was issued to abolish Chinese clan associations in Vietnamese-controlled Cambodia, but this proved ineffective. Minh Mạng’s son, Thiệu Trị , introduced a new law allowing only Chinese-born immigrants to register with Chinese clan associations, while their locally born male descendants were permitted to register with the Minh-Huong-xa and adopt Vietnamese attire. The Nguyễn court also exhibited subtle discrimination against individuals of Chinese origin; only one Minh Huong Chinese individual was promoted to the rank of Mandarin, a stark contrast to the high representation of individuals of Chinese descent who served the Nguyễn court during Gia Long’s reign.

Chinese immigration into Vietnam notably increased following the French colonization of Vietnam from the 1860s onward, particularly after the signing of the Convention of Peking , which officially recognized the rights of Chinese individuals to seek overseas employment under Chinese, British, and French authorities. Unlike their Vietnamese predecessors, the French welcomed these Chinese immigrants, seeing them as a means to stimulate trade and industry. The Chinese generally found employment as laborers or intermediaries. The French established a special Immigration Bureau in 1874, requiring Chinese immigrants to register with their respective Chinese clan and dialect group associations and easing previously existing trade restrictions. Historians such as Khanh Tran interpret this as a divide-and-conquer strategy, implemented to minimize the likelihood of any Vietnamese revolt against French rule. The Chinese population experienced exponential growth in the late 19th century and even more so in the 20th century. Between the 1870s and 1890s, approximately 20,000 Chinese settled in Cochinchina. Another 600,000 arrived in the 1920s and 1930s, with migration peaks particularly pronounced during the 1920s and late 1940s, coinciding with the impacts of conflict and economic instability stemming from the Chinese Civil War .

Intermarriage between Chinese and Vietnamese individuals led to the integration of Chinese customs into Vietnamese society. For instance, crocodiles were consumed by the Vietnamese, while they were considered taboo and forbidden for the Chinese. Vietnamese women who married Chinese men adopted these Chinese taboos. Vietnamese women were married to Chinese men who assisted in selling Viet Minh rice.

Statehood under North Vietnam and South Vietnam: 1950–1975

At a party plenum in 1930, the Indochinese Communist Party issued a declaration stating that the Chinese were to be treated equally with the Vietnamese, specifically defining them as “The workers and laborers among the Chinese nationals are allies of the Vietnamese revolution.” One year after the establishment of the state of North Vietnam , a mutual agreement was reached between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Vietnam to grant Vietnamese citizenship to ethnic Chinese residing in North Vietnam. This process was largely completed by the end of the 1950s.

During the Vietnam War , relations with the Chinese minority in North Vietnam remained cordial. Although authorities increasingly encouraged the Chinese to acquire citizenship and reduced the prominence of Chinese as a language, very few chose to do so. Along the path of gradual assimilation, the prominent Chinese politician Zhou Enlai , during a visit to Hanoi in 1956, encouraged the Chinese community to integrate into Vietnamese society. Unlike in the South, the authorities never coerced or punished the local Chinese for their cultural practices.

“The Hoa in the north had all the rights and privileges of Vietnamese citizenship and none of its disadvantages. From about 1970 the Vietnamese had been trying to get us to become citizens, but few of us regarded it to be in our best interests. We could even vote in their elections. We were regarded as Vietnamese in all respects, except that we were not subject to the military draft.”

Following the Battle of the Paracel Islands – an action taken by China that Hanoi disapproved of – the DRV authorities began to restrict the ability of the Hoa to visit relatives in the People’s Republic of China. Around the same time in South Vietnam , President Ngô Đình Diệm enacted a series of measures between 1955 and 1956 aimed at integrating the ethnic Chinese into South Vietnamese society:

• December 7, 1955: A nationality law was passed, automatically granting South Vietnamese citizenship to Vietnamese residents of mixed Chinese and Vietnamese parentage.
• August 21, 1956: Decree 48 was enacted, making all ethnic Chinese born in Vietnam South Vietnamese citizens, regardless of their families’ wishes. First-generation immigrants born in China, however, were not eligible to apply for Vietnamese citizenship and were required to obtain renewable residential permits and pay residential taxes.
• August 29, 1956: Decree 52 was passed, mandating that all Vietnamese citizens, irrespective of their ethnic background, adopt a Vietnamese name within six months, failing which they would face a substantial fine.
• September 6, 1956: Decree 53 was issued, prohibiting all foreigners from engaging in eleven specific trades, all of which were predominantly controlled by ethnic Chinese. Foreign shareholders were required to liquidate their businesses or transfer ownership to Vietnamese citizens within a six-month to one-year period, with non-compliance leading to deportation or a fine of up to 5 million piastres.

As the majority of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam held ROC nationality in 1955, these measures significantly reduced the expatriate Chinese population in South Vietnam. The fourth decree, in particular, incentivized Chinese businessmen to transfer their assets to their locally born children. In 1955, the number of ROC nationals stood at 621,000, a figure that dramatically decreased to 3,000 by 1958. The South Vietnamese government later softened its stance towards foreign-born Chinese in 1963, introducing a new nationality law that allowed them the option to retain their ROC nationality or adopt South Vietnamese citizenship. The following year, the Statistics Office created a new census category, “Nguoi Viet goc Hoa” (Vietnamese people of Chinese origin), ensuring that Vietnamese citizens of Chinese heritage were identified as such in all official documents. No further major measures were implemented to integrate or assimilate the Chinese after 1964.

Both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China protested these policies. While some Chinese individuals wished to leave Vietnam, only a small number departed for Taiwan due to disagreements between the two governments regarding the process. The protests from both Chinese states had no discernible impact on the Republic of Vietnam’s policies towards its Chinese community. Instead, it was the actions of the Chinese population itself that compelled the Vietnamese authorities to reconsider and amend the decrees.

Departure from Vietnam: 1975–1990

Following the reunification of Vietnam , the ethnic Hoa in South Vietnam experienced the most severe impacts of socialist transformation. A significant challenge for the government was managing and controlling the sensitive market economy, particularly in Ho Chi Minh City, where Chinese-owned businesses held a dominant position. After Vietnam’s diplomatic break with China in 1978, some Vietnamese leaders harbored fears of potential espionage activities within the Chinese business community. On one hand, Chinese-owned enterprises controlled trade in essential goods and services, including pharmaceuticals, fertilizer distribution, grain milling, and foreign currency exchange, sectors that were ostensibly state monopolies. On the other hand, shrewd Chinese entrepreneurs provided vital access to markets for Vietnamese exports through Hong Kong and Singapore. This access became increasingly critical in the 1980s as a means to circumvent the trade boycott imposed on Vietnam by numerous Asian and Western nations. An announcement on March 24 outlawed all wholesale trade and large-scale business activities, forcing approximately 30,000 businesses to close overnight, followed by another decree banning all private trade. Further government policies mandated that former business owners become farmers in the NEZ or join the armed forces to fight on the Vietnam-Cambodia border. All old and foreign currencies, as well as Vietnamese currency exceeding the equivalent of US$250 for urban households and $150 for rural households, were confiscated.

While these measures targeted all bourgeois elements, they disproportionately affected the Hoa, leading to the expropriation of their properties in and around major cities. Hoa communities mounted significant resistance, resulting in street clashes in Cholon described as “full of corpses.” These policies, coupled with heightened tensions stemming from Vietnam’s disputes with Cambodia and China in 1978 and 1979, triggered an exodus of the majority of the Hoa population. Over 170,000 fled overland into the province of Guangxi , China, from the North, while others escaped by boat from the South. China received an daily influx of 4–5,000 refugees, while Southeast Asian countries witnessed a wave of 5,000 boat people arriving on their shores each month. China dispatched unarmed ships to assist in the evacuation of refugees but encountered diplomatic obstacles as the Vietnamese government denied that the Hoa were subjected to persecution and later refused to issue exit permits after as many as 250,000 Hoa had applied for repatriation. In an effort to stem the refugee flow and counter Vietnamese accusations of Beijing coercing its citizens to emigrate, China closed its land border in 1978. This led to a surge in the number of boat people, with as many as 100,000 arriving in other countries by the end of 1978. However, the Vietnamese government by this time not only encouraged the exodus but also profited from it by extorting five to ten taels of gold, or an equivalent of US$1,500 to $3,000 per person, from those wishing to leave the country. The Vietnamese military also forcibly expelled thousands of border refugees across the China-Vietnam land border, leading to numerous border incidents and armed clashes, while blaming China for these movements by accusing them of using saboteurs to force Vietnamese citizens into China. This new influx brought the number of refugees in China to approximately 200,000. One family was tragically divided: an ethnic Chinese man was deported while his ethnic Vietnamese wife and child remained behind. For those who lacked the means to pay for their departure, they remained to face continued discrimination and ostracism, including forced retirement, reduced food rations, and exclusion from certain fields of study, measures deemed necessary for national security.

Quảng Ninh was the province most severely affected, with approximately 160,000 Hoa forced to leave, representing about 22 percent of the total population. The Chinese community provided crucial labor for the industrial and mining sectors, and the province’s economy was devastated by the departure of virtually the entire Chinese population.

The scale of the exodus intensified during and after the war. The monthly number of boat people arriving in Southeast Asia increased from 11,000 in the first quarter of 1979 to 28,000 by April, and 55,000 in June, while over 90,000 fled by boat to China. Additionally, the Vietnamese military began expelling ethnic Hoa from Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia, resulting in over 43,000 refugees, predominantly of Hoa descent, fleeing overland to Thailand. By this point, Vietnam was openly confiscating properties and extorting money from fleeing refugees. In April 1979 alone, Hoa individuals outside Vietnam had remitted a total of US$242 million (an amount equivalent to half the total value of Vietnam’s 1978 exports) through Hong Kong to Ho Chi Minh City to help their friends or family pay for their departure from Vietnam. By June, remittances from refugees had surpassed the coal industry as Vietnam’s largest source of foreign exchange, with projections reaching as high as US$3 billion. By 1980, the refugee population in China had reached 260,000, and the number of surviving boat people refugees in Southeast Asia totaled 400,000. An estimated 50% to 70% of Vietnamese and Chinese boat people perished at sea.

Đổi Mới (since 1986)

Following Nguyễn Văn Linh’s initiation of the Vietnamese economic reforms in 1986, the Hoa in Vietnam have experienced a significant commercial resurgence. Despite years of persecution, they have begun to regain much of their former economic power within Vietnam. The open-door policy and economic reforms adopted by Vietnam, along with improved economic and diplomatic relations with other Southeast Asian countries, have revitalized the entrepreneurial presence and economic influence of the predominantly urban Hoa minority, restoring them to the roles they held in the Vietnamese economy prior to 1975.

Trade and Industry

Ho Chi Minh City continues to be Vietnam’s primary financial district and a central hub for Hoa businessmen and investors. The city is now home to thousands of Chinese-owned businesses.

Similar to much of Southeast Asia, the Hoa have historically dominated Vietnamese commerce and industry at all levels of society, from urban industrialists in Chợ Lớn to rice merchants and shopkeepers in the rural hinterlands of the Mekong Delta. Prior to 1975, the Chinese community represented a disproportionately large share of Vietnam’s economy (70 to 80 percent) and has since prospered due to the country’s post-1988 economic liberalization reforms . The Chinese have maintained a substantial presence in Vietnam’s economy, having been an affluent, market-dominant minority for centuries, historically controlling the country’s most lucrative commercial, trade, and industrial sectors. The Hoa wielded considerable economic power over the Kinh majority and played a crucial role in maintaining the country’s economic vitality and prosperity before their property was confiscated by the Vietnamese Communists after 1975. The Hoa, a disproportionately wealthy and commercially powerful market-dominant minority, not only form a distinct ethnic community but also largely constitute an economically advantaged social class – the commercial middle and upper class, in contrast to their poorer Kinh majority working and underclass counterparts.

Early History and French Colonial Rule (3rd century BC–1945 AD)

The Hoa have played a prominent role in Vietnamese business and industry for over two millennia, with Chinese economic dominance in Vietnam dating back to 208 BCE. When the renegade Qin Chinese general Zhao Tuo defeated An Dương Vương , the king of Âu Lạc in northern Vietnam, and successfully conquered the Âu Lạc Kingdom , an ancient state inhabited by the Lạc Việt and Âu Việt confederation of upland tribal peoples, he annexed Âu Lạc into the Qin Empire the following year and declared himself the emperor of Nam Viet . A century later, the militarily powerful Han dynasty annexed Nanyue (which translates to “land of the southern barbarians” in Chinese) into the Han Empire, and Nanyue was ruled as a Chinese province for the subsequent centuries. The sinicization of Nanyue was facilitated by a combination of Han imperial military might, regular Han settlement, and an influx of Han Chinese refugees, officers, garrisons, merchants, scholars, bureaucrats, fugitives, convicts, and prisoners of war. By the end of the 17th century, a distinct Han Chinese community, known as the Hoa, had emerged within Vietnamese society. Hoa enclaves and small Chinatowns took root in every major Vietnamese city and trading center. Large congregations of newly arrived Han Chinese immigrants, coupled with their economic power, allowed for the establishment of various Hoa-based community organizations and institutions to regulate their commercial activities and to safeguard their economic interests. Modern Han Chinese settlement and immigration in Vietnam arose from the promising opportunities for trade, investment, and business presented during their visits to Hội An starting in the 16th century, where they initially traded black incense, silk, alum, and traditional Chinese medicinal products with the indigenous Kinh populace. Dutch, Portuguese, and French merchants visiting Hội An in the later 17th century introduced high-quality European-made brass utensils into the Vietnamese commercial market, which attracted the attention of Hoa merchants. In turn, other Hoa businessmen ventured into the production of various goods, including porcelain, silver bars, and a wide array of metals, which were traded in the domestic Vietnamese commodity marketplace. Around this time, the Hoa began to establish their own private trading federations and social associations, the latter referred to as a huiguan (会馆) or bang (帮) in Vietnamese, or what the French colonialists termed congrégations. These associations were responsible for promoting and safeguarding their economic interests and supporting the broader Hoa business community. The bang also mediated business disputes among members, allocated zones of economic influence to industry leaders, provided business assistance and credit to emerging and established Hoa entrepreneurs, and offered welfare services, private education, and healthcare for newly settled Chinese immigrants, including access to critical financial services like tax collection and lending. As an increasing number of Han Chinese immigrants arrived in Vietnam during the 19th century, many found immediate assistance, affinity, camaraderie, and solidarity from their fellow Hoa brethren, developing a strong connection with the broader Hoa community. The bang served not only as meeting points for newly settled immigrants to connect but also for fellow Hoa entrepreneurs to address their business concerns and collaboratively solve problems. Furthermore, the bang acted as hubs for Hoa community leaders and aspiring entrepreneurs to unite along ethnic and ancestral lines, pooling seed capital to establish and expand their own or existing businesses, exchange information, sign contracts, and develop business contacts. Within the bang, guilds and business cooperatives enabled the Hoa to conduct their commercial undertakings more efficiently and fluidly, facilitating the flow of high-quality market information, protecting trade secrets, enforcing business agreements, and fostering greater levels of social trust and entrepreneurial cooperation. Additionally, Hoa entrepreneurs cultivated Overseas Chinese business connections, negotiated favorable bargains, and struck deals to ensure customer satisfaction, while consistently dedicating extra hours and working diligently to gain a competitive advantage over their French and Kinh counterparts. A mild business temperament, astute decision-making, and a preference for earning small, consistent profits over a long period rather than seeking quick short-term gains were also significant factors contributing to the Hoa’s economic success in Vietnam.

The Hoa were notably enterprising entrepreneurs who engaged in trade and manufacturing of a diverse range of valuable goods and services, from fine Chinese silk to black incense. The monopolized gold export trade was entirely controlled by the Hoa, in addition to their dominance of the local trade in paper, tea, pepper, arms, sulfur, lead, and lead oxide. Across the economic landscape of the Hoa, different sub-ethnic groups specialized in various industry sectors. The Hakka predominated the traditional Chinese medicine clinic trade, the Cantonese became grocers, the Hainanese flourished in managing restaurant chains, the Hokkien monopolized hardware merchandising, and the Teochew controlled the rice trade. The economic power wielded by the Hoa, coupled with repeated military incursions and other invasive attempts by successive Chinese dynasties to conquer and dominate Vietnam, fueled anti-Chinese sentiments, hostility, bitterness, envy, insecurity, and resentment from their Kinh counterparts. Nevertheless, Chinese economic dominance continued to surge in an unwavering manner following the establishment of the Nguyễn dynasty in 1802. This was because the commercial activities overseen by wealthy Hoa merchants and investors served as an important source of tax revenue for the Nguyễn mandarin officials. By the time the French arrived in the mid-18th century, the Hoa commercially dominated the Kinh majority in trade, mining, and all urban market sectors, prospering under the colonial laissez-faire market policies implemented by the French.

During the period of French administration , the Hoa assumed a leading position in Vietnam’s rice processing, marketing, transportation, meat slaughtering, and grocery retail sectors. The French colonial era also witnessed a significant increase in the Hoa population due to French policies in Vietnam. Prior to the French arrival, both foreign and domestic trade were dominated by the Chinese. The French government decided to enhance the role of the Chinese in commerce and to import Chinese labor to assist in the development of infrastructure such as roads, railroads, mining, and industrial projects. Prevailing French colonial policy, later reformed by relaxing long-standing restrictions on rice exports towards the end of the nineteenth century, attracted new waves of Chinese merchants and shopkeepers eager to capitalize on the newly available rice export market. The expanding Vietnamese economy, spurred by these colonial policy reforms, further enticed additional Chinese immigrants, particularly into the southern regions of Vietnam. With their long-standing involvement in the rice trade, the Chinese subsequently broadened their interests to include rice milling, establishing a virtual monopoly in the industry.

Vietnam’s gold industry, in particular, was entirely monopolized by Hoa merchants. The Hoa also controlled Vietnam’s entire internal gold procurement and distribution system, as the French colonial regime recognized that its colonial interests would be better served by leveraging the market expertise provided by the Chinese. They allowed Hoa merchants to freely engage in external trade, sometimes leading to commercial cooperation between the French and Hoa in the import-export sectors. The French strategically fostered and supported Hoa entrepreneurship, welcoming the influx of Chinese immigrants whose entrepreneurial acumen was deemed essential for the sustainability of French colonial rule and its associated economic prosperity. The Hoa population increased nearly tenfold, from 25,000 in the 1860s to over 200,000 in 1911. Furthermore, Hoa businessmen acted as intermediaries, serving as agents for both the French and their own interests. Hoa businessmen also collaborated with the French and other European capitalists in exploiting Vietnam’s abundant natural resources and exploiting the indigenous Kinh population through the laissez-faire economic policies established under the French colonial authorities to enrich themselves. During the French colonial era, imports were fully controlled by the French authorities, with nearly all major import items such as machinery, transport equipment, building materials, and luxury goods handled by French chartered companies, while the Hoa operated as intermediaries for the French colonial authorities in exchange for a commission.

Chợ Lớn was a major business hub of Vietnamese economic life in its time and the heartland of Vietnam’s flourishing rice trade. Today, the city continues to be one of contemporary Vietnam’s leading centers of Hoa economic activity.

Following the fall of Ming China and the subsequent Manchu takeover , numerous Chinese emigrants, as a result of sporadic political upheavals and dynastic conflicts, eventually acquired substantial landholdings within the Saigon area and the Mekong Delta. There, they established Chợ Lớn , which rapidly became Vietnam’s most commercially influential city, with a significant portion of the country’s economy coming under the commanding influence of the Hoa by the end of the 17th century. By 1954, Chợ Lớn’s population reached 600,000, making it the second-largest host city for Overseas Chinese at the time, after Singapore. Chợ Lớn, meaning “Big Market,” served as the principal commercial epicenter in the late nineteenth century, essentially managed by Hoa entrepreneurs and investors themselves for their commercial undertakings, representing the heartland of Hoa economic influence in Vietnam at that time. However, significant resentment and pronounced hostility directed towards the disproportionate economic success of the Chinese among the Kinh majority in the vicinity sparked recurrent anti-Hoa reprisals, including the infamous 1782 massacre of approximately 2,000 Hoa in Cholon’s Chinatown. The 1782 massacre, in which an estimated ten thousand Hoa were slaughtered due to perceived loyalty to the Nguyễn lords by the Tây Sơn , saw Chinese-owned shops burned and looted, and the victims, including “men, women, and children,” were indiscriminately “killed and their corpses were thrown into the river,” according to official Vietnamese records.

The Hoa wielded significant influence over Vietnam’s agricultural sector. While relatively few Hoa were directly involved in farming, their provision of loans and transportation services was essential to the livelihoods of Vietnamese farmers. Even in Vietnam’s rural areas, the Hoa maintained close interactions with the majority of the local Kinh population, establishing a sophisticated economic network founded on trust and credit relationships. Historically, Vietnam’s rice industry has been overseen by the Chinese. They traditionally held considerable influence over all aspects of the rice trade, including marketing, transportation, and processing, with reports indicating they controlled approximately 75 percent of Vietnam’s 70 rice mills. In conjunction with this, they also managed commissaries, grocery stores, and other related enterprises. Their involvement in the rice trade was complemented by the management of commissaries and grocery stores, as well as facilitating money lending during intervals between rice harvests. During the French colonial epoch, Chợ Lớn was renowned for its extensive rice endowments, a leading source of wealth that formed the foundation of capital accumulation for the multitude of Hoa-owned rice processing enterprises that dominated the city. Under French rule, the collection of rice paddies in the Mekong Delta was entirely managed by Chinese entities, who then resold it to French companies for export. Industrial commodities imported from France by French companies in Vietnam were retailed to the rural Kinh population in the South by Hoa merchants, some of whom held exclusive distribution rights. In 1865, Hoa rice merchants in Cholon established connections with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to export rice and other agricultural products to Qing China. By 1874, fourteen rice exporting companies owned by the Hoa were competing with ten European import-export shipping lines. The Grain Merchants Association, headquartered in Cholon, maintained direct contracts with rice markets in Taiwan, British Hong Kong, Meiji Japan, Rattanakosin Siam, and British Malaya. Recognizing the substantial profit potential within Chợ Lớn’s rice trade, Hoa rice merchants began to compete with American and European businessmen for industry primacy, striving to capture significant shares of Vietnam’s burgeoning rice trading market. As Hoa rice merchants sought a stake in the Vietnamese rice trading market, they started establishing their own rice processing plants, distribution centers, and trading networks across South Vietnam between 1878 and 1886, with financial backing from Overseas Chinese investors in Malacca, Penang, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Of fundamental importance to the prosperity of the Hoa in the commercial rice trade was the development of a complex canal system. Control of the Vietnamese cargo system enabled Hoa merchants to dominate Southern Vietnamese commercial trade, with thousands of merchant ships under their command transporting rice and other market products between Southern Vietnam and other rice-growing regions. The Hoa merchant traders not only controlled the large merchant ships transporting rice nationwide but also monopolized the entire shipping and freight operation industry of Southern Vietnam prior to 1975. The first steam-operated rice milling enterprise owned by the Hoa was established in 1876 in Chợ Lớn. By the end of the 19th century, the Hoa controlled 5 out of the 8 rice mills in Saigon-Chợ Lớn. Although Hoa rice merchants faced direct competition from American and European counterparts, the Hoa maintained their dominance in the Vietnamese rice trading market, controlling seven of the nine rice mills built in Chợ Lớn between 1905 and 1914. From 1905 to 1918, the Hoa controlled 36 out of the total 41 rice mills in Chợ Lớn. In 1920, they expanded their ownership to 13 out of 20 rice mills, and by the 1930s, the Chinese owned 75 out of 94 rice mills. By 1940, Hoa rice merchants controlled 90 percent of the rice mills across Chợ Lớn. In its prime, Chợ Lớn served as the foremost center of Vietnam’s economic heartland during the 19th and 20th centuries, and the city continues to this day as one of contemporary Vietnam’s leading economic nerve centers of modern Hoa commercial life.

Given the pervasive dominance of the Hoa throughout Vietnam’s economic life in the early 20th century, they emerged as a prosperous economic minority, establishing themselves as the country’s leading entrepreneurs and investors. This was due to the disproportionately high levels of socioeconomic success within the Chinese community relative to their small population size, making them virtually indispensable to the Vietnamese economy. In the fishing sector, the Hoa maintained a strong presence, particularly in deep-sea fishing. Intense competition and high attrition rates among Hoa fishermen easily displaced their indigenous Kinh counterparts from the local fish export trade. As a result of this fierce competition among Hoa fishermen, the production of nước mắm , a popular Vietnamese fish sauce, also became monopolized by them. The Hoa also owned sugar refineries, construction equipment, and industrial machinery manufacturing facilities, as well as their own rice and sawmills. Other Hoa businessmen were involved in the production of textiles, cotton, sugar, condiments, silk, cinnamon bark, cardamom, and participated in the tea trade. Many Hoa also engaged in coconut and peanut oil production, having begun their careers as laborers on French rubber plantations, eventually working their way up to establish their own tea, pepper, and rice plantations supplying the domestic Vietnamese market. Hoa gardeners monopolized grocery stores and nurseries in the suburban areas of Saigon, while Hoa-owned restaurants and hotels began to appear in every urban Vietnamese market center.

In 1906, Hoa and French businessmen together generated a combined capital output of 222 million francs, compared to 2 million francs for the indigenous Kinh majority. In 1930, an estimated 40 Hoa trading cooperatives and 11 French concerns controlled over 80 percent of Cochinchina’s entire rice export, which was the region’s primary source of wealth. Throughout the 1930s, smaller businesses controlled by the Chinese filled the gaps and niches existing between the large-scale manufacturing establishments, commercial enterprises, plantations, and financial services providers operated by the French. Favorable economic policies attracted a rapid influx of Han Chinese immigrants seeking to achieve economic success through business and investment until the mid-twentieth century. Between 1925 and 1933, approximately 600,000 newly arrived Han Chinese immigrants settled in Vietnam. Between 1923 and 1951, as many as 1.2 million Chinese emigrants moved from China to Vietnam. Hoa merchants engaged in the rice, salt, liquor, opium, and spice trade, establishing plantations in the Mekong Delta hinterlands and selling their products in Cholon. In the North, the Hoa were primarily rice farmers, fishermen, and coal miners, except for those living in cities and provincial towns. The French regularly collaborated with Hoa businessmen in the agricultural and heavy industry sectors, with the latter often acting as intermediaries between themselves, the indigenous Kinh masses, and the French in the domestic Vietnamese trading sector. From 1920 to 1940, many Hoa found employment opportunities as merchant traders and moneylenders. The Chinese dominated every economic aspect of the Mekong Delta rice market, with the sole exception of primary production, controlling the regional export trade and owning nearly all the rice mills in the Red River Delta. Throughout the cities and villages of Southern Vietnam, the Chinese owned and operated the majority of the region’s general merchandise stores. Although the Hoa continued to exercise unprecedented economic power relative to their small population size from the 1930s to the 1940s, sociological factors motivated the Chinese to pursue entrepreneurship and investment as a means of social mobility, given the rigid social structure imposed by the French. Thus, the potential for acquiring significant wealth through a thriving business career was seen by the Hoa as the primary gateway to the upper echelons of the Vietnamese socioeconomic ladder. From 1939 to 1945, the number of Chinese-owned rice mills increased from 200 to 334 across Vietnam’s southern provinces, and the number of rice mills in Saigon owned by them surged from 60 to 79.

South Vietnamese Rule (1945–1975)

As Hoa entrepreneurs in South Vietnam achieved greater financial prosperity, they frequently pooled substantial seed capital and initiated joint business ventures with expatriate Mainland and Overseas Chinese businessmen and investors from around the world. Pertaining to exports, Hoa businessmen established their own business networks with fellow Han Chinese business compatriots operating in Mainland China and other Overseas Chinese business communities across Southeast Asia. Analogous to other Southeast Asian businesses owned by individuals of Chinese ancestry, Hoa-owned businesses in Vietnam often formed corporate partnerships with Greater Chinese and other Overseas Chinese businesses globally in pursuit of new business opportunities for capitalization, collaboration, and concentration. Beyond sharing common ancestral backgrounds and similar cultural, linguistic, and familial ties, many Hoa businessmen and investors are particularly strong adherents of the Confucian paradigm of interpersonal relationships in their business dealings with each other, as the Chinese believe that the cultivation of personal relationships is the fundamental source of entrepreneurial and investment success. Moreover, Vietnamese businesses of Chinese ownership are part of the larger bamboo network , a business network of Overseas Chinese companies operating in the markets of Greater China and Southeast Asia that share common family, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties. Hoa have also acted as agents for expatriate Mainland and Overseas Chinese investors outside of Vietnam, serving as their primary source of economic intelligence. Under the Saigon administration, a rapid influx of expatriate Chinese businessmen and investors from Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan arrived in South Vietnam seeking new business and investment opportunities. The Hoa compradore bourgeoisie in South Vietnam also received economic and political backing from wealthy expatriate Chinese businessmen from Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as Overseas Chinese investors in the United States and other Southeast Asian countries. Additionally, prominent Hoa compradore bourgeoisie were often observed colluding and mingling with Saigon’s government officials and the South Vietnamese military elite to further enhance their wealth. Furthermore, Hoa business networks, adhering to the Confucian paradigm of guanxi or personal relationships, cooperate with extended family members to marshal capital, utilize technology, and establish distribution networks. In addition, Hoa business networks employ business negotiations in casual settings that occur during Hoa community activities hosted by Hoa-based associations and guilds. Philanthropy is also a significant tenet, with wealthy Hoa businesspeople frequently making generous charitable donations to the less fortunate within the community and providing them with the necessary startup financial and social capital to establish their own businesses. Historically, the success of Hoa-owned enterprises was largely attributed to a strong emphasis on family-oriented operations, trust-based networks, openness to Han internationalization, and patronage towards the Chinese community. Much like the bamboo network, Hoa-owned businesses and business networks operating under Đổi Mới center on family management, where senior management teams work collaboratively with the founder’s relatives to oversee the company’s daily corporate activities. Many of the founders emerged from humble beginnings, starting as laborers and establishing their own part-time businesses by borrowing meager sums of startup capital from their families, gradually passing down the business to the next generation.

From 1948 to 1955, the Hoa played a significant role in the production, slaughter, and retailing of pork in Saigon-Cholon. Throughout the southern cities of Vietnam, the Hoa predominated the herbal and medicinal trade in the early 1950s, in addition to operating numerous noodle stalls, restaurants, and teahouses, and maintaining a strong position in the trade of dried and salted fish. From 1945 to 1954, Hoa business families were engaged in silk and textile manufacturing, with various Hoa subgroups monopolizing different industries across the Hoa economic landscape. The Hokkien participated in shipbuilding, operated banks, and managed rubber and coconut oil plantations. The Hainanese, on the outskirts of large Vietnamese cities, worked as market gardeners and pepper farmers, and ran restaurant chains within the city limits, while the Teochew worked as textile merchants, butchers, book dealers, manual laborers, and in the fishing sector. Until the nationality regulations enacted by the Vietnamese government in 1956, the Hoa controlled well over 80 percent of the country’s entire retail trade.

By the 1950s, the Hoa wielded considerable influence over Vietnam’s economic life. The societal implications of such vast economic power led to the stereotypical perception of the Chinese community as “a state within a state ,” forming a more distinctively cosmopolitan and wealthier population than the indigenous Kinh majority. The Hoa controlled the majority of South Vietnam’s economy, with their disproportionate economic influence and pronounced success invariably provoking resentment, envy, insecurity, and outright hostility from their Kinh counterparts. Despite being naturalized Vietnamese citizens, the Hoa remained somewhat detached from the mainstream of Vietnamese society, expressing a desire to remain culturally Chinese in their private lives. Cultural distinctions were delineated along ethno-racial lines, reinforced by the Chinese community’s strong attachment to their Han ancestral histories, which fostered kinship ties among fellow Hoa families. They adhered to traditional patterns of personal and social relations governed by the enduring principles of Confucianism. Given the Hoa community’s inclination to remain separate from mainstream Vietnamese life, they voluntarily disassociated and segregated themselves from the Kinh majority, typically by engaging primarily within the Chinese community. The Hoa satisfied their preferences by attending Chinese institutions and marrying within the Han Chinese community, projecting a sense of Han “superiority ”], “clannishness ,” and unabashedly affirming a distinct sense of their own Han ethnic identity , nationalism , and cultural exclusivity in contrast to their Kinh majority counterparts. After the withdrawal of French colonial authorities from Vietnam in the 1950s, the Ngô Đình Diệm government attempted to Vietnamize the economy by limiting Hoa and French participation while seeking to increase Kinh economic involvement to achieve a proportionate foothold relative to their population size. Unfortunately, these policy enactments aimed at curbing Hoa economic influence proved counterproductive. The Kinh, seeking to challenge the pervasive Hoa economic dominance through their own commercial activities, found themselves unable to compete with Hoa-owned businesses. Their ventures to curb Chinese economic influence ultimately failed due to a lack of capital and weak international business ties.

Up until the 1960s, the Hoa, along with their Overseas Chinese counterparts, dominated Vietnam’s garment and textile industries. The nation’s 600 small and medium-sized textile businesses and the top three textile manufacturing firms (Vinatex, Vinatexco, and Vinatefico) were under Chinese ownership, supplying up to four-fifths of the country’s total textile output. The Hoa also dominated Vietnam’s processing sectors, including cooking oil, dairy, cosmetics, plastics, and rubber industries, in addition to controlling 80 percent of the largest metallurgical factories in South Vietnam. Amidst the significant dominance of the Chinese in the Vietnamese retail trade, the development of extensive canal systems was central to this dominance, enabling Chinese merchant traders to exert their economic influence and maintain their monopoly over Vietnam’s shipping industry. Hoa retail merchants also controlled wholesale trades in Binh Tay, An Dong, and Soai Kinh Lam markets, and were responsible for three-fifths of the retail goods distributed throughout Southern Vietnam. In Vietnamese business circles, the Hoa were referred to as “crownless kings,” “rice kings,” “oil kings,” “gasoline kings,” or “scrap-iron kings,” reflecting their shrewd business acumen and investment prowess, particularly in Chợ Lớn, which served as a center for Hoa private enterprise throughout the South. Highly publicized profiles of wealthy Hoa businessmen and investors often garnered significant public interest and were used to illustrate the Chinese community’s substantial economic influence nationwide. The extensive materials supply chain system ensured maximum support for Hoa businesspeople, providing them with complete access to goods and services for sale to their clientele. The South Vietnamese market was allegedly structured to favor the Hoa, ensuring maximum profits and price manipulation through the Vietnamese import-export and transportation systems. One of the most notorious Hoa compradore bourgeoisie in South Vietnam was businessman and investor Ly Long Than, who reportedly held a diverse portfolio of business assets, including 18 major commercial and industrial manufacturing establishments (Vinatexco and Vinafilco textile factories, Vinatefinco dye-works, Vicasa steel factory, Nakydaco edible oil factory), presided over the Rang Dong shipping line, a real estate holding company, a luxury hotel, an insurance agency, a chain of restaurants, and was a controlling shareholder in sixteen Vietnamese banks, including the Vietnamese branches of the Bank of China and the Agricultural Bank of China , as well as the Agriculture Industry Commerce Bank. Foreign investors and visitors doing business in Chợ Lớn would recall the numerous import-export shipping lines, banks, modern high-rise buildings, luxury hotels, bars, discotheques, and restaurants all under the control of Hoa businessmen and investors. Other notable Hoa compradore bourgeoisie investors include Hoan Kim Quy, a native of Hanoi who amassed his fortune from barbed wire manufacturing and presided over a prominent shipping line, managed a large textile and appliance import business, held a gold mining concession, and led a trading cooperative. He also served as a corporate director of the Vitaco shipping line and was a major shareholder in several Vietnamese banks.

The presence of Chinese in the Vietnamese economy has been likened to the vital “blood circulation system of a human body.” This level of indispensability can be attributed to the widespread involvement of the Chinese in various economic sectors, particularly in trade – where they controlled a majority of Vietnamese trade in 1958 – as well as in banking and commerce. Also in 1958, the Hoa controlled 60 percent of Saigon’s 70 rice mills and owned 580 spinning and weaving firms operating as small family businesses. Their Overseas Chinese compatriots, active in markets across Southeast Asia, played a crucial role in Vietnam’s transportation sector and dominated the country’s import-export trade. By 1961, the Hoa controlled 80 percent of all capital in Vietnam’s retail trade and 75 percent of the nation’s overall commercial activities. Utilizing the Confucian paradigm of personal networks , the Hoa dominated several industries, including financial services, food, information technology, chemicals, electrical and electronic equipment, machinery, fabricated metals, wholesale trade, transportation equipment, and other miscellaneous services. Constituting a mere 1 percent of Vietnam’s population, the Hoa controlled an estimated 90 percent of non-European private capital in the mid-1960s and dominated Vietnam’s entire retail trade, financial services sector, manufacturing establishments, transportation outlets, and all aspects of the country’s rice trade. In the hospitality industry, the Hoa owned over 50 percent of the largest hotels and 90 percent of small hotels and boarding houses in the Saigon-Cholon and Gia Dinh areas, respectively, in addition to operating 92 large restaurants, 243 tea and beer shops, 48 hotels, and 826 eateries. Furthermore, the Hoa controlled a significant portion of restaurants, beverage establishments, hotels, amusement parks, recreation centers, medical facilities, educational institutions, and other miscellaneous establishments throughout Vietnam. Notably, Hoa businessmen operated restaurants and hotels as a springboard for further business ventures, as these enterprises generated quick profits with minimal startup capital. Moreover, due to a lack of bureaucratic red tape, hospitality companies were not subject to Vietnamese government regulation or local discriminatory policies. Although numerous wealthy Kinh individuals existed within the Vietnamese commercial class, the vast majority of economic power remained concentrated in the hands of the Hoa minority, fueling outright resentment, jealousy, insecurity, envy, and hostility from the Kinh majority.

Throughout the mid-1960s, the Hoa developed large-scale monopolies and oversaw powerful financial cartels, resulting in significant wealth concentration in Chinese hands. Their Overseas Chinese compatriots amassed considerable fortunes through their intricate network of exclusive rotating credit associations, which provided them with a distinct competitive advantage over rivals. By 1970, it was estimated that while the Hoa constituted only 5.3 percent of Vietnam’s total population, they reputedly controlled 70 to 80 percent of the country’s entire commercial sector. In 1971, Hoa controlled 2,492 shops, equivalent to 41 percent of all small and medium-sized shops in Saigon-Cholon’s nine districts. Additionally, the Hoa controlled 100 percent of wholesale trade and 50 percent of retail trade in South Vietnam before 1975. Hoa-owned businesses dominated much of the economic activity in Saigon , South Vietnam, controlling 80 percent of South Vietnam’s overall industry despite constituting a small percentage of the population. Prior to the Fall of Saigon , the Chinese controlled 40.9 percent of small-scale enterprises and 100 percent of wholesale trade in South Vietnam, transitioning from smaller retail outlets to larger wholesale enterprises. Hoa-owned enterprises accounted for 45.6 percent of all businesses involved in Vietnam’s import trade in the early 1970s. Furthermore, 815 of the 966 direct and indirect importers in 1971 were controlled by the Hoa, along with 300 Hoa-owned shipping lines operating in Ho Chi Minh City alone, with as many as fifty large Chinese agents representing these shipping agencies, brokering deals based on demand for various agricultural, seafood, and forestry products. Throughout the early 1970s, the Hoa firmly retained control of the country’s rice milling enterprises, retail trading cooperatives, pawnshops, moneylending services, and various key import-export markets. During this period, Vietnam’s river transportation business was primarily under Hoa operational control. The Hoa operated and owned several small steamboats that transported rice paddies from the country’s outlying regions to Saigon, which was their main export market.

During the Vietnam War , the wealth of the Hoa increased dramatically as they capitalized on lucrative business opportunities presented by the arrival of American troops, who required a trade and services network to meet their military needs. The war prompted the South Vietnamese government to gradually liberalize and deregulate the economy, adopting relatively free-market policies that allowed the local Hoa business community to exploit emerging opportunities, further extending their commercial dominance into Southern Vietnam’s light industry. Throughout the war, the Hoa leveraged American foreign aid, expanding not only their trade and services networks but also their operations in other industrial domains, enabling them to control nearly all key sectors of South Vietnam’s economy, including trade, industry, banking, communications, and transportation. Of the over US$100 billion poured into the war effort by the United States, a significant portion ended up in the hands of the Hoa, enriching them and further intensifying the aggregate wealth and economic power held by the Chinese. The capital infusion and expansion of the war effort spurred unprecedented economic growth in the South during the 1960s and early 1970s, with the road network and communication infrastructure significantly aiding the development and growth of the Hoa’s commercial grip within Southern Vietnam’s private business sector. In 1972, the Hoa owned 28 of the 32 banks in South Vietnam, handled over 60 percent of the total volume of goods imported into South Vietnam through American aid, and constituted 84 percent of direct and indirect shipping importers. In 1974, Hoa investment in the amusement and recreation sector accounted for 20 percent, and made up 80 percent of the total investment in the medical and health services industry. By the end of 1974, the Hoa controlled over 80 percent of the food, textile, chemical, metallurgy, engineering, and electrical industries, 100 percent of wholesale trade, over 50 percent of retail trade, and 90 percent of the import-export trade in South Vietnam. The Hoa’s commercial dominance over the South Vietnamese economy enabled them to “manipulate prices ” of rice and other scarce goods traded on the South Vietnamese commodity markets. Other major industries in the South, such as steel fabrication, textile manufacturing, rice processing, import-export trade, and cement mixing, were under the economic hegemony of the Hoa. The Hoa controlled nearly two-thirds of the circulating cash, 80 percent of the processing industry, 80 percent of fixed assets in manufacturing, 100 percent of wholesale trade, 50 percent of retail trade, and 90 percent of the import-export trade. The Hoa monopolized 100 percent of the grain trade and secured 80 percent of credits from South Vietnamese banks, controlling 42 out of the 60 companies with a turnover exceeding 1 billion piasters, including major banks, and accounting for two-thirds of the total annual investments in the South. Furthermore, the Hoa were responsible for generating 75 percent of the commercial economic output in South Vietnam in 1975, including controlling 100 percent of domestic wholesale trade, 80 percent of industry, 70 percent of foreign trade, and presiding over half the country’s retail trade. Despite the ongoing Vietnam War, the Hoa continued to thrive commercially and dominate Southern Vietnamese commerce and industry, with upwards of 80 to 90 percent of the South’s wholesale and retail trade falling under Chinese control. Hoa businessmen also controlled trade in key wholesale markets such as Binh Tay, An Dong, and Soai Kinh Lam. Additionally, the Hoa controlled the entire wholesale system, with upwards of 60 percent of retail goods distributed by Hoa entrepreneurs throughout various Southern Vietnamese provinces and into neighboring Cambodia. With the Hoa’s pervasive economic grasp in the South, approximately 117 of the 670 leading Southern Vietnamese business families were of Chinese ancestry.

Before 1975, the influx of Chinese investment capital, entrepreneurship, and skilled manpower in South Vietnam played a significant role in shaping the development of Vietnam’s domestic markets and international trade. In South Vietnam, the Hoa controlled over 90 percent of non-European capital, 80 percent of the food, textile, chemical, metallurgy, engineering, and electrical industries, 100 percent of wholesale trade, over 50 percent of retail trade, and 90 percent of the import-export trade. Of the Chinese-owned factories and manufacturing establishments operating in Southern Vietnam before 1975, the Hoa controlled 62.5 percent of food manufacturing, 100 percent of tobacco manufacturing, 84.6 percent of textile manufacturing, 100 percent of pulp and paper mills, 100 percent of chemical production, 100 percent of pottery manufacturing, 100 percent of steel and iron fabrication, 100 percent of engineering, 80 percent of food processing, and 100 percent of print manufacturing. The overwhelming economic dominance exerted by the Hoa led to resentful accusations from the Kinh majority, who felt they could not successfully compete against Chinese-owned businesses in a free-market capitalist system. With the Hoa’s evident economic influence, it was noted by 1983 that over 60 percent of Southern Vietnam’s bourgeoisie were of Han Chinese ancestry. Hoa merchants controlled the entirety of South Vietnam’s rice paddy market and obtained up to 80 percent of the South’s bank loans. Furthermore, Hoa entrepreneurs and investors owned 42 of the 60 corporations in South Vietnam with an annual turnover exceeding 1 million dong, and their investments accounted for two-thirds of the aggregate investment in the South.

The Hoa also became dominant in Vietnam’s financial services sector, pioneering the Vietnamese financial services industry and playing a key role in the emergence of some of Vietnam’s early banking houses and esteemed financial institutions. In the early twentieth century, the Franco-Chinese bank was jointly established by French and Hoa businessmen and investors in Saigon-Cholon. After the bank’s inauguration, its initial capital rapidly increased from 10 million to 50 million francs within five years. After learning sound Western banking practices under French stewardship, the Hoa soon applied their acquired knowledge and experience by establishing and managing their own banks, providing much-needed credit and loans to Hoa rice merchants and financing their own pawnshops. Pawnshops and moneylending services owned by the Hoa community significantly contributed to the Vietnamese banking sector by offering credit facilities and loans to small businesses, as well as to individuals in the urban Vietnamese working class and rural agricultural communities. In the early years of the Republic of Vietnam, the Hoa controlled three of the ten private banks nationwide, while the rest were owned by British and French entities. Additionally, the Hoa managed foreign branches of banks based in Mainland China, including the Bank of China , Bank of Communications , and Bank of East Asia , all of which had a direct international presence in Vietnam’s nascent banking sector. In South Vietnam, 28 of the 32 banks were controlled by the Hoa, with capital under Chinese ownership accounting for 49 percent of the total capital invested in eleven local private banks in 1974. Furthermore, the Hoa managed the bank’s Chinese Affairs Office to serve the needs of the Hoa business community. A notable success story in the pioneering of Vietnam’s banking industry is attributed to Hoa banker and businessman Đặng Văn Thành. Thành, who established Sacombank in 1991, has since become one of Vietnam’s leading banks, eventually becoming the first bank listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange in December 2006. Today, Sacombank engages with various banking industry constituents, operating as a wealth management house, investment bank, corporate financial advisory firm, brokerage, and private equity firm. On August 10, 2007, Thành fulfilled his commitment to the Hoa community by inaugurating a Sacombank branch for them, named Hoa-Viet Branch. Located in the Chinatown district of Ho Chi Minh City, this specialized branch serves as a financial institution specifically catering to Hoa clients and addressing the local banking needs of the Hoa community in Mandarin. Thành, a second-generation Hoa of Hainanese ancestry on his father’s side, began his business career operating several small factories producing sugarcane, cooking wine, and cattle feed. He then ventured into the banking sector, assuming the position of Chairman of the Thành Công banking cooperative and joining Sacombank’s board of directors in 1993, where he was promoted to Chairman two years later. The bank’s expansion and subsequent success contributed significantly to Thành’s personal and family fortune, with his family ranked among the top ten wealthiest in Vietnam in 2008. 2014 marked a major milestone for Sacombank when it announced its merger with Southern Bank, owned by Trầm Bê, another Hoa banker and businessman of Teochew descent. Today, Thành’s wife and children play a significant role in the daily operations of the family’s business, which has expanded into real estate and brewing. Of the five women in Thành’s immediate and extended family, their combined net worth totals 2,178 billion đồng (USD$136.12 million).

Reunification and Doi Moi (1975–present)

The control and regulation of markets represented one of the most sensitive, contentious, and persistent political issues confronting the Vietnamese revolutionary government following the initial stages of North-South integration in 1975. The incoming Lê Duẩn administration, in its doctrinaire pursuit of nationalizing the market-oriented Southern economy, faced several paradoxes. The foremost was the necessity to both cultivate and curtail the significant presence of commercial business activity controlled by the Hoa in the South, particularly in Ho Chi Minh City, as Chinese-owned businesses dominated much of the city’s commercial landscape and the broader Southern Vietnamese economy. Approximately one-fifth of the city’s 6,000 private companies and 150,000 small businesses were operated by the Hoa community. The commercial endeavors of these businesses contributed over 30% to Ho Chi Minh City’s overall business output, largely due to the superior equipment utilized by these enterprises. Following the breakdown of relations with China in 1978, some Vietnamese political leaders harbored fears regarding potential espionage activities within the Hoa business community. On one hand, Hoa-owned businesses controlled trade in various commodities and services, including the development of pharmaceuticals, fertilizer distribution, grain milling, and foreign currency exchange, sectors that were ostensibly presumed to be state-owned monopolies. On the other hand, Hoa businessmen also provided excellent access to international markets for Vietnamese exports through Hong Kong and Singapore. Such access became increasingly vital during the 1980s as a means to circumvent the trade boycott imposed on Vietnam by numerous Asian and Western nations. Southern Vietnamese politicians noted that the Hoa business community in Chợ Lớn remained active in municipal politics and the Vietnamese Communist Party, but maintained their primary focus on entrepreneurship, business, and investment. For centuries, the Chinese have been influential in Vietnam’s economic activities while remaining detached from the nation’s political affairs. This observation aligns with the acknowledgment by scholars specializing in Overseas Chinese immigration that the overseas Chinese community primarily focuses on their commercial pursuits and economic activities, earning a livelihood and accumulating wealth, thus taking only a passive interest in the formal political affairs of the countries in which they reside. Regardless of the Vietnamese political climate, the Hoa business community felt secure when engaging in everyday public business life as well as participating in activities that improved and enriched their social and cultural lives in private.

After Vietnam’s reunification in 1976, the socialist and revolutionary Vietnamese government began to use the Hoa as a convenient scapegoat for the nation’s socioeconomic problems. The revolutionary government characterized the enterprising Chinese as “bourgeois ” and perpetrators of “world capitalism.” Brutal and draconian policies were instituted against the Chinese, involving “employing the techniques Hitler used to inflame hatred against the Jews ,” as reported by Ray Wallace of U.S. News and World Report in 1979. This led to many Hoa being persecuted, fleeing the country, or succumbing to death after laboring in Vietnam’s so-called “new economic zones.” Many Hoa had their businesses and property confiscated by the Communists after 1975, and numerous Hoa fled the country as boat people due to persecution by the newly established Communist government. Persecution of the Hoa intensified in the late 1970s, with some even forcibly “kicked out” of the country. This occurred at a time when Vietnam experienced severe tensions with China in the late 1970s, and the government feared the Hoa collaborating with the Chinese communist government as a result of the Sino-Vietnamese War . Despite this, the remaining Chinese still controlled an estimated 66% of the nascent private economy, primarily concentrated in Saigon. Although enduring years of persecution by the socialist Vietnamese government, the Hoa have begun to reassert and regain much of the economic influence they previously held in the Vietnamese economy. Since the early 1980s, the Vietnamese government has gradually reintegrated the Chinese community into laying the groundwork for Vietnam’s mainstream economic development. By 1986, changes implemented through the Doi Moi reforms encouraged the Hoa to actively participate in driving Vietnam’s economic development. Such sweeping reforms enabled the Hoa community to re-establish themselves as a significant economic powerhouse in the country, reclaiming a substantial level of influence previously held within the Vietnamese private sector. Since the late 1980s, extensive economic reforms and the consistent implementation of new policies have allowed the Hoa community to broaden their economic ventures and exert greater influence over a significant portion of the economy.

Until the early 1990s, Hoa-owned businesses in Ho Chi Minh City contributed 40 percent to its entire gross domestic product output. The post-1988 Doi Moi reforms have enabled the Hoa community to re-establish themselves as the country’s most dominant economic force and reclaim a significant portion of their previous influence. By the 1990s, the commercial role and influence of the Hoa in Vietnam’s economy had substantially rebounded since the introduction of Doi Moi. The Vietnamese government’s post-1988 shift towards capitalist-based free-market liberalization led to a remarkable resurgence of Chinese economic dominance across the country’s urban areas. Large Vietnamese companies owned and operated by the Hoa have been established since the early 1990s, including the Viet-Hoa Construction Company (which also operates in the hotel and banking sectors), the Viet Huong Instant Noodle Processing Company, and the Binh Tien (Biti’s) Footwear Enterprise. According to District 5 statistics from the Vietnamese Department of Industry and Trade in 1990, there were 8,653 registered Chinese business households, of which 963 operated hotels and restaurants, and 854 provided services. Registered Hoa-owned businesses constituted 75 percent of all market stalls in the urban market district of Binh Ta , the largest wholesale market in the country. Across the nation, enterprising Hoa entrepreneurs and investors have reasserted much of their former economic influence prior to 1975. The Hoa, with their commercial prowess, have once again begun to contribute significantly to the expansive development of Vietnamese internal markets and capital accumulation, serving the purpose of small-scale industrial business incubation, as 45 percent of all privately registered Vietnamese businesses were founded by individuals of Chinese descent in 1992. In Ho Chi Minh City alone, Hoa entrepreneurs have generated half of the city’s commercial market activity and have extended their economic primacy into Vietnam’s light industry, import-export trade, shopping malls, and private banking sector. In 1996, Hoa entrepreneurs continued to dominate Vietnam’s private industry, generating an estimated $4 billion in commercial business volume, representing one-fifth of the country’s total domestic business output.

Modern Population

The official census conducted in 2019 recorded the Hoa population at 749,466 individuals, ranking ninth in terms of population size. Seventy percent of the Hoa reside in cities and towns, where they constitute the largest minority group, predominantly in Ho Chi Minh City, while the remainder live in rural areas of the southern provinces. The Hoa had constituted the largest ethnic minority group in the mid-20th century, with their population peaking at approximately 1.2 million, or about 2.6% of Vietnam’s population in 1976, a year after the end of the Vietnam War . Just three years later, the Hoa population had decreased to 935,000 as large numbers of Hoa left Vietnam. The 1989 census indicated an increase in the Hoa population to 960,000 individuals, though their proportion had dropped to 1.5% by then. In 1999, the Hoa population was around 860,000 individuals, or approximately 1.1% of the country’s population, by which time they were ranked as Vietnam’s fourth-largest ethnic group.

Ancestral Affiliations

The Hoa trace their ancestral origins to various regions of China centuries ago and are identified based on the dialects they speak. In cities with substantial Chinese communities, such as Ho Chi Minh City , Chinese communities have established clan associations that identify themselves by surnames or their ancestral homelands. In southern Vietnam, five distinct bang or clans are traditionally recognized within the Hoa community: Quảng (Cantonese), Tiều (Teochew), Hẹ (Hakka), Phúc Kiến (Hokkien), and Hải Nam (Hainanese), with the Cantonese forming the largest group. Each of these Hoa sub-groups tends to congregate in different towns, and one dialect group may be more predominant than others.

Other Sinitic groups

• Ngái (Chinese: 𠊎) are primarily Hakka-speaking people, classified distinctly by the Vietnamese government. Other groups, such as the Hlai or Tanka , are also classified as Ngái.
• Sán Dìu (Chinese: 山由) are a Yue -speaking group of Yao origin residing around the Tam Đảo range in Northern Vietnam. Some ethnic Hoa in Thái Nguyên province, who speak Quan hỏa or Southwest Mandarin Chinese, also identify as Sán Dìu.
• Sán Chay (Chinese: 山泽), also known as Cao Lan, are an ethnic group found sporadically in Northern Vietnam. Some Sán Chay speak Cao Lan , a Tai-Kadai language, while others speak Pạc và (Chinese: 白话), another name for Pinghua . According to the 2009 census, there are 18,444 ethnic Hoa in Bắc Giang province , the majority residing in Lục Ngạn district . However, many self-identify as Nùng, Kinh, or Sán Chỉ-Cao Lan.
• Chinese Nùng (Hoa Nùng; distinct from the Tai -speaking Nùng , an ethnic group in Vietnam related to the Zhuang of China) are Cantonese and Hakka-speaking people from the eastern regions of Quảng Ninh and Lạng Sơn provinces. After 1954, approximately 50,000 Chinese Nùng resettled in Bình Thuận and Đồng Nai provinces. Some identify themselves as Ngái .
• Xạ Phang (Chinese: 下方) are a group of 2,000 Chinese speakers primarily living in the western districts of Điện Biên province . They immigrated from China during the 20th century.

Diaspora Communities

Today, numerous Hoa communities exist in Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, where they have revitalized existing Chinatowns. For example, the established Chinatowns in Los Angeles , Oakland , Houston , Dallas , Toronto , Honolulu , and Paris possess a distinct Vietnamese atmosphere due to the significant presence of Hoa people. Some of these communities also host associations for displaced Hoa refugees, such as the Association des Résidents en France d’origine indochinoise in Paris.

Orange County, California , is also home to a substantial Hoa diaspora community, as are Cabramatta, New South Wales , Australia, and Mississauga, Ontario , Canada.

The Chinese Vietnamese population in China numbered up to 300,000 by the year 2000, residing primarily in 194 refugee settlements, mostly in the provinces of Guangdong , Guangxi , Hainan , Fujian , Yunnan , and Jiangxi . Over 85% have achieved economic independence, but the remainder live below the poverty line in rural areas. While they possess most of the same rights as Chinese nationals, including employment, education, housing, property ownership, pensions, and healthcare, they have not been granted citizenship and continue to be regarded by the government as refugees. Their refugee status allowed them to receive assistance from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) until the early 21st century. In 2007, the Chinese government began drafting legislation to grant full Chinese citizenship to Indochinese refugees, including the ethnic Hoa who constitute the majority, living within its borders.

Genetics

While native Kinh Vietnamese predominantly share ancestry with southern Chinese, closely related to Lingnan Han, Hoa people exhibit slight differences in haplogroup frequencies. For instance, haplogroup O1b1a2 and its sublineages are most prevalent in Hoa people, who also show a higher frequency of these haplogroups compared to eastern Chinese and Chinese residing in the southeastern regions of Northeast China. The frequency of the maternal haplogroup R9’F (39%) is substantially higher among the Hoa compared to the average Vietnamese population (27%).

Notable Hoa people

Historical figures

• Lý Tài , merchant pirate.
• Trần Văn Lắm , President of the Vietnamese Senate and minister for foreign affairs for the Republic of Vietnam during the height of the Vietnam War .
• Lai Teck , leader of the Communist Party of Malaya and the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army .
• Lâm Quang Thi , Lieutenant General of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War .
• Lê Văn Viễn , Major General of the Vietnamese National Army and head of Bình Xuyên , a powerful Vietnamese crime syndicate .
• Nguyễn Lạc Hoá , refugee nationalist Catholic priest , leader of the “Nung fighters” in Cà Mau during the Vietnam War (Originally from Guangxi, China ).

Celebrities

• Hà Vương Ngầu Nại , Vietnamese footballer .
• La Hối , Vietnamese musician.
• Lam Trường , Vietnamese singer.
• Lương Bích Hữu , Vietnamese actress and pop singer.
• Lý Hùng , Vietnamese vovinam artist, actor, film director, producer, entrepreneur, philanthropist, activist, and singer.
• Tống Anh Tỷ , Vietnamese footballer .
• Trấn Thành , MC and artist.
• Tăng Thanh Hà , Vietnamese actress and model.

Hoa diaspora

• David Tran , Founder of Huy Fong Foods Sriracha.
• Carol Huynh , Canadian wrestler.
• Chi Muoi Lo , actor, writer, director, and producer.
• Learner Tien , American Tennis player.
• Chau Giang , American poker player , three-time World Series of Poker bracelet winner and three-time final tablist of the World Poker Tour .
• Frank Jao , prominent American businessman in Southern California .
• Jack Lee , American celebrity chef .
• Eric Ly , American entrepreneur , investor and co-founder of LinkedIn .
• Ching Hai , spiritual leader of the Guanyin Famen (Chinese) or Quan Yin Method transnational cybersect (Real Name: Hue Dang Trinh).
• Ray Lui Leung-Wai , Hong Kong actor, famous for his role in TVB Classic, The Bund .
• Pauline Chan , Australian actress, director, screenwriter, and producer.
• Jeannie Mai , American television host, make-up artist, and stylist.
• Jennifer Pan , Canadian woman who committed matricide .
• Kyle Colonna , American soccer player.
• Gia Huy Phong , German footballer.
• Eliza Sam , Canadian actress.
• Vico Thai , Australian actor.
• Priscilla Chan , philanthropist and spouse of Mark Zuckerberg .
• Ke Huy Quan , American Academy award-winning actor and stunt choreographer .
• Tsui Hark , Hong Kong film director, producer, and screenwriter.
• Wan Kwong , Hong Kong singer, known as “The Temple Street Prince” (Real Name: Lui Minkwong).
• Wong Kwok-hing , Hong Kong trade unionist and a former member of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong .
• Olivia Munn , American Actress.
• France Nuyen , French-American Actress.
• Krew , a Canadian YouTube gaming group, consisting of Kat La (Funneh), Betty La (Rainbow), Kim La (Gold), Wenny La (Lunar), and Allen La (Draco), all siblings.