Iraqi Kurdistan

Ah, another historical tidbit you wish to dissect. Very well. Let’s illuminate this corner of the world, shall we? Try not to get lost in the dust of ages.

Kurdish-inhabited region in Iraq

This article is not about the Kurdistan Region , the semi-autonomous federal entity. It concerns itself with the broader geographic and cultural territory within Iraq that has historically been and continues to be predominantly inhabited by Kurds . It is considered a vital segment of Greater Kurdistan , a conceptual homeland for the Kurdish people that sprawls across Western Asia, encompassing parts of southeastern Turkey (known as Northern Kurdistan ), northwestern Iran (Eastern Kurdistan ), and northern Syria (Western Kurdistan ). A significant portion of this Kurdish-populated area within Iraq is officially recognized as the Kurdistan Region , a semi-autonomous region enshrined in the Constitution of Iraq . Like the rest of the historical Kurdistan, this region is characterized by its rugged, mountainous terrain, a stark contrast to the more arid landscapes found in much of the rest of Iraq.

Etymology

The precise etymological origins of the term “Kurd” remain somewhat elusive, a topic of scholarly debate and historical conjecture. The suffix “-stan” is a venerable Iranian term, signifying “land” or “region.” Thus, the literal and widely accepted translation of Kurdistan is the “Land of Kurds.” Historically, the spelling has seen variations, with “Curdistan” appearing in older texts. It’s also worth noting that the ancient region of Corduene , situated in what is now southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, is often cited as a potential precursor or namesake for the broader Kurdish homeland.

Geography

The landscape of Iraqi Kurdistan is predominantly defined by its dramatic, mountainous topography. The highest elevation within this region is an unnamed peak, locally referred to as Cheekha Dar , which translates to “black tent,” reaching an impressive 3,611 meters (11,847 feet) above sea level. Among the prominent mountain ranges that sculpt this terrain are the mighty Zagros Mountains, the distinctive Sinjar Mountains , the Hamrin Mountains , Mount Nisir , and the rugged Qandil mountains . The region is crisscrossed by numerous rivers, contributing to its reputation for fertile lands, abundant water resources, and breathtaking natural beauty. The Great Zab and the Little Zab rivers flow generally from east to west through this territory, while the Tigris River makes its journey into Iraq from the Kurdish regions of Turkish Kurdistan .

The combination of its mountainous character, varied microclimates, and plentiful water sources makes Iraqi Kurdistan a land ideally suited for both agriculture and tourism. The largest body of water in the region is the expansive Lake Dukan . Other notable lakes include Darbandikhan Lake and Duhok Lake. Moving westward and southward from the more dramatic eastern mountains, the terrain gradually transitions into rolling hills and open plains , often covered in hardy sclerophyll scrubland, a testament to the region’s diverse ecological zones.

Climate

Owing to its northerly latitude and significant altitude, Iraqi Kurdistan experiences a considerably cooler and wetter climate than the rest of Iraq. The majority of the region falls under the influence of a Mediterranean climate (classified as Csa in the Köppen climate classification), with areas in the southwestern reaches exhibiting a more semi-arid character (BSh).

Summers can be intensely hot, with average temperatures ranging from around 35 °C (95 °F) in the cooler northernmost areas to a scorching 40 °C (104 °F) in the southwest. Nighttime temperatures during this season typically hover between 21 °C (70 °F) and 24 °C (75 °F). Winters, however, offer a dramatic respite from the heat, being markedly colder than in other parts of Iraq. Daytime highs average between 9 °C (48 °F) and 11 °C (52 °F), while nighttime lows can drop to around 3 °C (37 °F) in some areas and frequently dip below freezing, averaging around −2 °C (28 °F) to 0 °C (32 °F) in others.

Cities like Soran , Shaqlawa , and Halabja are known to experience winter nighttime temperatures that average below freezing. Duhok often records the hottest summer temperatures in the region, with daytime highs averaging around 42 °C (108 °F). Annual rainfall varies considerably across Iraqi Kurdistan; some areas, like Erbil, receive as little as 500 millimeters (20 inches) of rain annually, while others, such as Amadiya, can receive up to 900 millimeters (35 inches). The bulk of this precipitation occurs during the winter and spring months, often in the form of heavy downpours. Summers and early autumn are characterized by a near-total absence of rain, while spring offers a milder, transitional period. Snowfall is not uncommon during the winter months, and frost is a regular occurrence. A slight seasonal lag can be observed in temperature peaks in some areas during summer, with the hottest periods sometimes extending into August and September.

Climate data for Erbil

Source 1: Climate-Data.org, ¹⁴ My Forecast for records, humidity, snow and precipitation days ¹⁵ Source 2: What’s the Weather Like.org, ¹⁶ Erbilia ¹⁷

Climate data for Amadiya

Source 1: World Weather Online (precipitation days) ¹⁸ Source 2: Climate-Data (temperatures and rainfall amount) ¹⁹

Economy

The provinces of Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah, which form the core of Iraqi Kurdistan, are blessed with significant agricultural potential. Wheat and various other cereals are cultivated extensively throughout these areas. While much of the agriculture relies on rainfed practices, there are also established, albeit smaller, irrigation systems that support cultivation. Beyond agriculture, tourism has emerged as a vital sector, drawing considerable attention to the Kurdistan Region (KRI). This burgeoning tourism sector was recognized when Erbil was designated the Tourism Capital by the Arab Council of Tourism in 2014.

History

Pre-Islamic period

The region of Iraqi Kurdistan bears witness to a deep and complex history, stretching back to prehistoric times. Evidence of early human habitation, including a Neanderthal culture, has been unearthed at the renowned Shanidar Cave . The area was also a cradle for the Jarmo culture, flourishing around 7000 BCE. Further evidence of early settlement comes from Tell Hassuna , the center of the Hassuna culture, dating back to approximately 6000 BCE, marking it as one of the earliest neolithic sites in the broader Kurdistan region.

During the Early and Middle Bronze Age, this territory was known geographically as Subartu and was populated by peoples speaking Hurrian dialects, alongside the Gutians and [Lullubi]. By 2200 BCE, the region fell under the dominion of Naram-Sin of Akkad , and subsequently, in 2150 BCE, it came under the rule of the Gutians. Key urban centers mentioned in inscriptions from this era include Mardaman , Azuhinum, Ninet , Arrapha , Urbilum (the ancient precursor to modern Erbil), and Kurda .

In the early second millennium BCE, the region was dominated by the kingdom of Kurda. However, this was briefly interrupted in the 18th century BCE when it was conquered by the Amorite king Shamshi-Adad I , who incorporated it into his Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia. By the 1760s BCE, the kingdom of Kurda faced an invasion during the Babylonian-Elamite War, eventually aligning itself with the powers of Mari and Babylon.

In the 16th century BCE, the Mitannians brought the region into their Hurrian empire. Following the collapse of the Mitannian Empire due to Hittite incursions, the region gradually came under the influence and eventual rule of the Assyrians between the 14th and 13th centuries BCE. Tukulti-Ninurta I, in the 13th century BCE, definitively conquered the entire area, appointing one of his commanders as the governor of the settlements of Kurda. The territory of Kurda was subsequently reduced to a province centered around the modern-day area of Sinjar. The city of Erbil saw its name Akkadianized to Arba-ilu, and during the Neo-Assyrian Empire, it became particularly noted for its distinct cult of the goddess Ishtar . In the early first millennium BCE, parts of the region also fell under the sway of Urartu and the kingdom of Musasir, with the modern Rawandiz district serving as a significant religious center for the Urartians.

The Medes conquered the region in the 7th century BCE, and it later became part of the Achaemenid Empire, remaining within the satrapy of Media. When the Greek historian Xenophon traversed the region in the 4th century BCE, he noted its occupation by the Medes. In 332 BC, the region was conquered by Alexander the Great and subsequently fell under the rule of the Greek Seleucid Empire . This period of Hellenistic influence lasted until the mid-second century BCE, when it came under the control of Mithridates I of Parthia . Throughout the roughly four centuries of Parthian rule (247 BCE to 226 AD), the region was governed by semi-independent principalities, including those of Barzan and Sharazur. In the 1st century AD, it was also partially under the dominion of the Jewish kingdom of Adiabene . Between the 3rd and 4th centuries AD, the region was ruled by the House of Kayus before being incorporated into the Sasanian Empire in 380 AD, where it was renamed Nodshēragān. During the period from the 1st to the 5th centuries AD, Christianity gradually spread throughout the region. Erbil, in particular, became the seat of the metropolitan of Hadhyab within the Church of the East , with several bishoprics established, including those at Marga, Beth Garmai, Beth Qardu, Beth MahQard, Beth BihQard, Beth Nuhadra, and Shahr-Qard. In Syriac , the region was commonly referred to as Beth Qardwaye.

Islamic period

The region was conquered by Arab Muslims in the mid-7th century AD as part of the broader Muslim conquest of Persia . The initial Muslim incursions into the area involved engagements with Kurdish forces in Mosul and Tikrit. In 641 AD, ‘Utba ibn Farqad captured all the Kurdish forts upon his conquest of Erbil. The territory subsequently became integrated into the Islamic Caliphates, initially the Rashidun , then the Umayyad , and later the Abbasid Caliphates. Following the eventual disintegration of these caliphates, Iraqi Kurdistan became a part of various Iranian , Turkic , and Mongol emirates . After the dissolution of the Ak Koyunlu confederation, its territories, including what is now Iraqi Kurdistan, passed to the Iranian Safavids in the early 16th century.

Between the 16th and 17th centuries, the area comprising modern Iraqi Kurdistan, formerly governed by the principalities of Baban , Badinan , and Soran , was a constant point of contention, frequently changing hands between the archrivals, the Safavids and the Ottomans . It was only in the mid-17th century, following the Ottoman–Safavid War (1623–39) and the subsequent Treaty of Zuhab , that the Ottomans established a decisive hold over the region. In the early 18th century, control briefly shifted to the Iranian Afsharids under Nader Shah . After Nader Shah’s assassination in 1747, Ottoman suzerainty was reasserted. Direct Ottoman rule was finally established in 1831, persisting until the conclusion of World War I , when the Ottoman Empire was defeated by the British Empire .

Kurdish revolts under British control

During the tumultuous period of World War I, the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France carved up the territories of West Asia . The subsequent Treaty of Sèvres (which never entered into force) and the Treaty of Lausanne that replaced it, laid the groundwork for the modern nation-states of Western Asia and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. The League of Nations allocated mandates for France over Syria and Lebanon , and for the United Kingdom over Palestine (which then comprised two autonomous regions: Mandatory Palestine and Transjordan ) and the territory that would become Iraq . Other former Ottoman territories on the Arabian Peninsula eventually came under the control of Saudi Arabia and Yemen .

In 1922, the British authorities reinstated Shaikh Mahmud Barzanji to power in an attempt to utilize him as a buffer against Turkish territorial claims over Mosul and Kirkuk . However, Shaikh Mahmud soon proved defiant to British control, declaring a Kurdish Kingdom in 1922 with himself as king. It took the British two years to suppress this Kurdish uprising and bring the areas under submission, with Shaikh Mahmud ultimately disappearing into hiding.

A subsequent uprising led by Shaikh Mahmud commenced in 1930, following the announcement of Iraq’s admission to the League of Nations. This revolt was ultimately quelled by British air and ground forces.

By 1927, the Barzani clan had emerged as prominent advocates for Kurdish rights within Iraq. In 1929, the Barzani family formally demanded the establishment of a distinct Kurdish province in northern Iraq. Encouraged by these assertions, Kurdish notables submitted a petition to the League of Nations in 1931, requesting the creation of an independent Kurdish government. Later that year, Ahmed Barzani initiated a Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi government. Although this rebellion was suppressed within months, it significantly bolstered the Kurdish struggle for self-determination and laid the groundwork for future prominent Kurdish leaders like Mustafa Barzani .

During the period of World War II, the power vacuum in Iraq was keenly exploited by Kurdish tribes. Under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani, a significant rebellion erupted in the north, enabling the Kurds to effectively control Kurdish-dominated areas until 1945. At this point, the Iraqi government, with British support, managed to regain control. Facing pressure from both the Iraqi government and the British, the most influential leader of the Barzani clan, Mustafa Barzani, was compelled to seek exile in Iran in 1945. Following the collapse of the Republic of Mahabad in 1946, he eventually relocated to the Soviet Union .

Barzani Revolt (1960–1970)

Main article: First Iraqi–Kurdish War

Following the military coup orchestrated by Arab nationalists on July 14, 1958, Mustafa Barzani was invited by the new leader, Abdul Karim Qasim , to return from exile. His return was met with widespread acclaim. As part of an understanding between Qasim and Barzani, Qasim had pledged to grant the Kurds regional autonomy in exchange for Barzani’s political support. The Provisional Constitution of Iraq acknowledged the country’s inclusion within the Arab world but also recognized the Kurds as partners in the Iraqi state. The national coat of arms even featured a Kurdish dagger alongside the Arab sword, symbolizing this partnership. During 1959–1960, Barzani assumed leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which was officially recognized and granted legal status in 1960. However, by early 1960, it became increasingly apparent that Qasim had no intention of fulfilling his promise of regional autonomy. Consequently, the KDP began to actively campaign for these rights. In response to growing Kurdish dissent and the consolidating power of Barzani, Qasim began to encourage historical rivals of the Barzani clan, such as the Baradost and Zebari tribes, leading to inter-tribal conflicts throughout 1960 and early 1961.

By February 1961, Barzani had successfully overcome pro-government forces and solidified his position as the undisputed leader of the Kurdish people. At this juncture, Barzani issued an order for his forces to occupy and expel all government officials from Kurdish territories. This action was met with strong opposition in Baghdad, leading to the cancellation of the Third Kurdish Teachers Congress and Qasim’s denial that “Kurds” constituted a distinct nation. Qasim subsequently began preparations for a military offensive into the north to reassert government control. Meanwhile, in June 1961, the KDP presented Qasim with a detailed ultimatum outlining Kurdish grievances, including a demand for the Kurdish language to be recognized as an official language in Kurdish-majority regions. Qasim disregarded these demands and proceeded with his war plans.

The Kurdish revolt effectively ignited on September 10, 1961, when an Iraqi army column was ambushed by a Kurdish group. In retaliation, Qasim ordered the Iraqi Air Force to carry out indiscriminate bombings of Kurdish villages, an act that served to unite the entire Kurdish population behind Barzani. Due to Qasim’s deep-seated distrust of the Iraqi Army , which he deliberately kept inadequately supplied with ammunition—even implementing a policy of ammunition rationing—his government proved incapable of suppressing the insurrection. This stalemate created significant discontent within powerful military factions and is widely considered a primary factor leading to the Ba’athist coup that overthrew Qasim in February 1963. In November 1963, following internal power struggles within the Ba’athist movement, Abdul Salam Arif seized power in a coup. Subsequently, after another unsuccessful military campaign against the Kurds, Arif declared a ceasefire in February 1964. This ceasefire, however, led to a division within the Kurdish movement, separating urban radicals from the Peshmerga (freedom fighters) led by Barzani.

Barzani accepted the ceasefire and expelled the radical elements from the KDP. Following the unexpected death of Arif, who was succeeded by his brother, Abdul Rahman Arif , the Iraqi government launched a final attempt to defeat the Kurds. This campaign met with failure in May 1966, when Barzani’s forces achieved a decisive victory over the Iraqi Army at the Battle of Mount Handrin, near Rawandiz . Reports from the time suggest that an entire Iraqi brigade was annihilated in this engagement. Recognizing the futility of continued military action, Rahman Arif proposed a 12-point peace program in June 1966. However, this program was never implemented due to the overthrow of Rahman Arif in a 1968 coup by the Ba’ath Party .

The Ba’ath government then initiated a concerted campaign to end the Kurdish insurrection, but this effort stalled in 1969. This stagnation can be attributed, in part, to internal power struggles within Baghdad and also to escalating tensions with neighboring Iran. Furthermore, the Soviet Union exerted pressure on the Iraqi government to reach a settlement with Barzani. A peace plan was formally announced in March 1970, which promised broader Kurdish autonomy and representation in government bodies, with implementation scheduled over a four-year period. Despite these assurances, the Iraqi government simultaneously pursued an Arabization program in the strategically important, oil-rich regions of Kirkuk and Khanaqin .

In the subsequent years, the Baghdad regime managed to overcome its internal divisions, forging a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in April 1972 and consequently ending its diplomatic isolation within the Arab world. Conversely, the Kurds remained heavily reliant on Iranian military support and were thus limited in their ability to significantly strengthen their own forces.

Second Kurdish Iraqi War Algiers Agreement

Main article: Second Iraqi–Kurdish War

In 1973, the United States entered into a secret agreement with the Shah of Iran, initiating covert funding of Kurdish rebels against Baghdad through the Central Intelligence Agency , in collaboration with the Mossad . These covert operations were part of broader geopolitical strategies involving Iraq, continuing from the Iraqi invasion and extending to the present day. By 1974, the Iraqi government launched a renewed offensive against the Kurds, pushing them towards the Iranian border. Iraq signaled to Tehran its willingness to address other Iranian demands in exchange for a cessation of aid to the Kurds. Through the mediation of Algerian President Houari Boumediene , Iran and Iraq reached a comprehensive agreement in March 1975, known as the Algiers Pact . This accord effectively left the Kurds without external support, as Tehran immediately cut off supplies to the Kurdish movement. Mustafa Barzani fled to Iran with a significant number of his followers, while others surrendered en masse, leading to the swift collapse of the rebellion.

As a direct consequence, the Iraqi government reasserted its control over the northern region after a 15-year period of intermittent conflict. To consolidate its influence, Baghdad initiated an Arabization program, relocating Arab populations to areas near oil fields in northern Iraq, particularly around Kirkuk, and other regions historically inhabited by Turkmen , Kurds, and Christians. The repressive measures implemented by the government against the Kurds following the Algiers Agreement led to renewed clashes between the Iraqi Army and Kurdish guerrilla forces in 1977. In 1978 and 1979, approximately 600 Kurdish villages were destroyed, and around 200,000 Kurds were forcibly deported to other parts of the country.

Arabization campaign and PUK insurgency

The Ba’athist government of Iraq engaged in systematic forced displacement and cultural Arabization of minority populations, including Kurds , Yezidis , Assyrians , Shabaks , Armenians , Turkmen , and Mandeans . These policies, implemented from the 1960s to the early 2000s, were driven by a desire to shift the demographics of northern Iraq in favor of Arab dominance, reflecting a form of settler colonialism . Under the leadership of Saddam Hussein , the Ba’ath party intensified these expulsion campaigns from the mid-1970s onwards. Between 1978 and 1979 alone, 600 Kurdish villages were reportedly burned, and approximately 200,000 Kurds were deported.

These campaigns were intrinsically linked to the ongoing Iraqi–Kurdish conflict , fueled by deep-seated ethnic and political tensions between Kurds and Arabs. The Arab settlement programs reached their zenith in the late 1970s, coinciding with the Ba’athist regime’s efforts at depopulation of minority areas. The Ba’athist policies driving these events have been characterized by scholars as “internal colonialism,” with Dr. Francis Kofi Abiew describing it as a “Colonial ‘Arabization’” program that involved large-scale deportations of Kurds and the forced settlement of Arabs in the region.

Iran–Iraq War and Anfal Campaign

See also: Kurdish rebellion of 1983

During the intense Iran–Iraq War , the Iraqi government escalated its anti-Kurdish policies, leading to a de facto civil war within the country. While the international community widely condemned Iraq’s actions, particularly the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds—which resulted in the tragic Halabja chemical attack —these condemnations rarely translated into significant punitive measures. The Anfal campaign is widely recognized as a systematic act of genocide targeting the Kurdish people of Iraq.

The second and far more extensive phase of the Anfal campaign commenced on March 29, 1987, and continued until April 23, 1989. During this period, the Iraqi army, under the command of Saddam Hussein and Ali Hassan al-Majid , perpetrated a genocidal campaign against the Kurds. This campaign was marked by egregious human rights violations, including the widespread deployment of chemical weapons, the complete destruction of an estimated 2,000 Kurdish villages, and the slaughter of approximately 50,000 rural Kurds, according to even the most conservative estimates. The large Kurdish town of Qala Dizeh , with a population of 70,000, was utterly razed by the Iraqi army. The campaign also encompassed a systematic Arabization of Kirkuk, aimed at expelling Kurds and other ethnic groups from the strategically vital, oil-rich city and replacing them with Arab settlers from central and southern Iraq.

Autonomous period

After the Persian Gulf War

Although a degree of autonomy had been formally agreed upon in 1970, the local population in Iraqi Kurdistan did not experience genuine democratic freedoms, living under conditions largely similar to the rest of Iraq. A significant shift occurred following the 1991 uprising against Saddam Hussein at the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 authorized the establishment of a safe haven, driven by international concern for the plight of Kurdish refugees. The U.S. and its coalition partners initiated a No-Fly Zone over a substantial portion of northern Iraq (as part of Operation Provide Comfort ), although this measure notably excluded key Kurdish population centers such as Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk. Persistent armed clashes between Iraqi forces and Kurdish fighters continued. Eventually, an uneasy balance of power was achieved, leading to the complete withdrawal of Iraqi military and government personnel from the region in October 1991. This withdrawal effectively allowed Iraqi Kurdistan to function as a de facto independent entity, governed by the two principal Kurdish parties: the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The region also established its own distinct flag and national anthem .

Concurrently, Iraq imposed a severe economic blockade on the region, drastically curtailing its supplies of oil and food. Elections held in June 1992 resulted in an inconclusive outcome, with the newly formed parliament almost equally divided between the two main parties and their respective allies. During this period, the Kurds found themselves subjected to a dual embargo: one imposed by the United Nations on Iraq as a whole, and another imposed by Saddam Hussein specifically on their autonomous region. The extreme economic hardship stemming from these embargoes exacerbated existing tensions between the KDP and PUK over control of vital trade routes and resources. Relations between the PUK and KDP began to deteriorate significantly from September 1993, following rounds of political realignments and party mergers.

After 1996, a portion of Iraq’s oil revenues—specifically 13%—was allocated to Iraqi Kurdistan, leading to a period of relative economic improvement in the region. In return, the KDP facilitated Saddam Hussein’s efforts to establish an oil smuggling route through territory under KDP control, with the active participation of senior members of the Barzani family. The taxation of this trade at the crossing points between Saddam’s territory and Kurdish-controlled areas, and subsequently into Turkey, along with related service revenues, meant that whoever controlled the strategic cities of Dohuk and Zakho had the potential to generate millions of dollars weekly. Direct mediation by the United States eventually led the two parties to a formal ceasefire, formalized in the Washington Agreement in September 1998. It is also argued that the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme from 1997 onwards played a significant role in de-escalating hostilities.

During and after US-led invasion

Iraqi Kurds played a crucial role in the Iraq War . Kurdish parties united against the Iraqi government during the conflict in the spring of 2003. The Kurdish military forces, known as the Peshmerga , were instrumental in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, since then, the Kurds have generally shown reluctance to deploy their troops into Baghdad, preferring to avoid entanglement in the sectarian violence that has come to dominate much of Iraq.

A new constitution for Iraq was ratified in 2005, establishing Iraq as a federalist state composed of Regions and Governorates. The Kurdistan Region was defined to include the Governorates of Erbil , Sulaymaniyah , and Duhok . The constitution recognized both the Kurdistan Region and all laws enacted by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) since 1992. It also included provisions allowing Governorates to form new regions, join existing ones, or leave them. As of late 2015, however, no new regions had been established, and the KRG remained the sole regional government within Iraq.

Jalal Talabani , a prominent leader of the PUK, was elected President of the new Iraqi federal administration, while Masoud Barzani , the leader of the KDP, assumed the position of President of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Following US withdrawal

Further information: Disputed territories of Northern Iraq and 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum

Tensions between Iraqi Kurdistan and the central Iraqi government escalated significantly throughout 2011–2012, centering on disputes over power-sharing arrangements, oil production policies, and territorial control. In April 2012, the president of Iraq’s semi-autonomous northern Kurdish region issued a stark warning: either officials would agree to their demands, or the region would pursue secession from Baghdad by September 2012.

In September 2012, the Iraqi federal government issued a directive ordering the KRG to transfer its authority over the Peshmerga forces to the central government. Relations became further strained with the establishment of a new command center, the Tigris Operation Command, intended to oversee Iraqi forces operating in a disputed area claimed by both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government . On November 16, 2012, a military clash erupted between Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga, resulting in one fatality. CNN reported that two individuals were killed (one of them an Iraqi soldier) and ten others wounded in clashes that occurred in the town of Tuz Khurmato.

As of 2014, Iraqi Kurdistan remained in a state of dispute with the federal Iraqi government concerning territorial control, the export of oil, and the distribution of the national budget. The region was largely functioning outside Baghdad’s direct control. Amidst the escalating Iraqi crisis and growing fears of Iraq’s potential collapse, discussions regarding independence gained momentum among the Kurdish population. During the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive , Iraqi Kurdistan forces seized control of the city of Kirkuk and its surrounding territories, as well as a significant portion of the disputed territories in northern Iraq. On July 1, 2014, Masoud Barzani announced that “Iraq’s Kurds will hold an independence referendum within months.” Notably, Turkey, which had previously opposed Kurdish independence aspirations, began to signal a potential recognition of an independent Kurdish state. On July 11, 2014, KRG forces took control of the Bai Hassan and Kirkuk oilfields , prompting strong condemnation from Baghdad and threats of “dire consequences” if the oilfields were not returned to Iraqi federal control.

In September, Kurdish leaders made the decision to postpone the independence referendum, prioritizing the ongoing fight against ISIL (ISIS). In November, Ed Royce , then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives, introduced legislation aimed at directly arming the Kurdish forces, bypassing the local governments.

In August 2014, the United States commenced a campaign of airstrikes in Iraq, partly as a measure to protect Kurdish areas, such as Erbil, from the advance of militant forces.

In February 2016, Kurdish President Masoud Barzani reiterated his stance, stating, “Now the time is ripe for the people of Kurdistan to decide their future through a referendum,” drawing parallels to similar independence referendums held in Scotland , Catalonia , and Quebec . On March 23, Barzani officially declared that Iraqi Kurdistan would hold the referendum sometime “before October” of that year. On April 2, 2017, the two main governing Kurdish parties issued a joint statement announcing the formation of a committee to prepare for a referendum scheduled for September 25.

The 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum took place on September 25, with an overwhelming 92.73% of voters choosing in favor of independence. This outcome triggered a swift military operation by the Iraqi federal government, which successfully retook control of Kirkuk and the surrounding territories. The KRG was subsequently forced to annul the referendum results. Scholars have argued that the retaking of Kirkuk, a traditional stronghold of the PUK, and the loss of other territories to federal control, paradoxically strengthened the political position of the Barzani family and the KDP, who retained power. Following the Kurdistan Region’s unsuccessful bid for independence after the 2017 referendum, the Iraqi federal government implemented a series of severe punitive measures against the KRI, ultimately aiming to curtail its autonomy. Some Kurdish officials in Iraq interpret these actions as evidence of Baghdad’s intention to revert to a centralized political system, abandoning the federal model adopted in 2005. In September 2023, the Prime Minister of the KRG, Masrour Barzani , sent a letter to the President of the United States, appealing for intervention and warning of the potential collapse of the Kurdistan Region and the “federal model ” in Iraq.

Culture

Kurdish culture encompasses a rich tapestry of distinctive traits and practices shared by the Kurdish people. This cultural heritage is a legacy derived from various ancient peoples who contributed to the shaping of modern Kurds and their society, with a primary influence from Iranian traditions. Among their regional neighbors, Kurdish culture exhibits notable similarities to Persian culture. A prime example is the shared celebration of Newroz as the New Year festival, observed on March 21, coinciding with the first day of the month of Xakelêwe in the Kurdish calendar and marking the vernal equinox.

• Kurdistan portal
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External links

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• Baghdad Invest at the Library of Congress Web Archives (archived 2015-11-15) – Kurdistan Investment Research
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• Turkey
• Aegean dispute
• Cyprus
• Pan-Turkism
• Yemen

Europe

Eastern

• Belarus
• Bulgaria
• Czechoslovakia
• Hungary
• Moldova
• Poland
• Kresy
• Kresy myth
• Intermarium
• Romania
• unification with Moldova
• Russia
• annexation and occupation of Crimea
• proposed annexation of South Ossetia
• invasion and occupation of Ukraine
• Ukraine

Northern

• Finland
• Karelia

Southern

• Albania
• unification with Kosovo
• Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Croatia
• Greece
• Aegean dispute
• Cyprus
• Enosis
• Megali Idea
• North Macedonia
• Portugal
• Serbia
• Kosovo Myth
• partition of Kosovo
• Spain
• Gibraltar
• Slovenia
• Yugoslavia

Italy

• Corfu
• Corsica
• Dalmatia
• Istria
• Italian Grisons
• Malta
• Nice
• Savoy
• Ticino

Western

• Belgium
• Celtics
• France
• Wallonia
• Germany
• Austria
• annexation of Austria
• Pan-Germanism
• Greater Germanic Reich
• Lebensraum
• Ireland
• Netherlands
• Switzerland

North America

• Canada
• Turks and Caicos Islands
• Mexico
• Saint Martin
• United States
• 51st state
• Canada
• Greenland
• Mexico
• Cuba
• Dominican Republic

Oceania

• Australia
• Papua New Guinea
• Samoa

South America

• Argentina
• Chile
• Colombia
• Venezuela

Related concepts: Border changes since 1914 · Partitionism · Reunification · Revanchism · Revisionism · Rump state

36°55′N 44°2′E / 36.917°N 44.033°E / 36.917; 44.033