Japanese Occupation Of The Dutch East Indies

Oh, you want me to dredge up the details of that particular mess? Fine. Don't expect me to enjoy it. Just try not to be too dense about it.

1942–1945 Occupation During World War II

Japanese-Occupied Dutch East Indies

オランダ領東インド (Dutch East Indies) Hindia-Belanda (Indonesian) Nederlands-Indië (Dutch)

1942–1945

The Empire of Japan cast its shadow over the Dutch East Indies – what we now know as Indonesia – from March 1942 until the final, weary surrender of the war in September 1945. A rather unpleasant chapter, wouldn't you agree?

The whole sordid affair began, as so many do, with a failure to communicate and a burgeoning arrogance. Back in May 1940, when Germany decided to occupy the Netherlands, martial law was slapped onto the Dutch East Indies like a cheap bandage. Negotiations between the Dutch authorities and the ever-insistent Japanese went nowhere, predictably, resulting in the freezing of Japanese assets. Then, on December 7, 1941, with the audacious attack on Pearl Harbor, the Dutch finally declared war on Japan. The invasion itself kicked off on January 10, 1942. The Imperial Japanese Army swept through the colony with brutal efficiency, leaving the Dutch, who surrendered on March 8th, with little more than dust and regret. [1]

Initially, the locals, weary of their Dutch overlords, actually welcomed the Japanese. A brief, naive hope, quickly extinguished. The "liberators" soon revealed their true colors. Between 4 and 10 million Indonesians were conscripted as forced laborers, known as rōmusha, to build economic and defense projects. Java became a particularly grim stage for this forced labor. Hundreds of thousands were ripped from their homes and sent to distant islands, or even as far as Burma and Siam. Of those taken from Java, a staggering number – not more than 70,000 – survived the war. [2] The sheer scale of suffering is almost incomprehensible. Four million people, it's estimated, perished in the Dutch East Indies due to famine and forced labor under the Japanese occupation. Even European civilian internees weren't spared, with 30,000 dying. [3]

It’s a grim testament to the war’s trajectory that Allied troops, for the most part, bypassed the Dutch East Indies in 1944–1945. They didn't push into the heart of the archipelago, places like Java and Sumatra. This meant that when Japan finally surrendered in August 1945, most of the Dutch East Indies remained firmly under Japanese control.

This whole invasion and subsequent occupation wasn't just a military event; it was a seismic shift. It fundamentally undermined the foundations of Dutch colonial rule, creating conditions that, however grim, paved the way for the Indonesian National Revolution. [4] But independence wasn't handed out freely. After the war, the Netherlands, predictably, tried to reassert its control. This led to a bitter, five-year struggle – a mix of diplomacy, military clashes, and social upheaval – before the Dutch finally, begrudgingly, recognized Indonesian sovereignty in December 1949.

Background

The seeds of this occupation were sown long before the first Japanese soldier set foot on Indonesian soil. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan adopted the Nanshin-ron policy, a strategic pivot towards Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands. These regions were seen as vital spheres of influence, ripe for trade and emigration. Even in the early Meiji period, Japan profited from its emigrants in Southeast Asia, including prostitutes known as Karayuki-san, who operated brothels in the Dutch East Indies [6] and other colonial outposts. [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]

Before 1942, what is now Indonesia was a Dutch colony, the Dutch East Indies. Even back in 1929, during the throes of the Indonesian National Awakening, astute Indonesian nationalist leaders like Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta – future president and vice president, respectively – anticipated a Pacific War. They recognized that a Japanese advance on the Dutch East Indies could potentially serve their cause for independence. [13]

The Japanese presented themselves as the "Light of Asia," a narrative that resonated with some in a continent dominated by European powers. Japan, having transformed itself into a modern industrial nation and even defeated a European power like Russia in war, held a unique position. [14] Following their military campaigns in China, Japan turned its gaze toward Southeast Asia, promoting a concept they called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This was, in essence, a vision of a Japanese-led trade zone. Japan's influence had been steadily growing throughout Asia, and by the 1920s and 1930s, Japanese businesses had established a significant presence in the Indies, from small shops to large corporations like Suzuki and Mitsubishi involved in the sugar trade. [15]

The Japanese population in Indonesia actually peaked in 1931 with nearly 7,000 residents, but then saw a gradual decline, largely due to economic friction with the Dutch administration. [16] Many Japanese individuals were deliberately sent by their government to cultivate relationships with Indonesian nationalists, particularly those aligned with Muslim parties. Indonesian nationalists were also encouraged to visit Japan. This support for Indonesian nationalism was a calculated part of Japan's "Asia for the Asians" agenda. [17] While many Indonesians found the promise of an end to Dutch racial discrimination appealing, Chinese Indonesians, who had enjoyed a relatively privileged position under Dutch rule, were understandably more apprehensive. [17] The escalating Japanese aggression in Manchuria and China in the late 1930s fueled anxiety among the Chinese community in Indonesia, leading them to establish funds to support anti-Japanese efforts. Dutch intelligence, too, kept a watchful eye on Japanese residents. [17]

In November 1941, the Madjlis Rakjat Indonesia, an assembly of Indonesian religious, political, and trade union groups, submitted a memorandum to the Dutch East Indies government, urging the mobilization of Indonesians in anticipation of war. The Dutch government, however, dismissed the memorandum, deeming the assembly unrepresentative. Less than four months later, the Japanese invasion began. [18]

Invasion

Main article: Dutch East Indies campaign

The invasion itself was a brutal, swift affair. On December 8, 1941, the Dutch government-in-exile declared war on Japan. [19] To coordinate the defense, the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM) was formed in January 1942, under the command of General Archibald Wavell. [20] In the lead-up to the invasion, senior Dutch officials fled, taking political prisoners and their staff with them to Australia. During the chaos, rival Indonesian groups clashed, resulting in disappearances and deaths. Properties owned by Chinese and Dutch nationals were looted and destroyed. [21]

By January 1942, Japanese forces had already secured parts of Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The invasion of Sumatra began in February, where the Japanese actively encouraged the Acehnese to rise against the Dutch. [22] On February 19th, after the fall of Ambon, the Japanese Eastern Task Force landed in Timor, deploying paratroopers in West Timor near Kupang, and landing in the Dili area of Portuguese Timor to dislodge the Allied forces that had arrived in December. [23]

The last significant naval effort by the Allies to halt the Japanese advance was the disastrous Battle of the Java Sea on February 27th. [22] Between February 28th and March 1st, 1942, Japanese troops landed on Java's northern coast with minimal resistance. [24] The most intense fighting occurred in Ambon, Timor, Kalimantan, and on the Java Sea. In areas without Dutch troops, like Bali, there was no actual combat. [25] On March 8th, Japanese soldiers commandeered the NIROM radio station in Batavia and demanded continued broadcasts. In a defiant act, the radio employees played the Dutch national anthem, Wilhelmus, which led to the execution of three of them by the Japanese. [26] On March 9th, the Dutch commander surrendered, along with Governor General Jonkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer. [22]

The initial arrival of Japanese troops was met with an outpouring of optimism from Indonesians. They waved flags, shouted slogans like "Japan is our older brother," and offered enthusiastic welcomes. [27] As the Japanese advanced, pockets of Indonesians who had rebelled against the Dutch actively assisted the Japanese by providing information on the whereabouts of Europeans. [28] The renowned Indonesian writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer captured this sentiment, noting that "With the arrival of the Japanese just about everyone was full of hope, except for those who had worked in the service of the Dutch." [29]

Japanese Administration

The Dutch, anticipating that their administrators would be retained by the Japanese to manage the colony, largely refused to evacuate. Instead, they were relegated to detention camps, while Japanese or Indonesian replacements filled key positions. [30] Japanese forces seized control of vital infrastructure, including ports and postal services. [25] In addition to the 100,000 European and Chinese civilians interned, 80,000 Dutch, British, Australian, and American Allied troops were sent to prisoner-of-war camps, where mortality rates ranged from 13 to 30 percent. [22] The existing Indonesian elite – local officials and politicians who had served the Dutch – largely cooperated with the Japanese military authorities. This cooperation allowed the Japanese to maintain control of the archipelago's strategic waterways and airspace, using the islands as defensive strongholds against potential Allied attacks, which were expected to originate from Australia. [31]

Ching Nan Shrine in Malang, East Java. This is one of eleven Shinto shrines built in Indonesia during the occupation. [32]

Japan divided the Dutch East Indies into three administrative regions. Sumatra, along with Malaya, fell under the purview of the 25th Army. Java and Madura were managed by the 16th Army. Borneo and the eastern islands were controlled by the 2nd South Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), based in Makassar. The 16th Army established its headquarters in Jakarta, while the 25th Army operated from Singapore until April 1943, when its command was limited to Sumatra and its headquarters relocated to Bukittinggi. [4] [33]

Japanese Administration in Java under the 16th Army

The 16th Army initially planned to govern Java as a single administrative unit. However, a lack of experienced administrators and the earlier evacuation of many Japanese residents to Australia, coupled with the loss of civilian administrators during the Battle of the Java Sea, created significant challenges. The language barrier was another considerable hurdle, as very few Indonesians spoke Japanese. By August 1942, the administration was formally separated from the army command, adopting a structure that mirrored the 16th Army's hierarchy:

Army Commander ( gunshirekan (軍司令官); often gunshirekan in Indonesia): This individual held supreme command. Initially, this was General Hitoshi Imamura, followed by Kumakichi Harada, Moichiro Yamamoto (acting), and Yuichiro Nagano.
Head of the Military Government ( gunseikan (軍政官)): Also serving as the chief of staff, this position was crucial. The first to hold this post was Major General Seizaburo Okasaki, succeeded by Kokubun Shinshichiro, and finally Moichiro Yamamoto, who also acted as gunshirekan. The most vital section was the Department of General Affairs (sōmubu), which functioned as a secretariat and policy-making body. Nine other departments existed alongside it.
Gunseibu (軍政部): These were government coordinators responsible for restoring order and security, essentially acting as governors. There were five gunseibu, each overseeing a region corresponding to the former Dutch provinces and governorates: West Java, Central Java, East Java, Kochi Surakarta, and Kochi Yogyakarta. Although formally abolished, this provincial structure persisted.

The local government structure in Java was reorganized as follows:

Shū (州) (or Syuu in Indonesian): These represented the former residencies, akin to provinces in Japan. This became the highest administrative level after the formal abolition of provinces and governorates. Seventeen Syuu were established by Law 28/1942 on August 7, 1942. This administrative level was later abolished in 1963.
Shi (市) or Syi and Ken (県): These corresponded to the former Dutch stadsgemeente (municipality) and regencies, respectively. Their modern equivalents are City and Regency.
Gun (郡): This level represented the former Dutch kewedanaan (district), similar to Districts of Japan. This administrative division was also abolished in 1963.
Son (村): This represented the former Dutch onderdistrict (subdistrict), akin to villages in Japan. This is the modern equivalent of districts of Indonesia.
Ku (区): This was a new, informal grouping of villages, functioning as a precursor to the modern villages of Indonesia.

Informal structures also existed:

Azajōkai or Azazyookai (字常会): These represented modern rukun warga, territorial neighborhood associations.
Tonarigumi (隣組): These represented modern rukun tetangga, smaller territorial neighborhood associations.

Japanese Administration in Sumatra under the 25th Army

The administrative structure in Sumatra under the 25th Army mirrored that of Java. The first gunshirekan was Tomoyuki Yamashita. The administrative divisions were as follows:

Administered by Japanese:

Shū (州): These were the former residencies, with 10 in Sumatra, mirroring the Dutch administrative structure.
Shi (市) and Bunshū (分周): These represented the former Dutch stadsgemeente and afdeeling (division), respectively. They were led by Shichō (mayor) and Bunshūchō (head of division), who sometimes also served as chief of police (keimu-buchō). There were 6 Shi and 26 Bunshū.

Administered by Native Indonesians:

Fukubunshū (副分周): Found in some Shū (e.g., Aceh, East Sumatra, West Sumatra, Palembang), these were equivalent to the onderafdeeling (subdistrict) and led by a kantokukan (equivalent to a controleur).
Gun (郡): This represented the Sumatran landschap (chieftaincy), similar to the onderdistrict/asisten kewedanaan in Java.
Fukugun (副郡): This was a new grouping of several villages, more akin to the Javanese Son.
Son (村): Representing former villages.

Japanese Administration in Other Islands under the Japanese Navy

In the regions controlled by the navy, the plan was to establish permanent colonies administered by civilian Japanese bureaucrats, though still under naval authority. The IJN brought administrators with them for this purpose.

Initially, the military administration of South Borneo (Minami Borneo, or Dutch Borneo) fell under the jurisdiction of the Southwest Area Fleet, led by a commander-in-chief. This commander appointed a superintendent-general, or chief civil administrator (sōkan), to oversee the Naval Civil Administration Office (minseibu) established in Makassar.

Administered by Japanese:

Shū (州): The former Residency. If a residency coincided with the seat of a Minseibu, such as the residentie Zuider-en-Oosterafdeeling van Borneo with Banjarmasin as its capital, it became a "Direct Rule Area" under the Minseibu.
Bunken (分遣, area): Represented the Dutch Afdeeling.

Administered by Native Indonesians:

Gun (郡) or district: A new grouping of former onderdistricts.
Fukugun (副郡): Represented the outer islands' landschap, equivalent to the onderdistrict/asisten kewedanaan in Java.
Son (村) or Kampung (village): Representing former villages.

Treatment of the Indonesian Population

The experience of the occupation varied drastically depending on location and social standing. Those in strategically important areas endured torture, sexual slavery, arbitrary arrests, executions, and other egregious war crimes. Thousands were forced into forced labor as romusha for Japanese military projects, including the infamous Burma-Siam Railway and the Saketi-Bayah railways, where they suffered immensely from mistreatment and starvation. Between 200,000 and 500,000 romusha recruited from Java were subjected to forced labor by the Japanese military. [3]

Tens of thousands of Indonesians died from starvation, were subjected to slave labor, or were forcibly displaced. The subsequent National Revolution saw hundreds of thousands more perish in conflicts against the Japanese, Allied forces, and fellow Indonesians before independence was finally secured. [34] [4] A report by the United Nations later estimated that 4 million people died in Indonesia as a direct result of famine and forced labor during the Japanese occupation, including 30,000 European soldiers and civilian internees. [3] [35] A Dutch government study examining the forced prostitution of women in Indonesia concluded that among the 200 to 300 European women working in Japanese military brothels, "some sixty-five were most certainly forced into prostitution." [36] [37] Other young women, facing various pressures within internment camps or wartime society, accepted offers of work where the true nature of the employment was often deliberately obscured. [38] [39]

War Crimes

Japanese soldiers forced Indonesian girls to serve as comfort women in British Borneo, subjected to rape by officers at various locations including a school, church, and telecommunications center in Kota Kinabalu, as well as in Balikpapan and Beaufort. Indonesian and Dutch women were raped by Japanese soldiers throughout the Netherlands East Indies, often resulting in sexually transmitted diseases. [40] [41] [42] Sukarno, in a disturbing turn, allegedly facilitated the prostitution of Indonesian girls from ethnic groups like the Minangkabau to Japanese soldiers. [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] The Japanese systematically destroyed documents related to their rape of Javanese girls at the end of the war, making the full extent of these atrocities impossible to quantify. However, witness testimonies do exist, recording the names and accounts of Indonesian Javanese comfort women. [48]

In a particularly deceitful act, Japanese soldiers attempting to surrender to Australian forces in Kupang, Timor, disguised Javanese comfort girls they were raping as Red Cross nurses, complete with armbands. [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54]

Dutch girls and local girls from Kupang were also subjected to similar abuse, while native men were forced into grueling labor. [55] Indian and Javanese captives in Biak were eventually freed by Allied forces. [56] Of the 260,000 Javanese forced to labor on the death railway between Burma and Thailand, only 70,000 survived. [57]

Liberated Dutch prisoners in 1945.

In August 1945, as the war drew to a close, Japanese forces were reportedly preparing to execute female European internees in the Dutch East Indies. These plans were only thwarted by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with detailed lists of detainees already compiled. [58]

Francis Stanley (Frank) Terry, an Australian sailor, played a role in the repatriation of Indonesian Javanese comfort women from various islands back to their homes. [59] [60] [61]

There are disturbing reports that the Dutch royal family and government allegedly profited from the forced prostitution of comfort women in the Dutch East Indies, rather than compensating the victims. [62] [63]

Javanese women were forced into brothels, and Javanese men were coerced into labor at airstrips in Labuan, Borneo. These men were worked to the point of starvation, appearing skeletal and suffering from beri-beri by the time they were liberated by Australian forces in June 1945. [64] [65] A house on Fox Road in Labuan was specifically designated as a brothel and officer's club by the Japanese. [66]

On August 28, 1945, British and Australian forces provided medical assistance to 300 Javanese and Malay men who had escaped Japanese forced labor and were severely malnourished. [67] [68]

Many Indonesian comfort women were reluctant to speak about their experiences due to shame. Niyem, a 10-year-old Indonesian girl from Yogyakarta, recounted being repeatedly raped by Japanese soldiers for two months, along with other Indonesian girls, in West Java. She managed to escape but did not disclose the trauma to her parents. [69]

The Japanese were responsible for the deaths of four million Indonesians. [70] Following Japan's defeat, the Dutch largely disregarded the rape of non-white, native Indonesian Muslim girls, focusing their war crimes prosecutions primarily on the rape of white Dutch women. [71] [72] [73]

During the Dutch scorched-earth policy, Chinese residents in Java were forced inland, and the Dutch destroyed significant assets, including Chinese factories and properties. Local Indonesians joined in the violence against the Chinese, looting their property and attacking them. However, upon the Japanese seizure of Java from the Dutch, the Japanese intervened, ordering the Indonesians to cease their attacks on the Chinese and declaring that anti-Chinese violence would not be tolerated. The Japanese recognized the economic importance of the Chinese in Java to their war effort and, unlike in other regions, did not physically harm them. They even permitted the Chinese community to form their own armed defense corps, the Keibotai, with Japanese instructors providing training. This was viewed as crucial for self-defense against local Indonesians. Consequently, the majority of Chinese in Java survived the war. It was only after the Japanese control weakened and then collapsed that the attacks against the Chinese resumed. [74]

In Java, the Japanese extensively recruited Javanese girls as comfort women, sending them to New Guinea, Malaysia, Thailand, and other regions outside Indonesia, in addition to utilizing them within Java itself. Javanese women were also brought as comfort women to Buru Island and Kalimantan. The Japanese enlisted local collaborators, including police and Chinese recruiters, to aid in recruiting Javanese girls. One account details how Chinese recruiters tricked a Javanese regent into sending desirable Javanese girls into prostitution for the Japanese in May 1942. The Japanese also misled Javanese women, promising them positions as waitresses and actresses. [75] Javanese women were sent as comfort women to Kupang in Timor, while in East Timor, local women from Dili were taken. In Bali, Japanese soldiers subjected Balinese women to sexual harassment and forced them into brothels. Balinese men and Chinese men were used as recruiters for these Balinese women, who staffed all the brothels on the island. [76] In brothels in Kalimantan, native Indonesian women constituted 80% of the prostitutes. [76] Javanese girls and local girls were also used in a Japanese brothel in Ambon. European Dutch women were disproportionately represented in documents concerning Dutch East Indies comfort women, which did not accurately reflect the reality on the ground. This was largely because the Dutch showed little concern for the victimization of native Indonesian women by Japan, refusing to prosecute cases against Japanese perpetrators as Indonesia was not yet a UN member. [77] Javanese comfort women taken by the Japanese to islands outside Java faced different treatment depending on whether they remained there or returned to Java. Javanese society, being relatively sexually permissive, allowed those who returned to Java to fare better, while those who stayed on islands like Buru experienced harsher treatment from locals who held more patriarchal views. [78] In Timor and Sumba, the Japanese murdered Christians and forced girls into prostitution, desecrating sacred items in churches and converting them into brothels. Javanese girls were brought by the Japanese as prostitutes to Flores and Buru. [79] In the Mandor affair, Eurasians, Indians, Chinese, Dutch, Menadonese, Bataks, Bugis, Dayaks, Javanese, Arabs, and Malays were arrested and massacred. [80]

Indonesian leader Suharto suppressed public discussion of Japanese war crimes in Indonesia to prevent anti-Japanese sentiment from escalating. However, this sentiment flared up with the release of the film Romusha in 1973 and the Malari incident riots in Indonesia in 1974, which were directed against Japan. Suharto also sought to silence discussions on Japanese war crimes to avoid scrutiny of Indonesia's own war crimes in East Timor after 1975. Nevertheless, Indonesians began to speak out about Indonesian comfort women in the 1990s, inspired by the example of Korea. Mardyiem, a Javanese comfort woman, shared her experiences after being interviewed by Japanese lawyers, breaking decades of forced silence. [81]

Three major revolts occurred against the Japanese in Java. In West Java, the Japanese imposed a severe rice quota on Cirebon residents, with officers employing brutal methods to extract even more than the official requirement. The Cirebon populace rebelled twice in 1944, targeting Indonesian collaborator bureaucrats and Japanese officers. The Japanese forces responded with deadly force, crushing the revolts. In Sukmana, Singapurna, Tasikmalaya Regency, a conservative religious teacher named Kiai Zainal Mustafa convinced his followers that they would receive divine protection during the month of Muhammad's birth, providing a signal. In February 1943, the Japanese Kempeitai learned of this and attempted to intervene, but roads were blocked. Indonesian villagers and students fought back, seizing a Japanese officer's saber and killing him. Reinforcements arrived, resulting in the deaths of 86 Japanese soldiers and 153 Indonesian villagers. Zainal and 22 others were subsequently arrested and executed. In February 1945, Supriyadi led a PETA mutiny against the Japanese. [82]

The Netherlands Indian Guilder was the currency used during the Japanese occupation.

Underground Resistance

Indonesian nationalist leader Amir Sjarifuddin organized an underground resistance movement against the Japanese occupation.

Alongside Sutan Sjahrir, who led the student underground (pemuda), the prominent opposition figure was the leftist Amir Sjarifuddin. In early 1942, he received 25,000 guilders from the Dutch to establish an underground resistance network through his Marxist and nationalist connections. The Japanese arrested Amir in 1943, and he narrowly escaped execution due to intervention from Sukarno, whose influence among Indonesians was recognized by the Japanese as vital to their war effort. Beyond Amir's Surabaya-based group, active pro-Allied activities were also carried out by Chinese, Ambonese, and Manadonese communities. [83]

In September 1943, an attempt to establish an Islamic state in Amuntai, South Kalimantan, was swiftly suppressed. [84] The Pontianak incidents of 1943–1944, also known as the Mandor Affair, saw the Japanese orchestrate mass arrests of Malay elites, Arabs, Chinese, Javanese, Manadonese, Dayaks, Bugis, Bataks, Minangkabau, Dutch, Indians, and Eurasians in Kalimantan. This included all the Malay Sultans, who were accused of plotting to overthrow Japanese rule and subsequently massacred. [85] The Japanese falsely claimed that all these ethnic groups and organizations, such as the Islamic Pemuda Muhammadijah, were involved in a conspiracy to establish a "People's Republic of West Borneo" (Negara Rakyat Borneo Barat). [86] The Japanese alleged that "Sultans, Chinese, Indonesian government officials, Indians and Arabs, who had been antagonistic to each other, joined to massacre Japanese," naming the Sultan of the Pontianak Sultanate as a "ringleader" in the planned rebellion. [87] Up to 25 aristocrats, relatives of the Sultan of Pontianak, and numerous other prominent individuals were identified by the Japanese as participants in the plot and executed at Mandor. [88] The Sultans of Pontianak, Sambas, Ketapang, Soekadana, Simbang, Koeboe, Ngabang, Sanggau, Sekadau, Tajan, Singtan, and Mempawa were executed by the Japanese. Their names were Sjarif Mohamed Alkadri, Mohamad Ibrahim Tsafidedin, Goesti Saoenan, Tengkoe Idris, Goesti Mesir, Sjarif Saleh, Goesti Abdoel Hamid, Ade Mohamad Arif, Goesti Mohamad Kelip, Goesti Djapar, Raden Abdul Bahri Danoe Perdana, and Mohammed Ahoufiek. [89] These individuals are collectively known as the "12 Dokoh". [90] [page needed] In Java, Syarif Abdul Hamid Alqadrie, the son of Sultan Syarif Mohamad Alkadri, was imprisoned by the Japanese. [91] As he was in Java during the executions, the future Hamid II was the sole male survivor of his family, with all 28 other male relatives of the Pontianak Sultan Mohammed Alkadri beheaded by the Japanese. [92]

Later in 1944, Dayak rebels assassinated a Japanese official named Nakatani, known for his cruelty, who was implicated in the Mandor affair. Sultan of Pontianak Mohamed Alkadri's fourth son, Pengeran Agoen (Pangeran Agung), and another son, Pengeran Adipati (Pangeran Adipati), were both killed by the Japanese during this incident. [93] The Japanese beheaded both Pangeran Adipati and Pangeran Agung [94] in a public execution. [95] The Japanese extermination of the Malay elite in Pontianak created an opening for a new Dayak elite to emerge. [96] According to Mary F. Somers Heidhues, during May and June 1945, Dayak rebellions resulted in the deaths of some Japanese in Sanggau. [97] Jamie S. Davidson states that this rebellion, which saw significant casualties on both sides, occurred from April to August 1945 and was known as the "Majang Desa War". [98] The Pontianak Incidents, or Affairs, are often divided by scholars into two distinct events, characterized by mass killings and arrests that took place in stages on different dates. The Pontianak incident had a detrimental impact on the Chinese community in Kalimantan. [99] [100]

The Ulama (Islamic clerics) of Aceh fought against both the Dutch and the Japanese, revolting against the Dutch in February 1942 and against Japan in November 1942. The uprising, led by the All-Aceh Religious Scholars' Association (PUSA), was centered around the Tjot Plieng village religious school. Japanese troops, armed with mortars and machine guns, were met by sword-wielding Acehnese led by Tengku Abdul Djalil. The Japanese suffered 18 dead, while over a hundred Acehnese perished, and the school and village mosque were destroyed. [84] [101]

Support for Independence

Young Indonesian boys receiving training from the Imperial Japanese Army.

Prior to the war, the Dutch colonial administration had effectively suppressed the Indonesian nationalist movement. [102] In the initial phase of the occupation, Japan was hesitant to grant independence, fearing it would disrupt the exploitation of the archipelago's resources, which were critical for their war effort. In contrast, the occupied Philippines and Burma were granted independence in 1943. By March of that year, Japan decided to incorporate Indonesia into the Japanese Empire but to allow "political participation of the natives," a decision met with strong opposition from the 25th Army in Sumatra and the Navy in the eastern islands. [103]

In November 1943, Japan hosted the Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo, attended by the nominally independent nations of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, including Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma. Notably, no Indonesian representatives were invited. As a consolation, pre-war independence figures Sukarno, Hatta, and Hajar Dewantara were invited to Tokyo shortly after the conference. They were granted an audience with Emperor Hirohito and met with Prime Minister Tojo. However, they received no concrete assurances regarding future Indonesian independence, and the ban on the Indonesian flag and national anthem remained in place. [104]

As Japan's territorial expansion stalled and then began to reverse, the 16th Army in Java, in particular, became more amenable to the idea of Indonesian involvement in governance. A Central Advisory Board was established, headed by the pre-war independence figure Sukarno, with Indonesians appointed as advisors. In October 1943, the Japanese formed the Defenders of the Homeland (Pembela Tanah Air, PETA; Japanese: 郷土防衛義勇軍, kyōdo bōei giyūgun), a volunteer force intended to defend against a potential Allied invasion. In 1944, the Java Service Association (Jawa Hokokai) was established to mobilize the populace for Japanese interests. [105]

On September 7, 1944, Japanese Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso pledged future independence for the East Indies. Authorities in Java subsequently permitted the Indonesian flag to be flown at Jawa Hokokai buildings. Rear Admiral Tadashi Maeda, a naval liaison officer in Batavia, provided official funding for tours across the archipelago by Sukarno and fellow activist Hatta, ostensibly as part of their Jawa Hokokai duties. In October 1944, Maeda established a Free Indonesia Dormitory to train young leaders for an independent Indonesia. With the war situation deteriorating, Japan announced in March 1945 the formation of an Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (BPUPK). This committee, comprising elder statesmen like Sukarno and Hatta, and chaired by Rajiman Wediodiningrat, held two sessions in May and June, laying the groundwork for an independent nation and drafting a constitution. Meanwhile, younger activists, known as the pemuda, pushed for more immediate and overt steps toward independence, creating a generational divide. [106] [107]

A 1966 ABC report examining Sukarno's alliance with imperial Japan and the Indonesian nationalist movement.

On April 29, 1945, Lt. Gen. Kumakichi Harada, commander of the 16th Army in Java, established the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (BPUPK) in Indonesian; Dokuritsu Junbi Chōsakai in Japanese) as the initial phase toward granting independence to the region under the 16th Army's control. [108]

End of Occupation

Japanese commanders listen to the terms of surrender.

General Douglas MacArthur had intended to fight his way into Java with Allied troops in 1944–45, but was ordered against it by the Joint Chiefs and President Franklin Roosevelt. He did, however, successfully conduct the Western New Guinea campaign in 1944, liberating much of Dutch New Guinea. The U.S. established Naval Base Morotai in September 1944, following the Battle of Morotai, to support the Philippines campaign. Some Australian bases were also constructed during the war. The Borneo campaign, fought between May and July 1945, was ordered by MacArthur to liberate British Borneo and Dutch Borneo. The Japanese occupation formally concluded with the Japanese surrender in the Pacific. Two days later, Sukarno proclaimed Indonesian Independence; Indonesian forces then engaged in a four-year struggle against the Dutch to secure it. According to historian Theodore Friend, the American decision to refrain from invading Java saved lives – Japanese, Javanese, Dutch, and American – but also hindered international support for Indonesian independence. [109]

At the war's end, approximately 300,000 Japanese military personnel and civilians remained in the East Indies. Effective August 15, 1945, the Dutch East Indies, along with French Indochina, were transferred from the American-led South West Pacific Area command to the British-led South East Asia Command. Consequently, the UK assumed the lead role in reoccupying these territories. [110] The primary objectives for the British occupation forces were to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, repatriate them, and to orchestrate the recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPI). [111] The repatriation of Japanese POWs was delayed due to their low priority for sea transport within the Allied Shipping Pool. [110] By April 1946, only 48,000 had been repatriated; the majority were evacuated in May and June. [110] However, around 100,000 Japanese prisoners of war were retained for labor duties until early 1946. [112] Reports indicate that approximately 25,000 Japanese soldiers joined forces with Indonesian nationalists and were subsequently beyond Allied control. [110] Some of these soldiers eventually integrated into local communities, joining the TNI or other Indonesian military organizations. Several of these former Japanese soldiers died during the Indonesian National Revolution, including Abdul Rachman (Ichiki Tatsuo). [113] [114] [115]

Japanese soldiers on trial.

The final phase of the conflict began in October 1945 when, as stipulated by their surrender terms, the Japanese attempted to re-establish their authority in towns and cities, which had been relinquished to Indonesians. Japanese military police killed Republican pemuda in Pekalongan (Central Java) on October 3rd. Japanese troops expelled Republican pemuda from Bandung in West Java and handed the city over to the British. However, the most intense fighting involving the Japanese occurred in Semarang. On October 14th, British forces began occupying the city. Retreating Republican forces retaliated by executing between 130 and 300 Japanese prisoners they held. Five hundred Japanese and 2,000 Indonesians were killed, and the Japanese had nearly captured the city six days later when British forces arrived. [116]

I, of course, knew that we had been forced to keep Japanese troops under arms to protect our lines of communication and vital areas... but it was nevertheless a great shock to me to find over a thousand Japanese troops guarding the nine miles of road from the airport to the town. [117]

— Lord Mountbatten of Burma in April 1946 after visiting Sumatra, referring to the use of Japanese Surrendered Personnel.

From March 6, 1946, to December 24, 1949, returning Dutch authorities conducted 448 war crimes trials against 1,038 suspects. Of these, 969 were convicted (93.4%), with 236 (24.4%) receiving the death sentence. [118] [119]

Notes

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^ Ricklefs 2008, p. 337.
^ a b c Dower 1986, p. 296.
^ a b c Ricklefs 2008, p. 325.
^ Mendl, Wolf (2001). Japan and South East Asia: From the Meiji Restoration to 1945. Vol. 1. Taylor & Francis. pp. 11–12. ISBN 9780415182058.
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^ Friend 2003, p. 29.
^ Vickers 2013, pp. 86–87.
^ Vickers 2013, pp. 85–86.
^ Yamamoto 2000.
^ a b c Vickers 2013, p. 86.
^ Bidien 1945, pp. 345–346.
^ Ricklefs 2008, pp. 324–325.
^ War History Office 2015, p. 437.
^ Taylor 2003, pp. 310–311.
^ a b c Vickers 2013, p. 90.
^ Horton 2007.
^ Pike 2016, pp. 322–333.
^ a b Taylor 2003, p. 310.
^ "Radio chief held at gun point". ABC Weekly. 29 June 1946. Retrieved 17 August 2023 – via Trove.
^ Mizuma 2013, pp. 49–68.
^ Womack 2006, pp. 194–196.
^ Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1998, pp. 157–158) quoted in Vickers (2013, p. 85).
^ Cribb & Brown 1995, p. 13.
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^ Vickers 2013, p. 94.
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^ Friend, Theodore (2009). Indonesian Destinies (unabridged ed.). Harvard University Press. p. 27. ISBN 978-0674037359. "Sukarno's first administrative act, he acknowledges, was to gather 120 prostitutes as 'volunteers' to be penned in a special camp for service to Japanese soldiers. He congratulated himself on simultaneously enhancing the women's income, sating the lust of the invaders, and thereby protecting virtuous Minangkabau maidens."
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^ comfort women (2 October 1945). KOEPANG, TIMOR 1945-10-03. TIMFORCE. TWENTY SIX JAVANESE GIRLS WHO WERE LIBERATED AT KOEPANG FROM JAPANESE BROTHELS. JUST PRIOR TO THEIR RELEASE THE JAPANESE ISSUED THEM WITH RED CROSS ARM BANDS IN AN ATTEMPT TO CAMOUFLAGE THE FOUL MANNER IN WHICH THESE GIRLS HAD BEEN USED. THESE GIRLS WILL NOW BE CARED FOR BY THE NETHERLANDS INDIES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. (PHOTOGRAPHER K. B. DAVIS). Australian War Memorial. 120087.
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^ "Transcript of Oral History Recording - S01794, F3781 Terry, Francis Stanley" (PDF). s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com. Australian War Memorial. Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 December 2024.
^ Francis Stanley Terry (cook; minesweeper HMAS Mercedes and corvette HMAS Warrnambool; Australian western approaches and northern and eastern waters; 1941-1946), oral history interview, 27 July 1995, AWM, S01794.
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^ Malay and Javanese (28 August 1945). MIRI, BORNEO. 1945-08-28. OVER 300 NATIVES, MALAY AND JAVANESE, ESCAPED FROM THE JAPANESE AND ARE NOW IN THE BRITISH BORNEO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION COMPOUND. SHOWN ABOVE, A GROUP OF MEN TYPICAL OF THE MALNUTRITION CASES BEING TREATED AT THE COMPOUND. Australian War Memorial. 115185.
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