Branch of the German military during World War II

This article delves into the air force of Germany as it existed before and during the Second World War . For those with a more contemporary interest, the current air force of Germany can be found under German Air Force . Should your curiosity extend to the earlier, First World War iteration of Germany’s army-affiliated air force, you’ll want to consult Luftstreitkräfte . For any other, less specific interpretations, the term is further clarified at Luftwaffe (disambiguation) .

Luftwaffe

Emblem of the Luftwaffe in silver

Founded 1935; 90 years ago (1935) Disbanded 1946; 79 years ago (1946) [N 1] Country  Germany Allegiance Adolf Hitler [2] Type Air force Role Aerial warfare Size Aircraft: 119,871 [3] (total production) Personnel: 3,400,000 (total in service at any time for 1939–45) [4] Part of Wehrmacht Engagements Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) World War II (1939–1945) Commanders OKL See list Inspector of Fighters See list Inspector of Bombers See list Notable commanders Hermann Göring Albert Kesselring Robert R. von Greim Insignia Balkenkreuz Balkenkreuz (alternate) Hakenkreuz Aircraft flown List of German WWII planes

Military unit

Hermann Göring , the first Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe (in office: 1935–1945) Robert Ritter von Greim , the second and last Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe (in office: April–May 1945)

The Luftwaffe [N 2] (German pronunciation: [ˈlʊftvafə] (ⓘ )) was, to put it plainly, the aerial-warfare arm of the Wehrmacht that Germany cobbled together before and then brutally deployed during World War II . It’s a concept that sounds rather grand in German, “Air Weapon,” but the reality was often far messier. Germany’s prior military air arms, those of the German Empire during World War I —specifically the Imperial Army’s Luftstreitkräfte and the Imperial Navy’s Marine-Fliegerabteilung —had been unceremoniously dismantled in May 1920. This was, of course, a direct consequence of the rather inconvenient terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles , which, with an almost quaint naiveté, had explicitly forbidden Germany from possessing any air force whatsoever [7].

Yet, during the rather tense interwar period , German pilots, with a characteristic disregard for international agreements, continued their training in secret. A notable, if rather clandestine, arrangement saw them honing their skills in violation of the treaty [8] at Lipetsk Air Base within the Soviet Union . A curious alliance, wouldn’t you say? With the inexorable ascent of the Nazi Party and their subsequent, brazen repudiation of the Versailles Treaty, the Luftwaffe’s existence was finally, and quite defiantly, brought into the public eye. It was officially established on 26 February 1935, a mere fortnight before the open declaration of German rearmament and conscription on 16 March [9] [10]. The Condor Legion , a Luftwaffe detachment dispatched to bolster the Nationalist forces in the Spanish Civil War , proved to be an invaluable, if morally dubious, proving ground. It offered a live-fire laboratory for the development and refinement of new tactics and aircraft. This firsthand combat experience contributed significantly to the Luftwaffe’s standing as one of the most sophisticated, technologically advanced, and battle-hardened air forces on the global stage when World War II inevitably erupted on 1 September 1939 [11]. By the summer of 1939, this rapidly assembled force boasted twenty-eight Geschwader (or “wings” to those less familiar with German military nomenclature [Wing_(military_unit)]). The Luftwaffe also saw fit to operate its own paratrooper contingent, infamously known as the Fallschirmjäger .

Initially, the Luftwaffe proved indispensable to the swift German victories across Poland in 1939 and throughout Western Europe in the spring of 1940. While it certainly inflicted considerable damage upon the RAF’s infrastructure during the Battle of Britain and laid waste to numerous British cities during the subsequent Blitz , it ultimately failed to compel Britain into submission. In 1941, during the Invasion of Yugoslavia , the German invasion of Greece , and from June 1941 onwards against the Soviet Union , the Luftwaffe continued its streak of significant, albeit often brutal, successes.

However, from 1942, the relentless Allied bombing campaigns began their methodical work, gradually dismantling the Luftwaffe’s fighter arm. Towards the end of 1942, the Luftwaffe, in a desperate attempt to shore up ground forces, diverted its surplus ground support and other personnel to establish Luftwaffe Field Divisions . Beyond its primary engagement on the Western front , the Luftwaffe also conducted operations over the Soviet Union , North Africa , and Southern Europe. Despite its rather belated deployment of advanced turbojet and rocket-propelled aircraft, intended for the interception and destruction of Allied bombers, the Luftwaffe found itself utterly overwhelmed by the sheer numerical superiority and refined tactics of the Allies, compounded by a critical scarcity of trained pilots and aviation fuel. By January 1945, amidst the dying throes of the Battle of the Bulge , the Luftwaffe mounted a final, desperate gamble for air superiority , a futile effort that met with resounding failure. With petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) supplies rapidly dwindling in the aftermath of this campaign, and as an intrinsic component of the entire, collapsing Wehrmacht military apparatus, the Luftwaffe effectively ceased to function as a coherent fighting force.

Following the inevitable defeat of Nazi Germany , the Luftwaffe was officially disbanded in 1946. Over the course of World War II , German pilots collectively claimed an astonishing roughly 70,000 aerial victories, while simultaneously over 75,000 Luftwaffe aircraft were either destroyed or severely damaged. Of these, nearly 40,000 were total losses. The Luftwaffe saw only two commanders-in-chief throughout its tumultuous existence: Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring for the vast majority of its history, and then, in the final two weeks of the war, Generalfeldmarschall Robert Ritter von Greim .

It is crucial to acknowledge that the Luftwaffe was deeply implicated in Nazi war crimes . As the war drew to a close, a significant portion of its aircraft production relied on labor extracted from concentration camps , an industry that exploited tens of thousands of forced laborers [N 3]. The Luftwaffe’s insatiable demand for labor was, in fact, one of the driving forces behind the deportation and systematic murder of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews in 1944. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe frequently engaged in the bombing of non-military targets, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) brazenly organized Nazi human experimentation , and its ground troops were responsible for committing horrific massacres in Italy, Greece, and Poland . A truly impressive legacy of destruction, wouldn’t you say?

History

Origins

• Main articles: Luftstreitkräfte and Aviation in World War I

Manfred von Richthofen with other members of Jasta 11 , 1917 as part of the Luftstreitkräfte

The Imperial German Army Air Service, initially established in 1910 under the rather cumbersome moniker Die Fliegertruppen des deutschen Kaiserreiches, was more commonly, and mercifully, abbreviated to Fliegertruppe. It was later rebranded as the Luftstreitkräfte on 8 October 1916 [12]. The aerial combat on the Western Front naturally garnered the lion’s share of attention in the early narratives of military aviation, largely because it produced the celebrated, almost mythical, figures of aces such as Manfred von Richthofen , Ernst Udet , Oswald Boelcke , and Max Immelmann . Following Germany’s defeat, this service was officially dissolved on 8 May 1920, a direct consequence of the punitive terms enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles , which, with a rather optimistic flourish, also mandated the complete destruction of all German military aircraft.

Since the Treaty of Versailles so inconveniently prohibited Germany from possessing an air force, German pilots, ever resourceful, resorted to clandestine training. Initially, this involved utilizing civilian aviation schools within Germany, though only light trainer aircraft could be employed, maintaining the flimsy facade that the trainees were merely preparing for careers with civil airlines like Deutsche Luft Hansa . To ensure its pilots were proficient on the latest combat aircraft, Germany sought assistance from the Soviet Union , which, sharing a similar pariah status in Europe, was amenable to such illicit cooperation. A secret training airfield was established at Lipetsk in 1924, operating for approximately nine years and utilizing a mix of Dutch and Soviet, along with a few German, training aircraft before its eventual closure in 1933. This base was officially, and rather blandly, known as the 4th squadron of the 40th wing of the Red Army . Hundreds of future Luftwaffe pilots and technical personnel visited, studied, and received training at various Soviet Air Force schools across Central Russia [13]. Figures like Roessing, Blume, Fosse, Teetsemann, Heini, Makratzki, Blumendaat, and many other future Luftwaffe aces passed through these joint Soviet-German facilities, set up under the guiding hand of Ernst August Köstring .

The initial steps towards the Luftwaffe’s formal establishment were taken just months after Adolf Hitler seized power. Hermann Göring , a World War I ace with a penchant for self-aggrandizement, was appointed National Kommissar for aviation, with former Luft Hansa director Erhard Milch serving as his deputy. In April 1933, the Reich Aviation Ministry (Reichsluftfahrtministerium or RLM) was created, a bureaucratic behemoth responsible for all aspects of aircraft development and production. Göring’s control over German aviation became, as expected, absolute. On 25 March 1933, the German Air Sports Association absorbed all private and national aviation organizations, yet ludicrously retained its “sports” designation. Then, on 15 May 1933, all military aviation organizations within the RLM were formally merged, officially marking the Luftwaffe’s “birthday” [14]. The National Socialist Flyers Corps (Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps or NSFK) was subsequently formed in 1937, ostensibly to provide pre-military flying training to young men and to integrate adult sport aviators into the burgeoning Nazi movement. Members of the NSFK who reached military age were then drafted directly into the Luftwaffe. As these former NSFK members were also, by definition, Nazi Party members, this process instilled a strong Nazi ideological foundation within the new Luftwaffe, a stark contrast to the more traditional branches of the Wehrmacht —the Heer (army) and the Kriegsmarine (navy). While Göring initially played a dominant role in the Luftwaffe’s buildup from 1933 to 1936, his direct involvement in its development significantly diminished after 1936, leaving Milch to become the de facto minister until 1937 [15].

Göring’s absence from the intricate details of planning and production was, in hindsight, rather fortunate. His grasp of contemporary aviation was tenuous at best; he hadn’t flown since 1922 and had made little effort to stay informed on the latest developments. Furthermore, Göring consistently demonstrated a profound lack of understanding regarding the doctrine and technical complexities of aerial warfare, wisely (or perhaps lazily) delegating such matters to those more competent. The Commander-in-Chief, after 1936, largely entrusted the organization and construction of the Luftwaffe to Erhard Milch . However, Göring’s position within Hitler’s inner circle proved invaluable for securing the necessary financial resources and materiel for the Luftwaffe’s rearmament and equipping [16].

Another significant, if less flamboyant, figure in the construction of German air power during this era was Helmuth Wilberg . Wilberg would later play a crucial role in shaping German air doctrine. Having led the Reichswehr’s air staff for eight years in the 1920s, Wilberg possessed considerable experience, making him an ideal candidate for a senior staff position [17]. Göring even considered appointing Wilberg as Chief of Staff. However, a rather inconvenient truth emerged: Wilberg had a Jewish mother. This posed a significant obstacle, preventing Göring from appointing him to such a prominent position. Yet, not wishing to squander his talent, Göring ensured that the draconian racial policy of Nazi Germany was, for once, conveniently overlooked in Wilberg’s case. Wilberg remained within the air staff and, working alongside Walther Wever , contributed to the drafting of the Luftwaffe’s foundational doctrinal texts: “The Conduct of the Aerial War” and “Regulation 16” [18] [19].

Preparing for war: 1933–1939

Wever years, 1933–1936

Walther Wever , Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, 1933–1936

The German officer corps, naturally, harbored ambitions of developing substantial strategic bombing capabilities to wield against potential adversaries. However, the cold, hard realities of economic constraints and geopolitical considerations necessitated a more pragmatic approach, forcing these grand aspirations to take a backseat. Despite this, German air power theorists continued to refine their strategic theories, though the immediate emphasis was unmistakably shifted towards direct army support. Germany, after all, was a continental power, and any declaration of hostilities was almost certainly expected to involve extensive ground operations [20].

For these very practical reasons, the Luftwaffe’s leadership, between 1933 and 1934, found itself primarily preoccupied with the intricacies of tactical and operational methods. In the context of aerial warfare, the army’s concept of Truppenführung —the art of leading troops—extended to an operational concept as much as a tactical doctrine. During World War I , the Fliegertruppe’s initial 1914–15 era Feldflieger Abteilung observation and reconnaissance air units, each typically comprising six two-seater aircraft, were directly attached to specific army formations and functioned as integral support elements. Dive bomber units were considered absolutely essential to Truppenführung, tasked with precise attacks on enemy headquarters and critical lines of communication [21]. Luftwaffe “Regulation 10: The Bomber” (Dienstvorschrift 10: Das Kampfflugzeug), published in 1934, championed air superiority and outlined approaches to ground attack tactics, yet conspicuously avoided delving into broader operational matters. Until 1935, the 1926 manual “Directives for the Conduct of the Operational Air War” remained the primary guide for German air operations. This manual, rather tellingly, directed the OKL to concentrate on limited operations (explicitly not strategic operations): primarily the protection of specific areas and the direct support of the army in combat [21].

With a seemingly effective tactical-operational concept in place [22], German air power theorists then turned their attention to the pressing need for a comprehensive strategic doctrine and organizational framework. Robert Knauss [de], a serviceman (though not a pilot) in the Luftstreitkräfte during World War I , who later became an experienced pilot with Lufthansa, emerged as a prominent theorist of air power [23]. Knauss was a fervent proponent of Giulio Douhet’s rather audacious theory, which posited that air power alone could win wars by systematically dismantling enemy industry and shattering civilian morale through the “terrorizing the population” of major cities. This, of course, explicitly advocated for attacks on non-combatants [24]. The General Staff, however, wisely (or perhaps fearfully) blocked the incorporation of Douhet’s theory into official doctrine, apprehensive of the inevitable, brutal revenge strikes against German civilians and cities [25].

In December 1934, Walther Wever , then Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, embarked on an ambitious endeavor to shape the Luftwaffe’s battle doctrine into a cohesive strategic plan. During this period, Wever meticulously conducted war games (simulating conflicts against France) in a concerted effort to validate his theory of a strategic bombing force. He firmly believed such a force would prove decisive by winning the war through the systematic destruction of enemy industry, even though these exercises also encompassed tactical strikes against enemy ground forces and their vital communication networks. By 1935, “Luftwaffe Regulation 16: The Conduct of the Air War” was drafted. Its conclusion, rather succinctly, stated: “The mission of the Luftwaffe is to serve these goals” [26] [27].

Historian James Corum asserts that, under this particular doctrine, the Luftwaffe leadership explicitly rejected the practice of “terror bombing ” (a concept further explored under Luftwaffe strategic bombing doctrine ). [28] According to Corum, terror bombing was considered “counter-productive,” likely to galvanize, rather than erode, the enemy’s will to resist [29]. Such bombing campaigns were ultimately viewed as a distracting diversion from the Luftwaffe’s primary objective: the destruction of enemy armed forces [30].

Despite this apparent rejection of terror bombing, Wever undeniably recognized the profound importance of strategic bombing . In the newly introduced doctrine, The Conduct of the Aerial Air War in 1935, Wever, while rejecting certain aspects of Douhet’s theory [31], meticulously outlined five crucial tenets for air strategy [32]:

• To cripple the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and by decisively defeating enemy air forces attempting to attack German targets.
• To impede the movement of substantial enemy ground forces to critical areas by systematically destroying railways and roads, with particular emphasis on bridges and tunnels, which were deemed indispensable for the swift movement and supply of forces.
• To provide direct support for army formations that operated independently of railways, such as armored and motorized units, by hindering enemy advances and actively participating in ground operations.
• To bolster naval operations through attacks on enemy naval bases, the protection of Germany’s own naval bases, and direct participation in naval engagements.
• To paralyze the enemy armed forces by halting production in their armaments factories.

Wever, with a clarity of vision that would later be sorely missed, began to meticulously plan for a dedicated strategic bomber force, aiming to integrate strategic bombing as a core component of future war strategy. He maintained that tactical aircraft should merely serve as an intermediate step towards the ultimate development of a truly strategic air force. In May 1934, Wever initiated an ambitious seven-year project to develop what he termed the “Ural bomber ,” an aircraft capable of striking deep into the industrial heartland of the Soviet Union. By 1935, this design competition had yielded the Dornier Do 19 and Junkers Ju 89 prototypes, though both suffered from being woefully underpowered. In April 1936, Wever articulated the requirements for the ‘Bomber A’ design competition: a formidable range of 6,700 kilometers (4,200 mi) coupled with a substantial 900 kilograms (2,000 lb) bomb load. Regrettably, Wever’s grand vision of a “Ural” bomber never truly materialized [33], and his emphasis on strategic aerial operations was, tragically, soon overshadowed [34]. The only design submission for Wever’s ‘Bomber A’ that eventually reached production was Heinkel’s Projekt 1041, which culminated in the production and frontline service of Germany’s sole operational heavy bomber, the Heinkel He 177 , officially designated with its RLM airframe number on 5 November 1937 [35].

In 1935, the military functions of the RLM were consolidated and grouped under the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL; “Air Force High Command”), a move intended to streamline military control.

Following Wever’s untimely death in an aviation-related accident in early June 1936, the Luftwaffe, by the late 1930s, found itself adrift, lacking a clear, overarching purpose. The air force was neither definitively subordinated to a pure army support role, nor was it endowed with any specific strategic mission. German doctrine, it seemed, was caught in an uncomfortable limbo between these two concepts. The Luftwaffe was intended to be a versatile organization, capable of executing broad and general support tasks rather than being rigidly confined to any single, specialized mission. This path was largely chosen to foster a more flexible application of air power and to provide ground forces with the optimal conditions for achieving decisive victory. In fact, contrary to the persistent myth that the Luftwaffe was designed exclusively for tactical and operational missions, upon the outbreak of war, only a mere 15% of its aircraft were actually dedicated to ground support operations [36].

Change of direction, 1936–37

General Ernst Udet . Along with Albert Kesselring , Udet was responsible for establishing the design trend of German aircraft. His focus was on tactical army support air forces.

Wever’s pivotal involvement in the foundational construction of the Luftwaffe came to an abrupt, and rather ironic, end on 3 June 1936. He was tragically killed, along with his engineer, in a Heinkel He 70 Blitz, on the very day that his ambitious “Bomber A” heavy bomber design competition was officially announced. After Wever’s death, Göring , predictably, began to take a more direct, and often meddlesome, interest in the appointment of Luftwaffe staff officers. Göring subsequently appointed Albert Kesselring as Chief of Staff—a man who would later prove to be an able, if ruthless, commander—and, more controversially, Ernst Udet to head the Reich’s Air Ministry Technical Office (Technisches Amt), despite Udet’s conspicuous lack of technical expertise. Notwithstanding this deficiency, Udet played a significant role in redirecting the Luftwaffe’s tactical focus towards fast medium bombers, with the aim of annihilating enemy air power directly in the battle zone, rather than through the more protracted and resource-intensive industrial bombing of aviation production facilities [26].

Kesselring and Udet, as one might expect from such disparate personalities, did not get along. During Kesselring’s tenure as CS from 1936 to 1937, a rather predictable power struggle erupted as Udet relentlessly attempted to expand his own influence within the Luftwaffe. Kesselring also found himself constantly battling Göring’s frustrating habit of appointing compliant “yes men” to positions of critical importance [37]. Udet, for all his bravado, eventually recognized his own limitations, and his significant failures in the production and development of German aircraft would, as history painfully showed, lead to severe long-term consequences [38].

The Luftwaffe’s failure to make substantial progress towards achieving a viable strategic bombing force can be attributed to a confluence of factors. Many within the Luftwaffe command structure genuinely believed that medium bombers possessed sufficient power to launch effective strategic bombing operations against Germany’s most probable adversaries: France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland [39]. The United Kingdom, however, presented a far more formidable challenge. General der Flieger Hellmuth Felmy , who would command Luftflotte 2 in 1939, was tasked with formulating a plan for an air campaign over the British Isles. Felmy, rather optimistically, was convinced that Britain could be brought to its knees through morale bombing, citing the alleged panic that had gripped London during the Munich crisis as evidence of inherent British weakness. A second, and perhaps more critical, reason for this failure was purely technical. German designers consistently failed to resolve the inherent design difficulties plaguing the Heinkel He 177A , a problem exacerbated by the initial, ill-conceived requirement, from its very inception on 5 November 1937, for moderate dive-bombing capabilities in an aircraft possessing a 30-meter wingspan. Moreover, Germany simply lacked the economic capacity to match the later, gargantuan British and American industrial efforts of 1943–1944, particularly in the mass production of truly high power output aircraft engines (those capable of generating over 1,500 kW (2,000 hp)). In addition, the OKL had fundamentally underestimated the industrial and military commitment that a sustained strategic bombing campaign would demand. Consequently, by 1939, the Luftwaffe was hardly better prepared than its adversaries to conduct such a campaign [40], a deficiency that would prove fatally exposed during the Battle of Britain [41].

The German rearmament program was constantly hampered by difficulties in acquiring essential raw materials. Germany was heavily reliant on imports for most of the critical materials needed to rebuild the Luftwaffe, with rubber and aluminum being particularly scarce. Petroleum imports were exceptionally vulnerable to blockade, a strategic weakness that would haunt them throughout the war. While Germany did push for synthetic fuel plants, these efforts consistently failed to meet the escalating demands. By 1937, Germany was importing more fuel than it had at the beginning of the decade. By the summer of 1938, a mere 25% of the required fuel could be produced domestically. In terms of steel, the industry was operating at barely 83% of its capacity, and by November 1938, Göring himself reported that the economic situation was dire [42]. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the overarching command for all German military forces, eventually ordered significant reductions in raw materials and steel allocated for armament production. These reductions were substantial: 30% for steel, 20% for copper, 47% for aluminum, and 14% for rubber [43]. Under such crippling circumstances, it was simply impossible for Milch, Udet, or Kesselring to conjure a formidable strategic bombing force, even if they had possessed the will to do so [40].

The development of new aircraft was, by necessity, confined to the production of twin-engined medium bombers. These required significantly less material, manpower, and aviation production capacity compared to Wever’s ambitious “Ural Bomber.” German industry, facing stark limitations, could produce two medium bombers for the cost of one heavy bomber, and the RLM was unwilling to gamble on developing a heavy bomber that would also consume precious time. Göring, ever the pragmatist when it suited him, famously remarked, “the Führer will not ask how big the bombers there are, but only how many there are” [44]. The premature death of Wever, undeniably one of the Luftwaffe’s most visionary officers, left the air force without a true strategic air arm during World War II , a deficiency that ultimately proved fatal to the German war effort [26] [45] [46].

The glaring absence of strategic capability should have been painfully obvious much earlier. The Sudeten Crisis starkly underscored Germany’s unpreparedness to wage a strategic air war (though, it must be noted, the British and French were in an even weaker position). In response, Hitler, with characteristic impulsiveness, ordered the Luftwaffe to expand to five times its existing size [47]. The OKL also severely neglected the crucial need for transport aircraft; even as late as 1943, transport units were still rather absurdly classified as Kampfgeschwadern zur besonderen Verwendung (Bomber Units on Special Duties, KGzbV), and were only finally grouped into dedicated cargo and personnel transport wings (Transportgeschwader) during that year [48]. In March 1938, as the Anschluss was unfolding, Göring instructed Felmy to investigate the feasibility of air raids against Britain. Felmy’s assessment concluded that such operations would be impossible until airbases in Belgium and the Netherlands were secured and the Luftwaffe possessed heavy bombers. This mattered little, however, as war was averted by the Munich Agreement , and the immediate need for long-range aircraft temporarily receded [49].

These fundamental failures, of course, remained largely unexposed until the crucible of wartime. In the interim, German aircraft designs originating from the mid-1930s, such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109 , the Heinkel He 111 , the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka, and the Dornier Do 17 , performed exceptionally well. All of these types first saw active service in the Condor Legion , pitted against Soviet-supplied aircraft, providing invaluable combat experience. The Luftwaffe also swiftly recognized the obsolescence of biplane fighters; the Heinkel He 51 , for instance, was quickly relegated to a training role. Particularly impressive were the Heinkel and Dornier bombers, which effectively met the Luftwaffe’s demand for aircraft that were faster than the prevailing 1930s-era fighters, many of which were still biplanes or strut-braced monoplanes.

Despite the combat debut of these advanced aircraft (primarily from 1938 onwards), it was the venerable Junkers Ju 52 —which would soon become the ubiquitous backbone of the Transportgruppen—that made the most significant early contribution. During the Spanish Civil War , Hitler, in a rare moment of candid appreciation, reportedly remarked, “Franco ought to erect a monument to the glory of the Junkers Ju 52. It is the aircraft which the Spanish revolution has to thank for its victory” [50].

Dive-bombing

Junkers Ju 87 Ds over the Eastern Front, winter 1943–44

The notorious inaccuracy of level bombers in 1937, a persistent issue, rather dramatically pushed the Luftwaffe towards embracing the clear benefits of dive-bombing. The latter offered vastly superior accuracy against tactical ground targets compared to its heavier, more conventional counterparts. Range, for this specific mission profile, was not considered a primary criterion. It was also not always feasible for the army to rapidly deploy heavy artillery across recently captured or difficult terrain to bombard fortifications or provide immediate support to ground forces; dive bombers, however, could accomplish this task with far greater speed and precision. These specialized aircraft, often single-engine, two-man machines, could achieve demonstrably better results than larger, six or seven-man bombers, all at a mere tenth of the cost and with four times the accuracy. This compelling calculus led directly to Udet’s fervent championship of the dive bomber, particularly the iconic, and often terrifying, Junkers Ju 87 [51].

Udet’s notorious “love affair” with dive-bombing profoundly impacted the long-term developmental trajectory of the Luftwaffe, an effect exacerbated after Wever’s death. The tactical strike aircraft programs were originally conceived as mere interim solutions, intended to bridge the gap until the next generation of more advanced aircraft became available. In 1936, the rather dated Junkers Ju 52 still formed the backbone of the German bomber fleet. This situation spurred a frantic rush on the part of the RLM to push through the production of the Junkers Ju 86 , the Heinkel He 111 , and the Dornier Do 17 before a thorough and proper evaluation of their capabilities could be completed. The Ju 86 proved to be quite poor, while the He 111 showed the most promise. The harsh realities of the Spanish Civil War , coupled with the limited output of the German munitions industry, convinced Udet that wastage, in terms of precious munitions, was simply unacceptable. Udet, therefore, sought to incorporate dive-bombing capabilities into the nascent Junkers Ju 88 and, in a rather unfortunate move, conveyed the same idea—initiated specifically by the OKL for the Heinkel He 177 —a requirement that was approved in early November 1937. In the case of the Ju 88, this decision necessitated an astounding 50,000 modifications, which inflated its weight from seven to twelve tons, resulting in a crippling speed loss of 200 km/h. Udet merely relayed the OKL’s ill-advised dive-bombing capability request to Ernst Heinkel regarding the He 177, who vehemently opposed such a notion, a decision that ultimately sabotaged its development as a truly effective heavy bomber [52]. It wasn’t until September 1942 that Göring was finally able to rescind the problematic dive-bombing requirement for the He 177A [53].

Mobilisation, 1938–1941

By the summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe, in a state of precarious readiness for the impending conflict, possessed nine Jagdgeschwader (fighter wings), predominantly equipped with the agile Messerschmitt Bf 109E . It also fielded four Zerstörergeschwader (destroyer wings), flying the twin-engine Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters, alongside 11 Kampfgeschwader (bomber wings), primarily operating the ubiquitous Heinkel He 111 and the versatile Dornier Do 17Z . Additionally, there were four Sturzkampfgeschwader (dive bomber wings), whose primary armament was the instantly recognizable, and deeply feared, Junkers Ju 87B Stuka . [54] The Luftwaffe was, at this juncture, only just beginning to integrate the Junkers Ju 88A into active service, a process delayed by persistent design difficulties, with only about a dozen aircraft of this type considered truly combat-ready. The overall strength of the Luftwaffe at this critical time stood at 373,000 personnel, comprising 208,000 flying troops, 107,000 in the Flak Corps, and 58,000 in the Signals Corps. Its aircraft inventory amounted to 4,201 operational aircraft: 1,191 bombers, 361 dive bombers, 788 fighters, 431 heavy fighters, and 488 transports. Despite certain inherent deficiencies, it was, by any reasonable measure, an impressively formidable force [55].

However, even by the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe had not yet achieved full mobilization, a critical oversight. Despite the persistent shortage of raw materials, Udet, through sheer force of will (or perhaps delusion), had managed to increase production by implementing a 10-hour working day across the aviation industries and by attempting to rationalize production processes. During this period, 30 Kampfstaffeln (bomber squadrons) and 16 Jagdstaffeln (fighter squadrons) were raised and equipped. A further five Zerstörergruppen (“Destroyer groups”) were created (JGr 101, 102, 126, 152, and 176), all of them outfitted with the Bf 110 [56].

The Luftwaffe also embarked on a significant expansion of its aircrew training programs, increasing capacity by a staggering 42%, establishing 63 new flying schools. These facilities were strategically relocated to eastern Germany, presumably to distance them from potential Allied threats. The total number of aircrew undergoing training reached 4,727, representing a 31% increase. However, the relentless pressure to complete this rapid expansion scheme came at a terrible cost, resulting in the deaths of 997 personnel and injuries to another 700. A further 946 aircraft were also lost in these accidents, a grim testament to the speed and inherent dangers of the program. Ultimately, the number of aircrew successfully completing their training rose to 3,941. The Luftwaffe’s overall strength now swelled to an enormous 2.2 million personnel [57].

In April and May 1941, Udet, ever the loyal, if increasingly tormented, servant, led the Luftwaffe delegation tasked with inspecting the Soviet aviation industry, ostensibly in compliance with the terms of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact . Udet, upon his return, reported to Göring, with stark honesty, “that Soviet air forces are very strong and technically advanced” [58]. Göring, however, chose to deliberately withhold these inconvenient facts from Hitler, clinging to the deluded hope that a surprise attack would swiftly decimate the USSR. Udet, facing the terrifying chasm between truth and loyalty, suffered a profound psychological breakdown and, in a desperate attempt, even tried to convey the grim reality to Hitler. But Göring, ever the manipulator, simply dismissed Udet as a liar, then brought him under his complete control by plying him with drugs at lavish drinking parties and hunting trips. Udet’s escalating drinking and deteriorating psychological condition became a serious problem, but Göring, ever opportunistic, ruthlessly exploited Udet’s dependency to further his own agenda [59]. Such loyalty, it seems, was merely a tool for exploitation.

Luftwaffe organisation

Luftwaffe commanders

Defendants in the dock during the Nuremberg trials . The main target of the prosecution was Hermann Göring (at the left edge on the first row of benches), considered to be the most important surviving Nazi official after Adolf Hitler’s death.

Throughout the rather brief, yet intensely destructive, history of Nazi Germany , the Luftwaffe managed to churn through only two commanders-in-chief. The first, and by far the most infamous, was Hermann Göring . The second, and ultimately the last, was Generalfeldmarschall Robert Ritter von Greim . His appointment as commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe was, rather dramatically, concurrent with his promotion to Generalfeldmarschall, a rank he received as the final German officer in World War II to achieve this highest military distinction. Other officers who managed to climb to the second-highest military rank in Germany included Kesselring , Hugo Sperrle , Milch , and Wolfram von Richthofen .

As the war reached its inevitable, brutal conclusion, with Berlin encircled by the relentless Red Army , Göring, with characteristic self-preservation, audaciously suggested to Hitler that he assume leadership of the Reich [60]. Hitler, predictably enraged by this perceived betrayal, immediately ordered Göring’s arrest and execution. However, Göring’s SS guards, perhaps sensing the futility of the dying regime, failed to carry out the order, allowing Göring to survive and face the rather more formal justice of the Nuremberg trials [61].

Sperrle, for his part, was put on trial at the OKW trial , which was one of the final twelve Nuremberg trials conducted after the war. Remarkably, he was acquitted on all four counts. He passed away in Munich in 1953, presumably having enjoyed a few more years of peace than many of his victims.

Organisation and chain of command

• Main article: Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–45)

At the outset of the war, the Luftwaffe’s structure, a rather neat and tidy affair on paper, comprised four Luftflotten (air fleets), each meticulously assigned responsibility for roughly a quarter of Germany’s expanding domain. As the war progressed, and German territorial control grotesquely expanded, more air fleets were, of course, created to manage these new conquests. For instance, Luftflotte 5 was established in 1940 to oversee operations in Norway and Denmark, with other Luftflotten formed as the ever-shifting needs of conflict dictated. Each Luftflotte would, in turn, encompass several Fliegerkorps (Air Corps), Fliegerdivision (Air Division), Jagdkorps (Fighter Corps), Jagddivision (Air Division), or Jagdfliegerführer (Fighter Air Command). These larger formations would then have attached to them a variable number of smaller units, typically several Geschwader, but also independent Staffeln (squadrons) and Kampfgruppen (combat groups) [62]. Luftflotten were also burdened with the responsibility for all training aircraft and schools within their designated operational areas [63].

A Geschwader was commanded by a Geschwaderkommodore , typically holding the rank of either major, Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel ), or Oberst (colonel ). Other “staff” officers within the unit, charged with administrative duties, included the adjutant, technical officer, and operations officer, who were usually (though not always, in a testament to the chaotic nature of war) experienced aircrew or pilots still actively flying on operations. Additional specialist staff encompassed navigation, signals, and intelligence personnel. A Stabschwarm (headquarters flight ) was, rather logically, attached to each Geschwader [62].

A Jagdgeschwader (hunting wing) (JG) was a single-seat day fighter Geschwader, typically equipped with the formidable Bf 109 or Fw 190 aircraft, deployed in either pure fighter or fighter-bomber roles. Towards the bitter end of the war, specifically by 1944–45, JG 7 and JG 400 (along with the jet specialist JV 44 ) were operating significantly more advanced aircraft. Meanwhile, JG 1 was attempting to work up with the Heinkel He 162 “emergency fighter” as the war itself was drawing its last breaths. A Geschwader was composed of Gruppen (groups), which in turn consisted of Jagdstaffel (fighter squadrons). Thus, Fighter Wing 1 was designated JG 1, its first Gruppe (group) was I./JG 1 (utilizing a Roman numeral solely for the Gruppe number), and its first Staffel (squadron) was 1./JG 1. The typical strength of a Geschwader usually hovered around 120–125 aircraft [62].

Each Gruppe was commanded by a Kommandeur, and a Staffel by a Staffelkapitän. It’s important to note, however, that these were “appointments” within the Luftwaffe, not fixed ranks. Typically, the Kommodore would hold the rank of Oberstleutnant or, in exceptional circumstances, an Oberst. Yet, even a Leutnant (second lieutenant) could, through the exigencies of war, find himself commanding a Staffel.

Similarly, a bomber wing was designated a Kampfgeschwader (KG), a night fighter wing was a Nachtjagdgeschwader (NJG), and a dive bomber wing was a Stukageschwader (StG). Units that mirrored those in RAF Coastal Command, with specific responsibilities for coastal patrols and critical search and rescue duties, were known as Küstenfliegergruppen (Kü.Fl. Gr.). Specialist bomber groups, often deployed for specific, targeted missions, were identified as Kampfgruppen (KGr). The operational strength of a bomber Geschwader typically comprised approximately 80–90 aircraft [62].

Personnel

• See also: Luftwaffe personnel structure and Ranks and insignia of the Luftwaffe (1935–1945)

Luftwaffe strength during the fall of 1941 [64]

The peacetime strength of the Luftwaffe in the spring of 1939 was, by all accounts, 370,000 men. After the general mobilization in 1939, this number swelled to almost 900,000 men in service. Just before Operation Barbarossa in 1941, the personnel strength had reached a staggering 1.5 million men [64]. The Luftwaffe hit its absolute peak personnel strength between November 1943 and June 1944, boasting nearly three million men and women in uniform. This colossal figure included 1.7 million male soldiers, 1 million male Wehrmachtsbeamte and civilian employees, and almost 300,000 female and male auxiliaries (Luftwaffenhelfer ) [65]. By October 1944, the anti-aircraft units alone commanded 600,000 soldiers and an additional 530,000 auxiliaries. This auxiliary force comprised 60,000 male members of the Reichsarbeitsdienst , 50,000 Luftwaffenhelfer (males aged 15–17, truly children forced into service), 80,000 Flakwehrmänner (males beyond military age) and Flak-V-soldaten (males deemed unfit for military service), a shocking 160,000 female Flakwaffenhelferinnen and RAD-Maiden, as well as another 160,000 foreign personnel (Hiwis ) [66] [67]. A truly diverse, if unwilling, workforce to feed the war machine.

Spanish Civil War

• Main article: Operational history of the Luftwaffe (1939–1945)

Ruins of Guernica , 1937

The Luftwaffe’s Condor Legion used the Spanish Civil War as a grim laboratory, experimenting with new doctrines and aircraft designs. It played a pivotal role in assisting the Falange under Francisco Franco in their brutal campaign to defeat the Republican forces. Over 20,000 German airmen gained invaluable combat experience, which, in a chilling precursor to the wider conflict, provided the Luftwaffe with a significant, and often ruthless, advantage as it plunged into the Second World War . One particularly infamous operation was the devastating bombing of Guernica in the Basque country . It is a common, though perhaps overly simplistic, assumption that this attack was a direct result of a nascent “terror doctrine” within Luftwaffe strategy. The raids on Guernica and Madrid certainly caused horrific civilian casualties and ignited a firestorm of international condemnation and protests. While it has been suggested that the bombing of Guernica was carried out for military tactical reasons, ostensibly in support of ground operations, the town itself was not directly involved in any fighting at that precise moment. It wasn’t until 1942 that the Germans began to explicitly develop a bombing policy where civilians were the primary targets, although the Blitz on London and numerous other British cities undeniably involved indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas [28]. These “nuisance raids” could even descend to the level of machine-gunning civilians and livestock, a truly petty cruelty [68].

World War II

Gun camera film showing tracer ammunition from a Supermarine Spitfire hitting a Heinkel He 111 bomber on its starboard quarter

When World War II erupted in 1939, the Luftwaffe, a product of brazen defiance and rapid rearmament, stood as one of the most technologically advanced air forces in the world. During the Polish Campaign , which served as the chilling overture to the war, it swiftly established air superiority, and then, with devastating effectiveness, total air supremacy. It provided crucial support for the German Army’s ground operations, which brought the campaign to a brutal close in a mere five weeks. The Luftwaffe’s performance was, by all accounts, precisely what the OKL had envisioned. It rendered invaluable support to the army [69], systematically eliminating pockets of resistance. Göring was, predictably, ecstatic with the results [70]. While initial command and control problems occasionally emerged, the inherent flexibility and improvisational capacity within both the army and the Luftwaffe quickly resolved these issues. The Luftwaffe was, notably, equipped with a sophisticated ground-to-air communication system, which played a vital role in the resounding success of 1940’s Fall Gelb [71].

In the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe lent its considerable strength to the Kriegsmarine and Heer during the invasion of Norway . By flying in crucial reinforcements and, more importantly, by decisively seizing air superiority, the Luftwaffe contributed monumentally to the German conquest, turning the tide where naval and ground forces alone might have faltered [72].

In May and June 1940, the Luftwaffe was instrumental in the utterly unexpected German triumph in the Battle of France . It systematically dismantled three Allied Air Forces and played a decisive role in securing the defeat of France in just over six weeks [73]. However, it notably failed to annihilate the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk despite relentless and intense bombing. The BEF , against all odds, managed to escape, thereby ensuring its continued participation in the war [74].

During the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, the Luftwaffe inflicted severe damage upon Britain’s Royal Air Force , yet it crucially failed to achieve the air superiority that Hitler had demanded as a prerequisite for the proposed invasion of Britain . This strategic failure led to the invasion’s postponement and eventual cancellation in December 1940 [75]. The Luftwaffe then proceeded to savage British cities during the Blitz of 1940–1941, but, once again, it failed to break British morale. Furthermore, the RAF, despite initial setbacks, managed to shoot down German planes at a ratio exceeding two to one. By this point, Hitler had already, with characteristic disregard for ongoing campaigns, issued orders for the preparations for Operation Barbarossa , the ambitious, and ultimately doomed, invasion of the Soviet Union.

In the spring of 1941, the Luftwaffe extended its support to its Axis partner, Italy, helping to secure victory in the Balkans Campaign . It then continued to provide support for Italy, and later the Italian Social Republic , across the Mediterranean, Middle East and African theaters until the bitter end in May 1945.

In June 1941, Germany launched its colossal invasion of the Soviet Union . Despite the initial, devastating destruction of thousands of Soviet aircraft [76], the Luftwaffe ultimately failed to completely obliterate the Red Air Force . Lacking dedicated strategic bombers (the very “Ural bombers” that Wever had so presciently requested six years prior), the Luftwaffe was incapable of consistently striking at crucial Soviet production centers with the necessary force to cripple their war effort [77]. The Axis and Soviet air operations during Operation Barbarossa consumed an astronomical number of men and aircraft. As the war inexorably dragged on, the Luftwaffe’s strength was systematically eroded. German defeats, particularly at the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942 and in the colossal Battle of Kursk in 1943, ensured the relentless and gradual decline of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front .

British historian Frederick Taylor , in a rather stark assessment, asserts that “all sides bombed each other’s cities during the war. Half a million Soviet citizens, for example, died from German bombing during the invasion and occupation of Russia. That’s roughly equivalent to the number of German citizens who died from Allied raids” [78]. A grim balance, indeed.

The Luftwaffe found itself increasingly tasked with defending German-occupied Europe against the ever-growing offensive might of RAF Bomber Command and, from the summer of 1942 onwards, the steadily building power of the United States Army Air Forces . The escalating demands of the Defence of the Reich campaign systematically decimated the Luftwaffe’s fighter arm. Despite its belated introduction of advanced turbojet and rocket-propelled aircraft for bomber-destroyer roles, it was utterly overwhelmed by the sheer numerical superiority of the Allies, compounded by a critical scarcity of trained pilots and, crucially, fuel. A final, desperate gamble, known as Operation Bodenplatte , launched on 1 January 1945 in a futile attempt to regain air superiority, ended in dismal failure. After the catastrophic losses of Bodenplatte, the Luftwaffe ceased to be an effective fighting force, its once formidable wings clipped forever.

German day- and night-fighter pilots, in a testament to their skill and the sheer duration of their engagements, claimed over 70,000 aerial victories during World War II [79]. Of these, an estimated 745 victories were attributed to the advanced Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighters [80]. Flak (anti-aircraft artillery) units, often providing a psychological crutch to the civilian population, reportedly shot down between 25,000 and 30,000 Allied planes. Breaking this down by Allied force, approximately 25,000 were American aircraft [81], about 20,000 British, a staggering 46,100 Soviet [82], 1,274 French [83], 375 Polish [84], and 81 Dutch, along with aircraft from other Allied nationalities.

The highest-scoring day-fighter pilot was the almost legendary Erich Hartmann , credited with an astonishing 352 confirmed kills, all but 7 of which were achieved on the Eastern Front against the Soviets. In the Western theatre, the leading aces included Hans-Joachim Marseille with 158 kills (the vast majority against British Commonwealth forces during the Desert campaign), and Georg-Peter Eder with 56 kills against USAAF aircraft (out of a total of 78). The most successful night-fighter pilot, Heinz-Wolfgang Schnaufer , is credited with 121 kills. A remarkable 103 German fighter pilots surpassed the 100-victory mark, collectively accounting for roughly 15,400 aerial victories. A further 360 pilots claimed between 40 and 100 aerial victories, totaling around 21,000 kills. Another 500 fighter pilots claimed between 20 and 40 victories, adding another 15,000 to the tally. Part of the reason German pilots accumulated such incredibly high victory totals was their relentless engagement throughout the entire war—unlike their Allied counterparts, who were rotated out of combat after a certain period to recuperate or to train new pilots. German pilots, by contrast, often flew until they were killed, captured, or too severely wounded to continue. It is reasonably certain that 2,500 German fighter pilots achieved “ace” status, defined as achieving at least five aerial victories [85] [86]. These extraordinary achievements were recognized with 453 German single and twin-engine (Messerschmitt Bf 110 ) day-fighter pilots receiving the coveted Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross . It’s worth noting that intense personal rivalry likely played a significant role in motivating these high-performing aces, who, after all, accounted for the vast majority of aerial victories. Public recognition, in the form of medals and mentions in the army bulletin, undoubtedly spurred on the efforts of their peers who had previously flown with these decorated individuals [87]. 85 night-fighter pilots, including 14 crew members, also received the Knight’s Cross [88]. Some bomber pilots, too, achieved considerable success. Stuka and Schlachtflieger (ground-attack) pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel flew an astounding 2,530 ground-attack missions and claimed the destruction of over 519 tanks and a battleship, among other targets. He became the most highly decorated German serviceman of the Second World War . Bomber pilot Hansgeorg Bätcher flew more than 658 combat missions, reportedly destroying numerous ships and other targets.

Luftwaffe losses, on the other hand, were equally staggering, a grim mirror to their claimed victories. The estimated total number of destroyed and damaged aircraft for the entire war reached 76,875. Of these, approximately 43,000 were lost in direct combat, while the remainder succumbed to operational accidents and training mishaps [89]. By aircraft type, losses were tabulated as follows: 21,452 fighters, 12,037 bombers, 15,428 trainers, 10,221 twin-engine fighters, 5,548 ground attack craft, 6,733 reconnaissance planes, and 6,141 transports [90].

According to the General Staff of the Wehrmacht , the losses among flight personnel up to February 1945 amounted to a grim tally [91]:

Official statistics indicate that total Luftwaffe casualties, encompassing ground personnel, reached 138,596 killed and 156,132 missing by 31 January 1945 [92]. A truly impressive rate of attrition, if one were to consider it a metric of achievement.

Omissions and failures

Lack of aerial defence

The Luftwaffe’s dismal failure in the Defence of the Reich campaign can be attributed to a confluence of deeply rooted factors, a perfect storm of strategic blunders and technological shortcomings. Critically, the Luftwaffe, despite its initial offensive prowess, lacked an effective air defense system in the early stages of the war. Hitler’s reckless foreign policy, ever pushing the boundaries, plunged Germany into war long before these essential defenses could be adequately developed or fully implemented. Consequently, the Luftwaffe was forced to improvise, attempting to construct its vital defensive infrastructure during the war, a truly uphill battle.

Daylight aerial engagements over German-controlled territory were, thankfully, sparse in 1939–1940, offering a temporary reprieve. The responsibility for defending German airspace largely fell to the Luftgaukommandos (air district commands). The defense systems of the time relied heavily, and often exclusively, on the “flak” (anti-aircraft artillery) arm. These defenses were notoriously uncoordinated, and communication between disparate units was abysmal. This fundamental lack of understanding and cooperation between the ground-based flak and the flying branches of the defense establishment would plague the Luftwaffe throughout the entire conflict [93]. Hitler, with his characteristic stubbornness, particularly insisted that the defense should primarily rest on anti-aircraft artillery, as he believed it provided the civilian population with a “psychological crutch,” regardless of how ineffective the weapons might actually be [94].

Most of the battles fought by the Luftwaffe on the Western Front during this early period were against the RAF’s relatively limited “Circus” raids and the occasional, probing daylight incursions into German airspace. This was, in hindsight, a rather fortunate position for the Germans, as the Luftwaffe’s initial strategy of concentrating its striking power on a single front began to unravel with the disastrous failure of the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Luftwaffe’s “peripheral” strategy between 1939 and 1940 had been to deploy its fighter defenses predominantly at the outer edges of Axis-occupied territory, leaving the inner depths largely unprotected [95]. Moreover, frontline units in the West were already vocal in their complaints about the meager numbers and underwhelming performance of available aircraft. Units lamented the scarcity of Zerstörer aircraft with all-weather capabilities and, perhaps most tellingly, the “lack of climbing power of the Bf 109 ” [95]. The Luftwaffe’s initial technological edge was clearly eroding, with the only truly formidable new aircraft in the German arsenal being the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 . Milch was nominally tasked with assisting Udet in increasing aircraft production and accelerating the introduction of more modern fighter types. However, at a meeting of the Reich Industrial Council on 18 September 1941, they were forced to explain that the promised next-generation aircraft had failed to materialize, and that production of increasingly obsolete types had to continue simply to meet the ever-growing demand for replacements [95]. A truly pathetic state of affairs.

The rapid buildup of the Jagdwaffe (“Fighter Force”) was, in its haste, too swift and consequently suffered a significant decline in quality. It remained decentralized, not being placed under a unified command until 1943, a critical organizational flaw that severely impacted the performance of the nine Jagdgeschwader (fighter wings) that existed in 1939. No further units were even formed until 1942, effectively wasting the crucial years of 1940–1941. The OKL conspicuously failed to construct a coherent strategic framework; instead, its command style was largely reactionary, and its measures, lacking thorough planning, proved far less effective. This deficiency became particularly glaring with the Sturmböck squadrons, which were formed as a desperate measure to replace the increasingly ineffectual twin-engined Zerstörer heavy fighter wings as the primary defense against the relentless USAAF daylight raids. The Sturmböcke flew Fw 190A fighters, heavily armed with potent 20mm and 30mm cannons, specifically designed to obliterate heavy bombers. However, this increased armament significantly added to the aircraft’s weight, adversely affecting the performance of the Fw 190 at a time when it was increasingly encountering large numbers of Allied types that were equal, if not superior, in capability [96].

Daytime aerial defense against the USAAF’s formidable and heavily defended heavy bomber forces, particularly the Eighth Air Force and the Fifteenth Air Force , did achieve some tactical successes through the calendar year of 1943. However, at the dawn of 1944, Eighth Air Force commander Jimmy Doolittle, with a stroke of strategic brilliance, implemented a major change in offensive fighter tactics . This decisive shift effectively dismantled the Luftwaffe’s day fighter force from that point onwards. Steadily increasing numbers of the truly superlative North American P-51 Mustang single-engine fighter, acting as long-range escorts leading the USAAF’s bombers deep into German airspace, first decimated the Bf 110 Zerstörer wings, and then proceeded to systematically destroy the Fw 190A Sturmböcke . The writing was, quite literally, in the sky.

Development and equipment

The most troublesome of all German designs during WWII – both in development and in service – was the He 177 A Greif heavy bomber.

In terms of technological development, the profound failure to develop a truly long-range bomber and equally capable long-range fighters during this critical period left the Luftwaffe utterly incapable of conducting any meaningful strategic bombing campaign throughout the entirety of the war [97]. However, it is also true that Germany at that time suffered from crippling limitations in vital raw materials such as oil and aluminum. This meant that there were simply insufficient resources to support much beyond a tactical air force, a rather inconvenient truth. Given these austere circumstances, the Luftwaffe’s reliance on tactical mid-range, twin-engined medium bombers and short-range dive-bombers can be viewed as a pragmatic, if ultimately self-limiting, strategic choice [98] [99]. One could even argue that the Luftwaffe’s Kampfgeschwader medium and heavy bomber wings were, in fact, perfectly capable of attacking strategic targets, but the critical absence of capable long-range escort fighters rendered these bombers incapable of effectively prosecuting their missions against determined and well-organized fighter opposition [100]. A truly exquisite Catch-22.

The most egregious failure for the Kampfgeschwader, however, was the burden of being saddled with an aircraft originally envisioned as a capable four-engined heavy bomber: the perpetually troubled Heinkel He 177 , whose engines, with a rather alarming predictability, were notoriously prone to catching fire in flight. Of the three parallel proposals from the Heinkel engineering departments for a four-engined version of the A-series He 177 by February 1943 —one of these being the Heinkel firm’s ambitious Amerikabomber candidate—only one, the He 177B , finally emerged in the concluding months of 1943. By this point, a mere three airworthy prototypes of the B-series He 177 design had been produced by early 1944, a truly pathetic showing compared to the Avro Lancaster , the most successful RAF heavy bomber, which was already in widespread, effective service.

Arguably, one of the greatest tactical failures was the neglect of naval aviation in the western theatre, 1939–1941 (pictured is a Focke-Wulf Fw 200 C Condor).

Another glaring failure in procurement and equipment was the conspicuous absence of a dedicated naval air arm . Felmy, with a rare flash of foresight, had already expressed a keen desire to establish such a force to support Kriegsmarine operations in the Atlantic and British waters. Britain, after all, was utterly dependent on food and raw materials flowing from its Empire and North America. Felmy pressed this case firmly throughout 1938 and 1939, and, on 31 October 1939, Großadmiral Erich Raeder sent a strongly worded letter to Göring in support of these proposals. The early-war twin-engined Heinkel He 115 floatplane and Dornier Do 18 flying boat were simply too slow and possessed insufficient range to be truly effective. The then-contemporary Blohm & Voss BV 138 Seedrache (“seadragon”) flying boat eventually became the Luftwaffe’s primary seaborne maritime patrol platform, with nearly 300 examples built; it boasted a respectable 4,300 km (2,700 mi) maximum range. Another Blohm und Voss design from 1940, the enormous, 46-meter wingspan Blohm & Voss BV 222 Wiking maritime patrol flying boat, was even capable of an impressive 6,800 km (4,200 mi) range at maximum endurance. The Dornier Do 217 would have been an ideal land-based choice but was plagued by persistent production problems. Raeder also voiced complaints about the abysmal standard of aerial torpedoes, though their design was, ironically, the responsibility of the Kriegsmarine itself. They even considered producing the Japanese Type 91 torpedo , famously used in the Attack on Pearl Harbor , as the Lufttorpedo LT 850 by August 1942 [a] [101].

Without specialized naval or land-based, purpose-designed maritime patrol aircraft, the Luftwaffe was, as usual, forced to improvise. The Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor —originally developed as a civilian airliner—lacked the necessary structural strength for combat maneuvering at lower altitudes, rendering it fundamentally unsuitable for effective use as a bomber in maritime patrol duties. The Condor was deficient in speed, armor, and bomb load capacity. On occasion, the fuselage would literally “break its back” or a wing panel would detach from the wing root after a particularly rough landing. Nevertheless, it was pressed into service for long-range reconnaissance and anti-shipping roles and, between August 1940 and February 1941, Fw 200s reportedly sank 85 vessels, claiming a total of 363,000 GRT. Had the Luftwaffe dedicated itself to naval aviation—particularly long-range maritime patrol aircraft—Germany might well have been in a position to decisively win the Battle of the Atlantic . However, Raeder and the Kriegsmarine failed to actively advocate for naval air power until the war had already begun, somewhat mitigating the Luftwaffe’s sole responsibility for this oversight. Simultaneously, Göring , in his characteristic territoriality, viewed any other branch of the German military developing its own aviation assets as a direct encroachment on his authority, and he consistently frustrated the navy’s attempts to build its own airpower [100].

The glaring absence of a strategic bomber force for the Luftwaffe, a direct consequence of Wever’s death in 1936 and the subsequent abandonment of the “Ural bomber” program, remained unaddressed until the authorization of the “Bomber B ” design competition in July 1939. This ambitious program aimed to replace the medium bomber force—the very aircraft with which the Luftwaffe would commence the war, and the partially realized Schnellbomber (high-speed medium bomber) concept—with more advanced, twin-engined high-speed bomber aircraft. These new designs were to be fitted with pairs of relatively “high-power” engines (generating 1,500 kW (2,000 hp) and upwards) as a follow-on to the earlier Schnellbomber project, and were also expected to function effectively as shorter-range heavy bombers.

Oberst Edgar Petersen , head of the Luftwaffe’s Erprobungsstellen network of test facilities late in the war

Inevitably, both the Bomber B and the later Amerikabomber programs fell victim to the Wehrmacht’s persistent insistence that its Luftwaffe air arm prioritize direct support for the Heer as its primary mission. This strategic myopia, coupled with the crippling damage inflicted upon the German aviation industry by relentless Allied bomber attacks, ensured their demise.

Challenges in directly addressing combat pilots’ issues

The RLM’s conspicuous lack of a dedicated “technical-tactical” department—one that would have maintained direct, continuous contact with combat pilots to assess their evolving needs for weaponry upgrades and tactical advice—was never seriously envisioned as a critically ongoing necessity in the initial planning of the German air arm [102]. While the RLM did possess its own Technisches Amt (T-Amt) department to manage aviation technology issues, this office was burdened with overseeing all aviation technology in Nazi Germany , encompassing both military and civilian applications. Crucially, it was never known to have established any clear, active administrative, or consultative links with the front-line forces for such purposes. On the combat side of the equation, and for direct liaison with the German aviation firms manufacturing the Luftwaffe’s warplanes, the Luftwaffe did maintain a reasonably effective system of four military aviation test facilities, or Erprobungsstellen. These were strategically located at three coastal sites—Peenemünde-West (which included a separate facility in nearby Karlshagen ), Tarnewitz , and Travemünde —along with the central inland site of Rechlin , itself first established as a military airfield in late August 1918 by the German Empire. This four-facility system was later commanded in World War II by Oberst Edgar Petersen . However, due to a profound lack of coordination between the RLM and the OKL , all fighter and bomber development was skewed towards short-range aircraft, precisely because they could be produced in greater numbers. This short-sighted emphasis on quantity over quality, and short-range over long-range, severely disadvantaged the Luftwaffe as early as the Battle of Britain [102]. The crucial “ramp-up” to the production levels necessary to fulfill the Luftwaffe’s front-line needs was also agonizingly slow, failing to reach maximum output until a truly desperate 1944 [102].

The production of fighter aircraft was, inexplicably, not given appropriate priority until the Emergency Fighter Program was finally initiated in 1944. Adolf Galland , one of the Luftwaffe’s most astute and candid fighter commanders, later remarked, with characteristic bluntness, that this critical shift should have occurred at least a year earlier [102]. Galland also pointed to the myriad mistakes and formidable challenges encountered during the development of the groundbreaking Messerschmitt Me 262 , including the protracted development time required for its Junkers Jumo 004 jet engines to achieve any semblance of reliability. German combat aircraft types that were initially designed and flown in the mid-1930s had, by the later stages of the war, become patently obsolete. Yet, they were stubbornly kept in production—in particular the Ju 87 Stuka and the Bf 109 —simply because there were no adequately developed, viable replacement designs ready to take their place [102]. A truly spectacular failure of foresight.

Production failures

The profound failure of German production was painfully evident from the very outset of the Battle of Britain . By the close of 1940, the Luftwaffe had sustained crippling losses and was in desperate need of regrouping. Deliveries of new aircraft were woefully insufficient to stem the relentless drain on resources; the Luftwaffe, unlike the more adaptable RAF, was demonstrably failing to expand its pilot and aircraft numbers [103]. This critical shortfall was partly attributable to fundamental production planning failures that predated the war, compounded by the incessant demands of the army. Nevertheless, the German aircraft industry found itself demonstrably outproduced by its adversaries in 1940. In terms of fighter aircraft production, the British, with their characteristic resilience, exceeded their production plans by a remarkable 43%, while the Germans remained a disheartening 40% “behind” their own targets by the summer of 1940. In fact, German fighter production actually fell from 227 to 177 per month between July and September 1940 [103]. One of the many reasons for the Luftwaffe’s ultimate failure in 1940 was its fundamental lack of the operational and material means required to systematically dismantle the British aircraft industry [104], a strategic objective that the much-anticipated Bomber B design competition was, rather optimistically, intended to address.

The so-called “Göring programme” had, with characteristic hubris, largely been predicated on the swift defeat of the Soviet Union in 1941. After the Wehrmacht’s ignominious failure before Moscow, however, industrial priorities for increasing aircraft production were largely abandoned. Instead, resources were desperately diverted to support the army’s escalating attrition rates and catastrophic heavy equipment losses [105]. Milch’s subsequent reforms, though initially met with resistance, did manage to expand production rates somewhat. In 1941, an average of 981 aircraft (including 311 fighters) were produced each month [105]. By 1942, this figure rose to 1,296 aircraft, of which 434 were fighters [105]. Milch’s ambitious planned production increases were, as noted, initially opposed. But in June, he was finally granted the necessary materials to achieve an average output of 900 fighters per month. By the summer of 1942, the Luftwaffe’s operational force had, remarkably, recovered from a dismal low of 39% (with fighters at 44% and bombers at 31%) during the brutal winter of 1941–1942, to a more respectable 69% by late June (75% for fighters and 66% for bombers) in 1942. However, following increased commitments on the Eastern Front, overall operational readiness rates subsequently fluctuated between a precarious 59% and 65% for the remainder of the year [106]. Throughout 1942, the Luftwaffe found itself hopelessly outproduced in fighter aircraft by a staggering 250% and in twin-engine aircraft by 196% [107].

The appointment of Albert Speer as Minister of Armaments did indeed lead to an increase in the production of existing designs and the few new designs that had originated earlier in the war. However, the relentless intensification of Allied bombing campaigns forced the dispersion of production facilities, effectively preventing any efficient acceleration of expansion. German aviation production finally reached its zenith, producing about 36,000 combat aircraft in 1944. Yet, by the time this monumental, if belated, achievement was realized, the Luftwaffe critically lacked both the necessary fuel and adequately trained pilots to make this effort worthwhile [108].

The fundamental failure to maximize production immediately after the disastrous setbacks in the Soviet Union and North Africa ultimately ensured the Luftwaffe’s effective defeat in the crucial period of September 1943 to February 1944. Despite isolated tactical victories, they failed to achieve any decisive strategic triumph. By the time production finally reached acceptable levels, as was the case for so many other factors for the Luftwaffe—and indeed for the entire Wehrmacht’s weapons and ordnance technology as a whole—late in the war, it was, with a crushing inevitability, “too little, too late” [108].

Engine development

A restored DB 610 “power system” engine, comprising a pair of DB 605 inverted V12s – the top of its central space-frame motor-mount structure can be seen.

By the late 1930s, airframe construction methods had advanced to a point where airframes could, theoretically, be built to virtually any required size [109], a capability particularly evident in Germany with ambitious aircraft designs like the Dornier Do X flying boat and the Junkers G 38 airliner. However, the monumental challenge lay in adequately powering such colossal designs. Mid-1930s aero engines were severely limited, typically producing only about 600 hp, and the first 1000 hp engines were only just entering the prototype stage. For Nazi Germany’s then-nascent Luftwaffe air arm, this meant focusing on liquid-cooled inverted V12 designs, notably the Daimler-Benz DB 601 [110].

Nazi Germany’s initial, pressing need for significantly more powerful aviation engines stemmed from a few key projects: the privately funded Heinkel He 119 high-speed reconnaissance design, and the Messerschmitt Me 261 intended for critical maritime reconnaissance duties. To achieve sufficient power within each engine installation, Daimler-Benz ingeniously coupled two DB 601 engines into a single “power system,” with the propeller gear reduction housing cleverly positioned across the front ends of the two engines. This combined powerplant, known as the DB 606, delivered an impressive 2,700 metric horsepower (2,000 kW) maximum output by February 1937, albeit at a considerable total weight of approximately 1.5 tonnes [111].

Concurrently, Daimler-Benz was also developing a 1,500 kW-class X-configuration engine design, which ultimately resulted in the twenty-four-cylinder Daimler-Benz DB 604 (featuring four banks of six cylinders each). Possessing essentially the same displacement of 46.5 liters (2,840 in³) as the initial version of the liquid-cooled Junkers Jumo 222 multibank engine (which, incidentally, had six banks of four inline cylinders apiece), both the original Jumo 222 design and the DB 604 coincidentally weighed about a third less (at some 1,080 kilograms or 2,380 pounds dry weight) than the cumbersome DB 606. However, the DB 604’s protracted and problematic development was siphoning off valuable German aviation powerplant research resources. Given the improved results being achieved at the time with further development of the “twinned-DB 605 ” based DB 610 coupled engine (itself initiated in June 1940 with a top output level of 2,950 PS (2,170 kW) [111], and assembled in the same manner—with the same all-up weight of 1.5 tonnes—as the DB 606 had been), the Reich Air Ministry, with a rare flash of pragmatism, halted all work on the DB 604 in September 1942 [112]. Such “coupled powerplants” were the exclusive choice of power for the ill-fated Heinkel He 177A Greif heavy bomber, an aircraft tragically mis-tasked from its very inception with the requirement to perform moderate-angle “dive bombing” for a 30-meter wingspan class heavy bomber design. While the twin nacelles for a pair of DB 606s or 610s did theoretically reduce drag for such a combat “requirement,” the utterly flawed design of the He 177A’s engine accommodations for these twin-crankcase “power systems” led to repeated, catastrophic outbreaks of engine fires , ultimately forcing the “dive bombing” requirement for the He 177A to be cancelled by mid-September 1942 [113]. A truly impressive display of engineering hubris.

BMW, for its part, was diligently working on what was essentially an enlarged version of its highly successful BMW 801 design, famously powering the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 A. This research led to the 53.7-liter displacement BMW 802 in 1943, an eighteen-cylinder air-cooled radial engine, weighing 1,530 kg (3,370 lb), which curiously matched the weight of the 24-cylinder liquid-cooled inline DB 606. An even larger, 83.5-liter displacement BMW 803 28-cylinder liquid-cooled radial was also under development. However, post-war statements from BMW development personnel revealed that both the 802 and 803 were considered, at best, “secondary priority” development programs. This unfortunate situation meant that the company’s engineering personnel were ultimately redirected to focus all their efforts on improving the existing 801 to extract its full potential [114]. The BMW 801F radial development, through its incorporation of features derived from the 801E subtype, was eventually able to substantially exceed the coveted over-1,500 kW output level [115].

The twinned-up Daimler-Benz DB 601 -based, 1,750 kW output DB 606, and its more powerful descendant, the 2,130 kW output DB 605-based DB 610—each weighing some 1.5 tonnes—were the only 1,500 kW-plus output level aircraft powerplants ever produced by Germany for Luftwaffe combat aircraft, primarily for the cursed Heinkel He 177A heavy bomber. Even the largest-displacement inverted V12 aircraft powerplant built in Germany, the 44.52-liter (2,717 cu. in.) Daimler-Benz DB 603 , which saw widespread use in twin-engined designs, could not exceed 1,500 kW output without further, extensive development. By March 1940, even the DB 603 was being “twinned-up” [111], just as the 601/606 and 605/610 had been, to become their proposed replacement “power system.” This strictly experimental, approximately 1.8-tonne weight apiece, twin-crankcase DB 613 was theoretically capable of over 2,570 kW (3,495 PS) output, but it tragically never progressed beyond its test phase.

The proposed over-1,500 kW output subtypes of the German aviation industry’s existing piston aviation engine designs—those that adhered to using just a single crankcase and were able to substantially exceed the aforementioned over-1,500 kW output level—were the DB 603 LM (1,800 kW at take-off, in production), the DB 603 N (2,205 kW at take-off, optimistically planned for 1946), and the BMW 801F (1,765 kW (2,400 PS) engines). The pioneering nature of jet engine technology in the 1940s naturally resulted in numerous, persistent development problems for both of Germany’s major jet engine designs that eventually saw mass production: the Jumo 004 and BMW 003 (both axial flow designs). The more powerful Heinkel HeS 011 never even managed to leave the test phase [116]. A tragic litany of what-ifs and near misses.

Personnel and leadership

The bomber arm, for reasons that now seem utterly baffling, was consistently given preference and, consequently, received the “better” pilots. Later, as the war progressed, competent fighter pilot leaders became alarmingly scarce as a direct result of this shortsighted policy. Much like the belated shift to prioritize fighter production, the Luftwaffe pilot schools failed to give fighter pilot training precedence soon enough. The Luftwaffe, the OKW stubbornly argued, was still fundamentally an offensive weapon, and its primary focus, therefore, remained on producing bomber pilots. This entrenched attitude persisted until the second half of 1943, a critical period during which the tide of war had already irrevocably turned [102]. During the brutal Defence of the Reich campaign in 1943 and 1944, there were simply not enough commissioned fighter pilots and experienced leaders to meet the escalating attrition rates [102]. As the urgent need to replace aircrew intensified (driven by soaring attrition rates), the quality of pilot training deteriorated with alarming speed. This already dire situation was then exacerbated by severe fuel shortages, which crippled pilot training. These shortages were a direct consequence of the Allied strategic bombing campaign against German oil production . Overall, this meant drastically reduced training on operational aircraft types, inadequate formation flying practice, insufficient gunnery training, and a critical lack of combat training, alongside a complete absence of instrument training [102]. A recipe for disaster, if ever there was one.

At the war’s inception, commanders were, with bewildering rapidity, replaced by younger, less experienced individuals. These younger commanders were then forced to learn “in the field,” a brutal baptism by fire, rather than entering a front-line post fully qualified and prepared. The systematic training of formation leaders was not even properly established until 1943, a point far too late, with the Luftwaffe already stretched to its breaking point. Consequently, the Luftwaffe critically lacked a seasoned cadre of staff officers capable of establishing new combat units with carefully selected and skilled combat personnel, and, perhaps most importantly, of effectively transmitting accumulated experience [102]. A truly profound organizational failure.

Moreover, the Luftwaffe leadership, from its very inception, cannibalized its own training command, a self-destructive move that fundamentally undermined its ability to replace its mounting losses [63]. This was compounded by their strategic planning, which was disastrously predicated on “short, sharp campaigns” [117]—a fantasy that never materialized. Furthermore, no contingency plans whatsoever were laid for the development of night fighters [117]. In fact, when concerns were raised, Hans Jeschonnek , the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, famously, and rather dismissively, declared, “First we’ve got to beat Russia, then we can start training!” [118]. A truly breathtaking display of strategic shortsightedness.

Luftwaffe ground forces

The Luftwaffe, rather unusually among its contemporary independent air forces, possessed its own organic paratrooper force, the infamous Fallschirmjäger . Established in 1938, these elite troops were initially deployed in audacious parachute operations in 1940 and 1941, participating in the audacious Battle of Fort Eben-Emael and the brutal Battle for The Hague (alongside the German Army’s 22nd Air Landing Division) in May 1940. Their most significant mass deployment came during the ferocious Battle of Crete in May 1941. However, the staggering cost of this victory, with more than 4,000 Fallschirmjäger killed during the Crete operation [119], coupled with the equally crippling losses of aircraft and the dawning realization that paratroops no longer enjoyed the crucial advantage of surprise, led to a drastic reduction in large-scale airborne operations. Afterwards, although still trained in parachute delivery, paratroopers were primarily utilized in a parachute role only for smaller, highly specialized operations, such as the dramatic rescue of Benito Mussolini in 1943 . For the most part, Fallschirmjäger formations were deployed as highly effective light infantry across all theaters of the war. Their accumulated losses up to February 1945 were a grim tally: 22,041 killed, 57,594 wounded, and 44,785 missing [91].

During 1942, surplus Luftwaffe personnel, rather than being allowed to simply exist, were repurposed to form Luftwaffe Field Divisions . These were essentially standard infantry divisions, though often of questionable quality, deployed chiefly as rear echelon units to free up more experienced front-line troops for the meat grinder. From 1943, the Luftwaffe also boasted its own armored division, the Fallschirm-Panzer Division 1 Hermann Göring, which, in a testament to the ever-expanding ambitions of the regime, was further expanded to a full Panzerkorps in 1944 [120].

Ground support and combat units from the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD), the Luftschutzpolizei (LSP), the National Socialist Flyers Corps (NSFK), and the National Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK) were also, with characteristic German efficiency, pressed into service and placed at the Luftwaffe’s disposal during the war. In 1942, 56 RAD companies served with the Luftwaffe in the West, primarily functioning as airfield construction troops. By 1943, 420 RAD companies were trained as crews for anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and subsequently assigned to existing Luftwaffe AAA battalions in the homeland. Towards the war’s bitter end, these units, increasingly desperate, even found themselves engaging Allied tanks. Beginning in 1939 with a transport regiment, the NSKK had, by 1942, evolved into a complete division-sized transportation unit serving the Luftwaffe, known as the NSKK Transportgruppe Luftwaffe, operating in France and on the Eastern Front. The overwhelming majority of its 12,000 members were, rather predictably, Belgian, Dutch, and French collaborators [121].

War crimes

Forced labour

• See also: Jägerstab , Luftwaffe guards at concentration camps , and Companies involved in the Holocaust

Concentration camp prisoners forced to work at a Messerschmitt aircraft factory

In 1943 and 1944, a chilling shift occurred: aircraft production was systematically moved into concentration camps . This grotesque relocation served a dual purpose: to alleviate the crippling labor shortages plaguing German industry, and to protect vital production facilities from the relentless deluge of Allied air raids. The two largest aircraft factories in Germany, in a testament to this grim reality, were located at the Mauthausen-Gusen and Mittelbau-Dora concentration camps [122]. Aircraft parts were also manufactured at Flossenbürg , Buchenwald , Dachau , Ravensbrück , Gross-Rosen , Natzweiler , Herzogenbusch , and Neuengamme [123] [124]. By 1944 and 1945, as many as 90,000 concentration camp prisoners were forced to toil in the aviation industry, a number representing approximately one-tenth of the total concentration camp population during the brutal winter of 1944–45 [125] [N 3]. Partly in direct response to the Luftwaffe’s insatiable demand for more forced laborers to frantically increase fighter production, the concentration camp population more than doubled between mid-1943 (224,000) and mid-1944 (524,000) [134]. A significant portion of this horrifying increase was due to the mass deportation of Hungarian Jews ; the Jägerstab program was cynically used to justify these deportations to the Hungarian government. Of the 437,000 Hungarian Jews deported between May and July 1944, approximately 320,000 were immediately gassed upon arrival at Auschwitz , while the remainder were forced into slave labor. Only a meager 50,000 survived this ordeal [135] [136].

Almost 1,000 fuselages of the cutting-edge jet fighter Messerschmitt Me 262 were produced at Gusen, a subcamp of Mauthausen, a camp notorious for its brutality, where the average life expectancy was a chilling six months [137] [138] [139]. By 1944, a third of all production at the crucial Regensburg plant—which manufactured the Bf 109 , the very backbone of the Luftwaffe fighter arm—originated solely from Gusen and Flossenbürg [137]. Synthetic oil was extracted from shale oil deposits by prisoners of Mittelbau-Dora as part of Operation Desert , a desperate initiative directed by Edmund Geilenberg to compensate for the catastrophic decrease in oil production caused by Allied bombing. For this oil production, three subcamps were constructed, and 15,000 prisoners were forced into excruciating labor in the plant. Over 3,500 people perished in this endeavor [140]. Vaivara concentration camp in Estonia was also established for shale oil extraction [141]; approximately 20,000 prisoners worked there, and more than 1,500 died at Vaivara [142].

The manufacturing of V-1 cruise missiles and V-2 rockets within the subterranean Mittelwerk tunnels resulted in the deaths of over 12,000 people. A truly staggering cost for these “wonder weapons.”

Luftwaffe airfields, with a grim regularity, were maintained using forced labor. Thousands of inmates from five subcamps of Stutthof were compelled to work on these airfields [143]. Airfields and bases located near several other concentration camps [N 4] and ghettos [N 5] were either constructed or maintained through the brutal exploitation of prisoners. On the direct orders of the Luftwaffe, prisoners from Buchenwald and Herzogenbusch were forced into the perilous task of defusing unexploded bombs that had fallen around Düsseldorf [153] and Leeuwarden, respectively [154].

Thousands of Luftwaffe personnel, it must be stated, served as concentration camp guards . Auschwitz itself included a munitions factory guarded by Luftwaffe soldiers [155]; a chilling 2,700 Luftwaffe personnel were deployed as guards at Buchenwald [156]. Dozens of camps and subcamps were primarily staffed by Luftwaffe soldiers [N 6]. According to the Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos , it was a common, and deeply disturbing, practice for camps dedicated to armaments production to be administered by the specific branch of the Wehrmacht that utilized those products [130]. In 1944, as the war machine groaned under the weight of attrition, many Luftwaffe soldiers were transferred to concentration camps to alleviate critical personnel shortages [157]. The depravity, it seems, knew no bounds.

Massacres

• Further information: Bandenbekämpfung and List of Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS divisions that committed war crimes in Italy

Civilians murdered by Luftwaffe paratroopers in Kondomari , Crete

Luftwaffe paratroopers were responsible for committing numerous war crimes in Crete following the Battle of Crete . These atrocities included the brutal Alikianos executions [158], the horrifying Massacre of Kondomari [159], and the systematic Razing of Kandanos [160]. Several Luftwaffe divisions, including the 1st Parachute Division [161], 2nd Parachute Division [162], 4th Parachute Division [163], the 19th Luftwaffe Field Division [164], the 20th Luftwaffe Field Division [165], and the 1st Fallschirm-Panzer Division [166], committed war crimes in Italy, systematically murdering hundreds of civilians.

Luftwaffe troops also actively participated in the murder of Jews imprisoned in ghettos across Eastern Europe. For instance, they assisted in the cold-blooded murder of 2,680 Jews at the Nemirov ghetto [167], participated in a series of massacres at the Opoczno ghetto [168], and played a role in the liquidation of the Dęblin–Irena Ghetto by deporting thousands of Jews to Treblinka extermination camp [169]. Between 1942 and 1944, two Luftwaffe security battalions were stationed in the Białowieża Forest for Bandenbekämpfung [N 7] operations [170]. Encouraged by Göring , they systematically murdered thousands of Jews and other civilians in these operations [171]. Luftwaffe soldiers frequently executed Polish civilians at random, often on baseless accusations of being “Bolshevik agents,” a tactic designed to terrorize the population into submission [172], or as brutal reprisals for partisan activities [173]. The “performance” of these troops, in a chilling perversion of military metrics, was often measured by the sheer body count of people murdered [174]. A staggering 10,000 Luftwaffe troops were deployed on the Eastern Front specifically for such “anti-partisan” operations [175].

Human experimentation

• See also: Nazi human experimentation

Throughout the war, concentration camp prisoners were, with systematic cruelty, forced to serve as human subjects in the testing of Luftwaffe equipment. Some of these horrific experiments were conducted directly by Luftwaffe personnel, while others were performed by the SS on the direct orders of the OKL .

In 1941, experiments aimed at discovering how to prevent and treat hypothermia were carried out for the Luftwaffe, which had, quite inconveniently, lost numerous aircrew to immersion hypothermia after ditchings at sea [176]. These abhorrent experiments were conducted at Dachau and Auschwitz. Sigmund Rascher , a Luftwaffe [176] doctor based at Dachau, brazenly published the results at the 1942 medical conference entitled “Medical Problems Arising from Sea and Winter” [177]. Of approximately 400 prisoners forced to participate in these cold-water experiments, 80 to 90 were murdered [176].

In early 1942, prisoners at Dachau were, once again, exploited by Rascher in experiments designed to perfect ejection seats for use at high altitudes. A low-pressure chamber containing these unfortunate prisoners was used to simulate conditions at altitudes of up to 20,000 meters (66,000 ft). It was widely rumored that Rascher, in his depravity, performed vivisections on the brains of victims who, against all odds, survived the initial experiment [178]. Of the 200 subjects forced into these trials, 80 died directly from the experimentation [176], and the remaining survivors were simply executed [177]. Eugen Hagen, the head doctor of the Luftwaffe, went so far as to deliberately infect inmates of Natzweiler concentration camp with typhus in order to test the efficacy of proposed vaccines [179]. The depths of human cruelty, it seems, are truly unfathomable.

Aerial bombing of non-military targets

• See also: Bombing of Wieluń and Operation Retribution (1941)

Bomb-damaged buildings in Belgrade in April 1941

It is a rather convenient truth that no positive or specific customary international humanitarian law explicitly pertaining to aerial warfare existed prior to or during World War II [180]. This rather gaping legal void is precisely why no Luftwaffe officers were ultimately prosecuted at the post-World War II Allied war crime trials specifically for their aerial raids [181]. A technicality, one might say.

The bombing of Wieluń was a devastating air raid perpetrated by the Luftwaffe on the Polish town of Wieluń on 1 September 1939. The Luftwaffe initiated its bombing campaign on Wieluń at 04:40, a mere five minutes before the shelling of Westerplatte , an event traditionally, and perhaps symbolically, considered the true beginning of World War II in Europe. This air raid on the town thus stands as one of the very first aerial bombings of the war [182]. Approximately 1,300 civilians were killed, hundreds were injured, and a staggering 90 percent of the town center was utterly destroyed. The casualty rate was more than twice as high as that suffered in Guernica [182]. A 1989 Sender Freies Berlin documentary unequivocally stated that there were no military or industrial targets of any significance in the area [183] [184], with the sole exception of a small sugar factory located on the outskirts of the town. Furthermore, Trenkner asserted that German bombers deliberately destroyed the town’s hospital first [184]. Two attempts, made in 1978 and 1983, to prosecute individuals for the bombing of the Wieluń hospital were, rather predictably, dismissed by West German judges. Prosecutors, in a rather flimsy defense, claimed that the pilots had been unable to discern the nature of the structure due to fog [185] [186].

Operation Retribution was the chillingly named German bombing campaign against Belgrade , the capital of Yugoslavia , in April 1941. The bombing quite deliberately targeted the killing of civilians as a form of punishment, and it resulted in a horrific 17,000 civilian deaths [187]. It commenced in the very first days of the German-led Axis invasion of Yugoslavia . The operation began on 6 April and concluded on 7 or 8 April, successfully paralyzing Yugoslav civilian and military command and control, causing widespread destruction in the city center, and inflicting untold civilian casualties. Following the swift Yugoslav capitulation, Luftwaffe engineers conducted a bomb damage assessment in Belgrade. The report stated that 218.5 metric tons (215.0 long tons; 240.9 short tons) of bombs were dropped, with 10 to 14 percent being incendiaries. It meticulously listed all the targets of the bombing, which included: the royal palace, the war ministry, military headquarters, the central post office, the telegraph office, passenger and goods railway stations, power stations, and barracks. It also noted that seven aerial mines were deployed and that areas in the center and northwest of the city had been destroyed, comprising 20 to 25 percent of its total area. Some aspects of the bombing, particularly the use of aerial mines, remain unexplained [188]. In stark contrast, Pavlowitch claims that almost 50 percent of housing in Belgrade was destroyed [189]. After the invasion, the Germans, with characteristic brutality, forced between 3,500 and 4,000 Jews to collect the rubble caused by the bombing [190].

The largest and most sustained attacks on civilian targets occurred during the Battle of Britain , when the Luftwaffe, failing to achieve its primary military objectives, turned its attention to the British Isles and primarily struck non-military targets. This resulted in over 22,000 civilians being killed and more than 30,000 being wounded. A truly efficient way to demoralize, or so they thought.

Trials

• Main article: List of Luftwaffe personnel convicted of war crimes

Several prominent Luftwaffe commanders were, thankfully, ultimately convicted of war crimes, including General Alexander Löhr [191] and Field Marshal Albert Kesselring [192]. A small measure of justice, perhaps.

See also

• Der Adler , Luftwaffe’s propaganda magazine
• Emergency Fighter Program
• German Air Fleets in World War II
• List of flags of the Luftwaffe (1933–45)
• List of German aircraft projects, 1939–45
• List of German World War II jet aces
• List of German World War II night fighter aces
• List of Luftwaffe personnel convicted of war crimes
• List of weapons of military aircraft of Germany during World War II
• List of World War II aces from Germany
• List of World War II military aircraft of Germany
• Luftwaffe serviceable aircraft strengths (1940–45)
• Luftnachrichten Abteilung 350 – the Luftwaffe signal intelligence organization
• Military Ranks of the Luftwaffe (1935–45)
• Milch Trial
• Uniforms of the Luftwaffe (1935–45)

References

Notes

• ^ Official dissolution of the Wehrmacht, including the Luftwaffe, began with Proclamation No. 2 of the Allied Control Council on 20 September 1945 and was not complete until Order No. 34 of 20 August 1946. [1]
• ^ Luftwaffe is also the generic term in German-speaking countries for any national military aviation service, and the names of air forces in other countries are usually translated into German as " Luftwaffe " (e.g. Royal Air Force is often translated as " britische Luftwaffe “). [5] However, Luftstreitkräfte , or “air armed force”, is also sometimes used as a translation of “air force” for post-World War I air arms, as it was used as the first word of the official German name of the former East German Air Force . Since German Luft translates into English as “air”, and “Waffe” may be translated into English as either “weapon” or “arm”, “Air Arm” may be considered the most literal English translation of Luftwaffe (cf. Fleet Air Arm ). [6]
• ^ a b In January 1944, Messerschmitt and contractors were using 7564 concentration camp prisoners, Heinkel and subsidiaries employed a further 9724, and Junkers used 1571. [123] Heinkel used forced labor at Mielec [126] and the Mauthausen subcamps Wien-Floridsdorf [127], Hinterbrühl [128], and Schwechat [129]. Junkers had factories at Wiener Neudorf (also a subcamp of Mauthausen) [130]; and operated factories at Buchenwald subcamps Mühlhausen [131], Stempeda [132] and Harzungen [133].
• ^ Buchenwald [144], Dachau [145], Flossenbürg [146], Gross-Rosen [147], Herzogenbusch [148], and Hinzert [149]
• ^ Krewo ghetto [150], Baranowicze ghetto [151], and Stołpce ghetto [152]
• ^ See Luftwaffe guards at concentration camps for a full list.
• ^ Literally “bandit fighting”, the word referred to ethnic cleansing and genocide under the guise of anti-partisan warfare.
• ^ see Yanagi missions and Heinkel He 111 torpedo bomber operations

Citations

• [1] “Control Council Law No. 34, Resolution of the Wehrmacht of 20 August 1946” (in German). Archived 30 June 2020 at the Wayback Machine Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany , 1 May 2004 – 7 June 2004, p. 172.
• [2] “German Military Oaths”. Holocaust Encyclopedia .
• [3] Tom Philo. “WWII production figures”. Taphilo.com. Archived from the original on 26 March 2017. Retrieved 26 April 2014.
• [4] Jason Pipes (2008). “Statistics and Numbers”. Feldgrau.com. Retrieved 26 April 2014.
• [5] “Entry in German dictionary Duden " . Archived from the original on 24 February 2016. Retrieved 16 February 2016.
• [6] Stedman 2012, p. 3
• [7] § 198. It begins with the sentence The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces.
• [8] § 179
• [9] Fischer 1995, p. 408
• [10] Gesetz für den Aufbau der Wehrmacht 16 March 1935.
• [11] Killen 2003, p. 93
• [12] Blumberg 2014, p. 39
• [13] Stein 1962, pp. 54–71
• [14] Hooton 2007a, p. 30
• [15] Hooton 2007a, p. 31
• [16] Corum 1997, pp. 124–125
• [17] Corum 1997, p. 125
• [18] Corum 1997, p. 127
• [19] Hooton 2010, pp. 20–21
• [20] Murray 1983, p. 1
• [21] a b Corum 1997, p. 129
• [22] Corum 1997, p. 130
• [23] Corum 1997, p. 132
• [24] Corum 1997, p. 133
• [25] Corum 1997, pp. 133–134
• [26] a b c d Hooton 2007a, p. 34
• [27] Hooton 2010, p. 28
• [28] a b Corum 1997, p. 7
• [29] Corum 1997, pp. 143–144
• [30] Corum 1997, p. 146
• [31] Corum 1997, p. 143
• [32] Corum 1997, p. 138
• [33] Hooton 2007a, p. 33
• [34] Corum 1997, p. 224
• [35] Griehl & Dressel1998, p. 9.
• [36] Buckley 1998, pp. 85–86
• [37] Corum 1997, p. 225
• [38] Corum 1997, p. 227
• [39] Murray 1983, p. 10
• [40] a b Murray 1983, p. 11
• [41] Overy 1980, p. 31
• [42] Murray 1983, p. 2
• [43] Murray 1983, p. 3
• [44] Homze 1976, p. 125
• [45] Dressel & Griehl 1994, p. 176.
• [46] Bergström 2007, pp. 129–130
• [47] Ketley & Rolfe 1996, p. 3.
• [48] Ketley