The claim that something is good or right simply because it is natural, or conversely, bad or wrong because it is unnatural, is a purported fallacy. For a detailed examination of this specific claim, one should consult the entry on the Appeal to nature .

In the intricate landscape of metaethics , the naturalistic fallacy is fundamentally the assertion that one can define the concept of good by reference to entities, properties, or processes that are merely descriptive in nature. This includes terms like ‘pleasant,’ ‘desirable,’ or even biological concepts such as fitness . The term itself was first articulated by the prominent British philosopher G. E. Moore in his seminal 1903 work, Principia Ethica .

Moore’s formulation of the naturalistic fallacy bears a significant resemblance to the is–ought problem , a concept deeply rooted in David Hume ’s influential Treatise of Human Nature (published between 1738 and 1740). However, it’s crucial to distinguish Moore’s perspective from Hume’s. Unlike Hume, Moore and his fellow proponents of ethical non-naturalism did not perceive the naturalistic fallacy as being in direct opposition to moral realism .

Common Uses

The Is–Ought Problem

The term “naturalistic fallacy” is often employed to critique arguments that attempt to derive an “ought” from an “is.” This is the essence of the is–ought problem . As Michael Ridge aptly elaborates, the core intuition is that conclusions concerning value or obligation necessitate at least one premise that itself expresses a value or obligation. Purely factual premises, describing the naturalistic features of things, are insufficient on their own to logically entail or even strongly support a normative conclusion. This problematic inference typically manifests when a general practice or observed state of affairs (an “is”) is used to justify a prescriptive claim (an “ought”). For instance, simply observing that people commonly eat three times a day, or that smoking is widespread, or that humans tend to dress warmly in cold weather, does not logically compel the conclusion that people ought to do these things, or that these actions are morally good. The naturalistic fallacy is committed when such an “is–ought” inference is justified by the claim that the observed practice is somehow natural, or inherently pleasant and desirable.

Jeremy Bentham , in his discussions concerning the relationship between law and morality, observed a tendency for individuals to focus on how things should be rather than how they are when debating issues. This can be seen in the discourse surrounding natural law and positive law . Bentham was particularly critical of natural law theory, arguing that it often fell prey to the naturalistic fallacy by describing existing states of affairs as if they inherently dictated moral imperatives, rather than focusing on what ought to be the case.

Moore’s Discussion

In his influential work, Principia Ethica , G. E. Moore contended that when philosophers attempt to define “good” reductively, by equating it with natural properties such as “pleasant” or “desirable,” they are committing the naturalistic fallacy.

Arthur N. Prior, in his analysis of Moore’s argument, articulates this point:

…the assumption that because some quality or combination of qualities invariably and necessarily accompanies the quality of goodness, or is invariably and necessarily accompanied by it, or both, this quality or combination of qualities is identical with goodness. If, for example, it is believed that whatever is pleasant is and must be good, or that whatever is good is and must be pleasant, or both, it is committing the naturalistic fallacy to infer from this that goodness and pleasantness are one and the same quality. The naturalistic fallacy is the assumption that because the words ‘good’ and, say, ‘pleasant’ necessarily describe the same objects, they must attribute the same quality to them.

Moore’s argument, presented in defense of ethical non-naturalism against ethical naturalism , delves into the semantic and metaphysical foundations of ethics. He posits that “good,” when understood as intrinsic value , is an ineffable quality. It cannot be defined in terms of other properties because it is not reducible to them. Instead, it is “one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves incapable of definition, because they are the ultimate terms by reference to which whatever ‘is’ capable of definition must be defined.” Ethical naturalists, conversely, tend to favor an empirically grounded analysis of goodness, often linking it to concepts like pleasure, as seen in hedonism .

Moore further illustrates his point with an analogy:

That “pleased” does not mean “having the sensation of red”, or anything else whatever, does not prevent us from understanding what it does mean. It is enough for us to know that “pleased” does mean “having the sensation of pleasure”, and though pleasure is absolutely indefinable, though pleasure is pleasure and nothing else whatever, yet we feel no difficulty in saying that we are pleased. The reason is, of course, that when I say “I am pleased”, I do not mean that “I” am the same thing as “having pleasure”. And similarly no difficulty need be found in my saying that “pleasure is good” and yet not meaning that “pleasure” is the same thing as “good”, that pleasure means good, and that good means pleasure. If I were to imagine that when I said “I am pleased”, I meant that I was exactly the same thing as “pleased”, I should not indeed call that a naturalistic fallacy, although it would be the same fallacy as I have called naturalistic with reference to Ethics.

In Section 7 of Principia Ethica, Moore categorizes properties as either complex, composed of simpler properties, or irreducibly simple. He argues that “good” is a simple property, much like pleasure or qualia such as colors. These simple properties cannot be defined by breaking them down into constituent parts. To understand “yellow,” for instance, one must experience it; knowing that it’s the color of egg yolks or the hue between green and orange on the spectrum is insufficient. Moore suggests that such definitions would fail to capture the essence of yellow, and similarly, defining “good” in terms of pleasure or desirability misses its fundamental nature. This line of reasoning is closely tied to his famous open question argument .

Appeal to Nature

A distinct, though sometimes conflated, usage of the term “naturalistic fallacy” or “appeal to nature” pertains to arguments that infer moral acceptability from naturalness, or moral undesirability from unnaturalness. Such arguments are frequently encountered in discussions concerning medicine , homosexuality , environmentalism , and veganism .

Steven Pinker succinctly describes this usage: “The naturalistic fallacy is the idea that what is found in nature is good. It was the basis for social Darwinism , the belief that helping the poor and sick would get in the way of evolution, which depends on the survival of the fittest. Today, biologists denounce the naturalistic fallacy because they want to describe the natural world honestly, without people deriving morals about how we ought to behave (as in: If birds and beasts engage in adultery, infanticide, cannibalism, it must be OK).”

Criticism

Bernard Williams’s Critique

Bernard Williams famously characterized Moore’s use of the term “naturalistic fallacy” as a “spectacular misnomer.” Williams argued that the issue Moore was addressing was fundamentally metaphysical, rather than a logical error in reasoning, which is what a “fallacy” typically implies.

Rejection and Proposed Solutions

A number of philosophers have challenged the concept of the naturalistic fallacy or offered alternative frameworks for understanding the relationship between facts and values.

Bound-up Functions

Ralph McInerny proposes that the “ought” is intrinsically linked to the “is” through the inherent purposes or ends embedded within the nature of things. He uses the analogy of a clock: a clock’s function is to keep time. Understanding this function implicitly establishes a standard for evaluating a clock – a good clock keeps time accurately, a bad one does not. If one cannot distinguish between a good and bad clock, they fundamentally misunderstand what a clock is. Similarly, McInerny suggests, if one cannot discern good human actions from bad ones, they lack a true understanding of the human person. This perspective implies that an understanding of what something is naturally includes an understanding of what it ought to be or do.

Irrationality of Anti-Naturalistic Fallacy

The assertion that the naturalistic fallacy is inherently flawed has itself been criticized as lacking rational grounding and has been labeled the “anti-naturalistic fallacy.” Alex Walter, for instance, argues:

“The naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s ’law’ are frequently appealed to for the purpose of drawing limits around the scope of scientific inquiry into ethics and morality. These two objections are shown to be without force.”

Walter contends that such objections implicitly deny any connection between facts and norms, particularly between factual realities and the mental processes that lead to the adoption of norms. However, philosophers have demonstrated that these connections are often unavoidable.

Consider a basic example: if people deem rescuing others as morally correct, this belief will inevitably shape their understanding of what constitutes danger and when intervention is warranted. On a broader scale, imagine two individuals with differing beliefs about the inherent predispositions of an ethnic group. One believes this group has a hereditary tendency to destroy civilization, while the other does not. This factual disagreement will lead the first person to conclude that persecuting this group might be an excusable “necessary evil,” whereas the second person will likely view such persecution as utterly unjustifiable.

Similarly, two individuals who agree that forcing people to work in extreme poverty is morally reprehensible will arrive at different conclusions regarding the rights of property owners. If one believes property owners are responsible for such exploitation, they might conclude that restricting property rights is necessary. The other, who rejects this premise, would see the persecution of property owners as unnecessary and wrong.

Inconsistent Application

Critics also point to instances where individuals who champion the idea that “is–ought” conclusions are fallacious fail to apply this principle consistently. For example, evolutionary psychologists who critique the “naturalistic fallacy” might themselves make “is–ought” inferences. They may argue that a “blank slate” view of human nature could lead to totalitarian social engineering, or that certain attitudes towards sexuality might encourage attempts to convert homosexuals to heterosexuals. Critics suggest this selective application indicates that charges of the naturalistic fallacy are often employed as rhetorical tactics rather than genuine detections of logical errors.

Universally Normative Allegations of Varied Harm

A significant criticism of the notion that descriptive statements cannot inherently lead to normative conclusions is the existence of universally normative allegations of harm. While descriptive statements about specific differences in effects can be interpreted normatively in various ways depending on one’s values (e.g., “people X are predisposed to eating babies” is a negative statement in the context of child protection, while “individual or group X is predisposed to emit greenhouse gases” is negative in the context of environmental protection), the statement “individual/group X is predisposed to harm whatever values others have” carries a universal negative implication against X. This refers to a situation where X is alleged to be capable of identifying what others value and then destroying it, without possessing any values of its own.

For instance, consider two opposing philosophies: one prioritizing child protection, viewing the eating of babies as the ultimate evil, and advocating for industries that emit greenhouse gases to secure a short-term safe environment. The other philosophy might deem long-term environmental damage the greater evil and advocate for eating babies to reduce overpopulation and, consequently, consumption that leads to greenhouse gas emissions. In this scenario, an individual or group X could be alleged to promote both eating babies and maximizing greenhouse gas emissions, thereby uniting these otherwise adversarial philosophies against X as a common enemy. The principle here is that an allegation of an individual or group being predisposed to adapt its harmful actions to undermine any set of values, even those that are diametrically opposed, inevitably carries universally normative implications. This is presented as a counterexample to the claim that “no descriptive statement can in itself become normative.” Furthermore, such allegations are argued to be scientifically difficult to falsify, as the accused group X might manipulate others to support their agenda, dismissing scientific criticism as part of that destructive agenda. The objection that certain values might condemn specific methods of persecuting X is deemed irrelevant, as different values would also propose various acceptable actions against groups they deem harmful.

Non-Synonymous Properties

In 1939, William Frankena critiqued G. E. Moore ’s concept of the naturalistic fallacy, suggesting it was an instance of the broader definist fallacy . Frankena argued that Moore’s assertion that “good” cannot be defined by natural properties stemmed from an attempt to avoid a more general confusion arising from defining a term using properties that are not synonymous with it.

Frankena also contended that “naturalistic fallacy” was a misnomer for two reasons. Firstly, he noted that Moore’s critique extended beyond just naturalistic properties, rejecting definitions in terms of non-natural properties as well. Secondly, Frankena argued that the term “fallacy” was inappropriate because the error was not necessarily one of faulty reasoning, but rather a semantic or definitional issue.

Moore’s open-question argument posits that if a question like “Is that which is pleasurable good?” can always be meaningfully asked, then “pleasurable” cannot be synonymous with “good.” Frankena challenged this, stating that the persistence of such an “open question” simply reflects the fact that it is always logically coherent to ask whether two things that are, in fact, identical are indeed so. Therefore, even if “good” were identical to “pleasurable,” it would still be legitimate to ask if this is the case, even if the answer is undeniably “yes.” Frankena suggests that Moore’s insistence on dismissing such questions without argument would, in fact, constitute the fallacy of begging the question .

See Also

• Appeal to nature
• Appeal to novelty
• Appeal to tradition
• Moralistic fallacy
• Evidence-based medicine
• Evolution of morality
• Fact–value distinction
• Is-Ought Problem
• Metaethics
• Philosophical naturalism
• Norm (philosophy)
• Open-question argument
• Principia Ethica
• The Right and the Good
• Value theory

Notes

• ^ a b Ridge, Michael (Fall 2019). “Moral Non-Naturalism”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 1 September 2024.
• ^ Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica § 10 ¶ 3
• ^ W. H. Bruening, “Moore on ‘Is-Ought’,” Ethics 81 (January 1971): 143–49.
• ^ Prior, Arthur N. (1949), Chapter 1 of Logic And The Basis Of Ethics , Oxford University Press ( ISBN 0-334-04040-X ) : ISBN / Date incompatibility (help )
• ^ Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica § 10 ¶ 1
• ^ Sailer, Steve (30 October 2002). “Q&A: Steven Pinker of ‘Blank Slate’”. UPI . Archived from the original on 5 December 2015. Retrieved 5 December 2015.
• ^ Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen (2006). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy . Abingdon, Oxfordshire : Taylor & Francis. p. 121. ISBN 978-0-415-39984-5 .
• ^ McInerny, Ralph (1982). “Chp. 3”. Ethica Thomistica . Cua Press.
• ^ Casebeer, W. D., “Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition”, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , (2003)
• ^ Walter, Alex (2006). “The Anti-naturalistic Fallacy: Evolutionary Moral Psychology and the Insistence of Brute Facts”. Evolutionary Psychology . 4 : 33–48. doi :10.1177/147470490600400102.
• ^ “naturalistic fallacy”, TheFreeDictionary .
• ^ Susana Nuccetelli, Gary Seay (2011) “Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates”
• ^ Peter Simpson (2001) “Vices, Virtues, and Consequences: Essays in Moral and Political Philosophy”
• ^ Jan Narveson (2002) “Respecting persons in theory and practice: essays on moral and political philosophy”
• ^ H. J. McCloskey (2013) “Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics”
• ^ Steven Scalet, John Arthur (2016) “Morality and Moral Controversies: Readings in Moral, Social and Political Philosophy”
• ^ N.T. Potter, Mark Timmons (2012) “Morality and Universality: Essays on Ethical Universalizability”
• ^ a b Frankena, W. K. (October 1939). “The Naturalistic Fallacy”. Mind . 48 (192). Oxford University Press: 464–477. doi :10.1093/mind/XLVIII.192.464. JSTOR 2250706.
• ^ a b Preston, Aaron (30 December 2005). “Moore, George Edward”. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Retrieved 31 March 2011.
• ^ a b Hamid, Md. Abdul (1989). G.E. Moore: A Study of His Ethics . Mittal Publications. pp. 93–96. ISBN 978-81-7099-174-8 .
• ^ a b Ridge, Michael (26 June 2008). “Moral Non-Naturalism”. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Retrieved 31 March 2011.
• ^ a b Flew, Antony (1984). “Definist fallacy”. A Dictionary of Philosophy . Macmillan. p. 85. ISBN 978-0-312-20923-0 .