The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC as it’s more commonly known, is a rather significant entity in the grand, often grimy, theatre of global energy. Not to be confused with the more pedestrian Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation , OPEC operates on a different scale, a different level of influence. It’s an organization that, for better or worse, has shaped the world’s relationship with oil for decades.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

Flag [Image of OPEC Flag]

Emblem [Image of OPEC Emblem]

OPEC and OPEC+ members [Map showing OPEC and OPEC+ member states]

Headquarters: Vienna , Austria Official Languages: English Type: Organization [1] [2] Membership:

• 12 OPEC members
• 11 OPEC+ members
• 5 observer states See § Membership

Leaders:

• Secretary General : Haitham al-Ghais

Establishment:

• Baghdad , Iraq
  • Statute: September 1960 (65 years ago) (September 1960)
  • In effect: January 1961 (64 years ago) (January 1961)

Website: opec.org

Let’s be clear: OPEC isn’t some benevolent guardian of energy. It’s a cartel, plain and simple, born from the desire of leading oil-producing nations to collectively wield their considerable power in the global market, with the ultimate aim of, shall we say, maximizing their profits. Its origins trace back to September 14, 1960, in Baghdad , where the initial five members – Iran , Iraq , Kuwait , Saudi Arabia , and Venezuela – laid the groundwork. Today, it boasts 12 member countries, and these nations collectively control a staggering portion of the world’s oil. In 2022, they accounted for 38 percent of global oil production . And if that wasn’t enough, 79.5 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves are tucked away within OPEC’s borders, with the Middle East alone holding a commanding 67.2 percent of OPEC’s total reserves.

The history of OPEC is essentially a story of shifting power dynamics. In the 1960s and 70s, the organization systematically dismantled the global oil production system that had been dominated by an oligopoly of powerful Anglo-American oil companies, often referred to as the “Seven Sisters ”. This was a deliberate move to transfer control of resources into the hands of the producing states. The impact of this shift was seismic. The oil production restrictions of the 1970s, for instance, sent oil prices soaring, a shockwave that reverberated through the global economy with profound and lasting consequences.

However, the narrative isn’t one of uninterrupted triumph. Since the 1980s, OPEC’s grip on world oil supply and price stability has been somewhat… tenuous. Internal disagreements, and let’s be honest, outright cheating by members on their production commitments, have frequently undermined the organization’s efforts. Often, member commitments merely reflect what they would have done anyway, independent of OPEC’s pronouncements.

Yet, the formation of OPEC undeniably marked a pivotal moment, a bold assertion of national sovereignty over natural resources . Its decisions have consistently played a significant role in the global oil market and, by extension, in international relations . While economists frequently label OPEC a textbook example of a cartel – a group colluding to stifle market competition – its actions are often shielded by the doctrine of state immunity under international law.

The current roster of OPEC members includes Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, and Qatar are former members. Then there’s OPEC+, a broader coalition formed in late 2016, encompassing OPEC members and other oil-producing nations, all aiming for greater control over the global crude oil market. Canada, Egypt, Norway, and Oman are registered as observer states.

Organization and Structure

The strategic restructuring of the global oil production landscape, favoring producing states over the entrenched oligopoly of the “Seven Sisters,” was a deliberate and multi-stage process throughout the 1960s and 1970s. OPEC’s coordinated efforts enabled its member states to pursue the nationalization of their oil industries and to dictate prices more favorably, largely without fear of reprisal from Western governments and corporations. Before OPEC’s existence, nations that dared to alter the arrangements of their oil production faced severe consequences. This could range from military intervention, as seen in the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran after his government nationalized its oil, to economic coercion, such as the “Seven Sisters” deliberately slowing production in one country while increasing it elsewhere to punish non-compliance.

At its core, OPEC operates on the principle that limiting global oil supply is mutually beneficial for its members, leading to higher prices. [8] However, this collective interest is constantly challenged by the individual incentive for each member to maximize its own production, a classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma .

Political scientist Jeff Colgan has argued that since the 1980s, OPEC’s effectiveness in achieving its stated goals – controlling supply, stabilizing prices, and ensuring long-term revenue – has been largely overstated. [8] His research indicates that members have failed to adhere to their commitments a staggering 96% of the time between 1982 and 2009. [13] The reason for this pervasive non-compliance, Colgan suggests, is the absence of any punitive mechanism within OPEC to enforce adherence to agreements. [8]

In a notable effort to address this, in June 2020, all participating countries within the OPEC+ framework collectively endorsed the implementation of a Compensation Mechanism. This initiative was designed to ensure full compliance with agreed-upon oil production cuts, aligning with one of OPEC’s stated objectives: fostering a stable oil market, which, it’s worth noting, has historically been more stable than other energy commodities. [14] [15]

Leadership and Decision-Making

The OPEC Conference stands as the organization’s supreme authority, typically comprised of delegations led by the oil ministers of each member country. The day-to-day executive leadership falls to the OPEC Secretary General . The Conference convenes regularly, usually at OPEC headquarters in Vienna, at least twice a year, with extraordinary sessions convened as needed. Decisions are generally reached through a process of unanimity, operating under a “one member, one vote” principle, with each country contributing equally to the annual budget. [16] However, it’s widely acknowledged that Saudi Arabia, by virtue of its immense oil production capacity and its historical role as the primary swing producer balancing the global market, effectively functions as OPEC’s de facto leader. [17]

International Cartel

The history of OPEC is punctuated by periods of apparent anti-competitive behavior, particularly concerning agreements on oil production levels and pricing. [18] Economists often cite OPEC as a prime example of a cartel, a group that collaborates to reduce competition, as defined by the OECD ’s Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law: “International commodity agreements covering products such as coffee, sugar, tin and more recently oil (OPEC: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) are examples of international cartels which have publicly entailed agreements between different national governments.”

However, while OPEC is frequently held up as a textbook cartel, a more nuanced perspective is offered by various authoritative and academic sources. For instance, the US Energy Information Administration ’s glossary defines OPEC as: [1] “An intergovernmental organization whose stated objective is to ‘coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of member countries’.”

Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary of Energy Science (2017) characterizes OPEC as: [2] “An organization set up in 1960 to coordinate petroleum policies among its member countries, initially with the aim of securing a regular supply to consuming countries at a price that gave a fair return on capital investment.”

OPEC members themselves tend to favor descriptions that emphasize their role in market stabilization rather than portraying them as a powerful anti-competitive cartel. They often point to their founding as a necessary countermeasure against the pre-existing cartel of multinational oil companies, the “Seven Sisters ”. Furthermore, the continued market share held by non-OPEC energy suppliers ensures a degree of global competition. [22] The inherent economic “prisoner’s dilemma ” within OPEC, which incentivizes individual member nations to exceed production quotas and undercut prices, frequently erodes the organization’s ability to influence global oil prices through collective action . [23] [24] [25] Political scientist Jeff Colgan has even challenged the notion of OPEC as a cartel, highlighting its endemic internal cheating and stating, “A cartel needs to set tough goals and meet them; OPEC sets easy goals and fails to meet even those.” [8]

OPEC has not been embroiled in any disputes concerning the competition rules of the World Trade Organization , despite the significant divergence in objectives, actions, and principles between the two organizations. [26] A pivotal ruling by a US District Court determined that OPEC consultations are protected as “governmental” acts of state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act , thereby shielding them from the purview of US competition law that governs “commercial” activities. [27] Despite considerable public skepticism, legislative efforts aimed at curtailing the organization’s sovereign immunity, such as the NOPEC Act, have thus far proven unsuccessful. [28]

Conflicts

The internal dynamics of OPEC are often characterized by a struggle to reach consensus on policy decisions. This difficulty stems from the wide disparities among member countries in terms of their oil export capacities, production costs, reserves, geological characteristics, population sizes, levels of economic development, budgetary needs, and prevailing political circumstances. [29] [30] Furthermore, over extended market cycles, oil reserves themselves can become a breeding ground for serious conflict, instability, and imbalances – a phenomenon often referred to by economists as the “natural resource curse ”. [31] [32] An additional layer of complexity arises from the recurring religious and political conflicts in the Middle East , a region central to global oil production. [33] [34]

The annals of OPEC’s history are marked by several internationally significant conflicts that have impacted its operations and the global oil market. These include the Six-Day War (1967), the Yom Kippur War (1973), a hostage siege directed by Palestinian militants at OPEC headquarters in 1975, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the protracted Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (1990–1991), the devastating September 11 attacks (2001), the American occupation of Iraq (2003–2011), the ongoing conflict in the Niger Delta (2004–present), the widespread upheaval of the Arab Spring (2010–2012), the complex Libyan crisis (2011–present), and the international Embargo against Iran (2012–2016). While events like these can cause temporary disruptions to oil supplies and lead to price spikes, the persistent internal disputes and regional instabilities tend to erode OPEC’s long-term cohesion and overall effectiveness. [35]

History and Impact

Post-WWII Situation

The initial impetus for what would become OPEC emerged in 1949 when Venezuela extended invitations to Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The aim was to foster more regular and closer communication among petroleum-exporting nations as the world was still recovering from the ravages of World War II . At this juncture, some of the planet’s most substantial oil fields were just beginning to yield their bounty in the Middle East. In the United States, the Interstate Oil Compact Commission , alongside the Texas Railroad Commission , was actively limiting overproduction. The U.S. was simultaneously the largest producer and consumer of oil globally. The international oil market was firmly under the control of a consortium of multinational companies known as the “Seven Sisters ”. Notably, five of these companies were based in the U.S., a direct consequence of the breakup of John D. Rockefeller ’s original Standard Oil monopoly. The growing concentration of political and economic power in the hands of these companies eventually spurred the oil-exporting countries to unite and form OPEC as a counterbalancing force. [37]

1959–1960: Anger from Exporting Countries

In February 1959, with new oil supplies coming online, the multinational oil companies (MOCs) unilaterally decided to slash their posted prices for Venezuelan and Middle Eastern crude oil by a significant 10 percent. Shortly thereafter, the first Arab League ’s Arab Petroleum Congress convened in Cairo, Egypt. It was at this gathering that the influential journalist Wanda Jablonski facilitated an introduction between Saudi Arabia’s Abdullah Tariki and Venezuela’s observer, Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo . These two ministers represented the then-largest oil-producing nations outside the United States and the Soviet Union. Both were incensed by the price cuts. Together, they spearheaded the establishment of the Maadi Pact, or Gentlemen’s Agreement , which called for an “Oil Consultation Commission” comprising exporting countries, to whom the MOCs were expected to present any proposed price changes. Jablonski’s reporting at the time noted a palpable hostility towards the West and a rising tide of protest against the “absentee landlordism ” of the MOCs, which held complete sway over oil operations within the exporting nations and wielded considerable political influence. In August 1960, disregarding these warnings and with the U.S. prioritizing Canadian and Mexican oil for strategic reasons, the MOCs once again unilaterally announced substantial reductions in their posted prices for Middle Eastern crude oil. [36] [37] [36] [37] [38] [39]

1960–1975: Founding and Expansion

The following month, from September 10 to 14, 1960, the Baghdad Conference took place. This meeting was initiated by Tariki, Pérez Alfonzo, and the Iraqi prime minister Abd al-Karim Qasim , whose country had not participated in the 1959 congress. [40] Government representatives from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela convened in Baghdad to deliberate on strategies for increasing the price of crude oil produced in their respective nations and to formulate a response to the unilateral actions of the MOCs. Despite significant opposition from the United States, the outcome was the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As one account states: “Together with Arab and non-Arab producers, Saudi Arabia formed the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) to secure the best price available from the major oil corporations.” [41] Initially, the Middle Eastern members advocated for OPEC headquarters to be located in Baghdad or Beirut. However, Venezuela proposed a neutral site, leading to the organization’s establishment in Geneva , Switzerland. In a subsequent move, OPEC relocated its headquarters to Vienna , Austria, on September 1, 1965, after Switzerland declined to grant the organization diplomatic privileges . [42] At the time, Switzerland was implementing policies to reduce its foreign population, making OPEC the first intergovernmental body to depart the country due to such restrictions. [43] Austria, eager to attract international organizations, extended favorable terms to OPEC, securing its presence. [44]

During its formative years, OPEC members operated under a 50/50 profit-sharing agreement with the oil companies. [45] While OPEC engaged in negotiations with the dominant oil companies (the “Seven Sisters”), internal coordination challenges persisted among its members. [45] If one OPEC member demanded excessively favorable terms, the oil companies could retaliate by curtailing production in that country and increasing it elsewhere. [45] The 50/50 agreements remained the standard until 1970, when Libya successfully negotiated a 58/42 agreement with Occidental , prompting other OPEC members to seek improved terms from the oil companies. [45]

In 1971, a significant accord was reached between major oil companies and OPEC members operating in the Mediterranean Sea region, known as the Tripoli Agreement. Signed on April 2, 1971, this agreement resulted in higher oil prices and increased profit shares for the producing countries. [46]

Between 1961 and 1975, the original five founding nations were joined by Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962–2008, rejoined 2014–2016), Libya (1962), the United Arab Emirates (initially represented by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi , 1967), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973–1992, 2007–2020), and Gabon (1975–1994, rejoined 2016). [47] By the early 1970s, OPEC’s membership represented more than half of global oil production. [48] Indicating OPEC’s openness to further expansion, Mohammed Barkindo , OPEC’s acting secretary general in 2006, encouraged his African neighbors Angola and Sudan to join, [49] with Angola eventually becoming a member in 2007, followed by Equatorial Guinea in 2017. [50] Since the 1980s, representatives from countries such as Canada, Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Oman, and Russia have attended numerous OPEC meetings as observers, fostering an informal mechanism for policy coordination. [51]

1973–1974: Oil Embargo

The oil market experienced a period of tightness in the early 1970s, which somewhat reduced the perceived risks for OPEC members considering the nationalization of their oil production. A primary concern for OPEC nations was the potential for a sharp decline in oil prices following nationalization. This environment contributed to a wave of nationalizations across countries like Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. With enhanced control over their oil production decisions and amidst rising oil prices, OPEC members unilaterally increased oil prices in 1973, triggering the 1973 oil crisis . [52]

In October 1973, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), comprising the Arab majority within OPEC along with Egypt and Syria, announced significant production cuts and an oil embargo targeting the United States and other industrialized nations that had supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War . [53] [54] A prior attempt at an embargo in response to the Six-Day War in 1967 had proven largely ineffective. [55] However, the 1973 embargo had a dramatic impact, leading to a sharp increase in oil prices and OPEC revenues, which surged from US$3 per barrel to US$12 per barrel. This period was also marked by emergency energy rationing , exacerbated by panic-driven reactions, a decline in U.S. oil production, currency devaluations, [54] and a protracted coal miners’ dispute in the UK. At one point, the UK imposed an emergency three-day workweek . [56] Seven European nations prohibited non-essential Sunday driving. [57] U.S. gas stations implemented strict limits on fuel dispensed, closed on Sundays, and restricted purchase days based on license plate numbers. [58] [59] Even after the embargo concluded in March 1974, following intense diplomatic efforts, prices continued to climb. The world then experienced a severe global economic recession , characterized by a simultaneous surge in unemployment and inflation , significant declines in stock and bond markets, major shifts in trade balances and petrodollar flows , and a dramatic halt to the post-WWII economic boom . [60] [61]

[Image: A woman using a fireplace for heat, with a newspaper headline about heating oil shortages visible.]

The oil embargo of 1973–1974 left a lasting imprint on the United States and other industrialized nations. In response, these countries established the International Energy Agency and developed national emergency stockpiles designed to withstand supply disruptions for extended periods. Energy conservation measures became widespread, including lower highway speed limits, the promotion of smaller and more energy-efficient vehicles and appliances, year-round daylight saving time , reduced reliance on heating and air-conditioning , improved building insulation , increased investment in mass transit , and a greater focus on alternative energy sources such as coal , natural gas , ethanol , and nuclear power . [80] [81] [82] These long-term strategies proved effective; while U.S. oil consumption saw only an 11 percent increase between 1980 and 2014, real GDP grew by a remarkable 150 percent. [62] [63] [64] [65] Nevertheless, in the 1970s, OPEC nations unequivocally demonstrated their capacity to wield oil as both a political and economic weapon against other nations, at least in the short term. [54]

The embargo also ignited a sense of hope within a segment of the Non-Aligned Movement , who viewed this newfound power as a potential catalyst for progress in their developing countries . Algerian President Houari Boumédiène articulated this sentiment in a speech at the UN’s sixth Special Session in April 1974:

The OPEC action is really the first illustration and at the same time the most concrete and most spectacular illustration of the importance of raw material prices for our countries, the vital need for the producing countries to operate the levers of price control, and lastly, the great possibilities of a union of raw material producing countries. This action should be viewed by the developing countries as an example and a source of hope. [66]

1975–1980: Special Fund, Now the OPEC Fund for International Development

OPEC’s engagement in international aid predates the significant oil price surge of 1973–1974. For instance, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has been operational since 1961. [67]

In the years following 1973, certain Arab nations emerged as prominent providers of foreign aid, a practice sometimes termed “checkbook diplomacy ”. [68] [69] OPEC expanded its objectives to include promoting the socio-economic development of poorer nations through oil sales. The concept of the OPEC Special Fund was conceived in Algiers, Algeria , in March 1975, and it was formally established the subsequent January. A “Solemn Declaration” at the time “reaffirmed the natural solidarity which unites OPEC countries with other developing countries in their struggle to overcome underdevelopment,’ and called for measures to strengthen cooperation between these countries… [The OPEC Special Fund’s] resources are additional to those already made available by OPEC states through a number of bilateral and multilateral channels.” [70] In May 1980, the Fund was officially recognized as an international development agency and was subsequently renamed the OPEC Fund for International Development , [71] gaining Permanent Observer status at the United Nations. [72] In 2020, the institution officially ceased using the abbreviation OFID.

1975: Hostage Siege

On December 21, 1975, a dramatic event unfolded at OPEC’s semi-annual conference in Vienna, Austria , when Saudi Arabia’s Ahmed Zaki Yamani , Iran’s Jamshid Amuzegar , and other OPEC oil ministers were taken hostage. The audacious attack was orchestrated by a six-person team led by the Venezuelan terrorist known as “Carlos the Jackal ,” which also included Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann and Hans-Joachim Klein . The group, self-identified as the “Arm of the Arab Revolution,” declared its objective to be the liberation of Palestine . Carlos’s plan involved a forceful takeover of the conference and holding all eleven attending oil ministers hostage, with the specific intent to execute Yamani and Amuzegar. [73]

Carlos arranged for bus and plane transportation for his team and 42 of the 63 hostages, with planned stops in Algiers and Tripoli , intending to eventually fly to Baghdad where Yamani and Amuzegar were to be killed. All 30 non-Arab hostages were released in Algiers, with Amuzegar being the exception. Additional hostages were freed at another stop in Tripoli before the group returned to Algiers. With only 10 hostages remaining, Carlos engaged in a phone conversation with Algerian President Houari Boumédiène , who reportedly warned Carlos that the ministers’ deaths would result in an attack on the plane. It is also believed that Boumédienne offered Carlos asylum at this time, possibly accompanied by financial compensation for the failed mission. Carlos expressed his regret at being unable to carry out the assassinations of Yamani and Amuzegar, after which he and his associates disembarked from the plane. The situation concluded without further incident, with all hostages and terrorists departing two days after the siege began. [73]

Subsequently, Carlos’s accomplices revealed that the operation had been directed by Wadie Haddad , a co-founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine . They also alleged that the idea and funding for the operation originated from an Arab president, widely believed to be Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, himself an OPEC member. Fellow militants Bassam Abu Sharif and Klein claimed that Carlos received and kept a ransom payment ranging from $20 million to $50 million from an unnamed “Arab president.” Carlos, however, asserted that Saudi Arabia paid ransom on behalf of Iran, but that the funds were “diverted en route and lost by the Revolution.” [73] [74] Carlos was eventually apprehended in 1994 and is currently serving life sentences for at least 16 other murders. [75]

1979–1980: Oil Crisis and 1980s Oil Glut

[Graph: Fluctuations of OPEC net oil export revenues since 1972]

In response to a series of oil nationalizations and the soaring prices of the 1970s, industrialized nations began to implement measures aimed at reducing their dependence on OPEC oil. This was particularly pronounced after prices reached new peaks, approaching US$40 per barrel in 1979–1980. [78] [79] The Iranian Revolution and the ensuing Iran–Iraq War significantly disrupted regional stability and oil supplies during this period. Consequently, electric utilities worldwide transitioned from oil to alternative energy sources like coal, natural gas, or nuclear power. [80] Governments initiated substantial research programs, backed by billions of dollars, to develop alternatives to oil. [81] [82] Concurrently, commercial exploration efforts led to the discovery and development of major non-OPEC oilfields in regions such as Siberia, Alaska, the North Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico. [83] By 1986, global daily demand for oil had decreased by 5 million barrels. Non-OPEC production experienced an even more significant increase, leading to a substantial decline in OPEC’s market share, which plummeted from approximately 50 percent in 1979 to less than 30 percent in 1985. [48] This volatility, characteristic of multi-year market cycles for natural resources, culminated in a sharp drop in oil prices, falling by more than half in 1986 alone. [85] As one oil analyst aptly summarized: “When the price of something as essential as oil spikes, humanity does two things: finds more of it and finds ways to use less of it.” [48]

To counteract declining revenues from oil sales, Saudi Arabia, in 1982, urged OPEC to adopt audited national production quotas in an effort to curb output and bolster prices. When other OPEC nations failed to comply, Saudi Arabia drastically reduced its own production, from 10 million barrels daily in 1979–1981 to just one-third of that level by 1985. When even this measure proved ineffective, Saudi Arabia reversed its strategy and flooded the market with inexpensive oil, driving prices below US$10 per barrel and rendering higher-cost producers unprofitable. [84] [86] [58:127–128, 136–137]

These strategic maneuvers by Saudi Arabia to regulate oil prices had profound economic repercussions. As the swing producer during this era, the Kingdom faced considerable economic strain. Its revenues plummeted from $119 billion in 1981 to $26 billion by 1985, resulting in substantial budget deficits and a doubling of its debt, which reached 100% of its Gross Domestic Product. [87] [58:136–137]

Faced with escalating economic hardship (which ultimately contributed to the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989), [88] [89] the “free-riding ” oil exporters, who had previously resisted OPEC agreements, finally began to implement production limits to support prices. This shift was based on meticulously negotiated national quotas, established since 1986, that aimed to balance oil-related and broader economic considerations. [84] [90] (Within their sovereign territories, the national governments of OPEC members possess the authority to impose production limits on both state-owned and private oil companies.) [91] Generally, reductions in OPEC production targets correlate with an increase in oil prices. [92]

1990–2003: Ample Supply and Modest Disruptions

[Image: One of the many Kuwaiti oil fires set by retreating Iraqi troops in 1991] [Graph: Fluctuations of Brent crude oil price, 1988–2015]

In the lead-up to his August 1990 Invasion of Kuwait , Iraqi President Saddam Hussein exerted pressure on OPEC to cease overproduction and drive oil prices higher. This was intended to provide financial relief to OPEC members and to facilitate reconstruction efforts following the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War . [95] However, these two Iraqi conflicts against fellow OPEC founders represented a low point in the organization’s cohesion, and oil prices quickly stabilized after the brief supply disruptions. The September 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on the US and the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq had even less significant short-term impacts on oil prices, as Saudi Arabia and other major exporters again collaborated to ensure adequate global supply. [96]

During the 1990s, OPEC saw the departure of its two most recent members, who had joined in the mid-1970s. Ecuador withdrew in December 1992, citing its unwillingness to pay the annual US$2 million membership fee and its belief that it needed to produce more oil than its allocated OPEC quota permitted. [97] Ecuador later rejoined in October 2007, only to leave again. Similar concerns prompted Gabon to suspend its membership in January 1995; [98] it subsequently rejoined in July 2016. [47] Iraq has remained a steadfast member of OPEC since the organization’s inception, but its production was excluded from OPEC quota agreements between 1998 and 2016 due to the country’s profound political challenges. [99] [100]

The lower demand triggered by the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis led to oil prices falling back to levels not seen since 1986. Following a slump in oil prices to around US$10 per barrel, coordinated diplomatic efforts resulted in a gradual reduction in oil production by OPEC, Mexico, and Norway. [86] After prices dipped again in November 2001, OPEC, Norway, Mexico, Russia, Oman, and Angola agreed to production cuts effective January 1, 2002, for a period of six months. OPEC’s contribution to the approximately 2 million barrels per day (mbpd) of announced cuts was 1.5 mbpd. [86]

In June 2003, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and OPEC convened their first joint workshop on energy-related issues. These collaborative meetings have continued on a regular basis since then, aiming “to collectively better understand trends, analysis and viewpoints and advance market transparency and predictability.” [102]

2003–2011: Volatility

[Graph: OPEC members’ net oil export revenues, 2000–2020]

The period of widespread insurgency and sabotage during the peak of the American occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 2008 coincided with rapidly increasing oil demand from China and intense activity from commodity -hungry investors. This, coupled with recurring violence against the Nigerian oil industry and dwindling spare production capacity to cushion against potential shortages , fueled a sharp rise in oil prices. Prices reached levels far exceeding those previously targeted by OPEC. [103] [104] [105] Price volatility reached an extreme in 2008, with WTI crude oil surging to a record US$147 per barrel in July, only to plummet back to US$32 per barrel in December amidst the worst global recession since World War II . [106] OPEC’s annual oil export revenue also set a new record in 2008, estimated at around US$1 trillion, and reached similar annual figures in 2011–2014 (accompanied by extensive petrodollar recycling activities) before experiencing another downturn. [77] By the time of the 2011 Libyan Civil War and the Arab Spring , OPEC began issuing explicit statements to counter what it described as “excessive speculation” in oil futures markets , attributing price volatility beyond market fundamentals to financial speculators. [107]

In May 2008, Indonesia announced its intention to withdraw from OPEC upon the expiration of its membership at the end of that year. This decision was attributed to Indonesia becoming a net importer of oil and its inability to meet its production quota. [108] A statement released by OPEC on September 10, 2008, confirmed Indonesia’s withdrawal, noting that OPEC “regretfully accepted the wish of Indonesia to suspend its full membership in the organization, and recorded its hope that the country would be in a position to rejoin the organization in the not-too-distant future.” [109]

2008: Production Dispute

[Map: Countries by net oil exports (2008)]

The diverse economic imperatives of OPEC member states frequently influence internal deliberations regarding production quotas. Poorer members often advocate for production cuts by their counterparts to drive up oil prices and, consequently, their own revenues. [110] These proposals stand in contrast to Saudi Arabia’s stated long-term strategy of collaborating with global economic powers to ensure a consistent oil supply that supports economic expansion. [111] A key rationale behind this policy is Saudi Arabia’s concern that excessively high oil prices or unreliable supply will compel industrial nations to intensify energy conservation efforts and accelerate the development of alternative fuels, ultimately diminishing global demand for oil and rendering substantial reserves obsolete. [112] This perspective was famously articulated by Saudi Oil Minister Yamani in 1973: “The Stone Age didn’t end because we ran out of stones.” [113] Reflecting Saudi Arabia’s contemporary approach, in 2024, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman outlined a stance that demonstrates the kingdom’s adaptation to evolving economic needs within OPEC and the broader international landscape. He emphasized the necessity of a balanced and equitable global energy transition , highlighting the importance of diversifying energy sources and noting substantial investments in natural gas , petrochemicals , and renewables . These initiatives support economic development in emerging countries and align with global climate objectives . [114] [115] Furthermore, he addressed the shifting concerns surrounding energy security , stating, “Energy security in the 70s, 80s, and 90s was more dependent on oil. Now, you get what happened last year… It was gas. The future problem on energy security will not be oil. It will be renewables. And the materials, and the mines.” [115]

On September 10, 2008, with oil prices hovering near US$100 per barrel, a production dispute arose when Saudi representatives reportedly walked out of a negotiation session where rival members had voted to reduce OPEC output. Although Saudi delegates officially endorsed the new quotas, they anonymously indicated their intention not to comply. The New York Times quoted one such delegate as stating: “Saudi Arabia will meet the market’s demand. We will see what the market requires and we will not leave a customer without oil. The policy has not changed.” [30] In the subsequent months, oil prices plummeted into the $30s, and did not rebound to $100 until the Libyan Civil War in 2011. [116]

2014–2017: Oil Glut

[Map: Countries by oil production (2013)] [Graph: Top oil-producing countries, thousand barrels per day, 1973–2016]

During the period of 2014–2015, OPEC members consistently exceeded their production ceiling. Concurrently, China experienced a slowdown in its economic growth. At the same time, U.S. oil production nearly doubled from its 2008 levels, approaching the volumes of leading “swing producer ” nations like Saudi Arabia and Russia. This surge was driven by significant long-term advancements and the widespread adoption of shale “fracking ” technology, a direct response to the years of record oil prices. These developments, in turn, led to a substantial reduction in U.S. oil import requirements (moving the country closer to energy independence ), resulted in record volumes of worldwide oil inventories, and triggered a collapse in oil prices that persisted into early 2016. [116] [118] [119]

Despite the global oversupply, at a meeting in Vienna on November 27, 2014, Saudi Oil Minister Ali Al-Naimi blocked appeals from less affluent OPEC members for production cuts aimed at supporting prices. Naimi argued that the oil market should be allowed to rebalance itself through competitive forces at lower price levels, strategically seeking to reclaim OPEC’s long-term market share by undermining the profitability of high-cost U.S. shale oil production. [29] As he articulated in an interview:

Is it reasonable for a highly efficient producer to reduce output, while the producer of poor efficiency continues to produce? That is crooked logic. If I reduce, what happens to my market share? The price will go up and the Russians, the Brazilians, US shale oil producers will take my share… We want to tell the world that high-efficiency producing countries are the ones that deserve market share. That is the operative principle in all capitalist countries… One thing is for sure: Current prices [roughly US$60/bbl] do not support all producers.

A year later, at the OPEC meeting in Vienna on December 4, 2015, the organization had exceeded its production ceiling for 18 consecutive months. U.S. oil production had seen only a marginal decline from its peak, global markets appeared to be oversupplied by at least 2 million barrels per day (despite war-torn Libya producing 1 million barrels below capacity), oil producers were implementing significant adjustments to cope with prices as low as $40 per barrel, Indonesia was rejoining the export organization, Iraqi production had surged after years of instability, Iranian output was poised for a rebound with the impending lifting of international sanctions , hundreds of world leaders at the Paris Climate Agreement were committing to limit carbon emissions from fossil fuels, and solar technologies were becoming increasingly competitive and widespread. In light of these considerable market pressures, OPEC decided to abandon its ineffective production ceiling until its next ministerial conference in June 2016. [17] [119] [121] By January 20, 2016, the OPEC Reference Basket had fallen to US$22.48 per barrel – less than one-fourth of its June 2014 high ($110.48), less than one-sixth of its July 2008 record ($140.73), and back below the level of April 2003 ($23.27) when its historic run-up began. [116]

As 2016 progressed, the oil glut was partially alleviated by significant production offline in the United States, Canada, Libya, Nigeria, and China. The basket price gradually rose back into the $40s. OPEC regained a modest percentage of market share, witnessed the cancellation of numerous competing drilling projects, maintained the status quo at its June conference, and endorsed “prices at levels that are suitable for both producers and consumers,” although many producers continued to face severe economic challenges. [122] [123] [124]

2017–2020: Production Cut and OPEC+

As OPEC members grew increasingly weary of a protracted supply contest yielding diminishing returns and depleting financial reserves, the organization finally undertook its first production cut since 2008. Despite numerous political hurdles, a decision made in September 2016 to trim approximately one million barrels per day was formalized through a new quota agreement at the November 2016 OPEC conference. This agreement (which exempted the disruption-plagued members Libya and Nigeria) was set to cover the first half of 2017. It was complemented by promised reductions from Russia and ten other non-member countries, though these were offset by expected increases from the U.S. shale sector, Libya, Nigeria, available spare capacity, and a surge in OPEC production in late 2016 before the cuts took effect. Indonesia announced another “temporary suspension” of its OPEC membership rather than accepting the organization’s requested five percent production cut. Prices fluctuated around US$50 per barrel, and in May 2017, OPEC decided to extend the new quotas through March 2018, leaving the world to anticipate whether the oil inventory glut would be fully absorbed by then. [125] [126] [50] Longstanding oil analyst Daniel Yergin described the relationship between OPEC and shale as “‘mutual coexistence’, with both sides learning to live with prices that are lower than they would like.” [127] These production cut agreements with non-OPEC countries are generally referred to as “OPEC+”. [128] [129]

In December 2017, Russia and OPEC agreed to extend the production cut of 1.8 mbpd through the end of 2018. [130] [131]

Qatar announced its withdrawal from OPEC, effective January 1, 2019. [132] According to The New York Times , this was a strategic response to the Qatar diplomatic crisis , which also involved Saudi Arabia, the UAE , Bahrain , and Egypt . [133]

On June 29, 2019, Russia and Saudi Arabia again agreed to extend the production cuts implemented in 2018 by a period of six to nine months. [134]

In October 2019, Ecuador announced its intention to withdraw from OPEC on January 1, 2020, citing financial difficulties facing the country. [135]

In December 2019, OPEC and Russia agreed on one of the deepest output cuts to date, designed to prevent oversupply, in a deal scheduled to last for the first three months of 2020. [136]

2020: Saudi-Russian Price War

In early March 2020, OPEC officials presented Russia with an ultimatum: cut production by 1.5% of world supply. Russia, anticipating continued cuts in the face of increasing American shale oil production, rejected the demand, effectively ending the three-year partnership between OPEC and major non-OPEC oil providers. [137] A significant contributing factor was the weakening global demand resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic . [138] This also led to the failure of ‘OPEC plus’ to extend the agreement that had cut 2.1 million barrels per day and was set to expire at the end of March. Saudi Arabia, which had shouldered a disproportionate share of the cuts to persuade Russia to remain in the agreement, notified its buyers on March 7 that it would increase output and discount its oil in April. This triggered a crash in Brent crude prices by over 30% before a slight recovery and caused widespread turmoil in financial markets. [137]

Many commentators interpreted this as a Saudi-Russian price war , or a game of chicken where each side waited for the “other side to blink first.” [139] [140] [141] Saudi Arabia possessed approximately $500 billion in foreign exchange reserves in March 2020, while Russia’s reserves stood at $580 billion at that time. The debt-to-GDP ratio for Saudi Arabia was 25%, compared to Russia’s 15%. [139] Another analysis suggested that Saudi Arabia could produce oil at a cost as low as $3 per barrel, whereas Russia required $30 per barrel to cover production expenses. [142] “To Russia, this price war is more than just about regaining market share for oil,” one analyst claimed. “It’s about assaulting the Western economy, especially America’s.” [141] To counter the oil exporters’ price war, which could render shale oil production uneconomical, the U.S. considered passing the NOPEC bill to protect its crude oil market share. [143] Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, represented by Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, maintained a conciliatory stance towards the U.S. shale industry. He clarified that harming this sector was never their intention, stating, “I made it clear that it was not on our radar or our intention to create any type of damage to their industry… they will rise again from the ashes and thrive and prosper.” He also noted that Saudi Arabia looked forward to a time when U.S. producers would thrive once again in a market with higher oil demand. [144]

In April 2020, OPEC and a coalition of other oil producers, including Russia, agreed to extend production cuts until the end of July. The cartel and its allies committed to cut oil production in May and June by 9.7 million barrels per day, equivalent to approximately 10% of global output, in an effort to support prices, which had previously fallen to record lows . [145]

2021: Saudi-Emirati Dispute

In July 2021, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a member of OPEC+, rejected a Saudi-proposed eight-month extension to oil output curbs that were in place due to COVID-19 and reduced oil consumption. [146] [147] The previous year, OPEC+ had implemented cuts equivalent to approximately 10% of the demand at that time. The UAE requested that its maximum recognized oil production limit be raised to 3.8 million barrels per day, from its previous limit of 3.2 million barrels. A compromise deal was reached, allowing the UAE to increase its maximum oil output to 3.65 million barrels per day. [148]

Under the terms of the agreement, Russia would also increase its production from 11 million barrels to 11.5 million by May 2022. All members would increase output by 400,000 barrels per day each month, starting in August, to gradually offset the previous cuts made due to the COVID pandemic. [149] This compromise, achieved through Saudi Arabia meeting the UAE halfway, underscored OPEC+ unity. UAE Energy Minister Suhail Al-Mazrouei expressed gratitude to Saudi Arabia and Russia for facilitating the dialogue that led to the agreement, stating, “The UAE is committed to this group and will always work with it.” On the Saudi side, Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman emphasized consensus-building and affirmed that the agreement strengthened OPEC+’s ties and ensured its continuity. [150]

2021–Present: Global Energy Crisis

[Image: A graph showing record-high energy prices.]

Record-high energy prices were primarily driven by a global surge in demand as the world emerged from the economic recession caused by COVID-19, particularly fueled by strong energy demand in Asia. [151] [152] [153] In August 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden ’s national security advisor Jake Sullivan issued a statement urging OPEC+ to boost oil production to “offset previous production cuts that OPEC+ imposed during the pandemic until well into 2022.” [154] On September 28, 2021, Sullivan met in Saudi Arabia with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to discuss the high oil prices . [155] By October 2021, the price of oil had reached approximately US$80 per barrel, [156] [157] [158] the highest level since 2014. [159] President Joe Biden and U.S. Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm attributed the rising oil and gas prices to OPEC+. [160] [161] [162]

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 significantly altered the global oil trade. European Union leaders attempted to ban the majority of Russian crude imports, but even before official action, imports to Northwest Europe had decreased. A greater volume of Russian oil is now being sold outside of Europe, particularly to India and China. [163]

In October 2022, key OPEC+ ministers agreed to oil production cuts totaling 2 million barrels per day, marking the first such reduction since 2020. [164] This decision reignited interest in the passage of the NOPEC bill. [165]

2022: Oil Production Cut

[Image: UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan with Russian President Vladimir Putin, days after OPEC+ cut oil production, October 11, 2022]

In October 2022, OPEC+, led by Saudi Arabia, announced a substantial cut to its oil output target, ostensibly to support Russia. [167] [168] In response, U.S. President Joe Biden vowed “consequences” and stated that the U.S. government would “re-evaluate” its long-standing U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia . [169] [170] Robert Menendez , the Democratic chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a freeze on cooperation and arms sales to Saudi Arabia, accusing the kingdom of aiding Russia in underwriting its war in Ukraine. [170]

Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministry issued a statement asserting that the OPEC+ decision was “purely economic” and was reached unanimously by all members of the conglomerate, pushing back against pressure to alter its stance on the Russo-Ukrainian War at the UN. [171] [172] In response, the White House accused Saudi Arabia of pressuring other OPEC nations into agreeing to the production cut, suggesting some felt coerced. The U.S. claimed it had presented the Saudi government with an analysis indicating no market basis for the cut. White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby stated that the Saudi government was aware the decision would “increase Russian revenues and blunt the effectiveness of sanctions” against Moscow, thereby rejecting the Saudi assertion that the move was “purely economic.” [173] [174] According to a report in The Intercept, sources and experts suggested that Saudi Arabia had sought even deeper cuts than Russia, with reports indicating that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman aimed to influence the outcome of the 2022 United States elections in favor of the GOP and the 2024 United States presidential election in favor of Donald Trump . [175] Conversely, Saudi officials maintain that their decision to reduce oil production was primarily driven by concerns regarding the global economy , rather than political motivations. They argue that the cuts were a response to the global economic situation and low inventory levels, which could potentially trigger a rally in oil prices . [176] Saudi Arabia reaffirms its commitment to its strategic partnership with the U.S., emphasizing shared goals of peace, security, and prosperity. [177]

In 2023, the IEA projected that global demand for fossil fuels, including oil, natural gas, and coal, would reach an all-time high by 2030. [178] OPEC countered this forecast, stating, “what makes such predictions so dangerous, is that they are often accompanied by calls to stop investing in new oil and gas projects.” [179]

In November 2024, S&P Global alleged that the UAE had disregarded OPEC’s oil production cuts, producing approximately 700,000 barrels more than its agreed quota, reaching 2.91 million barrels per day. Analysts suggested that the Emirates’ “quota busting” would undermine the efforts of Saudi Arabia and Russia to increase oil prices through production cuts. While Russia sought to fund its war in Ukraine, Saudi Arabia pursued its own agenda of economic diversification. [180]

2025: Production Increases

In 2025, OPEC+ began the process of reversing voluntary production cuts. As of September 2025, the group had already implemented cuts totaling about 2.5 million barrels per day, equivalent to approximately 2.4% of global demand. [181] OPEC+ announced its intention to continue reversing cuts and stated it would increase production by 137,000 barrels per day in October. [182]

Membership

As of January 2024, OPEC comprises 12 member countries: five located in the Middle East (West Asia ), six in Africa , and one in South America. [183] According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), OPEC’s combined oil production (including gas condensate ) accounted for 44% of the world’s total in 2016. [184] Furthermore, OPEC held 81.5% of the world’s “proven” oil reserves. More recent reports from 2022 indicate that OPEC member countries were responsible for approximately 38% of total global crude oil production. [3] It is also estimated that these nations hold 79.5% of the globe’s proven oil reserves, with the Middle East alone accounting for 67.2% of OPEC’s reserves. [5] [6]

The admission of a new member country requires the approval of three-quarters of OPEC’s existing members, including all five of the founding nations. [16] In October 2015, Sudan formally submitted an application to join, [185] but it has not yet become a member.

OPEC+

A significant number of non-OPEC member countries also participate in the organization’s initiatives, such as voluntary supply cuts, to further align policy objectives between OPEC and non-OPEC members. [12] This broader group, known as OPEC+, includes Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Russia, South Sudan, and Sudan. [194] [195]

The collaborative efforts among OPEC+ member countries led to the establishment of the Declaration of Cooperation (DoC) in 2017, which has since been extended multiple times due to its notable success. The DoC serves as a framework for cooperation and coordination between OPEC and non-OPEC nations. Additionally, OPEC+ members engage in further cooperative endeavors through the Charter of Cooperation (CoC), providing a platform for long-term collaboration. The CoC facilitates dialogue and the exchange of views on global oil and energy market conditions, with the overarching objective of ensuring a secure energy supply and fostering lasting stability that benefits producers, consumers, investors, and the global economy . [196]

Observers

Since the 1980s, representatives from countries such as Canada, Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Oman, and Russia have attended numerous OPEC meetings as observers. This arrangement facilitates an informal mechanism for coordinating policies. [197]

Lapsed Members

For countries that export relatively modest volumes of petroleum, the limited negotiating power gained from OPEC membership may not always justify the burdens imposed by OPEC’s production quotas and membership costs. Ecuador withdrew from OPEC in December 1992, citing its unwillingness to pay the annual US$2 million membership fee and its assessment that it needed to produce more oil than its allocated OPEC quota at the time allowed. [97] Ecuador rejoined in October 2007, only to leave again in January 2020. [201] The Ministry of Energy and Non-Renewable Natural Resources of Ecuador issued an official statement on January 2, 2020, confirming Ecuador’s departure from OPEC. [199] Similar concerns led Gabon to suspend its membership in January 1995; [98] it subsequently rejoined in July 2016.

In May 2008, Indonesia announced its intention to leave OPEC upon the expiration of its membership at the end of that year, having transitioned into a net importer of oil and being unable to meet its production quota. [108] Indonesia rejoined the organization in January 2016, [47] but announced another “temporary suspension” of its membership at the year’s end when OPEC requested a 5% production cut. [125]

Qatar departed from OPEC on January 1, 2019, after being a member since 1961. This decision was driven by Qatar’s strategic focus on natural gas production, where it holds the position of the world’s largest exporter in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). [200] [202]

During an OPEC meeting in November 2023, Nigeria and Angola, the two largest oil producers in Sub-Saharan Africa, voiced their dissatisfaction with OPEC’s quotas, which they argued hindered their efforts to increase oil production and bolster their foreign reserves. In December 2023, Angola announced its withdrawal from OPEC due to disagreements over the organization’s production quota system. [203]

Market Information

OPEC has been notably successful in fostering cooperation among its members regarding the improvement of the quality and quantity of information available on the international oil market. This enhanced data availability is particularly crucial for the natural resource industry, which requires extensive and meticulous planning spanning months and years for smooth operation.

Publications and Research

In April 2001, OPEC collaborated with five other international organizations (APEC , Eurostat , IEA , OLADE (es), UNSD ) to enhance the availability and reliability of oil data. This initiative led to the launch of the Joint Oil Data Exercise, which was later expanded in 2005 to include IEF and renamed the Joint Organisations Data Initiative (JODI). JODI now covers over 90% of the global oil market. In 2014, GECF joined as an eighth partner, enabling JODI to encompass nearly 90% of the global natural gas market as well. [204]

Since 2007, OPEC has published the “World Oil Outlook” (WOO) annually. This comprehensive report provides an in-depth analysis of the global oil industry, including medium- and long-term projections for supply and demand. [205] OPEC also produces an “Annual Statistical Bulletin” (ASB), [99] and disseminates more frequent updates through its “Monthly Oil Market Report” (MOMR) [206] and the “OPEC Bulletin.” [207]

Crude Oil Benchmarks

A “crude oil benchmark” serves as a standardized petroleum product, providing a reference price for buyers and sellers of crude oil. These benchmarks are essential for standardized contracts in major futures markets since 1983. Benchmarks are necessary because oil prices naturally vary (typically by a few dollars per barrel) based on factors such as variety, grade, delivery date, location, and other legal requirements. [208] [209]

The OPEC Reference Basket of Crudes has been a significant benchmark for oil prices since 2000. It is calculated as a weighted average of the prices of petroleum blends from OPEC member countries: Saharan Blend (Algeria), Girassol (Angola), Djeno (Republic of the Congo), Rabi Light (Gabon), Iran Heavy (Islamic Republic of Iran), Basra Light (Iraq), Kuwait Export (Kuwait), Es Sider (Libya), Bonny Light (Nigeria), Arab Light (Saudi Arabia), Murban (UAE), and Merey (Venezuela). [210]

North Sea Brent Crude Oil is the primary benchmark for Atlantic basin crude oils and is used to price approximately two-thirds of the world’s traded crude oil. Other widely recognized benchmarks include West Texas Intermediate (WTI), Dubai Crude , Oman Crude , and Urals oil . [211]

• West Texas Intermediate
• Brent Crude
• Urals oil (Russian export mix)
• Dubai Crude
• OPEC Basket Price

Spare Capacity

The US Energy Information Administration , which serves as the statistical arm of the US Department of Energy , defines spare capacity for crude oil market management as “the volume of production that can be brought on within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days… OPEC spare capacity provides an indicator of the world oil market’s ability to respond to potential crises that reduce oil supplies.” [92]

In November 2014, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that OPEC’s “effective” spare capacity, adjusted for ongoing disruptions in countries like Libya and Nigeria, stood at 3.5 million barrels per day (560,000 m 3 /d). They projected this figure to increase to a peak of 4.6 million barrels per day (730,000 m 3 /d) in 2017. [212] By November 2015, the IEA revised its assessment, noting that “with OPEC’s spare production buffer stretched thin, as Saudi Arabia – which holds the lion’s share of excess capacity – and its [Persian] Gulf neighbours pump at near-record rates.” [213]

See Also

• Energy portal
• Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
• Big Oil
• Energy diplomacy
• List of country groupings
• List of intergovernmental organizations
• Oligopoly
• World oil market chronology from 2003
• Gasoline
• Peak oil
• Peak gas
• Arun gas field

Notes

• ^ a b One petroleum barrel (bbl) is approximately 42 U.S. gallons, or 159 liters, or 0.159 m 3, varying slightly with temperature. To put the production numbers in context, a supertanker typically holds 2,000,000 barrels (320,000 m 3), [190] and the world’s current production rate would take approximately 56 years to exhaust the world’s current proven reserves.
• ^ a b c d e The five founding members attended the first OPEC conference in September 1960.
• ^ The UAE was founded in December 1971. Its OPEC membership originated with the Emirate of Abu Dhabi .