The original position. A thought experiment used for reasoning about the principles that should structure a society.
"Veil of ignorance" redirects here. For the album by Raised Fist, see Veil of Ignorance (album).
Imagine this: Citizens are making choices about the very foundations of their society, but they're doing it from a place of absolute equality. They're standing in an "original position," shrouded by a "veil of ignorance." This isn't some theatrical prop; it's a conceptual curtain, obscuring their personal attributes. They have no idea if they'll be born male or female, black or white, gifted or challenged, rich or poor, powerful or powerless. They don't know their individual tastes or their specific social position in the world they're about to enter. Philosopher John Rawls proposed this scenario, arguing that this very ignorance would compel them to choose "fair" policies. It’s a way to strip away personal bias, to force a perspective of genuine impartiality.
The Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance
In the realm of philosophy, the "original position" is a hypothetical construct. It’s a conceptual starting point where members of a society would, in theory, deliberate on the principles that should govern the fundamental structure of their society. The crucial caveat is that they do this without any foreknowledge of the specific position they will eventually occupy within that society. This deliberate lack of knowledge, the state of being behind a "veil of ignorance," is a thought experiment most famously associated with the American philosopher John Rawls.
Within this "original position," the "veil of ignorance" acts as a powerful equalizer. It prevents anyone from knowing their ethnicity, their social status, their gender, or, critically for Rawls's argument, their own or anyone else's deeply held beliefs about what constitutes a good life. The ideal outcome of this setup is to force participants, acting with rationality, to arrive at an "initial agreement" on the principles of justice that are inherently impartial. This agreement, forged in the absence of self-interest tied to specific personal circumstances, is intended to be the bedrock of a just society. [1]
Rawls's "original position" serves a similar theoretical function to the "state of nature" concept found in the social contract tradition of thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. This foundational idea of the original position is central to Rawls's seminal 1971 work, A Theory of Justice. Its influence has rippled outwards, impacting a diverse array of thinkers across the philosophical spectrum.
Rawls himself coined the phrases "original position" and "veil of ignorance." [2] However, it's important to note that the core of this thought experiment had been explored earlier in the field of social choice by economists like William Vickrey [3] and John Harsanyi, [4] [5] who independently developed mathematical proofs suggesting that a rational observer in such a position would naturally lean towards a utilitarian framework. [6]
History
The underlying concept of a "veil of ignorance" has been present in philosophical discourse for centuries, albeit under different names. Philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant, in their discussions of the social contract, touched upon similar ideas. Adam Smith explored the notion of an "impartial spectator," and the ideal observer theory also shares conceptual ground. However, it was John Harsanyi who first provided a formal mathematical structure for the concept, [4] [5] using it to argue in favor of utilitarianism rather than a social contract. Harsanyi's perspective was that rational agents would consider expected outcomes rather than worst-case scenarios. [7] The specific terminology and detailed development of the "veil of ignorance" as it is widely understood today are attributed to John Rawls in his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice. [8] [2]
More contemporary scholarship often delves into the different decision theories that might govern the choices made by individuals operating "behind the veil." [9] [10] Furthermore, Michael Moehler has argued that, from a moral standpoint, the focus shouldn't solely be on decision theory. Instead, the emphasis should be on the specific moral ideals that inform different versions of the veil of ignorance. According to Moehler, there isn't a single, monolithic "veil of ignorance," but rather a spectrum of interpretations. [11]
Nature of the Concept
This section requires further substantiation. Please contribute by adding citations to credible sources. Material lacking reliable sources may be subject to challenge and removal. Find sources for "Original position" – news, newspapers, books, scholars, JSTOR (May 2025). Learn how to add citations.
Rawls precisely defined the scope of concern for individuals in the original position. They are focused exclusively on each citizen's share of what he termed "primary social goods." These are not merely material possessions but encompass fundamental rights and liberties, as well as economic and social advantages. Rawls further posited that the representatives in the original position would adopt the "maximin rule" as their guiding principle for decision-making. This rule, borrowed from game theory, essentially means "maximizing the minimum." In simpler terms, it involves choosing the option that yields the highest possible outcome for the least advantaged position. Therefore, the maximin rule within the original position represents a specific formulation of social equality.
The rationale behind prioritizing the benefit of the least well-off stems from the argument that individuals behind the veil of ignorance would act with extreme risk aversion. The original position is presented as a singular, irrevocable decision concerning all the most vital social goods. Since participants have no knowledge of their future societal standing, they are inherently uncertain about their probability of becoming any particular member of society. To safeguard against the worst possible outcome, they would logically choose principles that ensure the maximum possible benefit for those in the most disadvantaged circumstances (hence, maximin).
However, some scholars have pointed out a potential divergence. If the original position were framed under conditions of risk neutrality rather than extreme risk aversion, the resulting principle would shift. Instead of Rawls's maximin approach, it would converge towards a rule that prioritizes wealth maximization. John Harsanyi's analysis, for instance, suggests that rational individuals, unaware of their future status but evaluating outcomes based on expected utility, would opt for maximizing average or total well-being. [4] [12] (For a deeper exploration of this alternative perspective, see wealth maximization).
In the broader context of social contract theory, individuals in a "state of nature" typically enter into an agreement to establish a civil society. For example, in John Locke's conceptualization of the state of nature, parties agree to form a civil society where the government possesses limited powers and bears the responsibility of protecting the persons and property of its citizens. Within Rawls's "original position," the representative parties similarly select principles of justice that are intended to govern the fundamental structure of society. Rawls argues that the representative parties in the original position would ultimately endorse two core principles of justice:
- First Principle: Each citizen is to be guaranteed an adequately comprehensive system of basic liberties, and this scheme of liberties must be compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all other citizens.
- Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are permissible only if they satisfy two conditions:
- They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (this is the "difference principle").
- They must be attached to offices and positions that are open to all individuals under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
The justification for benefiting the least well-off member of society is rooted in the assumption that individuals behind the veil of ignorance would behave as if they were risk-averse. The original position represents a unique and final decision concerning all essential social goods, made without knowledge of one's specific future role. To mitigate the risk of ending up in the worst possible scenario, they would rationally choose rules that maximize benefits for those at the minimum level of advantage (the maximin principle).
Rawls revisited the concept of the original position in his 1999 work, The Law of Peoples. In this context, he discusses "using the idea of the original position a second time" to elucidate how representatives of various "peoples" (a concept akin to states in Rawls's framework) would establish the principles governing the relationships between liberal and other "decent" societies. [13]
Thomas Nagel has further elaborated on the original position, suggesting that social ethics should be constructed by acknowledging the inherent tension between an individual's original, hypothetical position and their actual, lived circumstances. [ Citation needed ]
The original position has also found its way into mathematical modeling, particularly in relation to Wright-Fisher diffusion models, a classical concept in population genetics. [14] Furthermore, the original position has been invoked in arguments for negative eugenics, though Rawls's own consideration of the matter was limited to its use as a preventative measure. [15]
Criticisms
In his influential 1974 book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick presented a critique of Rawls's framework. Nozick conceded that the original position might represent a just starting point, but argued that any inequalities arising from subsequent free exchanges would be equally just. Consequently, he contended that any form of redistributive taxation would constitute an infringement on individual liberty. He also challenged Rawls's application of the maximin rule, suggesting that it represented an extreme form of risk aversion, making it an unsuitable principle even for those operating behind the veil of ignorance. [16]
Michael Sandel, in his 1982 work, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, criticized Rawls's notion of the veil of ignorance. Sandel argued that it is fundamentally impossible for an individual to completely detach themselves from their deeply held beliefs and convictions – their "Me" – which Rawls's thought experiment requires. [17]
A 1987 empirical study conducted by Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey provided further empirical challenges. [18] Their research, involving simulated original positions with undergraduates at American universities, indicated that participants tended to agree upon a distributive principle that maximized the average outcome with a specified floor constraint (a minimum provision for the worst-off), rather than solely maximizing the floor or the average alone. This contrasted with Rawls's assertion that individuals in the original position would unanimously choose to maximize the welfare of the worst off. In the survey, this principle was, in fact, the least popular choice, preferred by less than 5% of participants. [18]
[Iain King], in his 2008 book, [How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time], argued that individuals in the original position should not necessarily be risk-averse. He proposed that this would lead them to adopt the "Help Principle" (offering help if its value to the recipient exceeds its cost to the helper) rather than the maximin rule. [19]
Philosopher and Law Professor Harold Anthony Lloyd has offered a different perspective, suggesting that Rawls's veil of ignorance is not merely hypothetical but "dangerously real." Lloyd argues that individuals are inherently incapable of knowing the future, either for themselves or for others, and often lack complete knowledge of their own past or present circumstances. Faced with such profound uncertainty, he posits that careful egoism, driven by a desire to minimize risk, would naturally lead individuals to embrace altruistic behaviors like sharing risk through social safety nets and insurance mechanisms. [20]