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Created Jan 0001
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Type Existential Dread
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persian, enqelâbe mašrute, iranian, qajar era, parliament, iran, persia, islamic world, young turk revolution

Persian Constitutional Revolution

“The Persian Constitutional Revolution, known in Persian as مشروطیت (Mašrutiat) or انقلاب مشروطه (Enqelâbe Mašrute), was a pivotal period in Iranian history,...”

Contents
  • 1. Overview
  • 2. Etymology
  • 3. Cultural Impact

The Persian Constitutional Revolution , known in Persian as مشروطیت (Mašrutiat) or انقلاب مشروطه (Enqelâbe Mašrute ), was a pivotal period in Iranian history, unfolding between 1905 and 1911 during the waning years of the Qajar era . This tumultuous six-year struggle ushered in the profound and unprecedented establishment of a parliament within Iran (historically referred to as Persia ), marking what historians have rightly termed an “epoch-making episode in the modern history of Persia.” One might even call it a moment of collective exasperation finally boiling over.

This revolution stands as a singular, pioneering event within the Islamic world , predating even the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 . It flung open the gates to the modern age in Iran, fostering an environment where public debate could flourish, notably through a burgeoning, if often embattled, press. Numerous factions, each with their own vision (or delusion), vied to steer the course of this unfolding transformation. The entrenched old order, which the notoriously resistant Naser al-Din Shah Qajar had so strenuously, and for so long, strived to preserve, was finally dismantled, giving way to a nascent framework of new political institutions. A monumental shift, yet one that, in hindsight, merely swapped one set of problems for another, as is often the case.

Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar , perhaps sensing the inevitable or simply too weary to resist, reluctantly signed the 1906 constitution into existence just before his death. His successor, the rather less enlightened Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar , harbored no such constitutionalist sympathies. Demonstrating a preference for absolute power, he moved swiftly to abolish the nascent constitution and, with the rather predictable backing of Russian and British interests, bombarded the parliament in 1908 . This brazen act, however, only ignited a second, more determined wave of resistance. Constitutionalist forces, galvanized by the assault on their nascent democracy, converged on Tehran, ultimately compelling Mohammad Ali Shah’s abdication. His young son, Ahmad Shah Qajar , was enthroned in his stead, and the constitution was re-established in 1909. A brief triumph, a fleeting moment of clarity.

The revolution, however, proved to be a fragile construct. Its formal conclusion arrived in December 1911 when the Shah’s ministers, acting with the rather unsubtle leverage of “12,000 Russian troops,” oversaw the expulsion of the deputies of the Second Majlis from parliament. A rather definitive way to end a debate, wouldn’t you say?

Years later, following the 1921 Persian coup d’état (known in Persian as کودتای ۳ اسفند ۱۲۹۹), Iran’s parliament, now under new influence, amended the constitution on December 12, 1925. This revision formally replaced the 1797–1925 Qajar dynasty with the Pahlavi dynasty , establishing them as the new, legitimate sovereigns of Iran. The 1906–1907 constitution, though often more honored in the breach than in observance, remarkably persisted until after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. It was then that a new constitution was approved via a referendum held on December 2 and 3, 1979, officially ushering in the era of the Islamic republic. Because if there’s one thing history teaches us, it’s that revolutions rarely have a tidy ending.

History

The Persian Constitutional Revolution formally commenced in 1905, ignited by widespread outrage over the actions of a foreign customs director (a Belgian, no less) who, with a bureaucrat’s rigid devotion to rules, enforced tariff collections. These collections were, inconveniently, intended to service a loan from another foreign power (the Russians), which had, even more inconveniently, financed Mozazaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar ’s rather extravagant European escapades. The revolutionaries—primarily comprising shrewd bazaar merchants, influential members of the ulama (religious scholars), and a small, but increasingly vocal, cadre of radical reformers—voiced a litany of grievances. They pointed to the alarming trend of Iran’s vital oil industry being effectively ceded to the British, while simultaneously, tax breaks on imports, exports, and manufactured textiles were systematically dismantling Iran’s domestic economy, which had long been the backbone of the bazaar merchants’ livelihoods. The Shah, they argued, was quite literally selling off the nation’s assets merely to cover the interest on the vast fortune of foreign debt he had so carelessly accrued. A classic tale of royal excess meeting popular discontent, only this time, the consequences were rather more profound.

The revolution ultimately sputtered to a close in December 1911. By this point, the deputies of the Second Majlis found themselves beleaguered by a cocktail of “internal dissension, apathy of the masses, antagonisms from the upper class, and open enmity from Britain and Russia.” They were, to put it mildly, “roughly” expelled from the Majlis and, for good measure, threatened with death should they dare to return. This decisive action was, of course, orchestrated by “the shah’s cabinet, backed by 12,000 Russian troops.” Diplomacy by bayonet, a timeless classic.

Between these two definitive points—the initial spark of protest in 1905 and the final, brutal suppression in 1911—Iran endured the brief, tumultuous existences of two distinct majles (parliaments), witnessed the deposition of a shah, and experienced the deeply cynical Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which, with breathtaking colonial arrogance, divided the country into spheres of influence, capitalizing on Iran’s internal fragility. A new fundamental law was eventually crafted, establishing a parliament and, crucially, granting it final approval over all loans and the national budget. This new majles received the crucial endorsement of leading clerics from Najaf —notably Akhund Khurasani , Mirza Husayn Tehrani , and Shaykh Abdullah Mazandarani —lending it a veneer of religious legitimacy that would prove both powerful and, at times, precarious.

Background

In the twilight years of the 19th century, Iran, much like a significant portion of the Muslim world , found itself mired in a predictable quagmire of foreign intervention and exploitation. This was compounded by its own inherent military weakness, a profound lack of national cohesion, and endemic corruption that permeated every layer of society. A recipe for disaster, if ever there was one.

The 1813 Treaty of Gulistan and the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay served as stark, humiliating reminders of Iran’s vulnerability. Through these agreements, Iran was forced to relinquish “Georgia, Armenia, and their Caspian navy” to the burgeoning power of Russia . Furthermore, it had to “give up its claims to Afghanistan, and paid an indemnity of three million pounds to the tsar.” The Treaty of Paris (1857) added insult to injury, compelling Iran to withdraw from Herat (a region that had historically been part of Iran) and to sign a rather disadvantageous commercial treaty with Britain . A recurring theme, isn’t it? The lack of a robust, standing Iranian army was a critical flaw; the forces mustered to confront the Russians, for instance, were little more than “faction-ridden tribal contingents,” woefully lacking in modern artillery and, one assumes, morale.

To compensate for this glaring military deficiency, the Qajar Shah resorted to leveraging “loyal tribes.” His method for quelling rebellion was particularly brutal: he would declare a rebellious city or region “open booty” for these tribes, who would then descend upon it, indulging in acts of rape and pillage. A far more destructive and dehumanizing form of “discipline” than mere arrests and punishments. It certainly discouraged repeat offenses, at least from the survivors. Even supposed infrastructure improvements, such as the construction of major roads between cities, intended to facilitate transportation, paradoxically provided more opportunities for tax collectors to fleece towns along the route. This, predictably, “encouraged the local peasants to settle in more distant regions,” effectively turning potential arteries of commerce into channels of exploitation. A British Foreign Office survey, with typical understated colonial observation, reported:

‘There are large tracts of fertile land which remain waste owing to their proximity to the main roads, as no village having cultivators on such spots can possibly prosper or enjoy the least immunity from the pestering visits of Government officials, and thefts and robberies committed by the tribes.’

Perhaps the most galling indignities inflicted upon Iran by the militarily superior European powers were “a series of commercial capitulations.” While the Shah’s practice of selling “titles, patents, privileges, concessions, monopolies, lands, … high offices” did finance some superficial improvements, such as a rudimentary telegraph network and, in Tehran, a nascent police force and a municipal civil service, a significant portion of these funds was, rather inevitably, squandered on the opulent consumption habits of the shah’s court.

Under the extended reign of the Qajar dynasty (1789–1925), the influx of foreign (Western) mass-manufactured goods, particularly textiles, delivered a crippling blow to traditional handicrafts. This created a shared adversary for many bazaars —the ubiquitous “foreigner.” In Isfahan alone, it’s estimated that at least 10% of “the guilds in this city were weavers; not even 1/5 of those survived” the relentless competition from imported textiles. The economic ripple effects were devastating: widows and orphans, always the most vulnerable, suffered immensely. Farmers, too, faced ruin; by 1894, the price they received for their wheat harvest had plummeted to a mere one-sixth of its 1871 value. Compounding this agricultural crisis, irrigation systems, vital for a semi-arid country, had fallen into disrepair, “turning fields and villages into desert.”

In 1872, Naser al-Din Shah , demonstrating a remarkable willingness to mortgage his country’s future, negotiated a concession that granted a British citizen, Baron Paul Julius Reuter , sweeping control over Iranian roads, telegraphs, mills, factories, the extraction of natural resources, and other public works. In return, the Shah received a fixed sum and a promise of 60% of the net revenue. This audacious concession, however, was eventually rolled back due to ferocious local opposition, a rare moment of popular will prevailing over royal short-sightedness. Other significant concessions to the British included granting the newly established Imperial Bank of Persia exclusive rights to issue banknotes, and opening up the Karun River to foreign navigation.

Historian Nikki R. Keddie astutely observes that:

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 and the Russian revolution of 1905 gave impetus to an Iranian opposition movement that had been growing since 1901. After a century of successive defeats, an Asian power had defeated a European power, an event that bolstered pride throughout Asia. This feeling was particularly strong in those countries, like Iran, that had experienced Russian penetration and oppression. Many considered it significant that the only Asian power with a constitution had defeated the only Western power without one, and constitutions came to be looked upon as the “secret of strength” of Western governments.

A fascinating, if somewhat simplistic, conclusion drawn from geopolitical events, but one that undeniably resonated deeply within Iran.

Discontented groups

The political bedrock of the constitutionalist movement—a coalition united by the rather ambitious goal of reining in the power of the shah—was an uneasy, yet potent, alliance. It comprised the conservative, yet often pragmatic, ulama ; a diverse array of liberal and radical intellectuals, often educated abroad and disillusioned with Iran’s stagnation; and, crucially, the influential bazaar merchants. A strange bedfellows scenario, if ever there was one. This alliance, however, was forged primarily out of shared animosities rather than cohesive, common objectives. The ulama generally aimed “to extend their own power and to have Shi’i Islam more strictly enforced,” a timeless clerical ambition. The liberals and radicals, meanwhile, envisioned “greater political and social democracy and economic development,” a rather utopian ideal in that context. And the bazaaris ? They simply sought “to restrict favored foreign economic status and competition,” a pragmatic desire to protect their livelihoods.

The intellectuals, though a “small but growing” demographic, played a disproportionately significant role. Many had journeyed abroad, immersing themselves in Western societies, and were “generally struck by Western economic development, comparative justice, and lack of arbitrary rule.” Upon their return, their writings became sharp instruments of critique, lambasting Iran’s “autocratic rulers, petty officials, venal clerics, and arbitrary courts, and of the low status of women.” Meanwhile, the “mercantile class,” or bazaari , became increasingly convinced that “law and order, security of property, and immunity from arbitrary power could all be achieved by importing parliamentary democracy” from Europe. A somewhat naive assumption, perhaps, but understandable given their predicament. The ulama (Islamic scholars) had, ostensibly, less direct incentive to champion a constitution, yet many were persuaded (at least for a time) that their “hierocracy vis-a-vis the monarchy” would not be undermined. A delicate balancing act, indeed.

Tobacco protest

The tobacco protest of 1891–1892 was, by all accounts, “the first mass nationwide popular movement in Iran.” It is often, and quite accurately, described as a “dress rehearsal for the…Constitutional Revolution.” This powerful movement was born from an unlikely, yet effective, anti-imperialist and antimonarchist coalition of “clerics, mercantile interests, and dissident intellectuals.” A formidable combination, especially when united by a common grievance.

In March 1890, Naser al-Din Shah , demonstrating his usual fiscal myopia, granted a concession to an Englishman, Baron Paul Julius Reuter , bestowing upon him a 50-year monopoly over the distribution and exportation of tobacco. In return, the Shah personally received a tidy £25,000, with an additional £15,000 annually for the state. The problem, for the Shah, was that Iranians cultivated a unique variety of tobacco, “much prized in foreign markets,” which was not grown elsewhere. This concession, therefore, directly threatened the economic security of a substantial segment of the Iranian population—literally hundreds of thousands of workers across both agriculture and the bazaars .

This egregious arrangement sparked an unprecedented nationwide protest, which erupted first among the bazaari and then spread rapidly among the influential ulama . In December 1891, the most revered religious authority in Iran, the marja’ -e taqlid Mirza Hasan Shirazi , issued a fatwa (religious edict) that proved to be a masterstroke. He declared the use of tobacco to be tantamount to a declaration of war against the Hidden Imam , employing the strongest possible theological language to oppose the Régie (tobacco monopoly). The effect was immediate and profound: bazaars across the country shut down, and Iranians, with remarkable collective discipline, ceased smoking tobacco. This was particularly striking given the ubiquity and popularity of tobacco, which Iranians were famously said to be less likely to forego than bread. The religious ban was so astonishingly effective that it was even reported that women within the shah’s harem themselves quit smoking. A truly inconvenient truth for the Shah.

The success of this protest demonstrated to the Iranians, “for the first time that it was possible to win out against the Shah and foreign interests.” Historian Nikki Keddie posits a direct, unbroken “line from the coalition which participated in the tobacco movement… culminating in the Constitutional Revolution” and, arguably, even the Iranian Revolution almost a century later. Because once people realize their collective power, it’s rather difficult to put that genie back in the bottle.

Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar

The fourth Qajar monarch , Naser al-Din Shah , met his rather abrupt end on May 1, 1896, assassinated by Mirza Reza Kermani , a devoted follower of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī , during a visit to the Shah Abdol-Azim Shrine where he was praying. Upon Mozaffar ad-Din Shah’s accession, Iran inherited a dire financial crisis, with governmental expenditures annually far outstripping revenues—a direct legacy of his father’s profligate policies. It was this same Mozaffar ad-Din Shah who, as previously noted, signed the 1906 constitution into being shortly before his own death.

The pattern of royal weakness and financial extravagance persisted, indeed intensified, during the relatively brief reign of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah (1896–1907). He frequently delegated the daunting task of managing his decentralized state to his chancellor, perhaps preferring the more agreeable pursuits of leisure. His increasingly desperate financial straits compelled him to sign numerous concessions to foreign powers, encompassing a vast array of trade items, from armaments to tobacco. As a direct consequence, the aristocracy, the influential religious authorities, and the burgeoning educated elite began to vocalize demands for a strict curb on royal authority and the establishment of the rule of law. Their apprehension about escalating foreign (particularly Russian ) influence was growing, and with good reason. The Qajars had already incurred massive loans from both Russia and Britain to bankroll the Shah’s notoriously extravagant lifestyle and the operational costs of his government. For instance, the Shah financed a lavish royal tour of Europe in 1900 by securing a ₽22 million loan from Russia, cynically using Iranian customs receipts as collateral. A classic example of sacrificing national assets for personal indulgence.

First protests

The year 1905 saw the initial eruption of widespread protests, fueled by public anger over the imposition of Iranian tariffs, which were, of course, designed to repay the aforementioned Russian loan that had funded Mozaffar ad-Din Shah’s rather self-indulgent royal tour. In December of that year, two Tehran merchants were subjected to the humiliating punishment of bastinado (foot-whipping) for the rather vague offense of “price-gouging.” This act of perceived injustice ignited a rebellion among the city’s merchants, who promptly closed its bazaar . The clergy , drawing upon the alliance forged during the successful Tobacco Protest , swiftly joined the fray.

The two protesting groups sought traditional sanctuary (known as bast) within a Tehran mosque. However, the government, with rather less respect for tradition, entered the mosque and forcibly dispersed them. This heavy-handed action, predictably, escalated the situation, triggering a larger, more organized movement that sought refuge at a venerated shrine outside Tehran. Faced with this burgeoning popular uprising, the Shah, with characteristic Qajar reluctance, yielded to the demonstrators on January 12, 1906. He agreed to dismiss his unpopular prime minister and, crucially, to transfer power to a “house of justice,” a clear precursor to what would become the Iranian parliament. The basti protesters returned from the shrine in triumph, riding in royal carriages and hailed as heroes by a jubilant crowd. A moment of rare unity, a flicker of hope.

However, the peace was fleeting. In early 1906, a violent confrontation with government forces resulted in the death of a sayyid (a descendant of Muhammad ), further inflaming tensions. A subsequent skirmish saw Cossacks kill 22 protesters and injure 100, a grim tally that underscored the regime’s brutality. The bazaar once again closed its doors, and the ulama went on strike en masse, with a significant number seeking sanctuary in the holy city of Qom . Many merchants, shrewdly assessing their options, instead sought refuge at the British embassy in Tehran , which, ever pragmatic, agreed to shelter the basti on its grounds. A rather convenient display of “humanitarianism” from a power with its own colonial interests.

Creation of the constitution

During the sweltering summer of 1906, approximately 12,000 men established a sprawling encampment within the capacious gardens of the British embassy . This impromptu gathering, a veritable “vast open-air school of political science,” became a crucible for burgeoning political demands. The insistent cry for a parliament (a majlis) grew louder, its primary objective being the crucial limitation of the Shah’s hitherto absolute power. Mozaffar ad-Din Shah , perhaps recognizing the futility of further resistance or simply too infirm to care, finally acquiesced to the establishment of a parliament in August 1906. The first elections were swiftly organized and held that autumn. One hundred fifty-six members were elected, with the overwhelming majority hailing from Tehran and, predictably, representing the influential merchant class.

The inaugural session of the National Consultative Assembly convened in October 1906. The Shah, by this point, was a frail and ailing man, and his attendance at the parliament’s inauguration proved to be one of his final official acts. Mozaffar ad-Din Shah’s son and successor, Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar , harbored a deep-seated antipathy towards constitutionalism, a fact that would soon become painfully clear. Nevertheless, the Shah, on December 31, 1906, signed the constitution (a document rather optimistically modeled on the Belgian constitution ), thereby, at least on paper, making his power contingent upon the will of the people. He died a mere three days later, perhaps spared the full consequences of his reluctant signature.

The constitution

The constitution itself was not merely drafted; it was brought into being through a royal proclamation issued on August 5, 1906, by Mozaffar ad-Din Shah , ostensibly “for the peace and tranquility of all the people of Persia.” While the Quran was declared its foundational text, the Belgian constitution served as a practical, if somewhat incongruous, partial model for the document’s structure and principles. A rather ambitious hybrid, one might observe.

The electoral law, promulgated on September 9, 1906, meticulously defined the regulations for elections to the Majlis . It was, however, a rather exclusive form of democracy. Certain demographics were, rather predictably, excluded from the franchise: women, foreigners, men under the age of 25, “persons notorious for mischievous opinions,” those with a criminal record, active military personnel, and others deemed unsuitable. Members of parliament, meanwhile, were held to a rather specific set of qualifications: they had to be fully literate in Persian , “Iranian subjects of Iranian extraction,” “locally known,” “not be in government employment,” fall between the ages of 30 and 70, and, crucially, “have some insight into affairs of State.” Because competence, apparently, was a prerequisite for representation.

The fundamental laws, enacted on December 30, 1906, delineated the role of the Majlis as a bicameral legislature . The National Consultative Assembly was to be founded “on justice,” a noble, if vague, aspiration, and there was also to be “another Assembly, entitled the Senate.” The Constitutional Amendment of 1907 further declared Twelver Shi’ism to be the official state religion, and, rather presciently, called for a council of five high-ranking Twelver Shia clerics. Their solemn duty? To ensure that any laws passed by the parliament did not, Heaven forbid, contravene the sacred laws of Islam. A clever mechanism for maintaining clerical influence, if nothing else.

Mohammad Ali Shah

Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar , the sixth Qajar shah , ascended to power in January 1907. His disdain for the newly established constitutional order was palpable and immediate. In a swift and cynical geopolitical maneuver, the British, ever opportunistic, shifted their support to the Shah, abandoning the constitutionalists they had so recently, and conveniently, sheltered.

In August of that same year, taking advantage of Iran’s inherent weakness and internal divisions, the infamous Anglo-Russian Convention was signed. This agreement, a testament to imperial arrogance, carved Iran into a Russian zone of influence in the north and a British zone in the south, leaving the central portion of the country in a rather precarious “neutral” state. Because nothing says “respect for sovereignty” quite like two foreign powers unilaterally deciding your nation’s fate.

The Minor Tyranny and the civil war of 1908–1909

In 1908, the Shah, Mohammad Ali Shah , made his move. He sought to “exploit the divisions within the ranks of the reformers” and, with characteristic authoritarian zeal, eliminate the majlis entirely. This audacious act culminated in a coup d’état that plunged Iranian history into a dark chapter known as the Minor Tyranny . It was during this period that Fazlollah Nori , a cleric who had initially supported constitutionalism, rather conveniently defected to the Shah’s side, actively assisting in the suppression of revolutionaries and, most infamously, participating in the bombardment of the parliament . A stark reminder of how quickly principles can be abandoned when power is at stake.

Iran, in a desperate bid to assert its independence, attempted to resist the suffocating grip of Russian influence through the steadfast, if ultimately doomed, opposition of the majlis to the Shah’s policies. In a move of calculated defiance, parliament appointed the American lawyer William Morgan Shuster as Iran’s treasurer-general, hoping his international standing would offer some protection. Russia ’s response was swift and brutal: it issued an ultimatum demanding Shuster’s expulsion and the suspension of parliament, backing its demands with the menacing act of occupying Tabriz .

After the shelling of the Majles (parliament) in the capital, Tehran, Mohammad Ali Shah’s forces, numbering 40,000, were ordered to attack Tabriz , where constitutional rebels stubbornly held out. Sattar Khan was appointed the commander-in-chief of the High Council, effectively leading the constitutionalist forces. By April 1909, the Tabriz rebels had suffered significant losses, but, against formidable odds, succeeded in driving the royalist forces from the city. Sattar Khan and his loyal lieutenant, Baqir Khan , distinguished themselves as genuine heroes of the popular resistance. Inspired by this hard-won victory, constitutionalists across Iran swiftly organized, establishing special committees in Tehran, Rasht , Qazvin , Isfahan , and other key cities. Crucially, the powerful Bakhtiyari tribal leaders, recognizing the shifting tides, threw their considerable support behind the Tabriz rebels.

This renewed momentum saw constitutionalist forces march triumphantly into Tehran, forcing Mohammad Ali Shah’s abdication in favor of his young son, Ahmad Shah Qajar . The constitution was, for a second time, re-established in 1909. A brief, glorious moment of vindication.

However, the revolutionary movement, prone to internal fragmentation, experienced a further significant split in 1910. “A group of guerrilla fighters headed by Sattar Khan , refused to obey a government order to disarm.” This defiance led to a “brief but violent confrontation” during which Sattar Khan himself was wounded. Yeprem Khan , the recently appointed police chief of Tehran—a constitutionalist himself, ironically—“succeeded in disarming them.” A sad culmination of revolutionary fervor turning on itself.

The end

The revolution, a grand, messy experiment in self-determination, finally reached its ignominious end in December 1911. The deputies of the Second Majlis , battered by “internal dissension, apathy of the masses, antagonisms from the upper class, and open enmity from Britain and Russia,” found themselves in an untenable position. They were “roughly” expelled from the Majlis and, for good measure, threatened with death should they dare to return to their legislative duties. This final, decisive blow was delivered by “the shah’s cabinet, backed by 12,000 Russian troops.” A rather blunt instrument for resolving political disputes, but effective nonetheless. The dream of a constitutional Iran, for the moment, was over.

Religious debate

The 1891 fatwa issued by Mirza Hasan Shirazi , which effectively brought tobacco consumption in Iran to a screeching halt and reversed the highly unpopular tobacco monopoly agreement, served as a potent demonstration. It revealed the immense, almost unparalleled, influence wielded by the Usuli Twelver Shi’i clergy over the Iranian populace, an influence that extended far beyond matters strictly confined to religious ritual. (For the uninitiated, Usuli Shi’i doctrine considers it an absolute obligation for a Muslim not formally trained in religious sciences to obey a mujtahid —specifically, a marja’ —when seeking to determine Islamically correct behavior). Following this profound humiliation, the new Shah, Mohammad Ali Qajar , understood a crucial, if inconvenient, truth: he could no longer rely solely on royal prestige and tradition to combat the burgeoning constitutional government. Instead, he would have to strategically cultivate religious allies. A rather cynical, yet entirely predictable, pivot.

Unsurprisingly, the clergy themselves were far from monolithic in their views, finding themselves divided, often acrimoniously, on the matter of constitutionalism. On the side of constitutional government stood three of the most highly esteemed clerics (marja’ ) of the era: Akhund Khurasani , Mirza Husayn Tehrani , and Shaykh Abdullah Mazandarani . From their influential schools in Najaf , Iraq, they transmitted fatwas unequivocally endorsing the constitution. Of this formidable trio, Muhammad Kazim Khurasani , widely known as Akhund Khurasani, was arguably the most deeply involved in the constitutional discourse. He, along with his astute student Muhammad Hossain Naini , articulated a nuanced theological argument: while perfect justice was an impossibility until the prophesied return of the Hidden Imam , “human experience and careful reflection” clearly demonstrated “that democracy reduces the tyranny of state.” This, they argued, rendered it a “lesser evil” in governance, and therefore something that Shi’i Muslims were obligated to support until the Imam’s reappearance. Also lending his support to constitutionalism was Mirza Ali Aqa Tabrizi , who asserted that only the opinions of the sources of emulation (the highest-ranking clerics) should be heeded in matters of faith.

Conversely, the most vocal and influential leader of those opposing constitutional government was Fazlullah Nouri . Other prominent opponents included Mullah Qurban Ali Zanjani. Nouri staunchly maintained that sharia constituted a comprehensive and entirely sufficient code of life, encompassing far more than mere religious ritual. Any other legal codes, he argued, were not only superfluous but fundamentally antithetical to Islam. Despite ranking below the highest-tier Marja’s in clerical hierarchy, he boldly instructed Shi’i Muslims to disregard the teachings of any Marja’ they followed if that Marja’ happened to support democracy. A rather convenient reinterpretation of religious authority, wouldn’t you say?

Important events

The three leading clerics: (left to right) Akhund Khurasani , Mirza Husayn Tehrani , and Abdullah Mazandarani —a formidable, if ultimately outmaneuvered, intellectual force.

Early fatwa by marja'

After the parliament was established, its members maintained a consistent line of communication with Akhund Khurasani . Whenever legislative bills were under discussion, he was dutifully telegraphed with the details, his juristic opinion eagerly sought. In a letter dated June 3, 1907, the parliament informed Akhund of a faction of anti-constitutionalists actively attempting to undermine the legitimacy of democracy, rather disingenuously, in the name of religious law. Akhund Khurasani and the other two members of the clerical trio (Mirza Husayn Tehrani and Shaykh Abdullah Mazandarani ) responded with a categorical declaration:

Persian اساس این مجلس محترم مقدس بر امور مذکور مبتنی است. بر هر مسلمی سعی و اهتمام در استحکام و تشیید این اساس قویم لازم، و اقدام در موجبات اختلال آن محاده و معانده با صاحب شریعت مطهره علی الصادع بها و آله الطاهرین افضل الصلاه و السلام، و خیانت به دولت قوی شوکت است.

الاحقر نجل المرحوم الحاج میرزا خلیل قدس سره محمد حسین، حررّہ الاحقر الجانی محمد کاظم الخراسانی، من الاحقر عبدالله المازندرانی

English “Because we are aware of the intended reasons for this institution, it is therefore incumbent on every Muslim to support its foundation, and those who try to defeat it, and their action against it, are considered contrary to shari’a.” —Mirza Husayn Tehrani , Muhammad Kazim Khurasani , Abdallah Mazandaran .

A rather clear and unequivocal endorsement, one would think.

Fazlollah Nouri and the anti-constitutionalists

At the outset of the constitutional movement, Sheikh Fazlullah Nouri initially appeared to be a proponent, delivering speeches and distributing tracts in support of the sources of emulation (Shi’i marja’ religious leadership) in Najaf and their collective stance on constitutionalism. They all, ostensibly, agreed that the people had a sacred duty to counter autocracy and injustice through a constitution that limited the powers of the state and a legislature that genuinely represented the country. However, when the monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar , made his intentions brutally clear—his desire to roll back democracy and re-establish his absolute authority, leveraging military and foreign support (in 1908)—Shaikh Fazlullah executed a rather convenient reversal of his position, aligning himself unequivocally with the Shah and his court. A familiar pattern of political opportunism, dressed in religious garb.

Nouri, being a man of considerable wealth and holding a high-ranking position within the Qajar court —responsible for solemnizing marriages and contracts, managing the wills of the affluent, and collecting religious funds—had a deeply entrenched, powerful vested interest in maintaining the existing political structure of Iran. His rather vocal professions of opposition to foreign influence, however, were consistently undermined by a series of his own actions: his suspiciously close ties to the Russians, his outright refusal to support the early bazaari protests against Europeans who were aggressively collecting customs dues, his endorsement of the sale of a sacred cemetery to Russians for the construction of a (Russian) bank—an act that led to the unplanned exhumation of bodies—and, perhaps most damningly, his financing of an anti-constitutionalist rally with funds directly sourced from that very Russian bank. One struggles to reconcile these actions with genuine anti-foreign sentiment.

In his relentless campaign against the institution of parliament, Nouri rallied a significant number of followers and initiated a round-the-clock sit-in at the Shah Abdol-Azim Shrine , commencing on June 21, 1907, and lasting until September 16, 1907.

The anti-democracy clerics under Nouri’s influence actively incited violence, with one particularly fervent cleric declaring that merely approaching the parliament was a greater sin than adultery, robbery, and murder combined. In Zanjan , Mulla Qurban Ali Zanjani mobilized a force of six hundred thugs who proceeded to loot the shops of pro-democracy merchants, seized control of the city for several days, and brutally murdered the local representative, Sa’d al-Saltanih. Nouri himself, with a rather unholy disregard for religious decorum, recruited mercenaries from criminal gangs to harass and intimidate supporters of democracy. On December 22, 1907, Nouri led a mob towards Toopkhaneh Square , where they unleashed an attack on merchants and looted stores. Nouri’s deep-seated connections to the Shah’s court and the powerful landowning class only served to reinforce his fanaticism. He even went so far as to contact the Russian embassy for support, and his men delivered inflammatory sermons against democracy in mosques, directly contributing to widespread chaos and unrest. A most unedifying display of clerical power.

Fatwas for the Constitution

Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri (d. 1909), a cleric who rather enthusiastically supported the coup d’état of Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar in 1908, eventually met his deserved fate. He was hanged by the constitutional revolutionaries on July 31, 1909 (in Toopkhaneh ) as a traitor. A rather definitive end to his particular brand of religious-political maneuvering.

Notified of Nouri’s increasingly disruptive and violent activities, Akhund Khurasani consulted with the other leading Marja’ and, in a letter dated December 30, 1907, they jointly issued a unequivocal statement:

Persian چون نوری مخل آسائش و مفسد است، تصرفش در امور حرام است.

محمد حسین (نجل) میرزا خلیل، محمد کاظم خراسانی، عبدالله مازندرانی

English “Because Nouri is causing trouble and sedition, his interfering in any affair is forbidden.” —Mirza Husayn Tehrani , Muhammad Kazim Khurasani , Abdallah Mazandaran .

Despite this clear religious injunction, Nouri, with a stubbornness bordering on delusion, persisted in his disruptive activities. A few weeks later, Akhund Khurasani and his fellow Marja’s were compelled to issue a further, more forceful declaration, advocating for his immediate expulsion from Tehran:

Persian رفع اغتشاشات حادثه و تبعید نوری را عاجلاً اعلام.

الداعی محمد حسین نجل المرحوم میرزا خلیل، الداعی محمد کاظم الخراسانی، عبدالله المازندرانی

English “Restore peace and expel Nouri as quickly as possible.” – Mirza Husayn Tehrani , Muhammad Kazim Khurasani , Abdallah Mazandaran .

Leading clerical figures

Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri

Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri , the arch-opponent of the constitutionalists, presented a rather rigid theological argument against the nascent democratic movement. He asserted that Islam, in its entirety, already contained a complete and sufficient code of life. Therefore, he argued, any democratic system that would allow for “teaching of chemistry, physics and foreign languages” would inevitably lead to the insidious spread of atheism . His logic, one might note, was rather fear-driven. He tirelessly propagandized against female education , going so far as to claim that girls’ schools were, in fact, thinly disguised brothels. A truly enlightened view, certainly. Nouri also vehemently opposed freedom of the press, modern methods of governance, the allocation of funds for modern industry, and the radical notion of equal rights for all citizens, irrespective of their religion. To disseminate his rather retrograde views, he acquired a printing press and launched his own newspaper, “Ruznamih-i-Shaikh Fazlullah,” alongside numerous leaflets. His core belief was that the ruler was accountable to no institution other than God, and that the people possessed no inherent right to limit the powers or question the conduct of the shah. Consequently, he declared that those who supported democratic forms of government were corrupt and, rather damningly, apostates from Islam .

Much like certain Islamists who would emerge later in the 20th century, Nouri forcefully preached the idea of sharia as a comprehensive, all-encompassing code for social life, not merely a set of religious rituals. In his view, any other legal codes were not only redundant but fundamentally antithetical to Islamic principles.

Shari’a covers all regulations of government, and specifies all obligations and duties, so the needs of the people of Iran in matters of law are limited to the business of government, which, by reason of universal accidents, has become separated from Shari’a. … Now the people have thrown out the law of the Prophet and have set up their own law instead.

And, in a direct challenge to the authority of the highest religious leaders, he declared that if a Marja’ (religious leader) supported democracy, that Muslim should not follow them:

If a thousand jurists write that this parliament is founded on the command to do good and prohibit evil … then you are witness that this is not the case and they have erred … (exactly as if they were to say) this animal is a sheep, and you know it is a dog, you have to say, ‘You are mistaken, it is unclean’.

Unlike later Islamists who would challenge the monarch, Nouri viewed the shah as the “executive of the Islamic government,” and therefore, any debilitation of the shah’s power was, in his rigid interpretation, “a derogation of religion.” A convenient theological justification for absolute monarchy, indeed.

Three marja'

The three highest-ranking clerics (marja’ ) of the time—Akhund Khurasani , Mirza Husayn Tehrani , and Shaykh Abdullah Mazandarani —stood as staunch defenders of the parliament when it came under relentless assault from the cleric of the shah’s court, Nouri . They served as a crucial legitimizing force for the constitutional movement, invoking the powerful Quranic command of ‘enjoining good and forbidding wrong ’ to provide theological justification for democracy during the prolonged period of occultation (the absence of the Hidden Imam ). More powerfully still, they linked opposition to the constitutional movement to ‘a war against the Imam of the Age ,’ which, in Shi’i Islam , represents the most severe condemnation imaginable. In doing so, they inadvertently established a foundational model of religious secularity within government during the Imam’s absence—a model that, remarkably, continues to influence (some) Shi’i seminaries to this day. A nuanced theological tightrope walk, to be sure.

Mirza Ali Aqa Tabrizi

Mirza Ali Aqa Tabrizi , the Thiqa tul-islam from Tabriz , emerged as a vocal opponent of Nouri’s rigid anti-constitutionalism. He asserted, quite rightly, that only the considered opinion of the sources of emulation (marja’ ) was truly worthy of consideration in matters of faith. A direct challenge to Nouri’s self-appointed authority. He eloquently penned:

He who wins his own soul, protects his religion, is against following his desires and is obedient to the command of his Master; that is the person whom the people should take as their model.

And further, emphasizing the collective wisdom of the highest religious authorities:

Let us consider the idea that the constitution is against Sharia law: all oppositions of this kind are in vain because the hujjaj al-islam of the atabat, who are today the models (marja’ ) and the refuge (malija) of all Shiites, have issued clear fatwas that uphold the necessity of the Constitution. Aside from their words, they have also shown this by their actions. They see in Constitution the support for splendour of Islam.

He firmly rejected the very notion of a supervisory committee composed of Tehran’s local clerics being empowered to censor the conduct of parliament, stating with clear authority:

this delicate subject shall be submitted to the atabat, … we don’t have the right to entrust government to a group of four or five mullahs from Tehran.

A rather pointed dismissal of Nouri’s attempts to centralize clerical control in Tehran.

Muhammad Kazim Khurasani

Responding directly to Nouri’s rather narrow and self-serving arguments, Akhund Muhammad Kazim Khurasani offered a comprehensive theological counter-argument:

Persian سلطنت مشروعه آن است کہ متصدی امور عامه ی ناس و رتق و فتق کارهای قاطبه ی مسلمین و فیصل کافه ی مهام به دست ‏شخص معصوم و موید و منصوب و منصوص و مأمور مِن الله باشد مانند انبیاء و اولیاء و مثل خلافت ‏امیرالمومنین و ایام ظهور و رجعت حضرت حجت، و اگر حاکم مطلق معصوم نباشد، آن سلطنت غیرمشروعه است، ‏چنان‌ کہ در زمان غیبت است و سلطنت غیرمشروعه دو قسم است، عادله، نظیر مشروطه کہ مباشر امور عامه، عقلا و متدینین ‏باشند و ظالمه و جابره است، مثل آنکه حاکم مطلق یک نفر مطلق‌ العنان خودسر باشد. البته به صریح حکم عقل و به فصیح ‏منصوصات شرع «غیر مشروعه ی عادله» مقدم است بر «غیرمشروعه ی جابره». و به تجربه و تدقیقات صحیحه و غور ‏رسی‌ های شافیه مبرهن شده که نُه عشر تعدیات دوره ی استبداد در دوره ی مشروطیت کمتر می‌شود و دفع افسد و اقبح به ‏فاسد و به قبیح واجب است.

English “According to Shia doctrine, only the infallible Imam has the right to govern, to run the affairs of the people, to solve the problems of the Muslim society and to make important decisions. As it was in the time of the prophets or in the time of the caliphate of the commander of the faithful, and as it will be in the time of the reappearance and return of the Mahdi . If the absolute guardianship is not with the infallible then it will be a non-islamic government. Since this is a time of occultation, there can be two types of non-islamic regimes: the first is a just democracy in which the affairs of the people are in the hands of faithful and educated men, and the second is a government of tyranny in which a dictator has absolute powers. Therefore, both in the eyes of the Sharia and reason what is just prevails over the unjust. From human experience and careful reflection it has become clear that democracy reduces the tyranny of state and it is obligatory to give precedence to the lesser evil.” —Muhammad Kazim Khurasani

Akhund Khurasani thus concluded that, as “sanctioned by sacred law and religion,” a true theocratic government could only be legitimately formed and led by the infallible Imam. This crucial distinction effectively undercut Nouri’s claims of absolute clerical authority in the Imam’s absence.

Nouri , in his rather idiosyncratic interpretation, viewed Sharia as a direct, competing equivalent to the written constitutions of modern society. He saw them as mutually exclusive. This stood in stark contrast to Akhund Khurasani who, besides holding a significantly higher clerical rank, understood adherence to religion in a society as a complex phenomenon that transcended the limited perspective of any single person or singular interpretation. A profound difference in approach, one that shaped the very nature of the religious debate.

Kazim Yazdi: the apolitical Marja of Najaf at times of democratic revolution

Mohammed Kazem Yazdi , another prominent Marja’ in Najaf , found himself courted by Nouri for support. While both Mohammad Kazem and Khorasani presided over influential Shia schools in Najaf , their political views often diverged significantly. Although Akhund Khorasani was an eminent Marja’ , many followers also prayed behind Kazem Yazdi , whose lessons on legal rulings (fiqh ) were widely renowned. Yazdi himself, however, maintained a staunchly apolitical stance, contending that Usulism did not grant the liberty to actively support constitutional politics. In his considered view, political matters lay beyond his direct expertise, and he therefore meticulously avoided direct participation. Consequently, throughout the tumultuous Iranian Constitutional Revolution , he largely remained neutral, seldom issuing any overtly political statements.

This principled neutrality, however, did not equate to an endorsement of Fazlullah Nouri and Mohammad Ali Shah . When parliament, in its earnestness, requested his review of the final draft of the constitution, Yazdi suggested several changes and, notably, ultimately signed the document. He affirmed that modern industries were permissible unless explicitly prohibited by Sharia . Furthermore, he agreed with the teaching of modern sciences, adding the crucial caveat that the state should not intervene in the autonomous centers of religious learning (Hawza ). He expressed no opposition to the formation of organizations and societies that did not incite chaos, making no distinction between religious and non-religious groups in this regard. In the complex realm of law-making, unlike Nouri , he clearly distinguished between religious law (Sharia ) and public law (Urfiya). His considered opinion was that personal and family matters should be adjudicated in religious courts by qualified jurists, while governmental affairs and matters of state should be handled by a modern judiciary. The parliament, heeding his wisdom, incorporated articles 71 and 72 into the constitution based on his opinions. Ayatullah Yazdi ultimately stated that as long as the modern constitution did not compel people to commit acts forbidden by Sharia or prevent them from fulfilling their religious duties, there was no justifiable reason to oppose democratic rule, and the government retained the right to prosecute wrongdoers. A remarkably pragmatic and forward-thinking position for his time.

Sayyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī

Mirza Sayyed Mohammad Tabatabai was a “well-known figure” and one of “the two most widely recognized clerical leaders of the Revolution” (the other being Sayyed ʿAbd-Allāh Behbahānī). Both hailed from “old and powerful clerical families” whose traditional authority over the religious community was, at this juncture, “beginning to be threatened by rival mojtaheds.” Ṭabāṭabāʾī himself had “demonstrated liberal proclivities since the late period of Nāṣer-al-Dīn Shah.” In a “famous letter” addressed to the then-prime minister, ʿAyn-al-Dawla, in 1323/1905, he launched a scathing attack on “opposition to creation of a national assembly (majles-e mellatī)”:

The Shiʿite state is confined to Persia, and their [i.e., the Shiʿites’] prestige and prosperity depended upon it. Why have you permitted the ruin of Persia and the utter humiliation of the Shiʿite state? … You may reply that the mullahs did not allow [Persia to be saved]. This is not credible. … I can foresee that my country (waṭan), my stature and prestige, my service to Islam are about to fall into the hands of enemies and all my stature gone. As long as I breathe, therefore, I will strive for the preservation of this country, be it at the cost of my life"

A rather passionate and prescient plea for national preservation, one that underscored the deep anxieties of the time.

Nouri’s execution and celebration

Shaykh Ibrahim Zanjani, with a rather heavy burden of responsibility, served as the head of the tribunal that ultimately sentenced Fazlullah Nouri to death.

Nouri had, with predictable self-interest, allied himself with the new Shah, Mohammad Ali Shah , who, with the rather explicit assistance of Russian troops, orchestrated a coup d’état against the Majlis (parliament) in 1907. However, the constitutionalists, with renewed determination, marched triumphantly onto Tehran in 1909, effectively bringing an end to the dark period known as the Minor Tyranny . Nouri was swiftly arrested.

The Revolutionary Tribunal, after due deliberation, declared Nouri guilty of a litany of offenses: inciting mobs against the constitutionalists, and, perhaps most egregiously, issuing fatwas that branded parliamentary leaders as “apostates,” “atheists,” “secret Freemasons,” and koffar al-harbi (warlike pagans)—individuals whose blood, he declared, ought to be shed by the faithful. He was ultimately found guilty of “sowing corruption and sedition on earth.” In July 1909, Nouri was hanged as a traitor. A rather stark and uncompromising end for a man who championed absolute power.

Legacy

The legacy of the Persian Constitutional Revolution in Iran is, predictably, a complex and decidedly mixed affair. Like most grand historical endeavors, it left behind a tangled web of triumphs and disappointments.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini , the revered leader of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution (who was, it should be noted, merely a child at the time of the Constitutional Revolution), later developed a theological theory asserting that until the prophesied return of the Hidden Imam , Islamic jurists should legitimately rule Iran. Decades after the Constitutional Revolution’s ultimate collapse, Khomeini rather dismissively asserted that the 1906 constitution itself was, in fact, the cunning handiwork of (Iranian) agents of imperialist Britain , conspiratorially working against Islam. Their purpose, he claimed, was to “deceive the people and conceal the true nature of their political crimes” by taking “advantage of the idea of constitutionalism.” A rather convenient historical revision, one might observe.

At the beginning of the constitutional movement, when people wanted to write laws and draw up a constitution, a copy of the Belgian legal code was borrowed from the Belgian embassy and a handful of individuals (whose names I do not wish to mention here) used it as the basis for the constitution they then wrote, supplementing its deficiencies with borrowings from the French and British legal codes. True, they added some of the ordinances of Islam in order to deceive the people, but the basis of the laws that were now thrust upon the people was alien and borrowed.

Following the Iranian Revolution , Nouri , who had been executed as a traitor during the Constitutional Revolution, was remarkably rehabilitated and celebrated within the Islamic Republic . He was honored to the extent that a major expressway was named after him. This, of course, presented a rather glaring historical irony: Nouri had vehemently defended the monarchy against the constitution, while the Islamic Revolution (at least before Khomeini consolidated power) was fundamentally about the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Shah ’s monarchical rule. History, it seems, can be rewritten to suit current political narratives.

Reza Aslan argues that a crucial lesson gleaned from the Constitutional Revolution is that what fundamentally differentiates the “countless uprisings and popular protests” that have peppered the last century of Iranian history from those pivotal movements in 1906, 1953, and 1979—those that “ultimately resulted in radical change”—is a specific, rather difficult, ability. This ability is to successfully forge a broad and resilient coalition comprising “the educated middle class,” the influential mid-level clerics and seminary students (who “maintain an enormous amount of control and power over the pious masses”), and, perhaps “most crucially, the business class – the merchant class – the bazaari merchants.” A challenging alliance to build, and an even harder one to sustain, as history so often demonstrates.

Notable participants

Constitutionalists

A poignant poster commemorating the July 1909 Triumph of Tehran , featuring the distinguished figures on horseback: Mohammad Vali Khan Khalatbari Tonekaboni and Sardar Asad .

Baqir Khan (left) and Sattar Khan —two faces of revolutionary determination.

(left to right) Arshak Gafavian , Yeprem Khan , and Khetcho —a diverse group of revolutionary leaders.

The second anniversary of the revolution, a moment to reflect on hard-won, if ultimately fleeting, gains.

  • Mirza Nasrullah Khan – The first elected Prime Minister of Iran, a brief tenure in a rapidly changing landscape.
  • Mirza Jahangir Khan – Founder and editor of the influential Sur-e Esrafil newspaper, a voice of the revolution.
  • Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani – A nationalist writer and literary critic, shaping the intellectual currents of the time.
  • Mirza Sayyed Mohammad Tabatabai – A key clerical leader, instrumental in legitimizing the constitutional cause.
  • Mohamad Vakil Altodjâr Yazdi – Deputy for Rasht , representing regional interests.
  • Nikol Duman – Participated valiantly in the defense of Tabriz , a crucial stronghold.
  • Seyed Jamal Vaez – A prominent orator and constitutionalist.
  • Hossein Ardabili – Active in Mashhad , spreading the revolutionary message.
  • Aref Qazvini – A celebrated poet and composer, whose works often reflected the revolutionary spirit.
  • Stepan Zorian – An Armenian revolutionary, demonstrating the diverse nature of the movement.
  • Ali-Akbar Dehkhoda – A towering intellectual figure, satirist, and lexicographer.
  • Mehdi Cont – An activist in Kerman , contributing to regional resistance.
  • Sattar Khan – A legendary revolutionary leader, particularly renowned for his role in Tabriz .
  • Bagher Khan – Sālār-e Melli (national chieftain), a steadfast lieutenant to Sattar Khan .
  • Mirza Kuchak Khan – Founder of a revolutionary movement based in the dense forests of Gilan Province , a later, more radical offshoot.
  • Mirza Malkom Khan – A prominent intellectual and reformer, whose ideas influenced the revolution’s early stages.
  • Khetcho – Another Armenian revolutionary leader, highlighting cross-ethnic cooperation.
  • Yeprem Khan – An Armenian Iranian revolutionary leader, who, ironically, wounded Sattar Khan while disarming revolutionaries in Tehran as commander of Tehran’s police force during the interim constitutionalist government. A tragic turn of events.
  • Arshak Gafavian – Yet another Armenian revolutionary leader, part of the diverse fighting force.
  • Sardar Assad – A powerful Bakhtiari tribal leader whose forces played a crucial role in capturing Tehran in 1909.
  • Bibi Khanoom Astarabadi – A satirist, writer, and a pioneer of the Iranian women’s movement, advocating for fundamental social change.
  • Hassan Pirnia – A prominent statesman and historian.
  • Heydar Latifiyan – A lesser-known but active participant.
  • Ahmad Kasravi – A historian and intellectual, who would later write extensively on the revolution.
  • Amanollah Khan Zia’ os-Soltan – An aristocrat and landowner, accused of a bomb attack on Mohammad Ali Shah and subsequently freed by British troops.
  • Mohammad-Taqi Bahar – A renowned poet, scholar, and politician.
  • Sevkaretsi Sako – Another Armenian revolutionary.
  • Hassan Taqizadeh – An influential intellectual and politician, a key figure in the constitutional movement.
  • Mirza Abdul’Rahim Talibov Tabrizi – An intellectual and social reformer, whose writings contributed to the reformist discourse.
  • Abdolhossein Teymourtash – A prominent political figure who would rise to power in the subsequent Pahlavi era .
  • Abdol-Hossein Farman Farma – A powerful Qajar prince and statesman, whose allegiances sometimes shifted.
  • Mohammad Vali Khan Khalatbari Tonekaboni – A pivotal leader of revolutionary forces from the northern provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran .
  • Howard Baskerville – An American teacher who, remarkably, fought alongside the constitutionalists and was killed in action, a testament to international solidarity.
  • Mohammed Mosaddegh – A liberal nationalist who would later become a future prime minister of Iran, a figure whose own struggles echoed those of the constitutional era.
  • Morteza Gholi Khan Hedayat – A constitutionalist statesman.

Monarchists (Anti-Constitutionalists)

Religious leaders

See also