The Transition to the New Order in Indonesia was a tumultuous and consequential period, spanning roughly from the 30 September Movement in 1965 to the First inauguration of Suharto in March 1968. This era marked the dramatic ousting of Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, after his 22-year tenure, and the ascent of Suharto, who would go on to preside over a regime lasting 32 years. It was a period rife with political upheaval, ideological conflict, and profound societal change, fundamentally reshaping the trajectory of the nation.
Transition to the New Order
The period is bookended by two pivotal events: the 30 September Movement on the one hand, and the First inauguration of Suharto on the other. Between these two points, Indonesia navigated the disintegration of Guided Democracy and the establishment of the New Order.
The infographic associated with this period highlights the key players and events. Sukarno, the incumbent president until March 12, 1967, was gradually eclipsed, while Suharto emerged as the dominant figure from March 12, 1967, onwards. Major events include the 30 September Movement, the ensuing Indonesian mass killings, the significant KAMI mass demonstration, the signing of the fateful Supersemar document, Suharto's Acting presidency, and finally, his First inauguration. These events, when viewed chronologically, paint a picture of a nation in flux, grappling with internal power struggles and ideological battles.
Background
President Sukarno, a charismatic nationalist leader, had declared Indonesian independence in 1945 and steered the nascent nation through its early years. Despite his success in unifying a diverse archipelago after a protracted Indonesian National Revolution against the former Dutch colonial government, his administration struggled to establish a robust economic system, leaving many citizens mired in poverty. Sukarno's political philosophy leaned towards socialist policies domestically and a staunchly anti-imperialist stance internationally. His leadership style was undeniably authoritarian, heavily reliant on his personal charisma.
In foreign policy, Sukarno pursued an independent path, cultivating ties with the Eastern Bloc and the People's Republic of China while simultaneously seeking amicable relations with the United States to maximize Indonesia's leverage. He was also instrumental in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, famously hosting the Bandung Conference in 1955. Domestically, Sukarno's political acumen was evident in his delicate balancing act between the country's various political factions, most notably the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
However, by the late 1950s, Indonesia's political landscape grew increasingly volatile, and the economy began a steep decline. By the mid-1960s, the government was perpetually cash-strapped, leading to the abandonment of essential public sector subsidies. Annual inflation soared, estimated to be between 500% and 1,000%, export revenues dwindled, infrastructure decayed, and factories operated at a fraction of their capacity due to a severe lack of investment. Widespread poverty and hunger were the grim realities for much of the population. During this period, Sukarno also led Indonesia in a tense military confrontation with Malaysia, intensifying his revolutionary and anti-Western rhetoric.
Sukarno, often described as the great dhalang ("puppet master" or "puppeteer"), found his authority increasingly dependent on maintaining a precarious balance between the army and the PKI, two forces that were becoming increasingly antagonistic. His anti-imperialist ideology led Indonesia into greater reliance on the Soviet Union and China. By 1965, amidst the heightened tensions of the Cold War, the PKI had managed to infiltrate various levels of the government, gaining significant influence at the army's expense, thereby fostering deep resentment within its ranks. By the end of 1965, the army itself was fractured, with a left-wing faction aligned with the PKI and a right-wing faction that was actively being courted by the United States.
Military Split
The very policies that garnered Sukarno support among certain segments of the population alienated many in the Western world, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. Western investors were increasingly disgruntled by Sukarno's nationalisation of key sectors like mining, agriculture, and energy. In its strategic pursuit of allies against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States fostered connections with various military officers through exchanges and arms deals. This strategy inadvertently deepened a split within the Indonesian military, with the US and its allies backing a right-wing faction against a left-wing faction that had strong ties to the PKI.
When Sukarno rejected food aid from the United States Agency for International Development, a move that exacerbated the existing famine conditions, the right wing of the military adopted a regional command structure. This allowed them to engage in smuggling essential commodities, thereby securing the loyalty of the rural population. In an attempt to counter the growing influence of the right wing, the PKI and its allied left-wing military faction established several mass organizations, including those for peasants.
Indonesia–Malaysia Confrontation
The policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against the newly formed Federation of Malaysia, announced by the Sukarno regime in 1963, further deepened the schism within the military. The left-wing faction and the Communist Party actively participated in guerrilla operations along the Malaysian border, while the right-wing faction remained largely disengaged from the conflict, whether by choice or due to presidential orders.
The Confrontation emboldened Western powers to explore avenues for Sukarno's removal, as he was perceived as a growing threat to regional stability in Southeast Asia, a concern amplified by the domino theory prevalent at the time. The escalating conflict, which by 1965 teetered on the brink of full-scale warfare, fueled widespread discontent with Sukarno's leadership and bolstered the influence of the right-wing generals, whose forces remained strategically positioned near the center of power in Jakarta.
Collapse of Guided Democracy
30 September Movement
On the night of September 30 to October 1, 1965, a seismic event shook Indonesia. Six of the army's most senior generals were abducted and brutally murdered in Jakarta by elements of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, the Presidential Guard. This event, widely characterized as an "attempted coup," decimated the right faction of the top generals, including the influential Chief of Staff of the Army, Ahmad Yani. Minister of Defence, Abdul Haris Nasution, managed to escape the violence. Simultaneously, approximately 2,000 troops from the "coup" factions occupied key positions in Jakarta, including parts of the Presidential Palace, the radio station, and the telecommunications center. Crucially, they did not secure the east side of Merdeka Square, the location of the Kostrad headquarters.
The group, identifying themselves as the "30 September Movement," announced via radio around 7 AM that their objective was to preempt a US Central Intelligence Agency-backed military coup intended to depose Sukarno. They claimed to have apprehended several generals involved in a conspiracy, the "Council of Generals," which allegedly planned a coup for Armed Forces Day (October 5) with CIA support, aiming to establish a military junta. The soldiers also declared the formation of a "Revolutionary Council" composed of prominent military and civilian figures, intended to function as the supreme authority, and declared Sukarno's Dwikora Cabinet "demisioner" (invalid).
According to Lt. Col. Latief, a key conspirator, Major General Suharto, commander of Kostrad (the Army Strategic Reserve Command) and considered a Sukarno loyalist, was deliberately spared. Suharto, along with the surviving General Nasution, countered this narrative, asserting that the G30S was a subversive movement aiming to replace Sukarno's government with a Communist-controlled regime led by the PKI. Upon hearing the radio announcement, Suharto and Nasution moved swiftly to consolidate their forces, securing the allegiance of Jakarta Garrison Commander Maj. Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumah and Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, commander of the army's elite special forces, RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat).
By the evening of October 1, RPKAD soldiers recaptured the RRI and Telecommunications Building without encountering significant resistance, as the rebel soldiers had already retreated to Halim Air Force Base. The following morning, RPKAD forces launched an assault on Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force Base, but were met with fierce resistance from the rebel soldiers, resulting in casualties on both sides. A direct order from President Sukarno eventually led to the surrender of the rebel soldiers by noon, after which Suharto's forces occupied the base. On October 4, the bodies of the murdered generals were discovered at Halim. A large public funeral was held on October 5, Armed Forces Day.
Internal military power-struggle
The assassination of the generals created a power vacuum, which allowed individuals within the Army more willing to confront Sukarno and the PKI to rise to prominence. Following the assassinations, the highest-ranking surviving officer and third in the overall command structure was Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, a figure associated with the right-wing faction. On October 2, Suharto accepted Sukarno's order to assume command of the army, but only under the condition that he be granted full authority to restore order and security. The establishment of Kopkamtib (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) on November 1 formalized this authority, with Suharto appointed as its first commanding general. However, on October 5, Sukarno attempted to assert his authority by appointing Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudro, perceived as a Sukarno loyalist, as the new Chief of Staff of the Army.
The New York Times, citing an unnamed Western diplomatic report, alleged that Pranoto was a former member of the PKI. This alleged communist affiliation, coupled with his timely promotion, fueled the narrative that the PKI and Sukarno had conspired to assassinate the generals to consolidate their power. Despite this, Suharto and his KOSTRAD units were strategically positioned closest to Jakarta. Consequently, Suharto effectively became the field general responsible for addressing the G30S crisis. Later, at the insistence of Gen. Nasution, Pranoto was removed from his post, and Suharto was appointed the new Chief of Staff of the Army on October 14, 1965.
Anti-communist purge
Following the events of September 30, a deliberate military propaganda campaign was launched to convince both domestic and international audiences that the incident was a communist-orchestrated coup, portraying the murders as cowardly atrocities against national heroes. The 30 September Movement was officially branded as Gestapu (an abbreviation for "30 September Movement"). The Army, under Suharto's directives and Nasution's supervision, initiated a campaign of incitement and agitation among the civilian population, targeting communists and Sukarno himself. Despite the PKI's denials of involvement, these efforts proved largely ineffective. The political regime was rapidly destabilized, with the Army emerging as the sole force capable of maintaining order.
During the funeral of Nasution's daughter, Irma, Admiral Eddy Martadinata, Chief of Staff of the Navy, reportedly signaled Muslim leaders to initiate action against communists and their sympathizers. This led to widespread calls for a "Holy War" against the PKI and its affiliated organizations. On October 8, the PKI headquarters was ransacked and set ablaze, with firefighters making no attempt to intervene. Demonstrations escalated, demanding the dissolution of the Communist Party. The residences of prominent party figures, including PKI chairman D. N. Aidit, M. H. Lukman, and Nyoto, were also targeted and destroyed. The army spearheaded a nationwide campaign to eradicate the influence and power of the communist party and its allied leftist organizations from Indonesian society, government, the armed forces, and law enforcement. Leading PKI members were swiftly arrested, and some were summarily executed.
On October 18, a declaration was broadcast over army-controlled radio stations, officially banning the PKI and its affiliated organizations, including its youth and women's wings, peasant associations, intellectual and student groups, and the SOBSI trade union. While initially unclear whether the ban applied only to Jakarta, it soon became a pretext for the Indonesian Army to conduct widespread extrajudicial actions across the country. These actions included mass arrests and summary executions of Sukarno loyalists and suspected leftists associated with the PKI and its allies. Despite Sukarno's attempts to halt the violence, his orders were disregarded. He also refused to assign blame to the PKI for the coup or to ban the party as the Army demanded. Although Suharto and Nasution harbored growing suspicions about Sukarno's potential involvement, they were hesitant to confront him directly due to his enduring popularity.
The anti-communist purge, fueled by deep-seated communal animosities, intensified from late October 1965. The Indonesian Army, in conjunction with civilian allies, particularly Muslim vigilante groups, systematically targeted and killed actual and suspected members and associates of the PKI and its affiliated organizations. The United States government covertly supported these massacres, reportedly providing extensive lists of suspected communists to be targeted. The killings, which began in Jakarta, spread rapidly to Central Java, East Java, and Bali. While the violence encompassed the entire archipelago, the most severe atrocities occurred in the provinces of Central Java, East Java, Bali, and North Sumatra—regions with strong PKI support. The massacres reached their zenith in the latter part of 1965, gradually subsiding in the early months of 1966. Estimates of the death toll vary widely, ranging from over 100,000 to three million, though most scholars converge on a figure of approximately 500,000. Countless others were imprisoned, with some remaining incarcerated for years as suspects; it is estimated that as many as 1.5 million individuals were imprisoned at various times. This brutal purge effectively dismantled one of Sukarno's key pillars of support, the PKI, by the combined forces of the armed forces and political Islam, with support from elements in Bali who viewed the PKI as a threat to their traditional way of life.
Demonstrations
In October 1965, student groups in Jakarta formed KAMI (Indonesian Students Action Front), demanding the immediate banning of the PKI. This movement quickly gained momentum, inspiring similar organizations composed of high school students, workers, artists, and laborers. Their grievances extended beyond political demands to include rising prices and government inefficiency. Demonstrations were also directed against Subandrio, the foreign minister, head of the intelligence agency BPI, and a key figure in Sukarno's government.
On January 10, 1966, KAMI and other demonstrator groups converged in front of the Provisional legislature, articulating the "Three Demands of the People" (Tritura): the dissolution of the PKI, the expulsion of PKI-aligned elements from the cabinet, and measures to lower prices and improve economic conditions.
In February 1966, amidst escalating anti-communist sentiment, Sukarno attempted to appease Suharto by promoting him. On February 21, he sought to reassert his authority by announcing a new cabinet, the Revised Dwikora Cabinet. This cabinet included AVM Omar Dani, the former Air Force chief, who had initially issued a statement supporting the coup on October 1. More controversially, Sukarno dismissed General Nasution as Minister of Defense, replacing him with MG Sarbini, while Suharto retained his position as Chief of Staff of the Army and became a cabinet member. This new cabinet was swiftly dubbed the "Gestapu cabinet," referencing the acronym used by the military for the 30 September Movement.
Two days after the new cabinet's announcement, a large crowd attempted to storm the presidential palace. The following day, during the cabinet's inauguration, soldiers from the presidential guard opened fire on the crowd, killing student protester Arif Rachman Hakim. Hakim’s death transformed him into a martyr, and he was accorded a hero's funeral the next day.
On March 8, 1966, students occupied the foreign ministry building for five hours, defacing its walls with slogans accusing Subandrio of complicity in the generals' murders and depicting him as a dog or hanging from gallows, a jab at his perceived alignment with communist China.
Sukarno then proposed a three-day series of meetings aimed at restoring his authority. The first, on March 10, brought together political party leaders, who ultimately signed a declaration cautioning against student demonstrations undermining presidential authority. The second stage, a cabinet meeting scheduled for March 11, was disrupted when Sukarno received reports of unidentified troops surrounding the palace. He hastily departed for Bogor, where, later that night, he signed the Supersemar document, transferring the responsibility for restoring order to Major General Suharto. Suharto acted decisively. On March 12, he ordered a nationwide ban on the PKI and its associated organizations, along with all party activities. The same day, a conspicuous "show of force" by the Army in Jakarta's streets was met with cheers from onlookers. On March 18, Subandrio and 14 other ministers, including the third deputy prime minister Chairul Saleh, were arrested and subsequently placed in "protective custody."
Suharto later acknowledged in his autobiography that he maintained regular contact with student protesters throughout this period and that Sukarno frequently implored him to quell the demonstrations.
Political manoeuvring
On March 27, a new cabinet lineup, negotiated between Suharto and Sukarno, was announced. The Second Revised Dwikora Cabinet featured Suharto himself as interim deputy prime minister for defense and security, concurrently serving as Minister of Defense and Commander of the Armed Forces, with the mandate to prevent the resurgence of communism. The Sultan of Yogyakarta, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, was appointed deputy prime minister for economic, financial, and development affairs, tasked with addressing the nation's economic crises. Adam Malik assumed the role of deputy prime minister for social and political affairs, responsible for managing foreign policy.
In a speech delivered on April 24, 1966, to members of the Indonesian National Party, Suharto outlined "three deviations" that the nation's youth, in collaboration with the Armed Forces, needed to rectify. These deviations were: the extreme-left radicalism of the PKI and its promotion of class struggle; political opportunism driven by personal gain, allegedly orchestrated by the Indonesian Central Intelligence Board (BPI) under Sukarno ally Subandrio; and economic adventurism leading to deliberate chaos.
The new cabinet, acting contrary to Sukarno's wishes, initiated measures to end the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation and began to distance Indonesia from China, a response to China's support for the communists and its role in the confrontation.
Meanwhile, Suharto and his allies continued their systematic purge of Sukarno loyalists from state institutions. The Tjakrabirawa Regiment was disbanded and replaced by an Army military police regiment. Following further student demonstrations on May 2, the leadership of the Mutual Cooperation People's Representative Council (DPR-GR), headed by Speaker I Gusti Gde Subamia, was replaced. Sukarnoist and pro-communist members were stripped of their parliamentary titles from both the DPR-GR and the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS), the nation's supreme legislative body, and were expelled. Pro-Suharto MPs were appointed to both bodies, with Wiluyo Puspoyudo assuming the role of ad-interim speaker of the MPRS.
A session of the MPRS, initially scheduled for May 12, commenced on June 20 and concluded on July 5. One of its primary actions was the ratification of the Supersemar, making its revocation virtually impossible. The MPRS also ratified the ban on the PKI and the teaching of Marxist ideology. It instructed Suharto to form a new cabinet, demanded that Sukarno provide an account of the nation's economic and political situation, and stripped him of his title of "president for life." Furthermore, a decree was passed stipulating that if the president became incapacitated, the holder of the Supersemar would assume the presidency. Suharto deliberately avoided seeking Sukarno's outright removal at this MPRS session due to the lingering support for the president within certain segments of the armed forces, particularly the Marines, the navy, and some regional army divisions.
The new cabinet, announced by Sukarno on June 20, was the Ampera Cabinet. It was led by a five-person presidium headed by Suharto, who also served as de facto prime minister. Malik and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX were appointed as deputies. Suharto concurrently held the positions of minister of defense and chief of the Army.
On August 11, a peace treaty was signed, formally ending the Konfrontasi, despite Sukarno's objections. Indonesia announced its intention to rejoin the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. Political prisoners were released, and compensation was paid to the British and American governments for damages sustained by their diplomatic buildings during the Sukarno era's demonstrations.
In his annual independence day speech on August 17, Sukarno asserted that Indonesia would not recognize Malaysia nor rejoin the UN, and crucially, stated that he had not transferred power to Suharto. This declaration provoked an indignant response in the form of renewed demonstrations. Indonesia did indeed rejoin the UN in September, participating in the General Assembly on September 28. Concurrently, criticism leveled by demonstrators against Sukarno became increasingly strident and personal, with calls for him to be put on trial before the Special Military Court (Mahmilub).
On June 22, 1966, Sukarno delivered a speech known as Nawaksara (Nine Points) before the MPRS, offering an account of his appointment as president for life, his proposed work plan, and the practical application of the Constitution. The G30S was conspicuously absent from his address. The MPRS rejected the Nawaksara speech and demanded a further explanation from Sukarno regarding the G30S. On January 10, 1967, Sukarno submitted a letter to the MPRS, enclosing an addendum to the Nawaksara (Pelengkap Nawaksara), which presented his version of events surrounding the 30 September Movement. In this document, he claimed the kidnappings and murders of the generals came as a "complete surprise" and asserted that he alone was not responsible for the nation's moral and economic woes. He also alluded to the role of the PKI and the alleged involvement of "neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist" forces in the G30S crisis. These statements further incited demonstrators, who called for Sukarno's execution.
The MPRS leadership convened on January 21 and concluded that Sukarno had failed to uphold his constitutional duties. In a resolution passed on February 9, the DPR-GR rejected the Nawaksara and requested the MPRS to convene a special session.
On March 12, 1967, the special session commenced. Following intense debates, it was agreed to strip Sukarno of his presidential powers. On March 12, Suharto was appointed acting president. Sukarno subsequently went into de facto house arrest in Bogor. A year later, on March 27, 1968, another MPRS session formally appointed Suharto as the second president of Indonesia.
General Nasution was reportedly attempting to consolidate his own power base, securing an appointment to the Supreme Operations Command on December 16, 1965, thereby gaining control over the traditionally civilian-led aspects of military hierarchy. Reports at the time suggested Nasution favored the formation of a military junta to replace Sukarno.
Consequences
Anti-Chinese laws
While historical animosity between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese Indonesians predated the New Order, the regime implemented anti-Chinese legislation in the aftermath of suppressing the communists. Stereotypes portraying the Chinese as disproportionately wealthy and avaricious were prevalent, not only in Indonesia but also in Malaysia. The anti-communist hysteria amplified these sentiments, associating ethnic Chinese Indonesians with the People's Republic of China and casting them as a potential communist fifth column.
Indonesia severed its previously friendly diplomatic ties with mainland China, and the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta was targeted and burned by a mob. New legislation imposed restrictions, including the prohibition of Chinese-language signs on shops and buildings, the closure of Chinese language schools, and requirements for adopting "Indonesian"-sounding names. Limits were also placed on the construction of Buddhist temples.
New political system
The dissolution and banning of the Communist Party (and its associated organizations) eliminated one of Indonesia's largest political parties, which had been a significant force within the Comintern with an estimated three million members. Coupled with Suharto's subsequent efforts to consolidate power by purging Sukarno loyalists from parliament, the civilian government in Indonesia was effectively dismantled in the wake of the coup countermeasures.
A persistent hallmark of the 31-year New Order regime was its strident anti-communism. The new political order that emerged from the upheavals of the 1960s was fundamentally committed to maintaining political stability, fostering economic development, and restricting mass participation in the political process. The military was granted a significant role in governance, political and social organizations were bureaucratized and corporatized, and a system of selective, yet effective and often brutal, repression was employed against regime opponents.
A portion of parliamentary seats was reserved for the military under the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine, which empowered the military to assume administrative roles at all governmental levels. Political parties not outright banned were consolidated into a single entity, the Party of the Functional Groups (Indonesian: Partai Golongan Karya), commonly known as Golkar. While Suharto permitted the formation of two non-Golkar parties, they were deliberately kept subordinate throughout his rule.
Rise of Islamism
The marginalization of two secularist parties, the Nationalists and the Communists, had a significant consequence: it created greater space for the development of Islamism within Indonesia. This included a diverse spectrum of Islamic practice, encompassing liberal, conservative, and extremist groups.
Improved ties with the West
The change in leadership ushered in a policy shift that allowed USAID and other relief organizations to operate within the country. Suharto embarked on economic liberalization by divesting state-owned enterprises, and Western nations, in particular, were encouraged to invest and assume control of numerous mining and construction interests. This resulted in economic stabilization and alleviated the severe poverty and famine conditions that had arisen from rice supply shortages and Sukarno's refusal of Western aid.
As a consequence of his decisive action against the communists, Suharto came to be viewed as a pro-Western and staunchly anti-Communist leader. This cemented ongoing military and diplomatic relationships between Indonesia and Western powers, leading to substantial arms sales and military training programs from the US, Britain, and Australia.
United States assistance to Suharto
Some scholars contend that the United States played a direct role in facilitating and encouraging the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of suspected communists in Indonesia during the mid-1960s. Bradley Simpson, Director of the Indonesia/East Timor Documentation Project at the National Security Archive, argues that "Washington did everything in its power to encourage and facilitate the army-led massacre of alleged PKI members, and U.S. officials worried only that the killing of the party's unarmed supporters might not go far enough, permitting Sukarno to return to power and frustrate the [Johnson] Administration's emerging plans for a post-Sukarno Indonesia." Simpson posits that the terror in Indonesia was a crucial "building block of the quasi neo-liberal policies the West would attempt to impose on Indonesia in the years to come." Historian John Roosa, referencing documents declassified from the US embassy in Jakarta in 2017, confirms that "the US was part and parcel of the operation, strategising with the Indonesian army and encouraging them to go after the PKI." Geoffrey B. Robinson, a historian at UCLA, asserts that without the backing of the U.S. and other major Western states, the Indonesian Army's campaign of mass killings would not have occurred. Vincent Bevins, in his book The Jakarta Method, writes that "The United States was part and parcel of the operation at every stage, starting well before the killing started, until the last body dropped and the last political prisoner emerged from jail, decades later, tortured, scarred, and bewildered." Ruth J. Blakeley, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield, argues that the Indonesian case exemplifies how the United States prioritized the interests of Western capitalist elites over the human rights of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians by supporting the Indonesian Army in its "extensive campaign of state terrorism."
As early as 1958, the U.S. and its allies provided covert assurances, financial, and military support to anti-communist elements within the Indonesian Army. This support intensified significantly once the mass killing campaigns commenced, demonstrating the Army's "resolve." During the peak of the violence, U.S. embassy official Robert J. Martens supplied the Indonesian Army with lists containing approximately 5,000 names of high-ranking PKI members, which, according to Robinson, "almost certainly aided in the death or detention of many innocent people." He further notes that providing these "kill lists" sent a clear message that the U.S. government supported the army's campaign against the PKI, despite the devastating human cost.