UN Trade And Development

UN Trade and Development, often abbreviated as UNCTAD, functions as a permanent intergovernmental organization within the sprawling architecture of the United Nations Secretariat. Its mandate, a rather ambitious one, is to champion and promote the economic interests of developing countries within the often-unforgiving landscape of world trade.

Initially brought into existence in 1964 by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), it was known for sixty years as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. However, in a move reflective of modern branding sensibilities, it shed its longer moniker and rebranded to its current, more succinct name, UN Trade and Development, on the occasion of its 60th anniversary in 2024. This venerable institution maintains a dual reporting line, accountable to both the General Assembly and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ensuring ample oversight, or perhaps, ample opportunities for bureaucratic entanglement.

Comprising an impressive 195 member states, UNCTAD also extends its collaborative reach to numerous non-governmental organizations across the globe. Its permanent secretariat, the operational heart of the organization, is strategically located at the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) in Geneva, Switzerland, specifically within the historic Palais des Nations.

The overarching objective guiding UNCTAD's endeavors is the meticulous formulation of policies encompassing every conceivable facet of development. This includes the predictable pillars of trade, aid, and transport, but also delves into the more intricate domains of finance and technology. Its very genesis was a direct response to a palpable unease among developing countries. These nations felt, with considerable justification, that the existing pantheon of international economic institutions – entities such as the venerable General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which has since been superseded by the formidable World Trade Organization, alongside the powerful International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ubiquitous World Bank – were simply not adequately structured or sufficiently attuned to address their unique and often systemic challenges. UNCTAD was thus conceived as a dedicated sanctuary, a forum where developing nations could collectively articulate, dissect, and confront the myriad problems impeding their journey towards sustainable economic development. One might consider it a diplomatic pressure valve, or perhaps, a long-overdue attempt to rebalance the scales.

Among its more tangible and enduring accomplishments, UNCTAD can proudly lay claim to the conceptualization and subsequent implementation of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). This innovative mechanism was designed to specifically foster the export of manufactured goods originating from developing countries, offering them a somewhat fairer shot in markets traditionally dominated by established industrial powers. Throughout the tumultuous decades of the 1970s and 1980s, UNCTAD became inextricably linked with the ambitious, if ultimately elusive, vision of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). This was a comprehensive suite of proposals, born from a profound desire to systematically dismantle the economic dependency and stark economic inequality that characterized the relationship between the global North and South. A noble ambition, certainly, but one that perhaps underestimated the inertia of entrenched power structures.

UNCTAD conferences, the grand quadrennial gatherings, ordinarily take place every four years, serving as pivotal moments for policy recalibration and strategic direction. The inaugural conference was held in Geneva in 1964, setting the stage for future dialogues. Since then, fifteen subsequent meetings have unfolded across the globe, with the most recent, the fifteenth session, having been hosted virtually in Bridgetown, Barbados, from 3–8 October 2021, a testament to the unforeseen challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The organization operates with a staff of approximately 400 individuals and manages a biannual budget (as per 2010–2011 figures) comprising US $138 million in core expenditures and an additional US$ 72 million in extra-budgetary funds dedicated to technical assistance. UNCTAD is also a contributing member of the United Nations Sustainable Development Group, a consortium of UN entities collectively striving to advance sustainable socioeconomic development worldwide. [5]

Membership

UNCTAD’s membership roster is, predictably, extensive, encompassing 195 states. [6] This impressive list includes virtually all member states of the United Nations, augmented by the unique inclusion of UN Observer states such as the Holy See and Palestine. One might imagine the logistical complexities of coordinating such a diverse array of national interests, each convinced of its own unique exceptionalism. For the sake of organizational tidiness – a concept much revered in such institutions – these members are neatly compartmentalized into four primary categories, a system derived from the broader framework of United Nations Regional Groups. [6] Though, as with any rigid classification, there are always a few outliers; in this case, seven members, including Armenia, Kiribati, Nauru, South Sudan, Tajikistan, and Tuvalu, find themselves, perhaps comfortably, unassigned.

List A, a particularly populous group, predominantly gathers nations from the UN's African Group and the sprawling Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Island Developing States. List B, by contrast, is a more exclusive club, primarily comprising countries from the Western European and Others Group, often the ones with the most entrenched economic advantages. List C provides a home for the vibrant nations of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC), while List D rounds out the geographical spread with countries from the Eastern European Group.

These lists, it turns out, aren't merely for aesthetic appeal. They were originally codified in the 19th General Assembly resolution 1995 [7], a bureaucratic pronouncement designed to ensure a semblance of geographical balance in the representation on the crucial Trade and Development Board and various other UNCTAD structures. Because, of course, nothing says 'fair representation' like a meticulously maintained spreadsheet of nations. Curiously, this categorisation scheme bears a striking resemblance to those employed by UNIDO, another UN specialized agency, suggesting a shared blueprint for managing unwieldy global participation.

The complete roll call, for those who appreciate the sheer scale of such endeavors, is as follows:

List A (98 members): Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

List B (32 members): Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

List C (33 members): Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

List D (25 members): Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

Not assigned countries (7 members): Armenia, Kiribati, Nauru, Palestine, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Tuvalu.

It’s worth noting that some sovereign entities, such as the Cook Islands, Niue, and various states with limited recognition, do not participate in UNCTAD’s proceedings. One might wonder if their absence is a quiet protest or simply a pragmatic decision to avoid the perennial diplomatic ballet.

Meetings

The actual operational rhythm of UNCTAD's inter-governmental work unfolds across a meticulously structured hierarchy of meetings, five distinct levels, each designed to ensure that no stone of policy or program goes unexamined – or, more accurately, that every stone is discussed, debated, and occasionally, nudged an inch.

At the apex of this structure sits The UNCTAD Conference, the grand quadrennial gathering, a diplomatic spectacle that convenes every four years. It's here that the major policy pronouncements are ideally forged, and global economic directives are, in theory, recalibrated. The history of these conferences is a geographical tour of the developing world, punctuated by the occasional return to the more familiar diplomatic hubs:

Nr.	City	Country	Dates
XV	Bridgetown	Barbados	3–8 October 2021 [8] [9]
XIV	Nairobi	Kenya	17–22 July 2016 [10]
XIII	Doha	Qatar	21–26 April 2012 [11]
XII	Accra	Ghana	21–25 April 2008 [12]
XI	São Paulo	Brazil	13–18 June 2004 [13]
X	Bangkok	Thailand	12–19 February 2000 [14]
IX	Midrand	South Africa	27 April – 11 May 1996
VIII	Cartagena	Colombia	8–25 February 1992
VII	Geneva	Switzerland	8 Jul – 3 Aug 1987
VI	Belgrade	Yugoslavia	6–30 Jun 1983
V	Manila	Philippines	7 May – 3 Jun 1979
IV	Nairobi	Kenya	5–31 May 1976
III	Santiago	Chile	13 Apr – 21 May 1972
II	New Delhi	India	31 Jan – 29 Mar 1968
I	Geneva	Switzerland	23 Mar – 16 Jun 1964

Beneath the grand conference, the day-to-day, or rather, year-to-year, operations are overseen by The UNCTAD Trade and Development Board. This body acts as the crucial managerial link, steering the organization's work through the lengthy intervals between the major conferences. It convenes with a greater frequency, typically up to three times annually, to keep the ship, however slowly, on course.

Further down, providing more granular focus, are the Four UNCTAD Commissions and one Working Party. These specialized groups meet even more frequently than the Board, delving into the minutiae of policy formulation, program implementation, and, of course, the perennial budgetary issues that plague any large organization. Their existence ensures that the broader directives from the Conference and Board are translated into actionable, if sometimes painstakingly slow, initiatives.

Finally, at the foundational level, are the Expert Meetings. These are the intellectual engines, where the various commissions gather specialists to deliberate on selected topics. Their purpose is to furnish substantive and expert input, ostensibly providing the Commissions with the necessary data and perspectives for their policy discussions. One can only hope their expertise isn't lost in the subsequent layers of bureaucratic interpretation.

The most recent quadrennial gathering, the 15th session, provided a stark reminder of humanity's rather persistent challenges. Originally slated for an in-person event, it ultimately transpired virtually in Bridgetown, Barbados, from 25 to 30 April 2021 [15], a testament to the enduring impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. One might argue that the virtual format merely streamlined the inevitable delays.

Geneva, 1964

The inaugural UNCTAD Conference, held in the rather predictable diplomatic hub of Geneva in 1964, wasn't born out of spontaneous generosity. It was a direct, almost unavoidable, consequence of the mounting apprehension among developing countries – often referred to then, and sometimes still, as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Their position in the labyrinthine corridors of world trade was not merely stagnant; it was, with alarming consistency, deteriorating. This collective anxiety reached a critical mass, prompting the United Nations General Assembly to reluctantly approve what was initially conceived as a singular, 'one-off' conference to address these grievances. A temporary bandage for a systemic wound, one might cynically observe.

Yet, these initial discussions, despite their tentative beginnings, proved remarkably fertile. They laid the groundwork for the establishment of novel facilities within the International Monetary Fund (IMF), designed to offer crucial financial lifelines to nations grappling with unpredictable shortfalls in their commodity earnings. More significantly, they were the birthplace of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a scheme that, for the first time, genuinely sought to enhance access for manufactured imports from the global South into the more affluent markets of the North. A small step, perhaps, but one that acknowledged a fundamental imbalance.

The LDCs, exhibiting a surprising degree of cohesion and resolve, capitalized on this momentum. They successfully argued that their plight warranted more than a fleeting discussion. Their proposal to transform the conference and its nascent secretariat into a permanent, enduring organ of the UN, complete with regular quadrennial meetings, was ultimately accepted. Thus, UNCTAD, from its very inception, carved out its own niche within the sprawling UN bureaucracy. It was at this seminal Geneva gathering that Raúl Prebisch stepped into the spotlight. A highly influential Argentinian economist, renowned for his work with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Prebisch, with his keen insights into dependency theory, was appointed as the organization's very first secretary-general [17]. His appointment signaled UNCTAD's commitment to challenging conventional economic wisdom and advocating for structural changes, rather than merely superficial adjustments. It was a statement, however politely delivered, that the old ways were no longer sufficient [16].

New Delhi, 1968

Four years after its inception, the UNCTAD caravan rolled into New Delhi for its second major conference, convening through February and March of 1968. This particular assembly served as a critical platform, allowing the disparate voices of developing countries to coalesce and forge a consensus on the foundational tenets of their collective development policies. It was, in essence, a moment for them to articulate a unified vision, a rare feat in the often fragmented world of international relations. The conference was heralded as an opportune moment for various nascent schemes, particularly those discussed in Geneva, to transition from abstract proposals to concrete, approved initiatives.

Indeed, the New Delhi gathering provided a significant, if somewhat temporary, jolt to the international community, particularly in its efforts to sway the economically dominant nations of the North. The aim was to compel them to honor the resolutions painstakingly crafted at UNCTAD I, especially regarding the full implementation of the Generalized System of Preferences. Progress, as is often the case, was incremental. A notable, albeit largely symbolic, achievement was the elevation of the target for both private and official financial flows directed towards Least Developed Countries (LDCs). This ambitious new benchmark was set at a full 1% of the North's aggregate Gross National Product. A grand gesture, certainly, but one that, with the benefit of hindsight, proved to be more aspirational than actual. The developed countries, with their characteristic blend of diplomatic rhetoric and economic inertia, conspicuously failed to meet this target by any specified deadline. This perennial shortfall, a testament to the gap between promise and delivery, would, predictably, morph into a recurring, often acrimonious, point of contention and debate at virtually every subsequent UNCTAD conference.

Beyond the broader policy aspirations, the New Delhi conference also yielded a more specific, tangible outcome: the genesis of the International Sugar Agreement. This accord was designed with the rather optimistic goal of introducing a modicum of stability into the notoriously volatile world of sugar prices. A noble endeavor, given the profound impact of commodity price fluctuations on the economies of many developing countries, though one might question the long-term efficacy of any agreement attempting to tame the inherent unpredictability of global markets [16] [18].

Santiago, 1972

By April 1972, the UNCTAD spotlight shifted to Santiago, Chile, marking the third such occasion where the collective voice of developing countries directly, and perhaps with increasing exasperation, confronted the wealthier nations. The central tenet of their argument remained unwavering: the imperative to wield existing trade and aid mechanisms with greater efficacy, not as acts of charity, but as tools for genuinely elevating living standards across the developing world. One might observe that this plea, though perfectly rational, has a rather persistent echo across the decades.

The discussions at Santiago honed in on the intricate and often opaque workings of the international monetary system. A particularly salient proposal from the global South advocated for a more equitable distribution of new Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), suggesting that a larger proportion should be specifically allocated to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as a direct form of aid. This concept, somewhat optimistically dubbed the 'link,' aimed to inject much-needed liquidity and developmental support into struggling economies. It was, in essence, an attempt to leverage the very architecture of global finance for developmental objectives, rather than merely for the convenience of the already rich.

However, the path to solidarity is rarely smooth, and Santiago witnessed significant internal friction within the nascent Group of 77 (G77). Despite the customary pre-conference meetings, designed to forge a common front, deep disagreements bubbled to the surface. The 'link' proposal itself became a point of contention, with some factions within the G77 pushing for truly fundamental, structural changes – such as a radical alteration of voting allocations within the International Monetary Fund to favor the South. Others, notably many of the Latin American countries, advocated for a more cautious, milder approach to reform, perhaps wary of upsetting the delicate global balance of power. This internal discord, a predictable outcome when diverse interests are forced into a single bloc, predictably undermined the group's collective negotiating power. The outcome was a carefully worded, ultimately non-committal, motion. It recommended that the IMF merely 'examine' the proposed 'link' and that 'further research' be conducted into general reforms. Such language, as any seasoned diplomat knows, is the polite way of saying 'let's table this indefinitely.' No firm commitments were extracted, no decisive action mandated, and the motion, a testament to the power of diluted ambition, was duly passed by the conference [16] [19].

Nairobi, 1976, and Manila, 1979

The fourth iteration of UNCTAD, convening in Nairobi in May 1976, managed to distinguish itself by achieving a 'relative success' – a phrase that, in diplomatic circles, often means 'we didn't completely fail.' According to an insightful Overseas Development Institute briefing paper from April 1979, a significant factor contributing to this modest triumph was the seismic shock of the 1973 Oil Crisis. This global upheaval, by demonstrating the leverage held by commodity producers, inadvertently spurred other Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to recognize and pursue similar gains through their own primary exports. Suddenly, the notion of collective bargaining for raw materials seemed less like a pipe dream and more like a pragmatic necessity.

The crowning achievement of UNCTAD IV was the formal adoption of the Integrated Programme for Commodities. This ambitious framework wasn't merely about preventing wild price swings; it aspired to a more profound transformation. Its objectives extended far beyond simple stabilization, encompassing the pursuit of "Just and remunerative pricing, taking into account world inflation" – a concept that, even then, sounded refreshingly equitable. Furthermore, the program aimed to foster the expansion of processing capabilities, distribution networks, and the control of technology within LDCs, thereby empowering them to extract greater value from their own resources. An improved, more equitable, access to global markets was also a central pillar, an eternal quest for those on the periphery of the global economy [20] [21].

Three years later, the UNCTAD assembly descended upon Manila in 1979 for its fifth session, still very much operating in the shadow, or perhaps the hopeful glow, of the Nairobi Conference's relative achievements. This gathering cast its net wide, grappling with a daunting array of interconnected challenges. High on the agenda were the ever-present specters of protectionism, particularly as it impacted developing countries, and the undeniable, yet often resisted, need for fundamental structural changes within the global economic order. Discussions predictably revolved around trade in commodities and manufactured goods, the perennial debates surrounding development aid, and the seemingly intractable problem of international monetary reform. Emerging technologies, the complex logistics of shipping, and the elusive goal of enhanced economic co-operation among developing countries themselves also commanded significant attention. Another Overseas Development Institute briefing paper from 1979 thoughtfully dissected these proceedings, specifically highlighting the evolving and increasingly assertive role of the Group of 77 as a collective force within the broader international community. One might say they were learning to flex their muscles, albeit in a world still largely controlled by others [20].

Belgrade, 1983

By the time the sixth UN Conference on Trade and Development convened in Belgrade from 6 to 30 June 1983, a certain weariness had begun to settle over the proceedings. This gathering unfolded against a rather bleak backdrop: the persistent, indeed, seemingly intractable, failure of previous UNCTADs to meaningfully bridge the chasm of disagreements between the developed and developing countries. It was, by then, a well-established pattern of high hopes meeting harsh realities. Adding to this pervasive sense of stagnation was the grim reality of a global economy mired in its most severe recession since the devastating downturns of the early 1930s. One might surmise that the mood was less 'optimistic dialogue' and more 'desperate plea.'

In this somber atmosphere, the agenda was dominated by issues of immediate and pressing concern. The intertwined challenges of international finance and structural adjustment – often euphemisms for austerity measures imposed on struggling nations – took center stage. The perennial quest for commodity price stabilization, a recurring theme since the very first conference, resurfaced with renewed urgency, as did the broader discussions on the future and fairness of global trade. The conference, therefore, was less about groundbreaking new initiatives and more about desperately trying to weather an economic storm that threatened to undo what little progress had been achieved. It was a stark reminder that even the most well-intentioned international bodies are ultimately constrained by the prevailing economic winds [16].

Bridgetown, 2021

Fast forward several decades, past numerous conferences and countless reports, to the fifteenth session of UNCTAD. This particular gathering was a victim of global circumstance, originally slated for 2020 but inevitably postponed until 2021, thanks to the rather inconvenient global interruption known as COVID-19. The pandemic, it seemed, cared little for diplomatic schedules.

When it finally did convene, albeit largely virtually, in Bridgetown, Barbados, it marked a quiet but significant milestone: it was the very first time this quadrennial conference had been hosted by a Small Island Developing State (SIDS). A symbolic gesture, perhaps, acknowledging the unique vulnerabilities and urgent developmental needs of these often-overlooked nations, which find themselves on the front lines of climate change and economic precarity. One hopes the symbolism translated into tangible action, though experience suggests such transformations are often slower than the rising tide.

Achievements

Among the rather lengthy catalogue of intentions and aspirations, UNCTAD can indeed point to a few concrete achievements, though they often feel like small victories in an endless war. One of its earliest, and arguably most impactful, accomplishments was the meticulous formulation and subsequent implementation of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). This wasn't merely a polite suggestion; it was a structured mechanism designed to offer meaningful special tariff concessions, specifically aimed at boosting the exports of manufactured goods originating from developing countries.

The underlying argument for GSP was simple, yet profoundly challenging to get the entrenched powers to accept: that developing countries needed a leg up, a preferential treatment, to compete in global markets rigged against them. Surprisingly, or perhaps predictably after much diplomatic arm-twisting, the developed countries eventually conceded. They formalized the GSP scheme, a framework under which manufactured exports, and even certain agricultural goods, from developing countries could enter their markets either entirely duty-free or at significantly reduced tariff rates. The genius, if one can call it that, lay in the inherent competitive advantage this created: while similar items imported from other developed nations would still be subject to the standard, often higher, rates of duties, those from the developing world would effectively receive a preferential entry. It was an attempt, however imperfect, to level a playing field that had been decidedly tilted for centuries. A pragmatic solution, one might say, to a problem that should never have existed in the first place.

Reports

Beyond the conferences and the policy debates, UNCTAD consistently generates a substantial volume of analytical work, meticulously documented in a series of topical reports. These publications serve as the organization's intellectual output, offering data, analysis, and policy recommendations, often with a focus on the precise challenges faced by developing countries. One might even say they are the institutional memory, albeit one often ignored by those who could benefit most.

Among the more prominent of these regular publications are:

The Trade and Development Report [22]: A flagship publication, this report offers an overarching analysis of global economic trends, trade patterns, and their implications for development, providing a critical counter-narrative to more mainstream economic assessments.
The Trade and Environment Review [23]: This publication delves into the complex, often fraught, intersection of international trade policies and environmental sustainability, exploring how trade can either contribute to or detract from ecological goals.
The World Investment Report [24]: An authoritative annual review of global foreign direct investment (FDI) trends, policies, and their impact on development, often highlighting the uneven distribution of capital across the globe.
The Economic Development in Africa Report [25]: A dedicated analysis focusing specifically on the unique economic challenges and opportunities confronting the African continent, often providing granular insights into regional dynamics.
The Least Developed Countries Report [26]: This report provides an in-depth, often sobering, assessment of the structural impediments and progress (or lack thereof) in the world's most vulnerable economies, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
UNCTAD Statistics [27]: A comprehensive compilation of data related to international trade, investment, and development, providing the raw material for countless analyses and policy debates.
Digital Economy Report [28]: Formerly known as the Information Economy Report, this publication tracks the evolving landscape of the global digital economy, examining its impact on developing countries, particularly concerning issues of inclusion, access, and governance.
The Review of Maritime Transport [29]: An annual publication that offers an exhaustive overview of seaborne trade, port development, and the myriad issues affecting global shipping, a critical artery for international commerce.
The International Accounting and Reporting Issues Annual Review [30]: This review focuses on the often-overlooked but crucial aspects of corporate transparency, accounting standards, and reporting practices, particularly their role in fostering sustainable development and combating illicit financial flows.
The Technology and Innovation Report [31]: This report explores the dynamic interplay between technological advancements, innovation ecosystems, and their potential to drive or hinder development in various national contexts.

One could build a rather impressive library with these, though whether they're actually read as much as they are produced is another matter entirely.

Other

Beyond the grand pronouncements and the weighty reports, UNCTAD also engages in more hands-on, practical endeavors through its various technical cooperation programmes [32]. These initiatives are designed to provide tangible support and build capacity within developing countries, aiming to translate high-level policy into practical, on-the-ground improvements. It's the kind of work that actually gets things done, if you can wade through the paperwork.

Notable examples of these programs include:

ASYCUDA: The Automated System for Customs Data is a comprehensive customs management system designed to help countries modernize and streamline their customs procedures, enhancing efficiency and revenue collection. Because even bureaucracy can be improved, apparently.
DMFAS: The Debt Management and Financial Analysis System provides technical assistance and software for managing public debt, a critical tool for nations grappling with complex financial obligations. A rather necessary service, given how easily some countries find themselves in over their heads.
EMPRETEC [33]: This programme focuses on fostering entrepreneurship and promoting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries, equipping individuals with the skills and mindset needed to thrive in competitive markets. A rare instance of encouraging individual agency amidst systemic challenges.
WAIPA: The World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies is a network that facilitates cooperation and information exchange among investment promotion agencies worldwide, aiming to attract and retain foreign direct investment.

Furthermore, UNCTAD doesn't always operate in splendid isolation. It often collaborates on technical cooperation initiatives with the World Trade Organization (WTO) through their joint venture, the International Trade Centre (ITC). The ITC functions as a specialized technical cooperation agency, with a laser focus on the operational and enterprise-oriented dimensions of trade development. It's where the rubber, presumably, meets the road for businesses in developing countries.

In an effort to bring a semblance of order to the chaotic world of corporate finance, UNCTAD also serves as the host for the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) [30]. This group endeavors to harmonize and improve global accounting and reporting standards, a task that, if successful, might just prevent a few financial catastrophes. Or at least make them easier to analyze after the fact.

Partnership initiatives

In a world increasingly interconnected, even a body as ostensibly self-sufficient as UNCTAD finds itself entangled in a web of partnerships. It proudly stands as a founding member of the United Nations Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSE) initiative. This initiative, a rather optimistic attempt to infuse financial markets with a conscience, aims to encourage stock exchanges globally to embrace and promote sustainable development. Because, naturally, the pursuit of profit and planetary well-being are always perfectly aligned.

UNCTAD co-founded this initiative alongside other key players in the sustainable finance ecosystem: the Principles for Responsible Investment, which advocates for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations in investment decisions; the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI), which mobilizes private sector finance for sustainable development; and the venerable UN Global Compact, a framework encouraging businesses worldwide to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies. It’s a collective effort to convince the titans of finance that there’s more to life than quarterly earnings, a message that, one suspects, requires constant reiteration.

List of secretaries-general and officers-in-charge

The leadership of UNCTAD has, over the decades, been entrusted to a succession of individuals tasked with navigating the complex currents of global trade and development. These are the faces that have, for better or worse, steered the organization through its various triumphs and tribulations, often facing a thankless job with an ever-present sense of Sisyphean struggle.

Nr	Secretary-General	Dates in office	Country of origin	Remarks
1	Raúl Prebisch	1963–1969	Argentina	The visionary Argentinian economist who first articulated the challenges of dependency theory for developing countries.
2	Manuel Pérez Guerrero [es]	1969–1974	Venezuela	A Venezuelan diplomat and politician, continuing the early efforts to establish UNCTAD's role in global economic governance.
3	Gamani Corea	1974–1984	Sri Lanka	A distinguished Sri Lankan economist and diplomat, whose tenure spanned a critical decade marked by the push for the New International Economic Order.
4	Alister McIntyre	1985	Grenada	Served as Officer-in-Charge, providing interim leadership during a period of transition.
5	Kenneth K.S. Dadzie	1986–1994	Ghana	A prominent Ghanaian diplomat, his leadership focused on strengthening UNCTAD's advocacy for African development and commodity issues.
6	Carlos Fortin	1994–1995	Chile	Served as Officer-in-Charge, bridging the gap between full Secretaries-General.
7	Rubens Ricupero	1995–2004	Brazil	A Brazilian diplomat and politician, his term saw UNCTAD grapple with the challenges of globalization and trade liberalization.
8	Carlos Fortin	2004–2005	Chile	Again served as Officer-in-Charge, a testament to his consistent presence and institutional knowledge.
9	Supachai Panitchpakdi	1 September 2005 – 30 August 2013	Thailand	A former Director-General of the World Trade Organization, bringing a unique perspective from another key global trade body.
10	Mukhisa Kituyi	1 September 2013 – 15 February 2021	Kenya	A Kenyan politician and former cabinet minister, leading UNCTAD through a period of increasing digital transformation and sustainable development focus.
11	Isabelle Durant	15 February 2021 – 11 June 2021	Belgium	Served as Officer-in-Charge during a particularly turbulent period for global trade and development, impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.
12	Rebeca Grynspan	Since 11 June 2021	Costa Rica	The first woman to hold the position, a former Vice President of Costa Rica, now tasked with leading UNCTAD in its rebranded era.

Each, in their turn, has faced the unenviable task of trying to steer the global economy towards a more equitable path, a journey that often feels like pushing a boulder uphill, only to watch it roll back down. Still, someone has to try, I suppose.