Atheism During The Age Of Enlightenment

Contents

1. Overview
2. Etymology
3. Cultural Impact

Frontispiece to Richard Bentley ’s The Folly of Atheism (Boyle Lectures , 1692)

Atheism , as it is meticulously defined within the hallowed pages of Diderot and d’Alembert ’s monumental Encyclopédie , refers to “the opinion of those who deny the existence of a God in the world. The simple ignorance of God doesn’t constitute atheism. To be charged with the odious title of atheism one must have the notion of God and reject it.” [1] During the vibrant intellectual ferment of the Age of Enlightenment , the open and avowed profession of atheism, while made more conceivable by the burgeoning seeds of religious toleration, was still far from being an encouraged pursuit.

Accusations of atheism were, in fact, quite prevalent. However, a significant number of those who were suspected by their contemporaries of harboring atheistic beliefs were, in reality, not atheists at all. Figures like d’Holbach and Denis Diderot stand out as two of the exceedingly few individuals in Europe during this era who publicly identified as atheists. Thomas Hobbes , for instance, was widely perceived as an atheist due to his distinctly materialist interpretation of scripture. His former friend, Henry Hammond, even went so far as to describe him in a letter as a “Christian Atheist.” [2] Similarly, David Hume faced accusations of atheism stemming from his profound writings on the “natural history of religion.” [3] Pierre Bayle , too, was branded an atheist for his audacious defense of the possibility of an ethical atheist society within his influential Critical Dictionary. And Baruch Spinoza was frequently regarded as an atheist due to his “pantheism ”. It is crucial to note, however, that all three of these thinkers vigorously defended themselves against such calumnies.

Rise of Toleration

The preceding epochs of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation had established Europe as a “persecuting society,” one that exhibited scant tolerance for religious minorities or, indeed, for atheism. [4] Even in France, despite the issuance of the Edict of Nantes in 1598, which was later revoked in 1685, there was a palpable scarcity of support for religious toleration at the dawn of the eighteenth century. [5] The prevailing concern for states revolved around the maintenance of religious uniformity, a stance driven by two primary motivations: firstly, the deeply held conviction that their chosen confession represented the sole path to divine salvation, rendering all other religions heretical; and secondly, the understanding that religious unity was an indispensable prerequisite for enduring social and political stability. [6] The gradual advancement of toleration was, therefore, a complex tapestry woven from pragmatic political considerations and the lofty principles articulated by the Enlightenment philosophes. Religion itself was a central and often contentious topic of discourse throughout much of the eighteenth century, sparking debates in the bustling coffeehouses and learned societies of Enlightenment Europe, and serving as a persistent point of contention among the philosophes themselves. Michael J. Buckley astutely describes the emergence of toleration, and indeed of atheism itself, as a direct consequence of the pervasive religious violence that had characterized the preceding years—the brutal expulsions of the Huguenots from France, the ruthless machinery of the Spanish Inquisition, the widespread witch trials, and the devastating civil wars that ravaged England, Scotland, and the Netherlands. Buckley posits that “religious warfare had irrevocably discredited confessional primacy in the growing secularized sensitivity of much of European culture.” [7] This perspective finds an echo in the works of Ole Peter Brell and Ray Porter. Conversely, Marisa Linton emphasizes that a prevalent notion held that religious diversity would inevitably precipitate unrest and potentially plunge the nation into civil war. [8]

In England, according to Justin Champion, the crucial question was not so much about discerning ultimate religious truth, or even the existence of a god, but rather about comprehending the mechanisms by which the priesthood had accrued the authority to dictate what was accepted as truth. [9] Republican radicals, such as Henry Stubbe , Charles Blount , and John Toland , viewed religion as a socio-cultural construct rather than as a manifestation of transcendent principles. [10] Their primary impetus was a critique of priestly fraud, or “priestcraft.” The latter half of Thomas Hobbes ’ seminal work, Leviathan , offers a potent example of this anticlerical sentiment. Hobbes, much like Toland and other writers of the period who shared similar anticlerical leanings, approached religion through a historical lens. By positing a separation between religious truth and the institution of the church, they inadvertently paved the way for further expressions of religious dissent.

Given that France operated as an absolutist monarchy, where the king’s authority was considered to derive from divine right, it was generally assumed that all French citizens ought to adhere to his religious views. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which had previously granted a measure of toleration to the Huguenot minority in France, occurred in 1685. Marisa Linton argues that while the philosophes certainly contributed to the gradual shift towards religious toleration in France, the proactive engagement of French Huguenots also played a significant role. They began to practice their faith more openly in the more remote regions of the country, and their demonstrated loyalty to the French crown in the lead-up to and during the Seven Years’ War may have assuaged some of the monarch’s suspicions regarding their religious allegiance. [11] By the mid-eighteenth century, Jansenist intellectuals began to actively advocate for religious toleration for Calvinists . [12] Linton contends that these combined factors gradually influenced public opinion in favor of religious toleration. [13] It is important to note that this movement towards toleration was not universally embraced; for instance, Abbé Houtteville vehemently condemned the rise of toleration in France, arguing that it undermined ecclesiastical authority and fostered irreligion. [14] Nevertheless, in 1787, Louis XVI issued an Edict of Toleration, which formally recognized the civil rights of Protestants to marry and own property, although they were still denied the official right to public worship and were barred from holding public office or engaging in teaching. [13] Full religious toleration for Protestants would ultimately not be achieved until the tumultuous period of the French Revolution.

The concept of toleration itself fractured into two distinct ideological factions. The more palatable, or “acceptable face” of toleration, essentially represented the mainstream viewpoint: the freedom to worship according to one’s conscience and the peaceful coexistence of different religious denominations. This perspective found champions in figures like Kant, Locke, Voltaire, and Hume, becoming the public face of the Enlightenment. The Radical Enlightenment, in stark contrast, advocated for a more profound form of toleration, where proponents demanded not merely peaceful coexistence but absolute freedom of thought and expression. This movement was significantly shaped by less widely recognized figures such as d’Holbach, Diderot, Condorcet, and, most crucially, Spinoza, who provided the intellectual and philosophical bedrock for this faction. While reason was the supreme arbiter for the radicals, the more moderate thinkers maintained that reason itself must operate within the established confines of faith and tradition. Together, these two divergent interpretations of Enlightenment thought forged powerfully contrasting notions of what toleration truly entailed. [ citation needed ]

Writers on Toleration

The Dutch Jew Spinoza championed individual liberty in the expression of personal beliefs, while simultaneously advocating for the discouragement of large, organized religious congregations, unless they aligned with a somewhat deistic, idealized vision of a state religion. [15] According to Spinoza’s philosophy, freedom of thought, speech, and expression were the fundamental tenets of toleration—consequently, Spinoza was a staunch opponent of censorship. Jonathan Israel succinctly summarizes Spinoza’s position, arguing that anti-toleration laws were deliberately engineered “for personal advantage but also at great cost to the state and the public,” and that rather than diminishing religious conflict, they served only to exacerbate it. [16] Spinoza’s theoretical framework for toleration was grounded in the concept of freedom to think, rather than an inherent right to worship, and was established upon the principles of philosophy rather than any specific interpretation of religious scripture. [17] As a result, Spinoza’s arguments implicitly extended their embrace to all individuals, including atheists, Catholics, and Jews.

Pierre Bayle emerged as a fervent advocate for tolerance, a stance that ignited a significant quarrel with Louis XIV . [18] He famously defended the very notion of an ethical atheist society within the pages of his seminal dictionary. Martin Fitzpatrick credits Bayle with making a “powerful contribution to the way philosophes would wage war on intolerance and superstition.” [19] Despite his own desire to diminish the intellectual influence of Spinoza, Bayle found himself subjected to similar scrutiny by the Huguenots of the United Provinces, who perceived him as a dangerously radical thinker and a potential atheist. [19]

John Locke proposed a more pragmatic approach to toleration, [20] though his concept was largely confined to certain Christian sects. He vehemently denied atheists the right to toleration, positing that their disbelief in a god, lack of recognizable worship, and absence of concern for salvation rendered them unworthy of such a privilege. Similarly, he withheld toleration from Catholics, viewing papal authority as a potential threat to the state. In essence, Locke advocated for freedom of worship, not an unfettered freedom of thought. [21] The overwhelming majority of eighteenth-century writers, much like Locke himself, demonstrated little inclination to extend religious tolerance to ideas that deviated from the foundational tenets of revealed religion. [22] Most of these intellectuals harbored a strong opposition to Spinoza’s idealized vision of toleration, which they saw as being “chiefly about individual freedom and decidedly not the freedom of large ecclesiastical structures to impose themselves on society.” [23]

Voltaire , in his influential 1763 work, “A Treatise on Toleration,” continued in the intellectual tradition established by John Locke. He argued that the practice of toleration fostered improved communication and healthier relationships between diverse religious confessions within the marketplace. [24] Voltaire also posited that the return of the Huguenots to France would provide a significant boost to the French economy. [25] He was by no means the sole proponent of this economically-minded perspective on religious tolerance.

Opponents of toleration often resorted to conflating the diverse viewpoints of its proponents, lumping them together under the broad and ominous headings of dangerous anti-orthodoxy and atheism, despite the often radically divergent perspectives and confessions represented within this group.

Deism

Deism represents the philosophical conviction in the existence of a deity, grounded in reason rather than divine revelation or established dogma. This perspective gained considerable traction among the philosophes, who adopted deistic attitudes to varying degrees. In this crucial respect, Deism stands in stark contrast to atheism, which fundamentally denies the existence of any deity whatsoever. Voltaire, for instance, was firmly convinced that the existence of God was a demonstrable truth. However, the deity envisioned by deists often bore little resemblance to the God depicted in Christian scripture, a divergence that frequently led to severe criticism from adherents of confessional faiths and could result in accusations of atheism being leveled against deists.

Deists often became vocal advocates for religious toleration, a movement that, by its very nature, would have indirectly supported the open expression of atheism. This was not because they actively endorsed atheism—they did not—but rather because deist philosophers generally espoused the principle of civil freedom of conscience. As Michael J. Buckley aptly observes, “If atheism was unacceptable, superstition and fanaticism were even more so.” [26] While deists were not inherently pro-atheist, their pronounced anticlerical leanings inadvertently contributed to the gradual evolution and acceptance of atheistic thought.

From a historiographical standpoint, a close and often direct link has frequently been drawn between deism and atheism. Buckley, however, critiques Peter Gay’s assertion of such a direct tie, arguing, “the vectors which Gay charts are certainly there, but the distinction may be somewhat too neat, too overdrawn.” [27] Louis Dupré offers a different perspective, describing deism as “the result of a filtering process that had strained off all historical and dogmatic data from Christian theology and retained only that minimum which, by eighteenth-century standards, reason demands.” [28] Atheism, in this context, can be viewed as the same process taken a step further. Buckley attributes the rise of atheism to the progressive subjugation of theology to the dictates of philosophy—as thinkers, including those within the clergy, began to engage with religious arguments on philosophical terms, they inadvertently opened the door to disbelief, thereby making atheism a thinkable proposition. Deism, therefore, can be understood as a complex and perhaps transitional waypoint on the philosophical journey toward atheism: deism represents the rational belief in a deity, and once belief is predicated on reason, it becomes conceivable to subsequently reason one’s way into disbelief.

Freemasonry

Freemasons in continental Europe during the Enlightenment era frequently found themselves targets of accusations of atheism. The Masonic “Constitutions” of 1723, for example, are notably ambiguous on the subject of religion, stipulating that if a Freemason “rightly understands the Art, he will never be a stupid Atheist, nor an irreligious Libertine,” while simultaneously urging him to follow “that religion to which all men agree, leaving their particular opinions to themselves.” [29] Although Masonic literature contained sporadic and vague references to a “Grand Architect of the Universe,” the inherently secretive nature of their practices meant that the precise religious affiliation of each Freemason remained a matter of considerable speculation.

Freemasonry, originating in Britain, gradually disseminated to the Continent, carrying with it Enlightenment ideals concerning natural rights and the rights of the governed. In certain regions, Continental Freemasonry may have drawn inspiration from more radical and subversive English intellectual currents. Margaret C. Jacob meticulously outlines a significant connection between John Toland and Dutch Freemasonry; Jean Rousset de Missy , who established the first Masonic lodge in the Dutch Republic in 1735, was a self-proclaimed pantheist , a term he adopted from Toland. Jacob argues persuasively that “there is a streak of freethinking or deism that turns up at moments in the history of Continental Freemasonry right into, and especially during, the 1790s.” [30] This inherent religious ambiguity within Freemasonry could be interpreted as contributing to the broader “thinkability” of atheism during this period.

Contemporary Perspectives

Spinoza

Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), in his seminal 1670 work, Theologico-Political Treatise , launched a critical examination of Judaism (his religion of origin) and indeed all forms of organized religion. His philosophical orientation is frequently characterized as “pantheism,” a term that was actually coined by John Toland subsequent to Spinoza’s death. However, during the late seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries, Spinoza’s name became inextricably linked with a constellation of heterodox religious beliefs, including atheism, freethinking, materialism, and deism. The question of whether “pantheism” itself constitutes atheism remains a subject of ongoing debate among contemporary scholars. [31]

Pierre Bayle

Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) faced widespread accusations of atheism primarily due to his staunch advocacy for religious toleration, despite professing himself to be a Huguenot . He encountered considerable opposition for his willingness to defend the concept of atheism. In his renowned Dictionnaire historique et critique , Bayle conceded that while atheists were “exceedingly blind and ignorant of the nature of things,” [32] he also asserted that there existed numerous atheists “who are no way distinguished for their vices,” [33] and crucially, that “if atheists exist, who, morally speaking, are well-disposed, it follows that Atheism is not a necessary cause of immorality, but simply an incidental one in regard to those who would have been immoral from disposition or temperament, whether Atheists or not.” [34] In direct response to the mounting criticism, Bayle incorporated a significant essay titled “Clarifications: On Atheists” into the 1702 edition of the Dictionary. In this essay, he reiterated his thesis, arguing that “there have been atheists and Epicureans whose propriety in moral matters has surpassed that of most idolators,” [35] thereby contending that religion is not the sole determinant of morality. He further elaborated that “it is a very likely possibility that some men without religion are more motivated to lead a decent, moral life by their constitution, in conjunction with the love of praise and the fear of disgrace, than are some others by the instincts of conscience.” [36]

David Hume

David Hume (1711–1776) was frequently perceived as an atheist during his lifetime. His inherently skeptical approach to religion, evident in works such as “Of Superstition and Religion,” “Essays Moral and Political,” “On Suicide,” “On the Immortality of the Soul,” and “Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,” coupled with his deathbed conversations with Boswell (which were later published), solidified Hume’s reputation as a practicing atheist. Hume’s alleged atheism was so pronounced that he was even denied a teaching position at the University of Edinburgh in the 1740s. [37]

Diderot

Denis Diderot (1713–1784) was a central figure and esteemed guest at d’Holbach’s influential salon, and served as the principal editor of the monumental Encyclopédie . Although Diderot explored the concept of atheism extensively in his writings, he adopted a less polemical approach compared to d’Holbach or Naigeon . Rather than publishing his atheistic works openly, he tended to circulate them discreetly among his close circle of friends or entrust them to Naigeon for posthumous publication. [38] Diderot espoused a thoroughly materialist worldview. He grappled with the profound question of how the cosmos could have originated without a divine creator and theorized extensively about the potential for life to emerge from inorganic matter. According to Dupré, Diderot ultimately concluded that if one is willing to abandon “the unproved principle that the cosmos must have a beginning,” [39] then the perceived necessity of establishing an “efficient cause” for creation ceases to be a problem. Diderot posited that the genesis of life might be understood as a process of natural, internal evolution inherent within matter itself.

D’Holbach

• See also: D’Holbach’s Coterie

Baron d’Holbach (1723–1789) was the pivotal figure of the ‘coterie holbachique ’ [40] and the distinguished host of the salon held in his Parisian residence. This salon has been interpreted by many scholars as a clandestine meeting place for Parisian atheists, a notion largely stemming from an anecdote where d’Holbach recounted to David Hume, who claimed not to believe in anything, that out of the eighteen guests present at his salon, fifteen were avowed atheists, and the remaining three were still undecided. However, there exists some degree of scholarly doubt regarding the precise accuracy of this statement. [41] Regardless, d’Holbach himself was an avowed atheist. The salon served as a vibrant hub for extensive discussions concerning atheism, and it appears that the atheistic and theistic guests frequently engaged in good-natured debates, passionately advocating for their respective philosophical positions. [42] Despite claims that the salon was a veritable hotbed of atheism, historical records suggest that only three convinced atheists regularly attended: D’Holbach himself, Denis Diderot, and Jacques-André Naigeon .

D’Holbach’s published works frequently incorporated atheistic themes. Alan Charles Kors specifically highlights three of his works – Système de la nature , Le Bon-sens, and La Morale universelle – as being particularly dedicated to advancing the cause of atheism. Kors summarizes some of the fundamental tenets presented in these three texts as the assertion that rigorous materialism offers the only coherent philosophical viewpoint, and that “the only humane and beneficial morality was one deduced from the imperatives for the happiness and survival of mankind.” [43] What set d’Holbach apart, as Kors observes, was that he “was an atheist, and he proselytized.” [43]

The Encyclopédie

Although the Encyclopédie (published between 1751 and 1772) was spearheaded and meticulously edited by the atheist Denis Diderot, the articles within the encyclopedia specifically addressing atheism and atheists adopt a distinctly negative and critical tone. These particular entries were penned by the pastor Jean-Henri-Samuel Formey and the abbé Claude Yvon . This editorial stance likely reflected the prevailing public perception of atheism, and indeed, the views held by some of the “philosophes” themselves. Yvon identifies ignorance and sheer stupidity as the primary catalysts for atheism, alongside debauchery and the corruption of moral character. [44] The article specifically titled “Athées” is largely dedicated to refuting the assertions previously made by Bayle, adamantly insisting that atheists “cannot have an exact and complete understanding of the morality of human actions.” [44]

Sylvain Maréchal

Sylvain Maréchal (1750–1803), a figure who straddled the lines of proto-utopian-socialist thought and bordered on anarchism , was also a staunch and committed atheist. In his 1799 essay, “Preliminary discourse, or Answer to the question: What is an atheist?”, Maréchal boldly proclaimed his lack of need for God, stating that he required God no more than God required him, and declared this defiant stance to be “true atheism” after systematically rejecting several competing philosophical positions. [45] He unequivocally rejected the notion of any external authority, be it human or divine, ruling over his life, and this included the perceived will of any god. For Maréchal, the act of “believing in God is to submit to hierarchy .” He further contributed to the discourse by authoring the Dictionnaire des athées anciens et modernes (Dictionary of Atheists, Ancient and Modern), an ambitious undertaking aimed at presenting atheism as a legitimate and respectable philosophical tradition.

Notes

• ^ Yvon & Formey 2008.

• ^ Tuck 2003, p. 111.

• ^ Hume on Religion (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

• ^ Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter, “Toleration in Enlightenment and Europe” in Toleration in Enlightenment Europe , ed. Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1.

• ^ Marisa Linton , “Citizenship and Religious Toleration in France” in Toleration in Enlightenment Europe , ed. Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 157.

• ^ Linton, 157–158.

• ^ Buckley 1987, p. 39.

• ^ Linton, 158.

• ^ Justin Champion, The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 7.

• ^ Champion (1992), 134.

• ^ Linton, 169

• ^ Linton, 170.

• ^ a b Linton, 172.

• ^ Israel 1999, p. 6.

• ^ Israel 2000, pp. 104–105.

• ^ Israel 1999, p. 16.

• ^ Justin Champion, “Toleration and Citizenship in Enlightenment England: John Toland and the Naturalization of the Jews, 1714–1753” in Toleration in Enlightenment Europe , ed. Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 135.

• ^ Marin Fitzpatrick, “Toleration and the Enlightenment Movement” in Toleration in Enlightenment Europe, ed. Ole Peter Grell and Ray Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 36.

• ^ a b Fitzpatrick, 36.

• ^ Tomaselli, 93

• ^ Israel 2000, pp. 103–104.

• ^ Israel 2000, p. 102.

• ^ Israel 2000, p. 104.

• ^ Grell and Porter, 4–5

• ^ Sylvana Tomaselli, “Intolerance, the Virtue of Princes and Radicals” in Toleration in Enlightenment Europe , ed. Ole Peter Grell and Ray Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 93.

• ^ Buckley 1987, p. 38.

• ^ Buckley 1987, p. 37.

• ^ Louis Dupré, Religion and the Rise of Modern Culture (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 43

• ^ Margaret C. Jacob, Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 87

• ^ Jacob, 94.

• ^ Baruch Spinoza , Theologico-Political Treatise , originally published anonymously in 1670; Israel, Jonathan I. , Radical Enlightenment . Oxford University Press: 2001. ISBN 0-19-925456-7 ; Spinoza is also mentioned in Christopher Hitchens ’ The Portable Atheist , 2007.

• ^ Bayle 1826, p. 162.

• ^ Bayle 1826, p. 173.

• ^ Bayle 1826, pp. 173–174.

• ^ Bayle 2000, p. 312.

• ^ Bayle 2000, p. 313.

• ^ Douglas Nobbs, ‘The Political Ideas of William Cleghorn, Hume’s Academic Rival’, in Journal of the History of Ideas, (1965), Vol. 26, No. 4: 575–586; Boswell, J. Boswell in Extremes, 1776–1778.

• ^ Kors, 47.

• ^ Dupré, 50.

• ^ Alan Charles Kors , D’Holbach’s Coterie: An Enlightenment in Paris (Princeton University Press, 1976), 9

• ^ See Alan Charles Kors, D’Holbach’s Coterie 41–42 for a discussion of this claim.

• ^ Kors, 42–43

• ^ a b Kors, 45.

• ^ a b Yvon 2008.

• ^ • “Preliminary discourse, or Answer to the question: What is an atheist?”. Marxist Internet Archive .

Sources

• • Bayle, Pierre (1826). An Historical and Critical Dictionary . London: Hunt and Clark.

• • Bayle, Pierre (2000). Sally L. Jenkinson (ed.). Bayle – Political Writings . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• • Buckley, Michael J. (1987). At the Origins of Modern Atheism . London: Yale University Press.

• Champion, Justin. The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and its Enemies, 1660–1730 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

• Champion, Justin. “Toleration and Citizenship in Enlightenment England: John Toland and the Naturalization of the Jews, 1714–1753.” In Toleration in Enlightenment Europe , edited by Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter, 133–156. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

• Dupré, Louis. Religion and the Rise of Modern Culture . Notre Dama, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008.

• Grell, Ole Peter and Roy Porter. “Toleration in Enlightenment Europe.” In Toleration in Enlightenment Europe , edited by Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter, 1–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

• • Israel, Jonathan I. (1999). Locke, Spinoza and the Philosophical Debate Concerning Toleration in the Early Enlightenment (c. 1670 – c. 1750) . Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen.

• • Israel, Jonathan I. (2000). “Spinoza, Locke and the Enlightenment Battle for Toleration”. In Ole Peter Grell; Roy Porter (eds.). Toleration in Enlightenment Europe . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 102–113.

• Jacob, Margaret C. Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

• Kors, Alan Charles . D’Holbach’s Coterie: An Enlightenment in Paris . Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.

• Linton, Marisa. “Citizenship and Religious Toleration in France.” In Toleration in Enlightenment Europe , edited by Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter, 157–174. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

• Russell, Paul. “The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism and Irreligion.” New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

• Tomaselli, Sylvana. “Intolerance, the Virtue of Princes and Radicals.” In Toleration in Enlightenment Europe , edited by Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter, 86–101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

• • Tuck, Richard (2003). “The ‘Christian Atheism’ of Thomas Hobbes”. In Michael Hunter ; David Wootton (eds.). Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment . Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 111–130.

• • Yvon, Claude (2008). “Athées”. In Denis Diderot ; Jean le Rond d’Alembert (eds.). Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (Winter 2008 ed.). University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Projet. Archived from the original on 2012-12-15. Retrieved 2021-11-28. {{cite book }} : CS1 maint: publisher location (link ) Robert Morrissey (ed.)

• • Yvon, Claude; Formey, Jean-Henri-Samuel (2008). “Atheisme”. In Denis Diderot; Jean le Rond d’Alembert (eds.). Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (Winter 2008 ed.). University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Projet. Archived from the original on 2012-12-15. Retrieved 2021-11-28. {{cite book }} : CS1 maint: publisher location (link ) Robert Morrissey (ed.)