Battle Of Waterloo

The year 1815. A date that, for some, marks the definitive close of an era, and for others, merely the inconvenient end of a particular man’s grand delusions. Either way, it culminated in a rather decisive engagement, the Battle of Waterloo , fought on a rather unremarkable Sunday, the 18th of June, near Waterloo, Belgium . This particular skirmish, then part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and now firmly entrenched in Belgium , is widely considered the final, ignominious curtain call for the Napoleonic Wars . Here, the so-called French Imperial Army , under the rather predictable command of Napoleon I , was thoroughly disabused of its notions of victory by a pair of forces from the Seventh Coalition . One, a meticulously assembled, British -led contingent, drawing disparate units from the United Kingdom , the Netherlands , Hanover , Brunswick , and Nassau , found itself under the steadfast, if somewhat stolid, leadership of Field Marshal Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington . The other, comprising three distinct corps of the Prussian army, was guided by the rather more impetuous Field Marshal Blücher .

This grand finale of strategic blunders and desperate heroics bore different names depending on whose history books you consulted. In France, it was known, rather prosaically, as the Battle of Mont Saint-Jean , after a nearby hamlet. The Prussians, with a flair for the dramatic, dubbed it La Belle Alliance—“the Beautiful Alliance”—a nod, perhaps, to the inn that stood witness to their combined efforts, or perhaps just a conveniently poetic title for a rather messy victory. 18

Prelude

Main article: Waterloo campaign

The strategic situation in Western Europe in 1815 was, to put it mildly, dire for Napoleon. His grand return to power in March 1815, a period optimistically known as the Hundred Days , had, predictably, galvanized all the right people into forming the Seventh Coalition . These powers, having already gone through the trouble of defeating him once, were in no mood for a repeat performance and hastily mobilized their armies. 24 25

Napoleon, ever the pragmatist when cornered, understood the math: he was critically outnumbered. His only conceivable path to retaining power, once his feeble attempts at diplomatic dissuasion failed (and they did, rather spectacularly), was to strike first. He needed to attack before the coalition forces could fully mobilize and consolidate their overwhelming numbers. 26 The plan, audacious and typical of the man, was to engage Wellington’s and Blücher’s armies separately, near the northeastern border of France . If he could dismantle them before they linked up, he might just manage to push the British back to the sea and knock the Prussian Empire out of the war. This, in theory, would buy him precious time to scrape together more men and resources before confronting the Austrians and Russians. 27 28

An added, rather hopeful, consideration for Napoleon was the potential for a French victory to ignite a sympathetic revolution among French-speaking populations in Belgium . Furthermore, the coalition troops stationed in Belgium were, by and large, considered “second line”—many units were of questionable quality and, crucially, dubious loyalty. It seems even Napoleon had his moments of wishful thinking. 29 30

Wellington, the British commander, initially deployed his forces to counter a perceived threat: Napoleon enveloping the Coalition armies by advancing through Mons, Belgium , southwest of Brussels. This movement would have brought Wellington closer to Blücher’s Prussians, but at the cost of potentially severing his communications with his base at Ostend . Napoleon, ever the master of misdirection, attempted to exploit this by spreading false intelligence, suggesting Wellington’s supply lines from the English Channel ports were about to be cut. 31 32

By June, Napoleon had managed to assemble an army of approximately 300,000 men across France. The force he brought to Waterloo, however, was less than a third of that. Still, these were predominantly loyal and experienced veterans, a testament to his enduring charisma, or perhaps just their lack of better options. 33 Napoleon divided this force into three main components: a left wing under Marshal Ney , a right wing under Marshal Grouchy , and a reserve directly under his own command. Crucially, these elements were kept close enough to support one another, a lesson hard-learned from previous campaigns. Crossing the frontier near Charleroi just before dawn on 15 June, the French swiftly overwhelmed the Coalition outposts, effectively establishing Napoleon’s “central position” between Wellington’s and Blücher’s scattered armies. His hope, a rather transparent one, was to prevent their consolidation and then systematically destroy them, first the Prussians, then Wellington’s forces. 34 35 36 37

It wasn’t until very late on the night of 15 June that Wellington finally grasped the true nature of the Charleroi attack. In the early hours of 16 June, amidst the social distractions of the Duchess of Richmond’s ball in Brussels, he received a dispatch from the Prince of Orange . The speed of Napoleon’s advance, it seems, was quite shocking. He hastily issued orders for his army to concentrate at Quatre Bras , where the Prince of Orange, with Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar ’s brigade, was clinging to a rather tenuous position against Ney’s left wing. It’s worth noting that Prince Bernhard and General Perponcher , by all accounts, demonstrated a clearer understanding of the French advance than many of their superiors. Their initiative in holding the crossroads proved vital. General Constant de Rebecque , a Dutch divisional commander, famously disobeyed Wellington’s explicit orders to march to his designated concentration area near Nivelles, choosing instead to hold the crossroads and send urgent messages to the Prince and Perponcher. This little act of insubordination, born of better intelligence and local awareness, highlights Wellington’s initial underestimation of the French speed. Had these generals simply followed orders, Quatre-Bras would likely have fallen to the French, allowing them to reinforce Napoleon’s attack on the Prussians at Sombreffe via the swift, cobbled road. The entire campaign, one might argue, would have unfolded rather differently. 38 39

Ney’s original mandate was to secure the crossroads of Quatre Bras, maintaining the option to swing east and reinforce Napoleon if circumstances dictated. He found the crossroads lightly held, and though the Prince of Orange initially repelled his attacks, the sheer weight of French numbers gradually pushed the Anglo-allied forces back during the Battle of Quatre Bras . Eventually, reinforcements arrived, followed by Wellington himself. Taking command, he managed to push Ney back, securing the crossroads by early evening. However, this victory came too late to send aid to the Prussians, who had, by then, already suffered a significant defeat. 40 35 41

Meanwhile, on 16 June, Napoleon had indeed attacked and defeated Blücher at the Battle of Ligny , employing his main force alongside the right wing of his army. The Prussian center buckled under heavy French assaults, but their flanks, remarkably, held. What was truly crucial, and perhaps overlooked by the French in their haste, was that the Prussian retreat from Ligny was conducted in good order and, astonishingly, seemed largely unnoticed by the French. The bulk of their rearguard held positions until well past midnight, with some elements not moving until the following morning, completely ignored by the pursuing French. 42 43

Critically, the Prussians did not retreat eastward along their own lines of communication. Instead, with a tactical acumen Napoleon clearly underestimated, they fell back northward, parallel to Wellington’s line of march. This kept them within supporting distance and maintained open communication with Wellington, a factor that would prove decisive. The Prussians regrouped around Bülow ’s IV Corps, which had providentially not been engaged at Ligny and was positioned strongly south of Wavre . 44

With the Prussian withdrawal from Ligny , Wellington’s position at Quatre Bras became untenable. The following day, he executed a northward retreat to a defensive position he had shrewdly reconnoitered the previous year: the modest ridge of Mont-Saint-Jean , situated south of the village of Waterloo and the sprawling Sonian Forest . 45

Napoleon, burdened by his reserves, made a rather tardy start on 17 June, finally joining Ney at Quatre Bras at 13:00. His intention to attack Wellington’s army was thwarted, however, as he found the position entirely empty. The French pursued Wellington’s retreating army towards Waterloo. Yet, thanks to abysmal weather, churned-up mud, and the head start afforded by Napoleon’s own sluggish advance, there was no significant engagement, save for a brief cavalry action at Genappe . 46 47

Prior to departing Ligny, Napoleon had issued orders to Grouchy, commanding the right wing, to pursue the retreating Prussians with a force of 33,000 men. A late start, coupled with uncertainty regarding the Prussians’ direction of retreat, and the inherent vagueness of Napoleon’s orders, meant that Grouchy was too late to intercept the Prussian army before it reached Wavre. From Wavre, the Prussians could, and indeed would, march to support Wellington. More critically, the heavily outnumbered Prussian rearguard skillfully exploited the River Dyle, engaging Grouchy in a savage and protracted delaying action during the Battle of Wavre on 18–19 June. This effectively prevented Grouchy’s substantial force from participating in the main event at Waterloo. Napoleon finally received news of Grouchy’s predicament in the early morning of 18 June at La Caillou, the farmhouse where he had spent the night, but his response to the message wouldn’t come until mid-day. 48 49 47 50

As 17 June drew to a close, Wellington’s army had successfully occupied its chosen defensive position at Waterloo, with the main body of Napoleon’s army trailing in pursuit. Blücher’s army, meanwhile, was consolidating in and around Wavre, a mere 8 miles (13 km) to the east. Early the following morning, Wellington received a crucial assurance from Blücher: the Prussian army would indeed support him. With this commitment, Wellington made his final decision to stand his ground and give battle. 51 47

Armies

Main article: Order of battle of the Waterloo campaign

The stage was set, and three armies, each a testament to the era’s complex alliances and national ambitions, prepared for their fateful encounter. Napoleon’s Armée du Nord, a multinational force under Wellington, and the Prussian army commanded by Blücher.

The French army, numbering approximately 74,500 men, was composed of 54,014 infantry, 15,830 cavalry, and 8,775 artillerymen, supported by 254 guns. 52 53 Napoleon, throughout his reign, had relied heavily on conscription to fill his ranks. However, for the 1815 campaign, he eschewed this practice. Consequently, his troops were largely seasoned veterans, possessing considerable experience and, more importantly, a fierce, almost fanatical, devotion to their Emperor. 54 The French cavalry, in particular, was both numerous and formidable, a force to be reckoned with. It included fourteen regiments of heavily armored heavy cavalry —the cuirassiers—and seven regiments of highly versatile lancers , equipped with lances, sabers, and firearms. 55 56 57

Despite the individual prowess of these soldiers, the army suffered from a critical organizational flaw. As units were formed, French officers were assigned to them somewhat haphazardly, meaning that many units found themselves led by officers they barely knew and often distrusted. More significantly, many of these officers lacked experience in working together as a cohesive force. The result was a noticeable absence of coordinated support between units, a factor that would prove costly. 58 59

Adding to their woes, the French were forced to march through relentless rain and thick, black coal-dust mud to reach Waterloo, only to endure more mud and rain as they bivouacked in the open. 60 Food, too, was scarce. Yet, in spite of these hardships, the veteran soldiers maintained an unwavering loyalty to Napoleon. 58 61 Such is the human capacity for devotion to a charismatic leader, even when he leads them into a quagmire.

Wellington, on the other hand, found himself commanding a rather eclectic assembly. In December 1814, the British Army had undergone significant reductions, shedding 47,000 men, largely through the disbandment of second battalions from 22 infantry regiments. 62 63 Wellington famously described his forces as “an infamous army, very weak and ill-equipped, and a very inexperienced Staff ”. 64 His total strength stood at 74,326 men: 53,607 infantry, 13,400 cavalry, and 5,596 artillerymen with 156 guns, plus engineers and staff. 65 Of these, only 27,985 (38%) were British, with an additional 7,686 (10%) from the King’s German Legion (KGL). The rest comprised 21,035 (28.3%) Dutch-Belgian and Nassauer troops, 11,496 (15.5%) from Hanover , and 6,124 (8.2%) from Brunswick . 66

While all British Army troops were regulars, and most had seen service in the Peninsula (only four of 23 British line infantry regiments lacked this experience, with similar levels in cavalry and artillery), the notion that most Peninsular War veterans were off fighting in the War of 1812 is, according to some, an “incorrect statement.” British battalions were indeed undermanned, but the French were often worse off, with their average battalion being 145 muskets weaker. In terms of cavalry squadrons, there was near parity, slightly favoring the British. 67 68

Many of the Coalition troops, particularly the Dutch, Belgians, and some German contingents, were undeniably inexperienced. g h The Dutch army, for instance, had only been re-established in 1815 after Napoleon’s earlier defeat. A rather inconvenient truth was that many of the professional soldiers in these Coalition armies had previously served in the French army or with Napoleonic allies. Yet, as historian Alessandro Barbero points out, under the crucible of fire, the distinction between British and foreign troops often proved insignificant. 69

Wellington also faced a severe shortage of heavy cavalry, possessing only seven British and three Dutch regiments. However, what he lacked in quantity, he made up for in quality: the British forces boasted the finest horses in Europe, a grim advantage gained from two decades of war that had depleted the mounts of other great powers. 70 The Duke of York , in his infinite wisdom, imposed many of his own staff officers on Wellington, including his second-in-command, the Earl of Uxbridge . Uxbridge, given carte blanche by Wellington to deploy the cavalry as he saw fit, would prove to be both a dynamic and, at times, impetuous commander. Wellington, ever cautious, also stationed a further 17,000 troops at Halle, Belgium , 8 miles (13 km) to the west. These were primarily Dutch troops under the Prince of Orange’s younger brother, Prince Frederick of the Netherlands , intended as a guard against a wide flanking movement or a rearguard should Wellington be forced to retreat towards Antwerp and the coast. 71 i

The Prussian army, meanwhile, was in the midst of a chaotic reorganization. In 1815, former Reserve regiments, Legions , and Freikorps volunteer formations from the wars of 1813–1814 were being absorbed into the regular line, alongside numerous Landwehr (militia) regiments. Many of these Landwehr troops arrived in Belgium largely untrained and ill-equipped. The Prussian cavalry was in a similar state of disarray. 72 Even their artillery was undergoing reorganization, failing to perform at its best, with guns and equipment continuing to arrive even during and after the battle itself. 73

However, these handicaps were offset by one critical advantage: the Prussian army boasted an excellent and highly professional general staff . These officers, rigorously trained in four specialized schools, operated with a common standard and efficiency that stood in stark contrast to the often conflicting and vague orders emanating from the French army. This superior staff system ensured that before Ligny , three-quarters of the Prussian army had concentrated for battle within a mere 24 hours’ notice. 73

This organizational resilience proved paramount. After their defeat at Ligny, the Prussian army, despite its losses, was able to swiftly realign its supply train, reorganize, and intervene decisively on the Waterloo battlefield within a remarkable 48 hours. 73 Two-and-a-half Prussian army corps, totaling some 48,000 men, would eventually engage at Waterloo. Two brigades under Bülow, commander of IV Corps, initiated their attack on Lobau at 16:30, while Zieten ’s I Corps and elements of Pirch I ’s II Corps joined the fray around 18:00. 74

Battlefield

Further information: List of Waterloo Battlefield locations

The actual site of this pivotal clash is nestled within the Belgian municipalities of Braine-l’Alleud and Lasne , 75 approximately 15 kilometers (9.3 mi) south of Brussels , and a mere 2 kilometers (1.2 mi) from the village of Waterloo itself. The modern landscape, however, is irrevocably altered, dominated by the rather imposing Lion’s Mound —an artificial hill constructed from earth literally scraped from the battlefield. This well-intentioned monument, sadly, has effectively erased the original topography near the mound, leaving history a little less tangible.

The position Wellington chose for his defense was, in classic fashion, a strong one. It comprised a long ridge, stretching east–west, bisected perpendicularly by the main road leading to Brussels. Along the crest of this ridge ran the Ohain road, a natural defensive feature in itself, being a deep sunken lane . Near the crucial crossroads with the Brussels road, a prominent elm tree stood, serving as Wellington’s command post for the better part of the day, a silent observer to the unfolding chaos. Wellington, ever the master of deception, deployed his infantry just behind the crest of this ridge, utilizing what he termed his “reverse slope defence.” 76

This tactic, employed many times before, allowed him to effectively conceal the true strength of his forces from the French, revealing only his skirmishers and artillery. 76 The battlefront itself was relatively concise, spanning only about 2.5 miles (4 km). This afforded Wellington the luxury of deploying his forces in considerable depth, particularly in the center and on his right, extending all the way to the village of Braine-l’Alleud . This deployment was made in the confident expectation that the Prussians would eventually reinforce his left flank as the day wore on. 77

In front of the ridge, three key positions offered natural fortification. On the extreme right, the château, garden, and orchard of Hougoumont provided a formidable strongpoint. This large, well-constructed country house was initially obscured by trees and faced north along a sunken, covered lane—what the British called “the hollow-way”—which could be used for resupply. On the extreme left, the hamlet of Papelotte anchored the other end of Wellington’s line. 78

Both Hougoumont and Papelotte were fortified and heavily garrisoned, serving as secure anchors for Wellington’s flanks . Papelotte, in particular, commanded the vital road to Wavre, the very route the Prussians would use to send their desperately awaited reinforcements. On the western side of the main road, directly in front of Wellington’s central line, stood the farmhouse and orchard of La Haye Sainte , garrisoned by 400 light infantrymen of the King’s German Legion . 78 Across the road, a disused sand quarry provided a natural defensive position for the 95th Rifles , who were deployed as sharpshooters. 79

The cumulative effect of Wellington’s strategic positioning presented a truly formidable challenge to any attacking force. Any attempt to turn Wellington’s right flank would necessitate assaulting the heavily entrenched Hougoumont. An attack on his right-center would force the attackers into a deadly gauntlet of enfilading fire from both Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. On the left, attackers would likewise be subjected to enfilading fire from La Haye Sainte and its adjacent sandpit. Furthermore, any effort to turn the left flank would involve a grueling fight through the labyrinthine lanes and hedgerows surrounding Papelotte and the other garrisoned buildings on that flank, not to mention navigating some rather unpleasantly wet ground in the Smohain defile . 80

The French army, conversely, formed up on the slopes of another ridge to the south. From his initial position at Rossomme farm, Napoleon could survey the entire battlefield, a rare luxury. However, he later moved closer to the inn La Belle Alliance , a position from which much of the battlefield was obscured. Command on the field, largely hidden from his view, was then delegated to Ney. 1 Critically, Napoleon could not see Wellington’s positions, a tactical blindness that led him to deploy his forces symmetrically around the Brussels road. On his right flank, d’Erlon ’s I Corps comprised 16,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, bolstered by a cavalry reserve of 4,700. On the left, Reille ’s II Corps commanded 13,000 infantry and 1,300 cavalry, with its own reserve of 4,600 cavalry. In the center, south of La Belle Alliance, lay a substantial reserve, including Lobau’s VI Corps with 6,000 men, the formidable 13,000 infantry of the Imperial Guard , and a further cavalry reserve of 2,000. 81

Battle

Preparation

Wellington, ever the early riser, began his day around 02:00 or 03:00 on 18 June, composing letters until the first hint of dawn. He had previously communicated with Blücher, confirming his intention to offer battle at Mont-Saint-Jean if Blücher could guarantee at least one corps of support; otherwise, a retreat towards Brussels was the only sensible option. At a late-night council, Blücher’s chief of staff, August Neidhardt von Gneisenau , harbored a deep distrust of Wellington’s strategic intentions. However, Blücher, with a more pragmatic view of their shared predicament, managed to persuade him that marching to join Wellington’s army was their only viable course. By morning, Wellington duly received Blücher’s reply, promising support with three full corps—a commitment that would prove critical. 82

From 06:00, Wellington was already in the field, personally overseeing the meticulous deployment of his forces. Meanwhile, at Wavre, the Prussian IV Corps under Bülow was designated to lead the march to Waterloo. This corps was in the best condition, having been spared the brutal engagement at Ligny . Yet, despite their lack of casualties, IV Corps had already endured two days of marching, covering the retreat of the other three Prussian corps from Ligny. They were also positioned farthest from the main battlefield, making their progress agonizingly slow. 83 84

The roads, utterly churned into mud by the night’s heavy rain, compounded their difficulties. Bülow’s men had to navigate the congested streets of Wavre, and then somehow move 88 pieces of artillery across the sodden landscape. Matters were hardly improved when a fire erupted in Wavre, effectively blocking several streets along Bülow’s intended route. Consequently, the last elements of the corps didn’t depart until 10:00, a full six hours after the leading elements had set out for Waterloo. Bülow’s men were eventually followed by I Corps, and then II Corps, a testament to Prussian perseverance, if not optimal timing. 83 84

Napoleon, meanwhile, enjoyed a rather more civilized breakfast off silver plate at Le Caillou, the house where he had spent the night. When Soult rather cautiously suggested that Grouchy should be recalled to reinforce the main force, Napoleon, in a display of what can only be described as monumental overconfidence, retorted, “Just because you have all been beaten by Wellington, you think he’s a good general. I tell you Wellington is a bad general, the English are bad troops, and this affair is nothing more than eating breakfast.” 85 84 One might, of course, interpret this dismissive remark as a strategic attempt to bolster morale, given his maxim “in war, morale is everything.” He had, after all, employed similar tactics in the past, perhaps trying to counter the pervasive pessimism among his chief of staff and senior generals. 86

Later, his brother, Jerome , relayed some rather conveniently overheard gossip from a waiter at the King of Spain inn in Genappe, suggesting the Prussians were marching from Wavre. Napoleon, ever eager to dismiss inconvenient truths, declared that the Prussians would need at least two days to recover and would be adequately handled by Grouchy. 87 It is, frankly, astounding that, Jerome’s dubious gossip notwithstanding, the French commanders at the pre-battle conference at Le Caillou possessed absolutely no intelligence regarding the alarming proximity of the Prussians. They evidently did not suspect that Blücher’s forces would begin to erupt onto the battlefield in significant numbers just five hours later. 88

Napoleon had prudently delayed the start of the battle, recognizing that the sodden ground would severely impede the maneuverability of his cavalry and artillery. Additionally, a considerable portion of his forces had bivouacked well to the south of La Belle Alliance, requiring time to deploy. At 10:00, in response to a dispatch he had received from Grouchy six hours prior, Napoleon sent a reply instructing Grouchy to “head for Wavre [to Grouchy’s north] in order to draw near to us [to the west of Grouchy]” and then to “push before him” the Prussians, urging him to arrive at Waterloo “as soon as possible.” 89 84

By 11:00, Napoleon had drafted his general order: Reille’s Corps on the left and d’Erlon’s Corps to the right were to launch a coordinated attack on the village of Mont-Saint-Jean, maintaining abreast of one another. This order, rather tellingly, presumed Wellington’s main battle-line was actually in the village, rather than occupying the more forward, elevated position on the ridge. 90 To facilitate this, Jerome’s division was tasked with an initial, diversionary assault on Hougoumont, which Napoleon confidently expected would draw in Wellington’s reserves. The loss of Hougoumont, he reasoned, would gravely threaten Wellington’s communications with the sea. 91 Following this, a grande batterie of reserve artillery from I, II, and VI Corps was to commence a heavy bombardment of Wellington’s center, scheduled for around 13:00. D’Erlon’s corps would then launch its main attack on Wellington’s left, aiming to break through and roll up his line from east to west. In his memoirs, Napoleon would later claim his intention was to sever Wellington’s army from the Prussians and drive it decisively back towards the sea. 92

Hougoumont

Main article: Hougoumont

As historian Andrew Roberts so succinctly notes, “It is a curious fact about the Battle of Waterloo that no one is absolutely certain when it actually began.” 94 Wellington, in his dispatches, recorded that at “about ten o’clock [Napoleon] commenced a furious attack upon our post at Hougoumont.” 95 Other sources, however, place the commencement of hostilities somewhere between 11:30 and 13:30, a testament to the chaos and differing perspectives inherent in such a grand melee. j The house and its immediate surroundings were stoutly defended by four light companies of Guards , while the surrounding wood and park were held by Hanoverian Jäger and the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Nassau Regiment. k 96

The initial assault by Pierre François Bauduin ’s brigade succeeded in clearing the wood and park, but was ultimately repulsed by devastating British artillery fire, costing Bauduin his life. As the British guns were briefly diverted by a duel with French artillery, a second, more determined attack by Soye’s brigade (and the remnants of Bauduin’s) managed to reach the north gate of the house. Sous-Lieutenant Legros, a French officer, in an act of desperate courage or perhaps sheer madness, broke the gate open with an axe, allowing a handful of French troops to surge into the courtyard. 97 However, the defenders, reinforced by the timely arrival of the Coldstream Guards and Scots Guards , managed to slam the gate shut, trapping the Frenchmen inside. All those caught within the courtyard were summarily killed, a grim lesson in the futility of partial breaches.

The struggle for Hougoumont raged on relentlessly throughout the entire afternoon. Its surroundings became heavily invested with French light infantry, who launched coordinated attacks against the troops positioned behind the fortified farmhouse. Wellington’s forces, however, staunchly defended both the house and the vital hollow way running north from it. In the afternoon, Napoleon, growing impatient, personally ordered the house to be shelled, a decision that resulted in the destruction of everything but the chapel. l Du Plat’s brigade of the King’s German Legion was brought forward to defend the hollow way, performing admirably despite being deprived of their senior officers. They were eventually relieved by the 71st Highlanders , a British infantry regiment. Adam’s brigade, further bolstered by Hugh Halkett ’s 3rd Hanoverian Brigade, successfully repelled repeated infantry and cavalry attacks dispatched by Reille. Hougoumont, against all odds, held out until the very end of the battle.

Wellington, in his typical understated fashion, later remarked:

I had occupied that post with a detachment from General Byng ’s brigade of Guards, which was in position in its rear; and it was some time under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel MacDonald, and afterwards of Colonel Home; and I am happy to add that it was maintained, throughout the day, with the utmost gallantry by these brave troops, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of large bodies of the enemy to obtain possession of it.

— Wellington. 98

Major Macready, of the Light Division, 30th British Regiment, Halkett’s brigade, offered a more vivid, almost theatrical, account:

When I reached Lloyd ’s abandoned guns, I stood near them for about a minute to contemplate the scene: it was grand beyond description. Hougoumont and its wood sent up a broad flame through the dark masses of smoke that overhung the field; beneath this cloud the French were indistinctly visible. Here a waving mass of long red feathers could be seen; there, gleams as from a sheet of steel showed that the cuirassiers were moving; 400 cannon were belching forth fire and death on every side; the roaring and shouting were indistinguishably commixed—together they gave me an idea of a labouring volcano. Bodies of infantry and cavalry were pouring down on us, and it was time to leave contemplation, so I moved towards our columns, which were standing up in square.

— Major Macready, Light Division, 30th British Regiment, Halkett’s brigade. 99

The incessant fighting at Hougoumont is often categorized as a mere diversionary attack, intended to draw in Wellington’s reserves, which then inexplicably escalated into an all-day struggle that, ironically, consumed French reserves instead. 100 However, a compelling argument can be made that both Napoleon and Wellington genuinely believed that holding Hougoumont was absolutely critical to securing victory. Hougoumont was one of the few areas of the battlefield Napoleon could clearly observe, 101 and he consistently funneled resources—a staggering 33 battalions, or 14,000 troops—towards it and its environs throughout the afternoon. Similarly, Wellington, though the house itself never held a vast number of soldiers, committed 21 battalions (12,000 troops) over the course of the day, specifically to keep the hollow way open for fresh troops and ammunition. He even diverted several artillery batteries from his already hard-pressed center to support Hougoumont, 102 later declaring, with characteristic finality, that “the success of the battle turned upon closing the gates at Hougoumont.” 103 The struggle for Hougoumont, therefore, was not a sideshow, but arguably the key battle within the battle, proving to be decisive terrain.

The Grand Battery starts its bombardment

The 80 guns of Napoleon’s grande batterie were meticulously positioned in the center. They unleashed their thunderous barrage at 11:50, according to Lord Hill (commander of the Anglo-allied II Corps), m though other sources place the opening salvos between noon and 13:30. 104 The grande batterie, however, was positioned too far back to achieve truly accurate targeting. Their primary targets were largely obscured, as the only visible troops were the skirmishers of Kempt’s and Pack’s regiments, and Perponcher ’s 2nd Dutch division. The rest of Wellington’s forces were, of course, cleverly employing his characteristic “reverse slope defence,” making them frustratingly difficult targets. 105 n

Despite the tactical limitations, the bombardment inflicted a significant number of casualties. While some projectiles dutifully buried themselves in the soft, sodden soil, many more found their marks on the reverse slope of the ridge, reaping a grim harvest. The intensity of the bombardment even compelled the cavalry of the Union Brigade, positioned in the third line, to shift to their left in an attempt to reduce their casualty rate. 106

Napoleon spots the Prussians

At approximately 13:15, a truly unwelcome sight greeted Napoleon: the first columns of Prussian troops were spotted near the village of Lasne-Chapelle-Saint-Lambert , a mere 4 to 5 miles (6.4 to 8.0 km) from his right flank—roughly a three-hour march for an army. 107 Napoleon’s immediate reaction was to dispatch Marshal Soult with a message to Grouchy, ordering him to march towards the battlefield and engage these newly arriving Prussians. 108 Grouchy, however, was diligently (or perhaps stubbornly) executing Napoleon’s previous orders to pursue the Prussians “with your sword against his back” towards Wavre. By this point, he was far too distant to reach Waterloo in time to influence the outcome. 109

Grouchy’s subordinate, Gérard , had, rather presciently, advised him to “march to the sound of the guns.” Yet, Grouchy, adhering rigidly to his original orders, instead engaged the Prussian III Corps rearguard, under the command of Lieutenant-General Baron von Thielmann , at the Battle of Wavre . Furthermore, Soult’s urgent letter, explicitly ordering Grouchy to move swiftly to join Napoleon and attack Bülow, would not actually reach him until after 20:00. 109 Such are the ironies of war and the vagaries of battlefield communication.

First French infantry attack

A little after 13:00, the attack of I Corps commenced, advancing in imposing columns . Bernard Cornwell, with a helpful dose of realism, notes that “’[column]’ suggests an elongated formation with its narrow end aimed like a spear at the enemy line, while in truth it was much more like a brick advancing sideways.” D’Erlon’s assault, in fact, consisted of four such “bricks,” each representing a division of French infantry. 110 Each division, with one notable exception, was arrayed in immense masses, comprising the eight or nine battalions of which they were formed, deployed in a column one behind the other, with a mere five paces separating each battalion. 111

The sole exception was the 1st Division, led by Quiot (commander of the 1st Brigade). 111 Its two brigades were formed similarly, but side-by-side rather than in depth. This was a tactical necessity, as, being on the leftmost flank of the four divisions, it was tasked with sending one (Quiot’s brigade) against the south and west of La Haye Sainte, while the other (Bourgeois ’) was to assault the eastern side of the same crucial post. 111

The divisions were instructed to advance in echelon from the left, maintaining a distance of 400 paces between them. Donzelot ’s 2nd Division was positioned to the right of Bourgeois’ brigade, followed by Marcognet ’s 3rd Division, and finally Durutte ’s 4th Division on the far right. Marshal Ney personally led this assault, each column presenting a front of approximately one hundred and sixty to two hundred files . 111

The leftmost division, as planned, advanced upon the walled farmhouse compound of La Haye Sainte , a position that, as the battle progressed, would prove to be of paramount tactical importance. 112 The farmhouse was staunchly defended by the King’s German Legion . While a single French battalion engaged the defenders head-on, the subsequent battalions fanned out to either side, and with the timely support of several squadrons of cuirassiers, succeeded in isolating the farmhouse. The King’s German Legion, despite being severely outnumbered, defended the position with remarkable resolve. Each French attempt to scale the walls was somehow repelled by the determined Germans. The Prince of Orange , observing La Haye Sainte’s isolation, attempted to reinforce it by deploying the Hanoverian Lüneburg Battalion in a line formation. This proved to be a fatal error. Cuirassiers, cleverly concealed in a fold in the ground, swiftly caught and annihilated the battalion in mere minutes. They then rode past La Haye Sainte, almost reaching the crest of the ridge, effectively covering d’Erlon’s left flank as his main attack developed. 113

At approximately 13:30, d’Erlon commenced the advance of his three remaining divisions—some 14,000 men—across a front of roughly 1,000 meters (1,100 yards), directly targeting Wellington’s left wing. At their intended point of impact, they faced a mere 6,000 Anglo-allied troops. The first line consisted of the 1st brigade (Van Bylandt’s brigade ) of the 2nd Netherlands Division, flanked by the British brigades of Kempt and Pack. The second line, composed of British and Hanoverian troops under Sir Thomas Picton , lay concealed in a dead ground behind the ridge. All these units had already suffered considerably at Quatre Bras. Bylandt’s brigade had, furthermore, been ordered to deploy its skirmishers in the hollow road and on the forward slope, with the rest of the brigade lying prone just behind the road. o p

As these skirmishers rejoined their parent battalions, the brigade was ordered to its feet and began to return fire. On the left of the brigade, where the 7th Dutch Militia stood, a “few files were shot down and an opening in the line thus occurred.” 114 The battalion, lacking reserves, was unable to close the gap. t q r s

D’Erlon’s men steadily ascended the slope, advancing towards the sunken road, the Chemin d’Ohain , which ran behind La Haye Sainte and continued eastward. This road was flanked on both sides by thick hedges. Bylandt’s brigade was positioned just across the road, while the British brigades were lying concealed about 100 yards further back. Kempt’s 1,900 men faced Bourgeois’ brigade of 1,900 men from Quiot’s division. In the center, Donzelot’s division had successfully pushed back Bylandt’s brigade. 115

On the right flank of the French advance was Marcognet’s division, spearheaded by Grenier’s brigade, comprising the 45e Régiment de Ligne and followed by the 25e Régiment de Ligne—a force of somewhat less than 2,000 men. Behind them came Nogue’s brigade, consisting of the 21e and 45e regiments. Opposing them, on the other side of the road, was Pack ’s 9th Brigade, a force of just over 2,000 men, composed of the 44th Foot and three Scottish regiments: the Royal Scots , the 42nd Black Watch , and the 92nd Gordons. A very evenly matched, and brutal, infantry engagement was about to unfold. 115

The relentless French advance drove in the British skirmishers and reached the sunken road. As they did so, Pack’s men, fearing French cavalry, rose to their feet, formed into a four-deep line formation, advanced, and opened fire. However, the French infantry, having anticipated a firefight, had advanced in a more linear formation. Now, fully deployed into line, they returned fire with devastating effect, successfully pressing the British troops. Although the French attack faltered somewhat in the center, the line directly in front of d’Erlon’s right began to crumble. Picton was killed shortly after issuing an order for a counter-attack, and the British and Hanoverian troops, overwhelmed by sheer numbers, also began to give way. 116

Pack’s regiments, despite their four-rank depth, advanced to engage the French in the road but faltered, resorting to firing instead of charging. The 42nd Black Watch halted at the hedge, and the ensuing firefight drove back the British 92nd Foot. At this critical juncture, the leading French 45e Ligne burst through the hedge, cheering triumphantly. Along the entire length of the sunken road, the French were relentlessly pushing the Anglo-allies back, the British line was disintegrating, and by two o’clock in the afternoon, it appeared Napoleon was undeniably winning the Battle of Waterloo . 117

Reports from Baron von Müffling , the Prussian liaison officer attached to Wellington’s army, paint a stark picture, relating that, “After 3 o’clock the Duke’s situation became critical, unless the succour of the Prussian army arrived soon.” 118

Charge of the British heavy cavalry

Wellington, with a weary sigh that probably echoed across the centuries, once remarked on his cavalry:

Our officers of cavalry have acquired a trick of galloping at everything. They never consider the situation, never think of manoeuvring before an enemy, and never keep back or provide a reserve.

— Wellington. 70

At this truly crucial juncture, when Wellington’s line seemed on the brink of collapse, Uxbridge, with characteristic impetuosity, ordered his two brigades of British heavy cavalry to charge. These brigades, formed unseen behind the ridge, were to support the desperately hard-pressed infantry. The 1st Brigade , known as the Household Brigade, commanded by Major-General Lord Edward Somerset , comprised the elite guards regiments: the 1st and 2nd Life Guards , the Royal Horse Guards (the Blues), and the 1st (King’s) Dragoon Guards . The 2nd Brigade , famously known as the Union Brigade, commanded by Major-General Sir William Ponsonby , earned its name from its composition: an English regiment (the 1st or The Royals ), a Scottish regiment (2nd Scots Greys ), and an Irish regiment (6th or Inniskilling ) of heavy dragoons. 119 120

Over two decades of incessant warfare had severely depleted the numbers of suitable cavalry mounts across the European continent. This grim reality meant that the British heavy cavalry, entering the 1815 campaign, possessed by far the finest horses of any contemporary cavalry arm. British cavalry troopers also benefited from exceptionally rigorous mounted swordsmanship training. However, they were, it must be said, notably inferior to the French in maneuvering large formations. They were also prone to a rather cavalier attitude, and, unlike the infantry, some units possessed surprisingly scant experience in actual warfare. 70

The Scots Greys, for instance, had not seen action since 1795, a rather glaring gap in their combat history. 121 Wellington, with his usual blunt assessment, noted that while they were superior individual horsemen, they lacked flexibility and tactical acumen. 70 “I considered one squadron a match for two French, I didn’t like to see four British opposed to four French: and as the numbers increased and order, of course, became more necessary I was the more unwilling to risk our men without having a superiority in numbers.” 122

The two brigades, with a combined effective field strength of around 2,000 men (despite an official strength of 2,651), charged with the 47-year-old Uxbridge at their head, and a woefully inadequate number of squadrons held in reserve. 123 u There is some evidence suggesting Uxbridge, anticipating the chaotic nature of battle, had issued an order that morning to all cavalry brigade commanders, granting them the discretion to commit their commands on their own initiative, as direct orders from him might not always be forthcoming. He also instructed them to “support movements to their front.” 124 It appears Uxbridge expected the brigades of Sir John Ormsby Vandeleur , Hussey Vivian , and the Dutch cavalry to provide crucial support to the British heavy cavalry. Uxbridge later expressed regret for personally leading the charge, admitting, “I committed a great mistake,” recognizing that he should have been organizing a sufficient reserve to follow up and exploit the initial breakthrough. 125

The Household Brigade, a vision of disciplined ferocity, crested the Anglo-allied position and thundered downhill. The French cuirassiers, guarding d’Erlon’s left flank, were still somewhat dispersed and were consequently swept over the deeply sunken main road before being utterly routed. 126 v

Lord Edward Somerset, commander of the Household Brigade, vividly recalled the impact:

The blows of the sabres on the cuirasses sounded like braziers at work.

— Lord Edward Somerset. 128

Sir Walter Scott , ever the keen observer, described a particularly dramatic moment in his Paul’s Letters to his Kinsfolk:

Sir John Elley , who led the charge of the heavy brigade, was […] at one time surrounded by several of the cuirassiers; but, being a tall and uncommonly powerful man, completely master of his sword and horse, he cut his way out, leaving several of his assailants on the ground, marked with wounds, indicating the unusual strength of the arm which inflicted them. Indeed, had not the ghastly evidence remained on the field, many of the blows dealt upon this occasion would have seemed borrowed from the annals of knight-errantry […]

Continuing their relentless attack, the squadrons on the left of the Household Brigade proceeded to annihilate Aulard’s brigade. Despite frantic attempts to recall them, they pressed on past La Haye Sainte, finding themselves at the bottom of the hill on exhausted horses, now confronting Schmitz’s brigade, which had managed to form in squares . 129

To their left, the Union Brigade, with a sudden, breathtaking surge, swept through the infantry lines. This gave rise to the enduring legend that some of the 92nd Gordon Highland Regiment clung to their stirrups, carried along into the charge. w From the center-left, the Royal Dragoons utterly destroyed Bourgeois’ brigade, triumphantly capturing the eagle of the 105e Ligne. The Inniskillings, meanwhile, routed the other brigade of Quoit’s division, while the Scots Greys, with their distinctive mounts, crashed into the leading French regiment, the 45e Ligne, as it was still attempting to reform after having crossed the sunken road and breached the hedge row in pursuit of the British infantry. The Greys captured the eagle of the 45e Ligne, 130 and subsequently overwhelmed Grenier’s brigade. These two captured eagles would be the only ones taken by the British during the entire battle. 131 On Wellington’s extreme left, Durutte’s division, with commendable swiftness, managed to form squares and successfully fend off the scattered groups of Greys.

However, much like their Household Cavalry counterparts, the officers of the Royals and Inniskillings found it an almost impossible task to rein back their impetuous troops, who, in the heat of the moment, lost all cohesion. Having sustained casualties and still struggling to reorder themselves, the Scots Greys and the rest of the Union Brigade found themselves dangerously exposed before the main French lines. 132 Their horses were blown, and they were still in complete disorder, with no clear collective objective in sight. Some, in their zeal, even attacked nearby gun batteries of the Grande Batterie. 133 While the Greys lacked the time or means to permanently disable or carry off the cannons, they rendered a great many out of action by killing or scattering the gun crews. 134 Sergeant Major Dickinson of the Greys, however, claimed his regiment was rallied before proceeding to attack the French artillery, with their regimental commander, Hamilton, allegedly crying out “Charge, charge the guns!” rather than holding them back. 135

Napoleon, ever swift to seize an opportunity, promptly responded by ordering a counter-attack. This force consisted of the cuirassier brigades of Farine and Travers, and Jaquinot’s two Chevau-léger (lancer) regiments from the I Corps light cavalry division. Disorganized and milling about in the valley between Hougoumont and La Belle Alliance, the Scots Greys and the rest of the British heavy cavalry were caught completely by surprise by this countercharge. Milhaud ’s cuirassiers, joined by lancers from Baron Jaquinot’s 1st Cavalry Division, crashed into them with devastating effect. 136

As Ponsonby desperately attempted to rally his men against the French cuirassiers, he was attacked by Jaquinot’s lancers and captured. A nearby party of Scots Greys, witnessing their brigade commander’s capture, bravely attempted a rescue. The French lancer, however, killed Ponsonby and then, with grim efficiency, used his lance to kill three of the Scots Greys who had intervened. 132

By the time Ponsonby fell, the momentum had entirely swung back in favor of the French. Milhaud’s and Jaquinot’s cavalrymen ruthlessly drove the Union Brigade from the valley, inflicting extremely heavy losses on the British cavalry. 137 138 A subsequent countercharge, executed by British light dragoons under Major-General Vandeleur and Dutch–Belgian light dragoons and hussars under Major-General Ghigny on the left wing, and Dutch–Belgian carabiniers under Major-General Trip in the center, finally managed to repel the resurgent French cavalry. 139

Estimating the precise losses of the cavalry brigades from this charge is a notoriously difficult task, as casualties were only recorded after the battle and aggregated for the engagement as a whole. 140 x Some historians, such as Barbero, 141 believe that official rolls tend to overestimate the number of cavalrymen actually present in their squadrons on the field, implying that proportionate losses were considerably higher than the paper numbers suggest. y

The Union Brigade suffered grievously, losing heavily in both officers and men killed (including its commander, William Ponsonby, and Colonel Hamilton of the Scots Greys) and wounded. The 2nd Life Guards and the King’s Dragoon Guards of the Household Brigade also sustained severe losses (with Colonel Fuller, commander of the King’s DG, among the fallen). However, the 1st Life Guards, positioned on the extreme right of the charge, and the Blues, who formed a reserve, managed to maintain their cohesion and consequently suffered significantly fewer casualties. 142 z On paper, the official strength for both brigades was listed as 2,651, while Barbero and others estimate the actual strength at closer to 2,000. 141 aa The officially recorded losses for these two heavy cavalry brigades during the battle amounted to 1,205 troopers and 1,303 horses. 119 ab

Some historians, including Chandler, Weller, Uffindell, and Corum, assert that the British heavy cavalry were effectively destroyed as a viable fighting force following their initial, epic charge. 143 144 Barbero, for instance, states that the Scots Greys were practically wiped out, with the other two regiments of the Union Brigade suffering comparable losses. 145 However, other historians, such as Clark-Kennedy and Wood, drawing on British eyewitness accounts, offer a different perspective, describing the continued, albeit costly, role of the heavy cavalry after their initial charge. These heavy brigades, far from being rendered ineffective, continued to provide invaluable service. They launched numerous countercharges against French cavalry (both brigades), 146 147 148 149 halted a combined cavalry and infantry attack (Household Brigade only), 150 151 152 and were instrumental in bolstering the morale of units in their vicinity during moments of crisis. They also filled dangerous gaps in the Anglo-allied line caused by heavy casualties in infantry formations (both brigades). 153 154 155 156 157

This continued service, however, came at a truly exorbitant cost. Constant close combat with French cavalry, carbine fire, infantry musketry, and—most deadly of all—artillery fire steadily eroded the number of effectives in both brigades. ac By 6 o’clock in the afternoon, the entire Union Brigade could muster only three squadrons, and even these launched a countercharge against French cavalry, losing half their remaining number in the process. 147 By the end of the fighting, the two brigades, by then combined into a shadow of their former selves, could barely form a single squadron. 147 156 158

In total, 14,000 French troops from d’Erlon’s I Corps had been committed to this initial attack. The I Corps was driven back in a disordered rout across the valley, costing Napoleon a staggering 3,000 casualties, 159 including over 2,000 prisoners. 160 Crucially, valuable time was also lost, as the charge had dispersed numerous units, and it would take until 16:00 for d’Erlon’s shaken corps to reform. And though elements of the Prussians were now beginning to appear on his right flank, Napoleon had already, before d’Erlon’s attack even began, ordered Lobau’s VI Corps to shift to the right flank to hold them back. A rather optimistic deployment, given the circumstances.

The French cavalry attack

A little before 16:00, Ney, ever impetuous, noted what appeared to be a significant exodus from Wellington’s center. He, in a rather costly misjudgment, mistook the movement of casualties to the rear for the beginnings of a full-scale retreat and sought to exploit it. Following the earlier defeat of d’Erlon’s Corps, Ney found himself with precious few infantry reserves, as most had been committed either to the futile Hougoumont attack or to the defense of the French right flank. In a desperate gamble, Ney resolved to break Wellington’s center with cavalry alone. 161 Initially, Milhaud’s reserve cavalry corps of cuirassiers and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes ’ light cavalry division of the Imperial Guard, totaling some 4,800 sabres, were committed. When these were predictably repulsed, Kellermann ’s heavy cavalry corps and Guyot ’s heavy cavalry of the Guard were added to the massed assault, bringing the total to an astonishing 9,000 cavalry in 67 squadrons. 162 When Napoleon observed this premature, grand charge, he famously remarked that it was “an hour too soon.” 159

Wellington’s infantry, with a disciplined predictability that must have been infuriating to the French, responded by forming squares —hollow box-formations, four ranks deep. These squares, often depicted as vast, impenetrable fortresses in paintings, were in reality much smaller; a 500-man battalion square would have been no more than 60 feet (18 m) in length on a side. Infantry squares that held their ground proved utterly deadly to cavalry. Cavalry, after all, could not effectively engage with soldiers protected by a hedge of bayonets, yet the squares themselves were vulnerable to sustained fire from artillery or infantry. Wellington, ever pragmatic, ordered his artillery crews to seek shelter within the squares as the cavalry approached, and then to return to their guns and resume firing as the French cavalry recoiled. 163 164

British infantry witnesses recorded no less than 12 distinct assaults. 165 However, given the broad frontage of the cavalry formations and the 950 m (1,040 yd) gap between Hougoumont and La Haie Sainte, any truly massed cavalry advance would, in practice, consist of a series of successive waves. 162 Kellermann, recognizing the sheer futility of these repeated attacks, attempted to hold back the elite carabinier brigade from joining the fray, but Ney, ever insistent, spotted them and demanded their involvement. 166

Captain Rees Howell Gronow, an officer in the Foot Guards, offered a particularly vivid and somewhat poetic British eyewitness account of the first French cavalry attack:

About four p.m., the enemy’s artillery in front of us ceased firing all of a sudden, and we saw large masses of cavalry advance: not a man present who survived could have forgotten in after life the awful grandeur of that charge. You discovered at a distance what appeared to be an overwhelming, long moving line, which, ever advancing, glittered like a stormy wave of the sea when it catches the sunlight. On they came until they got near enough, whilst the very earth seemed to vibrate beneath the thundering tramp of the mounted host. One might suppose that nothing could have resisted the shock of this terrible moving mass. They were the famous cuirassiers, almost all old soldiers, who had distinguished themselves on most of the battlefields of Europe. In an almost incredibly short period they were within twenty yards of us, shouting “Vive l’Empereur!” The word of command, “Prepare to receive cavalry”, had been given, every man in the front ranks knelt, and a wall bristling with steel, held together by steady hands, presented itself to the infuriated cuirassiers.

— Captain Rees Howell Gronow, Foot Guards. 167

In essence, this type of massed cavalry attack relied almost entirely on psychological shock for its effect. 168 Close artillery support could, in theory, disrupt infantry squares and create openings for cavalry to penetrate. At Waterloo, however, cooperation between the French cavalry and artillery was conspicuously lacking. The French artillery simply did not get close enough to the Anglo-allied infantry in sufficient numbers to be decisive. 169 While artillery fire between charges did produce mounting casualties, most of this fire was delivered at relatively long range and was often indirect, aimed at targets beyond the ridge, reducing its overall impact. 170

If the infantry, under attack, maintained their steadfast square defensive formations and, crucially, did not panic, cavalry alone could inflict very little significant damage. The French cavalry attacks were, time and again, repelled by the unwavering infantry squares, the relentless, harassing fire of British artillery as the French cavalry recoiled down the slopes to regroup, and the decisive countercharges of Wellington’s light cavalry regiments, the Dutch heavy cavalry brigade, and the remaining effectives of the Household Cavalry. 170

At least one artillery officer, Captain Mercer , who commanded ‘G’ Troop, Royal Horse Artillery , famously disobeyed Wellington’s explicit order to seek shelter within the adjacent squares during the charges. Mercer, convinced that the Brunswick troops on either side of him were so “shaky” as to be unreliable, kept his battery of six nine-pounders in continuous action against the cavalry, to devastating effect. 170 ad

Mercer’s own account underscores the sheer brutality:

I thus allowed them to advance unmolested until the head of the column might have been about fifty or sixty yards from us, and then gave the word, “Fire!” The effect was terrible. Nearly the whole leading rank fell at once; and the round shot, penetrating the column carried confusion throughout its extent … the discharge of every gun was followed by a fall of men and horses like that of grass before the mower’s scythe.

— Captain Cavalié Mercer , RHA. 171

For reasons that remain, perhaps conveniently, unclear, no concerted attempt was made to spike the Anglo-allied guns while they were temporarily in French possession. This oversight proved critical. In accordance with Wellington’s standing orders, gunners were consistently able to return to their pieces and unleash devastating fire into the French cavalry as they withdrew after each frustrated attack. After numerous costly but utterly fruitless assaults on the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge, the French cavalry was, quite simply, spent. ae

Their casualties, though difficult to estimate precisely, were undoubtedly severe. Senior French cavalry officers, particularly the generals, experienced heavy losses; four divisional commanders were wounded, nine brigadiers wounded, and one killed—a grim testament to their courage, or perhaps their foolhardiness, in leading from the front. 166 Illustratively, Houssaye reports that the Grenadiers à Cheval, numbering 796 of all ranks on 15 June, were reduced to a mere 462 by 19 June, while the Empress Dragoons lost 416 of their 816 men over the same period. 172 Overall, Guyot’s Guard heavy cavalry division suffered a staggering 47% loss of its strength.

Second French infantry attack

Eventually, it became glaringly obvious, even to Ney, that cavalry alone was achieving precious little beyond a spectacular display of self-destruction. Belatedly, he organized a combined-arms attack, incorporating Bachelu’s division and Tissot’s regiment of Foy’s division from Reille’s II Corps (approximately 6,500 infantrymen) alongside the remaining French cavalry that were still fit enough to fight. This assault was directed along much the same, by now well-trodden, route as the preceding heavy cavalry attacks, specifically between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. 173 It was ultimately halted by a charge from the Household Brigade cavalry, once again led by Uxbridge. However, the British cavalry, despite their valor, proved unable to break the French infantry formations and were forced to fall back, sustaining further losses from musketry fire. 174

Uxbridge, in a rather pointed observation, later recorded that he attempted to lead the Dutch Carabiniers, under Major-General Trip , to renew the attack, and that they “refused to follow him.” Other members of the British cavalry staff corroborated this alleged occurrence. 175 However, it’s worth noting that there is no corroborating evidence for this incident in Dutch or Belgian sources. ag Furthermore, Wellington, in his Dispatch to Secretary for War Bathurst on 19 June 1815, specifically praised General Trip, stating he had “conducted himself much to my satisfaction.” 176 Uxbridge then resorted to ordering a charge by three squadrons of the 3rd Hussars of the King’s German Legion. They managed to break through the French cavalry, but quickly became hemmed in, were cut off, and suffered severe losses. 177 Meanwhile, Bachelu’s and Tissot’s men, along with their cavalry supports, were being relentlessly pounded by fire from both artillery and Adam’s infantry brigade, eventually compelling them to fall back. 173

Although the French cavalry attacks inflicted relatively few direct casualties on Wellington’s center, the ceaseless artillery fire directed at his infantry squares took a heavy toll. Wellington’s cavalry, with the exception of Sir John Vandeleur’s and Sir Hussey Vivian’s brigades on the far left, had all been committed to the brutal fighting and had sustained significant losses. The situation appeared so desperate that the Cumberland Hussars, the sole Hanoverian cavalry regiment present, fled the field entirely, spreading alarm all the way to Brussels. 178 ah

French capture of La Haye Sainte

At approximately the same time as Ney’s combined-arms assault on the center-right of Wellington’s line, rallied elements of D’Erlon’s I Corps, spearheaded by the 13th Légère, renewed their attack on La Haye Sainte. This time, they were successful, partly due to the critical factor that the King’s German Legion ’s ammunition had, rather inconveniently, run out. However, the Germans had, with remarkable tenacity, held the center of the battlefield for almost the entire day, a feat that had significantly stalled the French advance. 179 180

With La Haye Sainte finally captured, Ney swiftly moved skirmishers and horse artillery forward, positioning them precariously close to Wellington’s center. 181 French artillery then began to mercilessly pulverize the infantry squares at short range with devastating canister fire. 182 The 30th and 73rd Regiments suffered such heavy losses that they were forced to combine their remnants to form a single, viable square. 183

Captain James Shaw, of the 43rd Foot and Chief of Staff 3rd Division, articulated the gravity of the situation:

The possession of La Haye Sainte by the French was a very dangerous incident. It uncovered the very centre of the Anglo-allied army, and established the enemy within 60 yards of that centre. The French lost no time in taking advantage of this, by pushing forward infantry supported by guns, which enabled them to maintain a most destructive fire upon Alten’s left and Kempt’s right …

— Captain James Shaw, 43rd Foot , Chief of Staff 3rd Division. 184

The breakthrough Napoleon desperately needed to sustain his offensive had finally occurred. 185 Ney, at this critical juncture, was on the precipice of shattering the Anglo-allied center. 184

Compounding the artillery barrage, a multitude of French tirailleurs skillfully occupied the dominant positions behind La Haye Sainte, unleashing a relentless and effective fire into the vulnerable squares. The situation for the Anglo-allies was now so dire that the 33rd Regiment’s colors and all of Halkett’s brigade’s colors were sent to the rear for safety—a measure that historian Alessandro Barbero described as “without precedent.” 186

Wellington, acutely aware of the slackening fire from La Haye Sainte, rode closer with his staff to assess the situation. French skirmishers, appearing around the building, promptly opened fire on the British command group as it struggled to extricate itself through the hedgerow along the road. The Prince of Orange, in a moment of questionable judgment, then ordered a single battalion of the KGL, the Fifth, to recapture the farm, despite the obvious and overwhelming presence of enemy cavalry. Their Colonel, Christian Friedrich Wilhelm von Ompteda , dutifully obeyed, leading his battalion down the slope. They briefly chased off some French skirmishers, only for French cuirassiers to fall upon their exposed flank, killing Ompteda, annihilating his battalion, and capturing its color. 185

A Dutch–Belgian cavalry regiment, ordered to charge, instead retreated from the field, shamefully fired upon by their own infantry. Merlen’s Light Cavalry Brigade, attempting to charge the French artillery taking position near La Haye Sainte, was utterly shot to pieces, and the brigade disintegrated. The Netherlands Cavalry Division, Wellington’s last cavalry reserve behind the center, having lost half its strength, was now rendered useless. The French cavalry, despite its own heavy losses, effectively commanded the field, compelling the Anglo-allied infantry to remain locked in their vulnerable squares. More and more French artillery was relentlessly brought forward. 187

A French battery advanced to within a mere 300 yards of the 1/1st Nassau square, inflicting devastating casualties. When the Nassauers attempted to attack the battery, they were ridden down by a squadron of cuirassiers. Yet another battery deployed on the flank of Mercer’s battery, tearing through its horses and limbers and forcing Mercer to pull back. Mercer later recalled, with grim precision:

The rapidity and precision of this fire was quite appalling. Every shot almost took effect, and I certainly expected we should all be annihilated. … The saddle-bags, in many instances were torn from horses’ backs … One shell I saw explode under the two finest wheel-horses in the troop down they dropped 187 188

French tirailleurs occupied the dominant positions, particularly one on a knoll overlooking the square of the 27th. Unable to break formation to drive off the French infantry due to the persistent threat of French cavalry and artillery, the 27th was forced to remain in its square and endure the relentless fire of the tirailleurs. This sustained barrage nearly annihilated the 27th Foot, the Inniskillings, who lost two-thirds of their strength within those three or four agonizing hours. 189

Edward Cotton, of the 7th Hussars, painted a bleak picture:

The banks on the road side, the garden wall, the knoll and sandpit swarmed with skirmishers, who seemed determined to keep down our fire in front; those behind the artificial bank seemed more intent upon destroying the 27th, who at this time, it may literally be said, were lying dead in square; their loss after La Haye Sainte had fallen was awful, without the satisfaction of having scarcely fired a shot, and many of our troops in rear of the ridge were similarly situated.

— Edward Cotton, 7th Hussars, 190

During this brutal period, many of Wellington’s generals and aides were either killed or wounded, including FitzRoy Somerset , Canning, ai de Lancey , Alten , and Cooke . 192 The situation was now truly critical, and Wellington, trapped within an infantry square and largely ignorant of events beyond his immediate vicinity, was desperately awaiting the arrival of Prussian aid. He later wrote, with a profound sense of the passage of time:

The time they occupied in approaching seemed interminable. Both they and my watch seemed to have stuck fast. 193

Arrival of the Prussian IV Corps: Plancenoit

See also: Prussians attack out of the Wood of Paris

Wellington, a man not prone to hyperbole, uttered a phrase that perfectly encapsulated the desperate gravity of the moment:

Night or the Prussians must come.

— Wellington. 193

The Prussian IV Corps , under Bülow, was the first to arrive in significant strength. Bülow’s primary objective was the village of Plancenoit, a strategic location the Prussians intended to leverage as a springboard into the rear of the French positions. Blücher, ever the master of aggressive maneuver, intended to secure his right flank upon the Châteaux Frichermont using the Bois de Paris road. 194 Blücher and Wellington had been in constant communication since 10:00 that morning, having agreed upon this advance on Frichermont should Wellington’s center come under heavy attack. 195 aj General Bülow, observing that the path to Plancenoit lay open, noted the time as 16:30. 194

At approximately this time, the Prussian 15th Brigade (Losthin’s de ), was dispatched to link up with the Nassauers on Wellington’s left flank in the Frichermont-La Haie area. The brigade’s horse artillery battery, supported by additional brigade artillery, was deployed to its left. 196 Napoleon, recognizing the burgeoning threat, sent Lobau’s corps to intercept the remainder of Bülow’s IV Corps before it could reach Plancenoit. The 15th Brigade, however, with a determined bayonet charge, swiftly ejected Lobau’s troops from Frichermont. They then pressed onward up the Frichermont heights, relentlessly battering French Chasseurs with 12-pounder artillery fire, continuing their advance towards Plancenoit. This aggressive push forced Lobau’s corps into a hasty retreat towards the Plancenoit area, driving them past the rear of the Armée Du Nord’s right flank and directly threatening its only viable line of retreat. Hiller’s 16th Brigade also surged forward with six battalions against Plancenoit. 36 197

Napoleon, now gravely pressed, dispatched all eight battalions of his Young Guard to reinforce Lobau. The Young Guard counter-attacked with furious determination and, after exceptionally hard fighting, managed to secure Plancenoit. However, their triumph was short-lived; they were themselves counter-attacked and driven out. 198 Napoleon, in a desperate measure, committed two battalions of the Middle/Old Guard into Plancenoit. Following ferocious bayonet fighting—they, with a disdain for lesser tactics, did not even deign to fire their muskets—this elite force recaptured the village. 198

Zieten’s flank march

Situation from 17:30 to 20:00

Throughout the late afternoon, the Prussian I Corps , under Zieten, had been steadily arriving in greater strength in the area just north of La Haie. General Müffling , the Prussian liaison officer attached to Wellington’s army, rode to meet Zieten, a crucial intervention. 199

Zieten had, by this point, brought up the Prussian 1st Brigade (Steinmetz ’s), but had become increasingly concerned by the sight of stragglers and casualties from the Nassau units on Wellington’s left and from the Prussian 15th Brigade (Laurens’). These troops appeared to be withdrawing, and Zieten, fearing that his own forces would be swept up in a general retreat, began to shift his movement away from Wellington’s flank and towards the main Prussian body near Plancenoit. Zieten had also received a direct order from Blücher to support Bülow, which he was, quite naturally, obeying. 199

Müffling, however, observing this potentially disastrous maneuver, managed to intercept and persuade Zieten to reverse course and directly support Wellington’s left flank. 199 Müffling sternly warned Zieten that “The battle is lost if the corps does not keep on the move and immediately support the English army.” 200 Zieten, convinced by this stark assessment, resumed his march to directly support Wellington. The timely arrival of his troops allowed Wellington to, with a sigh of relief, reinforce his crumbling center by judiciously moving cavalry from his now-strengthened left flank. 199

The French, still clinging to the increasingly desperate hope that Grouchy would march to their support from Wavre, were utterly shattered when the Prussian I Corps (Zieten’s) appeared at Waterloo instead. “The shock of disillusionment shattered French morale,” and “the sight of Zieten’s arrival caused turmoil to rage in Napoleon’s army.” 201 I Corps then proceeded to attack the French troops positioned before Papelotte, and by 19:30, the French position had been forced into a rough horseshoe shape. The ends of their line were now tenuously anchored on Hougoumont on the left, Plancenoit on the right, and the beleaguered center on La Haie. 202

Durutte had, through a series of desperate attacks, managed to seize the positions of La Haie and Papelotte. 202 However, he now found himself forced to retreat behind Smohain without offering significant opposition to the Prussian 24th Regiment (Laurens’) as it retook both positions. The 24th then advanced against the new French line, was initially repulsed, but returned to the attack, reinforced by Silesian Schützen (riflemen) and the F/1st Landwehr. 203 The French initially fell back before this renewed assault but then began to seriously contest the ground, attempting to regain Smohain and desperately cling to the ridgeline and the last few houses of Papelotte. 203

The Prussian 24th Regiment eventually linked up with a Highlander battalion which? on its far right and, alongside the 13th Landwehr Regiment and crucial cavalry support, managed to drive the French out of these positions. Further attacks by the 13th Landwehr and the 15th Brigade successfully dislodged the French from Frichermont. 204 Durutte’s division, suddenly finding itself on the verge of being charged by massed squadrons of Zieten’s I Corps cavalry reserve, wisely retreated from the battlefield. The rest of d’Erlon’s I Corps, witnessing this unraveling, also broke and fled in panic, while to the west, the French Middle Guard were simultaneously assaulting Wellington’s beleaguered center. 205 206 The Prussian I Corps then pressed its advantage, advancing relentlessly towards the Brussels road, which was, by this point, the only remaining line of retreat available to the French.

Attack of the Imperial Guard

Meanwhile, with Wellington’s center dangerously exposed by the fall of La Haye Sainte and the Plancenoit front temporarily stabilized, Napoleon committed his very last reserve: the hitherto-undefeated Imperial Guard infantry. This attack, launched at approximately 19:30, was intended as a desperate, final gamble—to shatter Wellington’s center and roll up his entire line, driving it away from the Prussians. While it remains one of the most celebrated passages of arms in military history, there has always been some historical ambiguity regarding precisely which units actually participated. It appears to have been primarily mounted by five battalions of the Middle Guard, ak rather than the legendary grenadiers or chasseurs of the Old Guard, who remained in reserve, forming the attack’s second line, but not directly assaulting the Anglo-allied positions. 207 al

Marshal M. Ney, ever the one to take credit (or blame, depending on the outcome), recounted:

… I saw four regiments of the middle guard, conducted by the Emperor, arriving. With these troops, he wished to renew the attack, and penetrate the centre of the enemy. He ordered me to lead them on; generals, officers and soldiers all displayed the greatest intrepidity; but this body of troops was too weak to resist, for a long time, the forces opposed to it by the enemy, and it was soon necessary to renounce the hope which this attack had, for a few moments, inspired.

— Marshal M. Ney. 208

Napoleon himself oversaw the initial deployment of the Middle and Old Guard. The Middle Guard formed into battalion squares, each approximately 550 men strong. The 1st/3rd Grenadiers, led by Generals Friant and Poret de Morvan , were positioned on the right along the road. To their left and slightly to the rear was General Harlet, leading the square of the 4th Grenadiers, then the 1st/3rd Chasseurs under General Michel , followed by the 2nd/3rd Chasseurs, and finally the substantial single square comprising two battalions of 800 soldiers of the 4th Chasseurs, led by General Henrion. Two batteries of Imperial Guard Horse Artillery accompanied them, with sections of two guns strategically placed between the squares. Each square was commanded by a general, and Marshal Ney, now mounted on his fifth horse of the day, gallantly led the advance. 209 Behind them, held in reserve, were the three battalions of the Old Guard: from right to left, the 1st/2nd Grenadiers, 2nd/2nd Chasseurs, and 1st/2nd Chasseurs. Napoleon, having set the stage, left Ney to conduct the actual assault. However, Ney, in a critical deviation, led the Middle Guard on an oblique course towards the Anglo-allied center-right, rather than a direct, frontal attack up the center. Napoleon dispatched Ney’s senior ADC, Colonel Crabbé, with orders to adjust the line, but Crabbé was unable to reach him in time.

Other French troops rallied to support the Guard’s desperate advance. On the left, infantry from Reille’s corps (those not still fruitlessly engaged at Hougoumont) and cavalry pressed forward. On the right, all the now-rallied elements of D’Erlon’s corps once again ascended the ridge, engaging the Anglo-allied line. French artillery also moved forward in support; Duchand’s battery, in particular, inflicted heavy losses on Colin Halkett ’s brigade. 210 Halkett’s front line, consisting of the 30th Foot and 73rd, initially exchanged fire with the 1st/3rd and 4th Grenadiers, but they were eventually driven back in confusion into the 33rd and 69th regiments. Halkett himself was shot in the face and seriously wounded, and the entire brigade, having been ordered to pull back, retreated in a disorganized mob. Other Anglo-allied troops also began to give way under the relentless pressure. A counterattack by the Nassauers and the remnants of Kielmansegge’s brigade from the Anglo-allied second line, led by the Prince of Orange, was also repulsed, and the Prince of Orange himself suffered a serious wound. The survivors of Halkett’s brigade, however, managed to reform and bravely re-engaged the French in a fierce firefight. 211 212

David Hendrik Chassé , the Dutch divisional commander, observing the unfolding disaster, made a critical decision on his own initiative.

I saw the Garde Impériale advancing while the English troops were leaving the plateau en masse and moving in the direction of Waterloo; the battle seemed lost…

— David Hendrik Chassé 213

At this desperate moment, Chassé, without orders, decided to advance with his relatively fresh Dutch division. 214 213 He first ordered his artillery forward; 213 led by a battery of Dutch horse-artillery commanded by Captain Krahmer de Bichin . This battery opened a destructive fire into the 1st/3rd Grenadiers’ flank. 215 Even this did not halt the Guard’s relentless advance, so Chassé, affectionately known as “Generaal Bajonet” by his soldiers, ordered his first brigade, commanded by Colonel Hendrik Detmers , to charge the outnumbered French with the bayonet. 216 217 As the Guard wavered, Chassé galloped among his men, finding Captain De Haan with a handful of soldiers from the 19th Militia, whom he ordered into a flank attack. According to Chassé:

[De Haan] jumped over the hedge, reformed the line of about fifty men and the murderous fire he inflicted caused death and confusion among the enemy’s lines. He took advantage of their confusion and advanced with the bayonet against them. I had the unspeakable joy to witness 300 Cuirassiers run away from 50 Dutchmen. 213

The French grenadiers, finally broken, then faltered and retreated. The 4th Grenadiers, witnessing their comrades’ retreat and having suffered heavy casualties themselves, now wheeled right about and retired. [218](/Battle_of_Waterloo#cite_note-Field_201