Ah, the Nationalist Movement Party . If you must insist on delving into the intricacies of Turkish politics, then fine. Just try to keep up.

The Nationalist Movement Party , often abbreviated as MHP, or occasionally translated with slightly less precision as the Nationalist Action Party (in Turkish : Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), stands as a prominent far-right and ultranationalist political party within Turkey . Its ideological underpinnings are so rigid, so deeply entrenched, that it has been widely characterized as neo-fascist , a label that, once applied, tends to stick. The party’s history is, shall we say, rich with affiliations to various violent paramilitary formations and, rather less reputably, certain organized crime groups . One might argue that such associations are merely a consequence of their fervent commitment, or perhaps just an inconvenient truth.

Central to the MHP’s operational structure, and certainly its public image, is its notorious youth wing: the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar). This organization, also known by the more innocuous-sounding moniker “Nationalist Hearths” (Ülkü Ocakları), didn’t just play a role in the turbulent political violence that plagued Turkey in the 1970s ; it was, by many accounts, a central protagonist. A pivotal force, some would claim, in shaping that era’s bloody narrative.

The party’s genesis traces back to 1969, under the stewardship of Alparslan Türkeş , a former Turkish Army colonel. Türkeş, having previously assumed leadership of the Republican Villagers Nation Party (CKMP) in 1965, embarked on this new political venture. His stated rationale for founding the MHP was a sharp critique of the then-dominant Republican People’s Party (CHP), which he accused of drifting too far from the foundational nationalist tenets laid down by their esteemed founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk . Türkeş, with a certain dramatic flair, claimed he wouldn’t have bothered to establish the MHP had the CHP not, in his view, so egregiously strayed from Atatürk’s original vision. One can almost hear the sigh of historical inevitability.

Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the party’s agenda was largely dominated by a fervent commitment to Pan-Turkist and Turkish nationalist principles. This unwavering focus, as one might expect, yielded varying degrees of electoral success. The MHP managed to secure enough parliamentary seats in both the 1973 and 1977 general elections to participate in the so-called “Nationalist Front ” coalition governments during the tumultuous 1970s. However, this period of influence was abruptly curtailed following the 1980 military coup , which saw the party, along with all others, summarily banned. Political parties, it seems, are often deemed inconvenient when the military decides to tidy up. Despite this setback, the MHP eventually re-emerged, re-established under its original name in 1993.

A notable period of participation in a coalition government followed. Yet, this relative prominence was short-lived. In the 2002 general election , the MHP suffered a significant blow, failing to clear the crucial 10% election threshold . This electoral setback resulted in the complete loss of its parliamentary representation, a situation exacerbated by the ascendance of the newly formed Justice and Development Party (AKP), which secured a plurality of the votes.

The MHP eventually clawed its way back into parliamentary relevance after the 2007 general election . For a considerable period following this return, the party positioned itself as a vocal and often fierce critic of the governing AKP , particularly on matters of alleged government corruption and perceived authoritarian tendencies. A principled stand, one might think. However, critics frequently, and somewhat derisively, referred to the MHP as the “AKP’s lifeline.” This rather pointed appellation stemmed from instances where the MHP, often in a less-than-transparent manner, provided crucial, if covert, support to the AKP. Such moments included the contentious 2007 presidential election , the controversial repeal of the headscarf ban , and the intricate maneuvering during the June–July 2015 parliamentary speaker elections . A convenient ally, it seems, regardless of prior criticism.

A more overt shift in allegiance occurred after 2016, when Devlet Bahçeli , the MHP leader, and the party itself, became a steadfast and key ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP . This strategic pivot, however, was not without its internal repercussions, causing a significant schism within the party . The fallout led to the departure of prominent figures, including Meral Akşener , who subsequently went on to establish the anti-Erdoğanist İYİ Party . Currently, the MHP lends its support to a minority government led by the AKP , a position that solidifies its role as a crucial pillar in the contemporary Turkish political landscape.

History

Before 1980

In 1965, Alparslan Türkeş , a figure whose nationalist convictions were as pronounced as his military background, and an ex-Colonel who had even received training in the United States under the auspices of NATO (and, notably, had founded the Turkish Gladio Special Warfare Department ), successfully maneuvered to gain control of the Republican Villagers Nation Party (in Turkish : Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, or CKMP), a party with a conservative, rural base. The transformation was formalized during an Extraordinary Great Congress held in Adana , Turkey, in 1969. It was there that Türkeş, with the crucial backing of Dündar Taşer , officially rebranded the party as the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). A new party logo, depicting the iconic three crescent moons, was also adopted, symbolizing, one assumes, a renewed and potent nationalist identity.

Under Türkeş’s unwavering leadership, the MHP became a powerful exponent of Turkish nationalism . This period, particularly the 1970s, was marred by widespread political violence . Militias directly linked to the party were implicated in the assassinations of numerous left-wing intellectuals and academics, a tragic list that, regrettably, included some Kurds. The party’s youth wing, the infamous Grey Wolves , named after a revered figure in Turkic mythology , operated with a chilling sense of self-importance. Their leader, with a bravado that borders on the absurd, once boasted that their intelligence organization was, in fact, superior to the state’s own. A bold claim, if not entirely unbelievable given the era’s chaotic nature.

Yet, the MHP’s influence wasn’t solely confined to street-level violence. It also cultivated connections with more intellectual circles, notably the Aydınlar Ocağı (AO), or “Hearth of Intellectuals.” This right-wing think tank , established in 1970 by respected university professors, served as a crucial bridge. It linked secular-conservative, nationalist, and Islamic rightist factions, actively promoting the ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis . The ideas emanating from AO, which some observers have even likened to those of the French Nouvelle Droite , exerted a profound and shaping influence on the MHP’s political programs. This intellectual veneer, one might observe, lent the far-right party a more legitimate, even respectable, public appearance, a useful polish for a movement with such a volatile undercurrent.

As noted, the MHP’s electoral performance in the 1973 and 1977 general elections allowed it to participate in the “Nationalist Front” governments. This period of governmental involvement was strategically exploited by the party, enabling it to infiltrate various layers of the state bureaucracy, particularly during the peak of the intense political violence between rightists and leftists . The escalating tensions reached a tragic climax on 27 May 1980, when Gün Sazak , the party’s deputy leader and a former government minister, was brutally assassinated outside his home. The perpetrators were identified as members of Revolutionary Left (in Turkish : Devrimci Sol or Dev Sol), a Marxist–Leninist militant group.

The political turmoil of the era culminated in the Turkish army seizing power on 12 September 1980 . This violent coup d’état, orchestrated by General Kenan Evren , led to the immediate banning of all active political parties, including the MHP. Consequently, many of its leading members found themselves imprisoned. In the aftermath, a number of former MHP members gravitated towards the liberal conservative Motherland Party or various Islamist political groups, a testament to the shifting sands of Turkish political allegiances. Agah Oktay Güner , a party member, famously, and perhaps wryly, observed that while the party’s members were incarcerated, its core ideology, ironically, remained very much in power.

Re-establishment

The MHP’s hiatus from the political stage proved temporary. In 1983, the party was reformed, albeit under a different guise, adopting the name “Conservative Party” (in Turkish : Muhafazakar Parti). This re-branding, however, was not the final iteration. After 1985, the name underwent another change, becoming the “Nationalist Task Party” (in Turkish : Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi). Finally, in 1992, the party reverted to its original and now familiar designation, the Nationalist Movement Party . This period of identity flux, one might suggest, reflects the challenges of maintaining political continuity under duress. It is worth noting that in 1993, a significant internal split occurred when Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and five other deputies chose to depart, subsequently founding the Great Union Party , which, tellingly, emerged as an Islamist party.

Devlet Bahçeli

Following the death of Alparslan Türkeş , the party’s charismatic founder, Devlet Bahçeli was elected as his successor. Under Bahçeli’s initial leadership, the MHP experienced what would become its most successful electoral outing to date. In the 1999 general election , the party garnered an impressive 18% of the national vote, securing 129 seats in the parliament. This unprecedented result saw Bahçeli ascend to the position of Deputy Prime Minister, entering a coalition government alongside the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP). However, Bahçeli’s subsequent insistence on an early election ultimately precipitated the government’s collapse in 2002. The ensuing 2002 general election proved disastrous for the MHP, as it once again failed to surpass the 10% election threshold , losing all its parliamentary representation to the surging Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The MHP, however, demonstrated a knack for political survival, regaining its parliamentary presence in the 2007 general election with 14.27% of the vote. In the years that followed, the party adopted a hardline stance, vehemently opposing the peace negotiations between the government and the Kurdistan Workers Party . Concurrently, it positioned itself as a sharp critic of the ruling AKP , frequently condemning alleged government corruption and perceived authoritarian tendencies. Yet, a curious pattern emerged, leading critics to label the MHP as the “AKP’s lifeline.” This designation arose from instances where the MHP, often subtly, provided crucial support to the AKP in key political moments, such as the 2007 presidential election , the repeal of the headscarf ban , and the complex June–July 2015 parliamentary speaker elections . One might call it strategic pragmatism, or perhaps just a remarkable coincidence of interests.

A more decisive shift in the MHP’s political alignment occurred after 2015, with Devlet Bahçeli openly declaring his support for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP . This very public endorsement triggered a significant schism within the party , resulting in the departure of Meral Akşener , who subsequently founded the center-right İYİ Party . The MHP then actively supported a ‘Yes’ vote in the contentious 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum and formalized its alliance with the AKP by forming the People’s Alliance electoral pact for the 2018 Turkish general election . Currently, the MHP continues to provide critical support to a minority government led by the AKP , holding 48 Members of Parliament in the Turkish Parliament . A rather neat arrangement for both parties, wouldn’t you say?

Ideology

The MHP’s ideological bedrock is firmly rooted in the Nine-Light doctrine , an overarching philosophy that fuses ultranationalism with a distinct interpretation of Islam . This synthesis forms the core of its political identity. The party is, quite broadly and consistently, described as neo-fascist , a characterization that, while strong, is frequently employed by both domestic and international observers.

However, since the 1990s, particularly under the prolonged leadership of Devlet Bahçeli , the MHP has embarked on a gradual, yet discernible, moderation of its political program. This shift has seen the party pivot from a more explicit ethnic nationalism towards a broader cultural nationalism and a more generalized conservatism . In this evolving ideological landscape, the MHP has increasingly emphasized the unitary and indivisible nature of the Turkish state . This strategic overture towards the mainstream has, rather effectively, expanded its appeal to a wider segment of voters, transforming it into the country’s third-strongest political party. Consequently, the MHP has maintained continuous representation in the National Assembly since 2007, consistently securing voter shares well above the 10% electoral threshold. Beyond these labels, the party’s ideology has also been described as a form of Islamokemalism and is a clear proponent of Turkish–Islamic nationalism . One might call it a carefully crafted ideological tapestry, woven to maximize political utility.

Opposition to the HDP

Given the stark ideological chasm between them, the MHP maintains an unyielding opposition to any form of dialogue or cooperation with the left-wing, pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Devlet Bahçeli , the MHP leader, has consistently manifested this opposition through parliamentary votes and public declarations. A particularly striking illustration of this stance occurred during the June–July 2015 parliamentary speaker elections . In a move that underscored their ideological rigidity, the MHP declared its refusal to support any candidate and proceeded to cast blank votes, especially after the HDP announced its backing for the Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidate, Deniz Baykal .

Furthermore, following the June 2015 general election , which resulted in a hung parliament , the MHP unequivocally ruled out any possibility of forming a coalition government that might rely on support from the HDP. This hardline position was maintained even when CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu extended an offer for Bahçeli to become Prime Minister within such a coalition. MHP deputy leader Celal Adan articulated this deep-seated antagonism with a rather dramatic flourish, claiming that “even using our party’s name in the same sentence as the HDP will be counted as cruelty by us.” A clear, if somewhat theatrical, demarcation of political boundaries. The party has also consistently and strongly opposed the peace negotiations between the government and the Kurdistan Workers Party .

In an interesting, albeit fleeting, development in early September 2015, both the MHP and the HDP found themselves voting in unison against the new interim election government ministers taking their oaths of office. This rare moment of alignment sparked immediate speculation regarding a potential softening of the MHP’s famously harsh stance against the HDP. However, Semih Yalçın , an MHP official, swiftly moved to downplay any notions of an emerging alliance between the two ideologically distant parties. He dismissed the incident with a rather pointed analogy, stating that “a broken clock will still show the correct time once a day, the HDP can sometimes take a correct decision in Parliament. Showing this as a ‘MHP-HDP coalition’ is a deliberate diversion.” A masterclass in political damage control, perhaps. More recently, in 2021, Devlet Bahçeli intensified his rhetoric, repeatedly demanding the closure of the HDP in several speeches, a move widely criticized as fundamentally undemocratic and authoritarian.

Despite this history of staunch opposition, early 2025 witnessed an almost unprecedented dialogue initiated by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli with the Kurdish-oriented DEM Party, which is widely considered a successor to the HDP. This unexpected overture followed a call for peace from the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan , which subsequently led to a ceasefire declaration by the PKK in March 2025. Yet, in a testament to the enduring complexities of Turkish politics, Bahçeli has concurrently and consistently rejected any direct association with the HDP itself, reiterating his calls for the party’s closure. His justification remains that the HDP’s activities are fundamentally incompatible with the concept of national unity. One might observe that political stances, like tectonic plates, can shift, yet some fault lines remain stubbornly fixed.

Economic policies

During the campaign for the June 2015 Turkish general election , the MHP unveiled a new and rather ambitious economic manifesto. The party’s promises were largely aimed at improving the financial well-being of Turkey’s working poor. Specifically, they pledged to eliminate taxes on diesel and agricultural fertilizers, a move designed to alleviate the burdens on farmers and transportation sectors. Furthermore, the MHP promised a substantial increase in the net minimum wage, aiming for a figure of $518, coupled with a $37 transportation subsidy for every minimum wage worker. For those struggling with housing costs, an additional $92 per month in rental aid was proposed. The party calculated that these policies, if implemented, would provide a minimum wage earner residing in a large city with an additional $646 annually.

The MHP’s economic projections were equally optimistic, forecasting the creation of 700,000 new jobs, an increase in the national income per person to $13.3K, and a boost in exports to $238 billion. All of this, they asserted, would be achieved while maintaining an annual economic growth rate of 5.2 percent between 2016 and 2019. However, reality, as it often does, diverged sharply from these hopeful predictions. The promised economic boom did not materialize; instead, Turkey experienced a significant decline in its GDP per capita and overall standard of living , plummeting from 12,614 USD in 2014 to a rather stark 9,126 USD by 2019. A rather inconvenient truth for a party that prided itself on national strength.

Controversies

In July 2015, amid a wave of protests against the Xinjiang conflict (a complex and sensitive issue), MHP-affiliated Ülkücü activists launched an attack on South Korean tourists in Istanbul’s historic Sultanahmet Square . The incident, predictably, caused an international stir. In a subsequent interview with Turkish columnist Ahmet Hakan , MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli chose to downplay the severity of these attacks, offering a rather… unique justification. He remarked, “These are young kids. They may have been provoked. Plus, how are you going to differentiate between Korean and Chinese? They both have slanted eyes. Does it really matter?” This statement, along with a deeply unsettling banner displayed at the Ülkücü Istanbul headquarters proclaiming, “We crave Chinese blood,” ignited a firestorm of criticism in both Turkish and international media. One might observe that such comments demonstrate a rather profound lack of diplomatic nuance, or perhaps, just a startling indifference to the concept of distinguishing between various Asian ethnicities.

Party leaders

Election results

General elections

Senate elections

The Senate of the Republic , in its existence from 1960 to 1980, also saw electoral participation from the MHP.

Local elections

See also

• Turkey portal
• Politics portal
• Conservatism portal
• Idealism (Turkey)
• Nine Lights Doctrine
• Conservatism in Turkey
• Fascism in Asia