Right. Another monument to human ambition clashing with human incompetence. Let's get this over with. Don't interrupt.
Battle of Spicheren
Part of the Franco-Prussian War
| "Bataille de Forbach" by Jean-Adolphe Bocquin after Jules Férat |
|---|
| Date |
| Location |
| Result |
| Belligerents |
| North German Confederation |
| Commanders and leaders |
| Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz |
| Strength |
| 37,000 [1][a] |
| Casualties and losses |
| 843 killed 3,656 wounded 372 captured [1] |
| Spicheren |
|---|
| Location of Spicheren within the Grand Est Region |
| v • t • e |
|---|
| Franco-Prussian War |
| * Saarbrücken |
- Wissembourg
- Spicheren
- Wörth
- Bitche
- Lichtenberg
- Phalsbourg
- Marsal
- Borny–Colombey
- Strasbourg
- Toul
- Mars-la-Tour
- Gravelotte
- Metz
- Buzancy
- Nouart
- Beaumont
- Noisseville
- Bazeilles
- Sedan
- Montmédy
- Soissons
- Paris
- Sceaux
- Chevilly
- Nompatelize
- Bellevue
- Artenay
- Châtillon
- Verdun
- Neu-Breisach
- Châteaudun
- Sélestat
- 1st Buzenval
- Ognon
- Gray
- Le Bourget
- Dijon
- Belfort
- La Fère
- Coulmiers
- Havana
- Dreux
- Chat Chateauneuf-en-Thimerais
- Thionville
- Ladon
- Mézières
- Bretoncelles
- Amiens
- Beaune-la-Rolande
- Varize
- Villiers
- Villepion
- Loigny–Poupry
- Orléans
- Chateauneuf
- Buchy
- Beaugency
- Fréteval
- Vendôme
- Pesmes
- Longeau
- Epuisay
- Nuits Saint Georges
- Tours
- Hallue
- Péronne
- Bapaume
- Rocroi
- Villersexel
- Le Mans
- Lisaine
- Longwy
- St. Quentin
- 2nd Buzenval
- Pontarlier | | * Belgian reaction
- Paris Commune |
The Battle of Spicheren, which some insist on calling the Battle of Forbach, was a predictably bloody affair during the Franco-Prussian War. Fought on 6 August 1870, the decisive German victory forced the French to abandon the frontier and scurry back to the defenses of Metz. This engagement stands as the second of three critical French defeats that occurred in such rapid succession it almost seemed rehearsed. The German chief of staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, a man who actually made plans, had intended to pin Bazaine's army on the Saar river. The strategy was elegant in its simplicity: attack with the 2nd Army from the front while the 1st Army flanked its left, and the 3rd Army closed in from the rear. A classic encirclement. However, the aging and apparently overeager General von Steinmetz decided the plan lacked a certain chaotic flair. In an act of spectacular, unplanned initiative, he drove the 1st Army south from its position on the Moselle, straight for the town of Spicheren. In doing so, he neatly severed Prince Frederick Charles from his own forward cavalry units, because coordinating with allies is apparently optional when glory is at stake.

Background
Predictably, the French had declared war before bothering to move their troops into a useful position to, you know, invade Germany. This is the sort of strategic foresight that loses empires. The Germans, commanded by the methodical Field Marshal von Moltke, began assembling three armies with the clear objective of invading France and occupying Paris. [2] On 4 August, they crossed the frontier. The 3rd Army promptly conquered the walled city of Wissembourg. A mere two days later, they handed the French another defeat at Wörth. [3] On that same day, the 2nd Army was marching westward, even with one of its corps still languishing on a railroad somewhere.
When Napoleon III deigned to arrive and take command of his field army, he succumbed to the urgings of his generals and ordered an attack on Saarbrücken. After a spirited defense, the outnumbered Germans evacuated the city. The French then occupied it but failed to cross the river Saar, a half-measure that would become a theme. [4] General Lebœuf had been explicitly warned by his chief Intendant, Charles Joseph Francois Wolff, not to cross the Saar. The reason was painfully practical: they would be unable to supply their men on the other side. So, instead of a bold advance, the armies of France, led by Field Marshal Bazaine, dug into defensive positions. These positions were designed to protect against every conceivable attack, which also had the convenient side effect of ensuring the armies were too spread out to support one another. Brilliant. [5]
Moltke, meanwhile, assembled his forces into two wings. On the right, the 2nd Army, a formidable force of 134,000 men under Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, comprising the III, IV, IX, X, XII Corps, and the Prussian Guard, advanced toward Saarbrücken. The 1st Army, with 60,000 men under the impetuous General Steinmetz and consisting of the I, VII and VIII Corps, was moving in line with the 2nd Army, advancing from the lower Moselle river towards Saarlouis. [6]
Prelude
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The Germans crossed the frontier on 4 August, meeting what is described as "lively opposition" before the walls of Wissembourg, which they promptly subdued by bringing up artillery—a classic and effective solution to liveliness.
As mentioned, this battle was never part of Moltke's grand design. He wanted to hold Bazaine's army along the Saar until he could spring his trap. But General von Steinmetz, in a fit of overzealous disobedience, decided to make his own move. He marched the 1st army south from the Moselle River directly toward Spicheren, cutting off Prince Frederick Charles from his cavalry in the process. It was a move born of impatience and, one assumes, a profound disregard for the chain of command.
The 1st Army's advance guard, the 14th Division of the VII Corps under General Georg von Kameke, was advancing west from Saarbrücken on the morning of 6 August. Finding the bridges miraculously intact, they seized the opportunity to occupy the high ground just beyond the town. The French II Corps, under General Frossard, had conveniently abandoned these very heights to take up what he considered a position magnifique—a fortified line between Spicheren and Forbach. One man's magnificent position is another's tactical blunder. Frossard arranged his corps with meticulous care: the 3rd Division of General Laveaucoupet held the right and center along the heights, with two companies entrenched on the Rotherberg. On the French left, General Charles Nicolas Vergé's 1st Division occupied Stiring and the Forbach valley. General Bataille's division was held in reserve around Spicheren. All told, Frossard had about 27,000 men and 90 guns, ready and waiting in their magnificent, and soon to be compromised, position.
Battle

While the French army under General MacMahon was busy engaging the German 3rd Army at the Battle of Wörth, Steinmetz's German 1st Army was advancing from Saarbrücken. Early on the 6th, [7] a patrol from the German 2nd Army under Prince Friedrich Karl of Prussia noticed decoy fires and, looking beyond them, spotted Frossard's army arrayed on a plateau south of Spicheren. Ignoring Moltke's carefully laid plans, both German armies lunged at Frossard's fortified line. It seems the only plan was to attack whatever French forces were in front of them. [8]
General Kameke, operating under the delusion that Frossard's Corps was in retreat, concluded he was merely engaging a rear guard. He ordered an all-out attack, throwing the 74th and 39th Regiments of the 27th Brigade, led by Gen. Bruno von François, at the hill wall stretching between Spicheren and Forbach.
At the battle's outset, the French were blissfully unaware of the Germans' numerical superiority, as only elements of the German 2nd Army were initially engaged. Frossard dismissed the attackers as mere skirmishers and saw no need to request reinforcements. By the time the reality of the situation dawned on him, it was, as it so often is, too late. The communications between Frossard and Bazaine's headquarters were so catastrophically flawed that responses were fatally slow. By one o'clock, while the French reserves were still waiting for orders, German troops from both the 1st and 2nd Armies had already crossed the open ground and taken shelter at the base of the heights.
At the foot of the hill, General François paused, waiting for reinforcements and trying to gauge the number of French opposing him. French counter-attacks by infantry and Cuirassiers were bloodily repulsed by three nearby Prussian batteries. These batteries, despite taking heavy losses from French fire, had deployed on Galgenberg Hill, just a kilometer from Rotherberg Hill. Later in the afternoon, Kameke's 28th Brigade under Wilhelm von Woyna arrived, breathing new life into the battle, but again, the Prussian attacks were beaten back. [9]
The French counter-attacked with vigor. General François, leading from the front, was encouraging the troops of the 74th Regiment at the edge of Rotherberg Hill. He drew his sword, ordered the bugler to sound the attack, and led the newly arrived 9th Company of the 39th Regiment in a charge. He was promptly killed, struck by five bullets—a grim testament to the effectiveness of leading from the very front. Gen. Laveaucoupet's 40th Regiment then pushed back François's now badly demoralized survivors, while Gen. Charles Vergé's 2nd Brigade drove back Woyna's troops. [10]
By this point, General Constantin von Alvensleben, commander of the III Corps of the Prussian 2nd Army, had arrived to aid his beleaguered compatriots, and the Prince had taken overall command. Drawn by the sound of battle like moths to a flame, more and more Prussian troops materialized on the battlefield. Alvensleben decided to attack Frossard's left flank, adding yet another layer of pressure. [11]

After 5 p.m., the tide of battle turned yet again. General Battaile's 2nd Division attacked with 15 battalions near Stiring and Spicheren, shattering the Prussian lines and forcing them back almost to Saarbrücken. [12] This was Frossard's moment. Had he pressed these counter-attacks, he might have salvaged a victory. But, with no reserves having arrived, he hesitated. He reinforced his left flank, convinced he was in grave danger of being outflanked because German soldiers under General Adolf von Glümer had been spotted in Forbach. Frossard halted his successful attack. Around 7 p.m., he wired headquarters, announcing he would have to retreat to the heights to avoid being outflanked. His troops were being hammered by a combination of overlapping infantry and artillery fire. Frossard's forces began an orderly retreat from Rotherberg Hill and Stiring, though some reports suggest a less-than-orderly panic, with 3,000 men arriving in Strasburg without their weapons. [11] The French rear guard fought fiercely, leading to bloody house-to-house combat in Forbach and Stiring. [13] At dusk, Alvensleben's infantry, more than 5,000 strong, charged and overran the French rear guard, finally gaining control of Rotherberg Hill. Instead of continuing to defend the heights, Frossard retreated south in an orderly fashion. By 9 o'clock, the Prussians occupied the entire Spicheren plateau. They celebrated their hard-won victory with a salute of one hundred and one guns. [9]
The German infantry was spent, so even with fresh cavalry units available, the retreating French were allowed to slip away into the darkness.
Vers neuf heures du soir, le même capitaine donne l'ordre d'abandonner la position. Il nous indique le lieu de ralliement avec le régiment. Il faut effectuer la route à marche forcée, les ennemis sont là qui menacent de nous couper la retraite. La plaine grouille de Prussiens, paraît-il. C'est égal, je ne suis pas content de battre en retraite sans essayer mon fusil !... C'est de mauvais augure, pensais-je. Nous sortons par où nous sommes entrés, et, à deux cent mètres, de la ville, nous nous jetons à travers la plaine. Arrivés sur un chemin vicinal, nous marchons à perdre haleine, craignant à chaque instant l'apparition des casques à pointes nous barrant la route. Ce n'est plus une retraite, vrai, c'est un sauve qui peut!
At about nine o'clock in the evening, the same captain gave the order to abandon the position. He tells us where to rally with the regiment. We have to make the road with forced march, the enemies are there threatening to cut off our retreat. The plain is crawling with Prussians, I hear. It's the same, I'm not happy to retreat without trying my gun!..... It's a bad omen, I thought. We leave by where we entered, and, two hundred meters from the city, we throw ourselves across the plain. Arrived on a rural road, we walk to lose our breath, fearing at every moment the appearance of pointy helmets blocking our way. It's no longer a retreat, true, it's a run for your lives! [14]
A soldier's honest assessment. "Retreat" is a word for generals. For the men on the ground, it's something else entirely.
Aftermath
The Prussian casualties numbered 4,871. This was the price of a headlong, unplanned assault against a fortified position defended by the brutally effective French chassepot rifle. French losses were 4,078. [15] When morning came, the Prussians discovered their efforts had not been in vain: Frossard had completely abandoned his position on the heights [16] and ordered a retreat towards the Moselle. His plan was to withdraw to the fortress of Verdun, and en route, he was reinforced by Bazaine's division. Their respite was brief; they were attacked again by Steinmetz at the Battle of Borny-Colombey.
Analysis
France had lost another battle. The primary culprits were the staggering incompetence of its military commanders and their chronic lack of initiative. The German casualties, however, were steep, a direct result of their own lack of planning and a healthy respect for the French chassepot rifle, which proved its worth even when its handlers were being let down by their leaders. It was a victory born of aggression and improvisation, but it came at a significant cost.
Commemoration
There are, of course, numerous memorials scattered across the plateau of Rotherberg Hill and in the military cemeteries in Spicheren. Many are German, alongside a large memorial for the fallen French. You can also find monuments in the Forest Cemetery and the German-French Garden in Saarbrücken, all commemorating the dead soldiers and officers of individual formations. In the decades following the battle, these stone markers of loss became popular subjects for postcards, which is a uniquely human way of processing tragedy. A trail named after the ill-fated General François now winds past the memorials on the Spicheren heights.
In the 21st century, because nostalgia is a powerful and strange force, groups from France and Germany regularly collaborate to re-enact the battle. [17] One assumes the outcomes are less permanent.
German memorial for the Lower Rhenish Fusilier Regiment No. 39
German memorial for the Hohenzollerian Fusilier Regiment No. 40
German memorial for the 5th Brandenburgian Infantry Regiment No. 48 "Von Stülpnagel".
German memorial for the 1st Hanoverian Infantry Regiment No. 74
Detail of the memorial for the 1st Hanoverian Infantry Regiment No. 74
German memorial for the 2nd Brandenburgian Grenadier Regiment No. 12
Detail of the memorial for the 2nd Brandenburgian Grenadier Regiment No. 12
German memorial for the 2nd Hanoverian Infantry Regiment No. 77 at the Forest Cemetery in Saarbrücken
German memorial at Rotherberg Hill marking the place where General Bruno von François died
French plaque indicating the General Bruno von François memorial trail
French battle of Spicheren memorial
French memorial on the Spicheren heights with a view of Forbach valley
See also
Notes
- ^ Henderson includes a table of returns for numerous "great battles," excluding prisoners. [1]