← Back to home

Costly Signaling Theory In Evolutionary Psychology

Alright. You want me to rewrite this Wikipedia article on Costly signaling theory in evolutionary psychology. You want it detailed, engaging, and absolutely not summarized. Fine. Don't expect me to hold your hand through it. It’s all there, just… presented.

Costly Signaling Theory in Evolutionary Psychology

Costly signaling theory, when applied within the framework of evolutionary psychology, delves into how psychological traits and states manifest as adaptations, often drawing insights from the closely related fields of human behavioral ecology and cultural evolution. This perspective predominantly focuses on humans and emphasizes the strategic advantages gained by influencing the perceptions of others. The crucial element here is the difficulty in faking these signals, a necessity born from the widespread existence of adaptations that demand reliable information to circumvent manipulation through dishonest cues.

Initially conceived to elucidate costly morphological traits as honest indicators of an individual's intrinsic quality, particularly within the realm of sexual selection, the reach of costly signaling theory has expanded considerably. It now encompasses signals of cooperative intent and need, extending the target audience of these signals far beyond potential mates.

Costly Signals Background

The fundamental premise is that nearly any organism can benefit from subtly altering the perceptions, behavior, or physiology of those around it in ways that serve its own interests. This is particularly evident in social species, where individuals often invest in signals to enhance their perceived attractiveness, formidability, or cooperative value to conspecifics.

A signal, distinct from a mere cue, is something that has evolved specifically to influence the behavior or perceptions of others. A cue, conversely, is any piece of information an organism utilizes to adjust its current state, but which was not originally designed for that communicative purpose. Because signals evolve due to their communicative impact and are not always perfectly aligned with the qualities they represent, they carry the inherent potential for being easily faked by those who lack the genuine trait. This faking would, of course, be favored by natural selection in situations rife with conflicts of interest, where the negative consequences for others are either inconsequential or outweighed by the benefits to the signaler.

Despite the substantial risks of deception, recipients of a signal may still find it advantageous to attend to this information, provided it is honest and relevant to fitness-related challenges. For this very reason, natural selection is thought to have sculpted adaptations in numerous species that serve to verify the authenticity of signals before accepting the information as dependable. Signaling in a costly manner is believed to satisfy these anti-manipulation adaptations when the resultant signals are demonstrably cheaper to produce for individuals possessing the underlying quality compared to those who lack it. In such scenarios, individuals with the desired quality can maximize their fitness by investing more heavily in the signal, thereby creating a communication that, while perhaps not entirely impossible to fake, is generally not worth the effort for impostors.

Costly Signals of Beneficial Qualities

The vast majority of explanations rooted in costly signaling theory revolve around behaviors that broadcast advantageous traits about an individual to others. In many instances, these signals are directed toward potential mates, with males often perceived as benefiting more from such signaling due to their typically lower investment in offspring, which can lead to greater fitness gains through multiple partnerships. However, the critical role of cooperation throughout human evolutionary history has also led to the development of numerous signals that demonstrate an individual's potential as a cooperative partner, even to those who are not potential mates.

Costly Signals of Embodied Capital

Hunting

Primarily through the dedicated work of human behavioral ecologists, hunting in humans has attracted significant attention as a potential honest indicator of various qualities, owing to its inherent differential costs. Early signaling approaches to hunting highlighted that while hunting could provide a vital source of calories and nutrients in small-scale societies, it was often practiced even when less efficient than other food acquisition methods. It frequently involved targeting species that yielded less meat for a given expenditure of effort. In response to these observations, and to findings that food was typically shared widely in these societies, the show-off hypothesis proposed that men might hunt challenging prey partly for the reputational benefits gained, which would increase the likelihood of others wanting skilled hunters in their group due to the advantages they conferred.

Subsequent models built upon this foundation, incorporating costly signaling theory more directly. Beyond the costs of inefficiency noted in some hunts, hunting can be expensive in terms of the time required to develop proficiency, the inherent risks involved, and the resources necessary for a successful endeavor. Consequently, it has been proposed that hunting can honestly signal a wide array of traits, including strength, skill, the capacity to buffer risk, leadership qualities, and various advantageous cognitive attributes – all of which can enhance an individual's attractiveness to both potential mates and cooperative partners. This is because, similar to other costly signals, hunting is relatively more taxing for those who lack these qualities or possess them to a lesser degree. Such individuals are more prone to producing less effective signals and sustaining injuries, both of which act as deterrents to faking the signal.

While not mutually exclusive with the show-off hypothesis, these costly signaling approaches have been presented as capable of explaining a broader spectrum of hunting behaviors. The benefits derived from signaling one's qualities do not necessarily require that hunting directly benefits others, thus providing a better account for seemingly wasteful displays. Nevertheless, these models still place emphasis on the advantages of providing for others, as the sharing of meat is often a public affair that attracts considerable attention, thereby amplifying the signal's effectiveness in elevating one's status within a group.

Evidence supporting the notion that hunting serves as a costly signal of beneficial qualities primarily stems from its valuation by group members and the tangible benefits enjoyed by proficient hunters. In small-scale societies, individuals can typically discern a good hunter from a poor one, with skilled hunters often holding higher status than their less adept counterparts. Material advantages are also evident, as skilled hunters have been shown to achieve increased reproductive success, wield greater political influence, and receive more support for their kin during both illness and health.

Compared to the reputational benefits associated with hunting, its significance in explaining human hunting behavior relative to explanations involving kin selection or reciprocity remains a subject of debate. This disagreement largely centers on differing views regarding the extent of provisioning within families and the general ability of hunters to control the distribution of the meat they procure.

Risk-taking

Often invoked in the context of costly signaling approaches to hunting, risk-taking has also been proposed as a mechanism that yields honest signals of quality in other domains. As the level of risk escalates, so too do the costs associated with failure. This inherently results in greater costs for individuals who lack the qualities that confer a higher probability of success or the ability to mitigate failure, in contrast to those who possess such traits. Consequently, risky behaviors may frequently serve as honest signals, with individuals lacking the relevant attributes expected to avoid such risks or to suffer excessive damage from failures, thus precluding the maintenance of risky behavior.

Numerous beneficial qualities have been implicated as underlying risk-taking behavior. For instance, physical skill, sound judgment, or bravery have all been argued to enhance the likelihood of success in perilous situations. Similarly, social dominance, confidence, and ambition may also prove advantageous in intraspecific competition, with social dominance, ambition, and wealth potentially mitigating the consequences of failure.

Generally, the intended recipients of risky signals are often considered to be potential mates. This is primarily based on the observation that young males—who represent the age and sex class with the highest reproductive variance—exhibit greater risk-taking behavior than any other group, a finding supported by both experimental and observational data. By engaging in risky endeavors, males are thought to signal the aforementioned qualities, which may be directly linked to their capacity to provide for and protect their families. Furthermore, traits such as bravery and physical prowess might also be valued by cooperative partners due to their benefits in group hunting and warfare, thereby expanding the potential audience for risk-takers.

Physical Attractiveness

Physically attractive traits have also been hypothesized to function as signals of mate quality, with facial characteristics, body type, vocal qualities, and body modification all suggested to convey information relevant to reproduction. However, most approaches tend to focus on how the information is relevant to the receiver rather than definitively distinguishing between signals and cues, with the two often being difficult to differentiate.

While exceptions exist, costly signaling theory has been predominantly incorporated into explanations for attractive male traits across a diverse range of species. In humans, both a low voice pitch and facial masculinity in males have been proposed as honest indicators of male quality. This is attributed to testosterone's established link with facial and vocal cord development, as well as its hypothesized role in mediating trade-offs. From this perspective, only high-quality males can afford to invest heavily in phenotypic qualities beyond those essential for survival, due to the comparatively lower costs of such investment. Testosterone's connection to these traits, manifesting in facial and vocal characteristics, is thought to prevent individuals from easily faking these signals. Additionally, low voice pitch may also be difficult to simulate in the short term due to the activation of the autonomic nervous system, which governs fight-or-flight responses and can alter vocal pitch. Consequently, only individuals confident in their abilities are likely to maintain low levels of arousal, potentially serving as an honest signal of formidability.

Regardless of whether the information is conveyed through cues or signals, differences are anticipated in the information valued by each sex. Generally, females are expected to be more attuned to information regarding a potential mate's capacity to acquire and defend resources, while males are expected to focus more on a potential partner's ability to conceive and nurture future children. Beyond these domains, both sexes are often suggested to benefit similarly from signals indicating pathogen resistance or a lack of deleterious mutations, given their hypothesized importance throughout human evolutionary history.

Art

Art has also been a subject of study as a potential costly signal of beneficial qualities relevant to sexual selection. If defined as environmental modification lacking adaptive functions beyond sexual selection, art or art-like behaviors have been observed in a variety of species, including spiders, crabs, fish, and birds, in addition to humans. However, unlike the art of other species, human art is generally not considered to be genetically predetermined. Instead, adaptationist perspectives often posit that humans possess adaptations capable of producing a wide range of artworks as sexual signals, along with adaptations for accurately evaluating the information being conveyed.

The costs associated with producing art are expected to increase with the quality of the piece and can manifest in various forms. Creating art may demand substantial time for skill acquisition, material sourcing, and the production itself, all of which can detract from an individual's ability to engage in other fitness-enhancing activities. The materials themselves might require significant resources to obtain, and the production process can be physically demanding or even risky. Once created, artworks may also necessitate defense against theft or sabotage by potential rivals.

Since these costs disproportionately affect those in poorer condition, the production of art is thought to serve as an honest signal of an individual's quality, as those in good condition are better able to afford greater investment in artistic endeavors. Consequently, art may reliably signal information about an individual's health, access to resources, or the relative absence of harmful mutations that could negatively impact their capabilities or overall condition. In instances where art requires defense, it may also signal an individual's formidability and social power.

As a hypothesized form of sexual signaling, males are expected to benefit from using art to signal to broader audiences than females. Evidence for this is observed in both humans and non-human animals. However, in humans, the potential for sex differences in this regard has been debated, with the prevalence of long-term monogamous relationships suggesting an increased importance of mutual mate choice, a factor that favors females investing more in sexual signals compared to other species.

Evidence consistent with art frequently serving as a sexual signal in humans primarily arises from studies examining mate preferences. For example, a study across thirty-seven cultures found that being "creative and artistic" ranked as the sixth most important trait for females and the seventh for males out of thirteen qualities considered attractive. Furthermore, greater investment in the creation of public art has been correlated with higher numbers of sexual partners among both young adults and artists.

Courtship duration

Extended periods of courtship have also been proposed as an honest signal of overall quality, particularly in non-human animals. Although often accompanied by other signals, courtship duration in isolation can incur significant opportunity costs, as males are unable to court other females or engage in other fitness-enhancing activities during this time. For this reason, it may serve as an honest signal of overall quality, based on the expectation that low-quality males will suffer more from opportunity costs per unit of time spent courting than high-quality males, thus incentivizing lower-quality males to withdraw from courtship sooner.

In humans, a willingness to engage in lengthy courtships has also been suggested to signal a desire for a long-term relationship as opposed to casual sex. Evidence indicates that persistent courtship styles are more attractive to females seeking long-term relationships than to those seeking shorter-term liaisons.

Infant crying as a signal of vigor

Beyond potentially signaling need or serving as a means to manipulate parents, crying in human infants has been hypothesized to function as a costly signal designed to reduce the child's risk of infanticide, a phenomenon observed across various cultures.

Given that conflicts of interest exist between an offspring and both its parents and siblings, parents are expected to be sensitive to their offspring's quality when determining the level of investment to provide. Investment in one offspring cannot be allocated to another, creating a situation where investing in a new child could potentially diminish an individual's fitness. This can occur when an offspring is unlikely to survive, thereby favoring investment in other areas. Furthermore, such investment might still be costly even with high survival probabilities if it jeopardizes the well-being of other siblings. In these circumstances, older siblings are often favored due to their proximity to reproductive maturity and the fact that they have already navigated the higher mortality rates of infancy.

Crying is proposed to help mitigate infanticide risk by establishing a perception of vigor in others. This is primarily thought to be achievable because the energetic costs of crying make it more taxing for infants in poorer condition. Consequently, it may serve as a reliable indicator of what an infant can afford to expend, thereby functioning as an honest signal of quality. Additionally, the acoustic frequency of an infant's cries may also convey information about its fitness prospects, supported by studies that have identified correlations between cry pitch and various diseases.

This theoretical framework has been extended to explain the excessive crying associated with colic. However, crying's association with need has also been suggested to lead to reduced parental investment when crying becomes excessive, as it might make the infant appear to be in worse condition.

Academic publishing

While not necessarily a signal of the author's inherent qualities, the costs associated with academic publishing have been proposed to result in honest signaling about the quality of a journal article under specific conditions.

Academic publishing involves inherent conflicts of interest between authors and journals. Authors benefit from having their work accepted in high-prestige journals regardless of its quality, while journals benefit from publishing only articles that meet their stringent standards. When the submission process incurs minimal cost and offers no differential benefits, authors are likely to adopt a strategy of signaling their work as being of higher quality than it is, submitting all publications to high-impact journals before considering lower-impact ones, even if the probability of acceptance is low.

One mechanism through which honest signaling can emerge in academic publishing is if the associated costs vary based on the paper's quality. This can occur when submitting a low-quality paper to a high-impact journal leads to a more protracted peer-review process, requires greater effort to give the paper the appearance of higher quality, or necessitates fees for resubmission. As these costs are experienced to a greater degree when submitting subpar papers, their presence may encourage honest communication and submission to journals that align with the paper's actual quality.

Costly Signals of Cooperative Intent

Beyond the context of mating, where direct provisioning or care of offspring might offer limited gains, a signal of high quality may not always be sufficient to elicit beneficial treatment from others, even when it is honest. Individuals are generally expected to assess the likelihood of receiving benefits before cooperating with another. This underscores the importance of signaling one's willingness to provide benefits to others as a crucial step in establishing cooperative relationships. Both observational and experimental studies support this, indicating that individuals tend to favor those who are generous, even if they have less to offer, over those who possess the capacity to provide benefits but do so infrequently.

Public displays of generosity

Costly signaling has frequently been employed in attempts to explain instances of public generosity, where individuals incur costs without any immediate, apparent benefits. While often interpreted as signaling an individual's capacity to provide benefits, such behaviors have also been considered honest signals of willingness to cooperate due to the inherent costs involved.

Food sharing

Food sharing is a commonly reported practice in many small-scale societies, particularly concerning hunted game. Explanations that do not involve signaling have centered on either the benefits of establishing reciprocal relationships to buffer against risk or the limited advantages of maintaining control over food, due to the effort required or the potential for spoilage in large game. However, neither of these explanations is necessarily mutually exclusive with signaling strategies, given the importance of reputation in cooperative relationships and the fact that sharing food that might not be worth defending still requires the effort of collection in the first place.

When viewed through the lens of signaling, food sharing can indicate the qualities of the provider, especially in situations where obtaining food involves differential costs based on an individual's underlying traits. Similar to other signals of cooperative intent, it can also signal generosity, as such sharing is more costly for those who are likely to defect rather than benefit from long-term cooperative relationships.

When interpreted as a signal of generosity, the specific information conveyed is likely to depend on the form of sharing and the recipients. Widespread sharing might signal an individual's intention for future cooperation with their group, while more targeted instances, restricted to a subset of the group, could indicate an interest in forming cooperative relationships with specific individuals or coalitions within the group. Sharing can also serve as an effective signal of generosity to those not directly receiving benefits if it reflects a stable personality trait that varies among individuals.

Competitive feasting

In contrast to the day-to-day sharing observed in small-scale societies, the organization of large feasts, where the hosts bear the majority of the costs, may also demonstrate cooperative intent. Such practices are found among diverse groups. However, the fact that feasts tend to occur only at specific times of the year and involve competition between groups has led to the suggestion that they may primarily function as forms of conspicuous consumption intended to signal an individual's overall quality or status.

Blood donations

Costly signaling has also been proposed as an explanation for blood donations. In the most common scenario, individuals donate blood voluntarily, receiving no payment and having no control over the recipient. This results in a lack of obvious benefits for the donor, who also incurs opportunity costs and the risk of adverse outcomes, the threat of which can induce anxiety and other forms of psychological distress.

Unlike explanations that rely on direct reciprocity and kin selection, which are suggested to be irrelevant to blood donations due to the lack of recipient control, signaling explanations allow for benefits to accrue from an individual's ability to alter the perceptions of others in ways that are advantageous to the signaler. This is proposed to involve enhanced perceptions of generosity and willingness to take risks, in addition to providing reliable information about one's health, as individuals with certain health conditions or diseases are typically barred from donating blood.

Indirect reciprocity

Costly signaling may also play a role in many forms of indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity occurs when an individual's seemingly altruistic acts enhance their reputation for cooperation, making others more likely to offer assistance, regardless of whether they were the direct recipient of the initial act. Based on game theoretic models, this can evolve even in the absence of signaling through fixed strategies. However, in species possessing the flexibility to adjust their level of cooperation based on their own state and relevant social variables, past interactions may not suffice on their own to reliably signal cooperative intent without additional mechanisms to ensure signal honesty. When this is the case, and a species can both assess the likelihood of others cooperating and signal its own cooperative intent, costly signaling may become a significant mechanism underlying indirect reciprocity.

In humans, this is proposed to manifest as individuals identifying potential targets for signals through the maintenance of welfare-tradeoff ratios and subsequently employing costly signals to elevate their perceived value as a cooperator to desirable targets for future cooperation.

Dyadic gift giving

Costly signals have also been suggested to be important for demonstrating commitment to both initiate and maintain dyadic relationships. Gift giving, in particular, has received considerable attention as both an individual strategy and as a custom.

These approaches emphasize that the risk of defection from potential friends and romantic partners is particularly high at the outset of relationships, due to the amount of private information individuals possess regarding their intentions to cooperate. Gifts are thought to mitigate this risk when the associated costs are substantial enough to be prohibitive for someone who does not value the potential for a long-term relationship. As the costs of the gift are presumed to result in a reliable signal, virtually any form of gift could potentially signal future cooperative intent. However, gifts that do not directly enhance the receiver's fitness prospects might be favored, as those providing material benefits to the receiver could increase the risk of manipulation by others. Similarly, the fact that gifts are often personalized, sex-specific, or involve goods that degrade quickly has been suggested to reduce the likelihood that the receiver can benefit by regifting the item to other partners, thereby further diminishing the risk of defection.

As a relationship progresses, some models propose that the costs associated with gift giving should escalate to signal increasing levels of commitment. Assuming one's partner reciprocates along the way, this is expected to result in costs exceeding those anticipated from a large favor offered during a time of need, which is precisely when established friendships are most vulnerable to defection.

While the focus often lies on signaling a desire for a long-term relationship, it is likely not the sole quality being signaled. An individual's capacity to acquire resources may also be demonstrated through more substantial gifts. Furthermore, individuals may also showcase their thoughtfulness and attentiveness to a partner by selecting a gift that aligns with their preferences, an act proposed to be exceedingly difficult to fake.

Assuming similar behaviors among other individuals in a population, gift giving may also diminish the benefits of defection by making the initiation of new relationships costly. This might be particularly likely when gift giving is largely governed by customs that are inherently burdensome for those lacking the intent of future cooperation.

Ritual

Costly signaling approaches to ritual often highlight its capacity to honestly signal commitment to one's group, given that the associated costs result in signals that are difficult to falsify. Religious rituals have garnered the most attention as potential costly signals. Similar to other forms of ritual, the costs arise from the time, energy, material resources, or physical harm required to adhere to the ritual's prescriptions, with extreme forms of self-harm not being uncommon. Although the costs of the ritual itself are likely to be uniform for both believers and nonbelievers, skeptics are thought to perceive rituals as more costly because they do not believe in the ritual's power to achieve its intended outcomes. This difference in perception makes it less likely that an individual would find belief worth feigning. More costly practices are expected to provide stronger indications of commitment. Furthermore, the common complexity of religious rituals means that mistakes can be easily detected throughout the process, further reducing the likelihood of someone faking their devotion.

Evidence consistent with costly signaling explanations for religious ritual has emerged from both experimental and observational studies, although examinations on the topic remain limited. For instance, members of religious kibbutzes have demonstrated greater cooperation compared to secular kibbutzes in a common-pool resource game. Similarly, individuals participating in communal religious rituals have been found to possess larger cooperative networks than those who did not engage in such practices. Other studies have attempted to establish a more direct link between the costs of signals and the effectiveness of cooperation. One study found that the number of costly requirements of a commune was associated with longer commune lifespans, while another indicated that participation in and observation of a costly ritual correlated with larger donations compared to those involved with a less costly ritual.

Apology

In addition to efforts to establish cooperative relationships, the costly signaling model of apology proposes that costly signals can also be employed to restore cooperation following a transgression. Given that the costs of honest and dishonest verbal apologies are identical for the apologizer, and the costs of continued victimization can be severe for the recipient, it is unlikely that verbal apologies alone will often suffice to convey contrition. Therefore, costs may serve as an adaptive component of an apology, enhancing its effectiveness and increasing the likelihood that the apologizer will remain involved in the cooperative venture.

For an apology to be effective, the model does not mandate that costs be directly tied to the harm caused by the transgression. Instead, the signal merely needs to be sufficiently costly to outweigh the benefits a defector could gain from a single interaction, thereby creating a situation where only those interested in future cooperation realize net benefits from the signal.

As honesty is established through costs, apologies consistent with the model can take various forms. Financial loss, self-harm, and the reduction of one's status have all been documented in association with apologies directed towards both other individuals and religious deities. Apologies may also include gifts or other benefits; however, the benefits themselves are not predicted to enhance the honesty of the signal. Rather, they may simply represent one method by which the signaler incurs costs.

In addition to less costly forms, non-lethal suicide attempts have also been suggested to function as honest apologies in certain contexts. Unlike other forms of costs, the expenses associated with a suicide attempt primarily stem from the probability of death, with riskier attempts being considered costlier. According to the costly apology model of suicide, such substantial costs may be necessary to honestly signal contrition when the potential payoff from future defection is sufficiently high to still allow deceivers to achieve net benefits through less costly signals. This scenario might arise when highly valuable cooperative relationships are threatened with termination. Suicide attempts may also facilitate the dissemination of information from the signal due to their noteworthy nature, which could be particularly important when the transgression was committed against a group or jeopardizes cooperative relationships with individuals outside the aggrieved party.

Evidence supporting the costly signaling model of apology primarily comes from experimental studies. For instance, multiple vignette studies have revealed that costly apologies enhance the perception of sincerity by the recipient of the signal across diverse countries and religions, with both gift-giving and self-punishment proving effective costs. Similarly, participants in one study who imagined an accidental transgression in the past indicated a greater willingness to engage in a costly apology when the individual was perceived as more important to them. However, costly self-punishment was prevalent in a study that required participants to accidentally treat an anonymous partner unfairly, which aligns with the notion that apologies may also serve to maintain one's reputation among a broader audience.

Infant-directed song

Infant-directed song has been proposed as a costly signal of parental attentiveness, a quality thought to be particularly crucial when infants are too young to walk or effectively avoid environmental dangers.

Although parents derive fitness benefits from attending to their infants, and infants can gain fitness benefits from their parents dedicating time to other tasks, the optimal allocation of resources to attentiveness is expected to be a point of parent-offspring conflict, with infants benefiting from more attention than is ideal for the parent. Due to this conflict of interest, infants are expected to be sensitive to information regarding parental attention and possess adaptations to elicit it. This is proposed to lead to selective pressures on parents to more effectively signal their attentiveness.

Infant-directed song is thought to contribute to this signaling function because its production is more costly when the parent is focused on other aspects of their environment, thereby enhancing the signal's honesty. According to this hypothesis, the potential costs of infant-directed song can manifest in multiple, non-exclusive ways. For example, singing may require investment in both planning and memory, while also potentially necessitating that the parent attend to the infant's emotional state and adjust the song accordingly. It might also preclude the parent from engaging in physically demanding activities, especially when specific breathing patterns are required.

Regardless of the specific form these costs take, the benefit to the parent is suggested to be a quicker and more reliable fulfillment of infant demands, which in turn allows for greater investment in other pursuits.

Costly Signals of Wealth

As wealth directly influences access to resources and enhances the status of its possessors, demonstrations of wealth have been hypothesized to confer substantial benefits and often take the form of costly signals. Although wealth itself may be a worthy signal, such displays are often suggested to convey information about qualities related to an individual's future capacity to acquire and defend resources. They may also signal generosity, particularly when a charitable component is involved; however, this benefit is often considered secondary.

Conspicuous consumption

One means by which wealth can be signaled is through conspicuous consumption. This refers to instances where individuals purchase luxury goods that offer little to no functional advantage over less expensive alternatives, thereby prioritizing self-presentation over economic efficiency. It is prevalent across all socioeconomic strata and often involves strategic planning to maximize the audience of the display and the impact of the signal.

Most signaling explanations of conspicuous consumption predict that the primary targets of the signal will be potential mates. As with other signals related to sexual selection, males are typically expected to invest more heavily in these signals due to the potential for greater benefits through increased mating opportunities. In these contexts, the information signaled is thought to extend beyond genetic quality to encompass the potential for investment, which is attractive to individuals pursuing both long-term and short-term mating strategies. Although often focused on males, females have also been suggested to benefit from conspicuous consumption in mating contexts, owing to its hypothesized ability to demonstrate a partner's commitment and to signal one's own mate quality to rivals, both of which can contribute to intrasexual competition and deter mate poaching.

Despite the emphasis on sexual selection, conspicuous consumption may also prove useful for addressing challenges beyond mate acquisition. This can involve efforts to attract other cooperative partners, who stand to gain from the signaler's capacity to confer benefits should an alliance be formed. As in mating contexts, there may also be advantages in intimidating rivals, thereby reducing the likelihood of direct competition for resources in the future.

Evidence supporting conspicuous consumption as a costly signal of wealth and status primarily comes from findings indicating that females perceive males with more expensive possessions as more desirable. This is most evident in experiments that have manipulated the costs of items associated with males. In multiple studies, cars and clothing typically associated with higher social classes have been linked to increased probabilities of females entering into various romantic and sexual relationships, as well as higher perceptions of attractiveness.

Beyond its potential benefits, less extensive research has explored whether conspicuous consumption meets the other criteria of a signal. It is possible that a mismatch exists between hypothesized adaptations for status signaling and contemporary environments, which include marketing campaigns that might exploit such adaptations. However, its widespread presence across cultures and social classes has led to arguments that humans may be well-suited to balancing the costs and benefits of this signal.

Public philanthropy

Extravagant charitable donations have also been proposed as an honest signal of wealth, given that large donations are either impossible or costlier for individuals with fewer resources to make. As with conspicuous consumption, such signals are also often expected to provide information about an individual's underlying quality in addition to their wealth, particularly concerning their capacity to acquire and maintain possession of resources.

Due to the qualities signaled and their public nature, public philanthropy is suggested to primarily serve the purpose of attracting new cooperators. Consequently, existing cooperators might perceive such signals as threats to their ongoing relationships and may place greater emphasis on private signals when evaluating a signaler's cooperative intent. Consistent with this reasoning, public displays of generosity may often diminish perceptions of cooperativeness or trustworthiness when they appear to be strategies aimed at gaining recognition or prestige.

Costly Signals of Need

In addition to signaling qualities intended to enhance an individual's attractiveness to potential mates or other cooperative partners, costly signals have also been hypothesized to result in honest displays of need. Primarily directed at existing cooperators who would be motivated to assist given genuine need on the part of the signaler, such signals are thought to reduce uncertainty surrounding the severity of one's situation in ways that less costly signals could not.

Depression

Partly due to its associated costs, prevalence, and apparent ability to affect anyone, major depression has been hypothesized to often serve as a credible signal of need. The bargaining model of depression suggests that throughout human evolutionary history, individuals frequently encountered situations of social adversity (e.g., abuse, the death of a significant figure, or the end of a romantic relationship) where their fitness prospects depended largely on the responses of others. In these circumstances, providing social support could yield benefits for individuals who gain from cooperating with the depressed individual or otherwise benefit from their success. However, the costs involved in providing assistance and the threat of manipulation necessitate reliable information before sufficient help is likely to be offered.

Similar to other proposed costly signals, depression is theorized to achieve this by making the signal prohibitively expensive to fake for those who are not in severe need. The costs of major depression primarily stem from a reduced interest in and investment in one's typical patterns of behavior. While highly costly for those not in genuine need, this does not necessitate substantial costs on the part of an honest signaler. Instead, instances of sufficiently severe adversity can create a situation where there is no difference in fitness prospects between being depressed or not, yet the costs remain substantial for those who are not truly in enough need.

In addition to functioning as an honest signal of need, the bargaining model also highlights depression's potential role as a bargaining tool. This is possible because the behavioral reduction often accompanying depression diminishes the benefits the depressed individual provides to others. Consequently, many instances of depression are predicted to be analogous to a labor strike, where recipients of the depressed individual's previously beneficial contributions receive the message that they must increase their support to once again derive value from their cooperation.

Illness symptoms

Various types of conspicuous illness symptoms have also been suggested to function as honest signals of need. While a significant portion of illness symptoms are likely to manifest as cues resulting from susceptibility to a pathogen or byproducts of the body's defenses, such approaches propose that these symptoms may also be upregulated to more effectively signal need. As symptoms can incur costs in terms of energy expenditure, opportunity costs, and reputational damage, it is expected to be costlier for potential fakers than for those who are genuinely ill and already experiencing symptoms. Therefore, potential fakers are not predicted to gain net fitness benefits from such displays, thus increasing the likelihood that recipients of the signal will believe the individual is ill and provide meaningful benefits that outweigh the signaling costs.

Formulated as an explanation for placebo responses, the signaling theory of symptoms predicts that once the signaling function of upregulated symptoms is achieved and others provide support, the symptoms will subsequently be downregulated to a level appropriate for disease-fighting signaling. Consistent with this, evidence exists for the ability to modulate symptom levels in response to the presence of conspecifics in numerous species, and placebo responses themselves tend to occur primarily after treatments that an individual believes to be efficacious are administered. Furthermore, placebo responses are often sensitive to the demeanor and behaviors of the care provider, as would be expected in signaling approaches if care providers are perceived as potential targets of the signal.

Crying

Compared to other proposed signals of need, crying is the least controversial in terms of its signaling function. However, it has been argued that there is currently limited evidence to confidently distinguish it from a cue, and relatively few signaling explanations address the costs of crying and how these might facilitate honest signaling.

Infant crying as a signal of need

The functions of crying are often thought to differ based on whether the crier is an infant or belongs to another age group. In infants, signaling the need for food, attention, and protection have been the most commonly proposed functions. As is the case with explanations of crying as a signal of vigor, the primary cost of infant crying is typically considered to be energetic, with such costs potentially leading to a signal that is more difficult to fake than to produce when genuinely in need. This has led to the suggestion that the frequency and duration of crying constitute an important part of the signal; however, it has also been proposed that the costs underlying crying may also be linked to the sounds produced.

Despite the prevalence of signaling explanations for infant crying, responses to infants can often be negative, in addition to the positive responses predicted. In particular, negative responses to crying have been associated with postpartum depression, anxiety, and high levels of neuroticism. However, not all responses are considered equally relevant for evaluating whether crying can be an adaptive signal, with negative emotional responses alone not being sufficient evidence of negative fitness outcomes due to the greater importance of behavioral responses.

Adult crying

Often expected to involve lower costs compared to other hypothesized costly signals of need, the potential costs of adult crying have been proposed to stem from diverse sources. For instance, crying has been shown to diminish one's reputation and potentially lead to avoidance in Western societies. It may also be linked to diminished immune function, based on studies reporting lower levels of salivary Immunoglobulin A in adult women following tears, but not sadness alone. Tear production also impairs vision, reducing an individual's ability to respond to threats in their environment. However, tears may also serve to obscure information by increasing the difficulty for others to discern the direction of one's gaze.

Consistent with signaling explanations, individuals have been observed to respond positively to those crying, despite viewing them less favorably and experiencing more negative emotions, although negative responses are also reported. Additionally, individuals have reported feeling better after crying when social support is present, whereas crying alone tends not to improve one's mood, as would be predicted by a signaling hypothesis.

See also

References

  • ^ a b Hasson, Oren (1994-04-07). "Cheating Signals". Journal of Theoretical Biology. 167 (3): 223–238. Bibcode):1994JThBi.167..223H. doi):10.1006/jtbi.1994.1065. ISSN) 0022-5193.
  • ^ a b Zahavi, Amotz (1975-09-01). "Mate selection—A selection for a handicap". Journal of Theoretical Biology. 53 (1): 205–214. Bibcode):1975JThBi..53..205Z. CiteSeerX) 10.1.1.586.3819. doi):10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3. ISSN) 0022-5193. PMID) 1195756.
  • ^ a b c Barclay, Pat (2013-05-01). "Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans". Evolution and Human Behavior. 34 (3): 164–175. doi):10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.02.002. ISSN) 1090-5138.
  • ^ a b c Hagen, Edward H (1999-09-01). "The Functions of Postpartum Depression". Evolution and Human Behavior. 20 (5): 325–359. doi):10.1016/S1090-5138(99)00016-1. ISSN) 1090-5138.
  • ^ Zahavi, Amotz (1993). "The fallacy of conventional signalling". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences. 340 (1292): 227–230. Bibcode):1993RSPTB.340..227Z. doi):10.1098/rstb.1993.0061. ISSN) 0962-8436. PMID) 8101657.
  • ^ a b Dawkins, Richard (1984). The extended phenotype: the long reach of the gene (Revised ed.). Oxford. ISBN) 978-0-19-102434-4. OCLC) 864140193. {{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  • ^ Krebs, John; Dawkins, Richard (1978). "Animal Signals: Mind-Reading and Manipulation". In Krebs, John; Davies, Nicholas (eds.). Behavioral Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications. ISBN) 0-632-00285-9.
  • ^ a b c d e f g h Barclay, Pat (2015). "Reputation". In The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. American Cancer Society. pp. 1–19. doi):10.1002/9781119125563.evpsych233. ISBN) 978-1-119-12556-3.
  • ^ Smith, Maynard J.; Harper, D. G. C. (1995-12-07). "Animal Signals: Models and Terminology". Journal of Theoretical Biology. 177 (3): 305–311. Bibcode):1995JThBi.177..305S. doi):10.1006/jtbi.1995.0248. ISSN) 0022-5193. S2CID) 42856706.
  • ^ a b Dawkins, Richard (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN) 0-19-217773-7. OCLC) 20012195.
  • ^ a b Grafen, Alan (1990-06-21). "Biological signals as handicaps". Journal of Theoretical Biology. 144 (4): 517–546. Bibcode):1990JThBi.144..517G. doi):10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80088-8. ISSN) 0022-5193. PMID) 2402153.
  • ^ a b c Bliege Bird, Rebecca; Smith, Eric; Bird, Douglas (2001-06-06). "The hunting handicap: costly signaling in human foraging strategies". Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology. 50 (1): 9–19. doi):10.1007/s002650100338. ISSN) 0340-5443. S2CID) 14940511.
  • ^ Cosmides, Leda; Tooby, John (1992). "Cognitive adaptations for social exchange". In Barkow, Jerome; Cosmides, Leda; Tooby, John (eds.). The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. Oxford: Oxford University PRess.
  • ^ Sugiyama, Lawrence S.; Tooby, John; Cosmides, Leda (2002-08-20). "Cross-cultural evidence of cognitive adaptations for social exchange among the Shiwiar of Ecuadorian Amazonia". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 99 (17): 11537–11542. Bibcode):2002PNAS...9911537S. doi):10.1073/pnas.122352999. ISSN) 0027-8424. PMC) 123291. PMID) 12177409.
  • ^ Boyer, Pascal (2020-02-02). "Why Divination?: Evolved Psychology and Strategic Interaction in the Production of Truth". Current Anthropology. 61 (1): 100–123. doi):10.1086/706879. ISSN) 0011-3204. S2CID) 210925724.
  • ^ a b c Gangestad, Steven W.; Scheyd, Glenn J. (2005). "The Evolution of Human Physical Attractiveness". Annual Review of Anthropology. 34 (1): 523–548. doi):10.1146/annurev.anthro.33.070203.143733. ISSN) 0084-6570.
  • ^ Hooper, Paul L.; Miller, Geoffrey F. (2008). "Mutual Mate Choice Can Drive Costly Signaling Even Under Perfect Monogamy". Adaptive Behavior. 16 (1): 53–70. doi):10.1177/1059712307087283. ISSN) 1059-7123. S2CID) 18301208.
  • ^ a b Buss, David M. (1989). "Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary hypotheses tested in 37 cultures". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 12 (1): 1–14. doi):10.1017/S0140525X00023992. ISSN) 1469-1825.
  • ^ a b c d Sundie, Jill M.; Kenrick, Douglas T.; Griskevicius, Vladas; Tybur, Joshua M.; Vohs, Kathleen D.; Beal, Daniel J. (2011). "Peacocks, Porsches, and Thorstein Veblen: Conspicuous consumption as a sexual signaling system". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 100 (4): 664–680. doi):10.1037/a0021669. ISSN) 1939-1315. PMID) 21038972.
  • ^ a b c d e f Miller, Geoffrey F. (2007). "Sexual Selection for Moral Virtues". The Quarterly Review of Biology. 82 (2): 97–125. doi):10.1086/517857. ISSN) 0033-5770. PMID) 17583267. S2CID) 1021904.
  • ^ a b c d e f Smith, Eric Alden; Bird, Rebecca L. Bliege (2000-07-01). "Turtle hunting and tombstone opening: public generosity as costly signaling". Evolution and Human Behavior. 21 (4): 245–261. doi):10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00031-3. ISSN) 1090-5138. PMID) 10899477.
  • ^ a b c Hawkes, Kristen; Bird, Rebecca Bliege (2002). "Showing off, handicap signaling, and the evolution of men's work". Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews. 11 (2): 58–67. doi):10.1002/evan.20005. ISSN) 1520-6505. S2CID) 15164689.
  • ^ Sosis, Richard (2000-07-01). "Costly signaling and torch fishing on Ifaluk atoll". Evolution and Human Behavior. 21 (4): 223–244. doi):10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00030-1. ISSN) 1090-5138. PMID) 10899476.
  • ^ a b c Hawkes, Kristen (1991-01-01). "Showing off: Tests of an hypothesis about men's foraging goals". Ethology and Sociobiology. 12 (1): 29–54. doi):10.1016/0162-3095(91)90011-E. ISSN) 0162-3095.
  • ^ a b c Gurven, Michael; Hill, Kim (2009). "Why Do Men Hunt?: A Reevaluation of "Man the Hunter" and the Sexual Division of Labor". Current Anthropology. 50 (1): 51–74. doi):10.1086/595620. ISSN) 0011-3204. PMID) 19579355. S2CID) 33909267.
  • ^ a b Gurven, Michael; von Rueden, Christopher (2006). "Hunting, social status and biological fitness". Biodemography and Social Biology. 53 (1–2): 81–99. doi):10.1080/19485565.2006.9989118. ISSN) 1948-5565. PMID) 21516952. S2CID) 26575043.
  • ^ a b c Gurven, Michael; Allen-Arave, Wesley; Hill, Kim; Hurtado, Magdalena (2000). "'It's a Wonderful Life': signaling generosity among the Ache of Paraguay". Evolution and Human Behavior. 21 (4): 263–282. doi):10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00032-5. PMID) 10899478.
  • ^ a b c d e f Wilson, Margo; Daly, Martin (1985-01-01). "Competitiveness, risk taking, and violence: the young male syndrome". Ethology and Sociobiology. 6 (1): 59–73. doi):10.1016/0162-3095(85)90041-X. ISSN) 0162-3095. S2CID) 9068200.
  • ^ a b c d e Farthing, G. William (2005). "Attitudes toward heroic and nonheroic physical risk takers as mates and as friends". Evolution and Human Behavior. 26 (2): 171–185. doi):10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.08.004.
  • ^ a b Baker, Michael D.; Maner, Jon K. (2009). "Male risk-taking as a context-sensitive signaling device". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 45 (5): 1136–1139. doi):10.1016/j.jesp.2009.06.006.
  • ^ a b Kelly, S.; Dunbar, R. I. (2001). "Who dares, wins: Heroism versus altruism in women's mate choice". Human Nature. 12 (2). Hawthorne, N.Y.: 89–105. doi):10.1007/s12110-001-1018-6. ISSN) 1045-6767. PMID) 26192164. S2CID) 25044517.
  • ^ a b c Feinberg, David R. (2008-04-23). "Are human faces and voices ornaments signaling common underlying cues to mate value?". Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews. 17 (2): 112–118. doi):10.1002/evan.20166. S2CID) 86168089.
  • ^ Thornhill, Randy; Gangestad, Steven W. (1999). "Facial attractiveness". Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 3 (12): 452–460. doi):10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01403-5. PMID) 10562724. S2CID) 961347.
  • ^ a b Bovet, Jeanne (2019-06-04). "Evolutionary Theories and Men's Preferences for Women's Waist-to-Hip Ratio: Which Hypotheses Remain? A Systematic Review". Frontiers in Psychology. 10: 1221. doi):10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01221. ISSN) 1664-1078. PMC) 6563790. PMID) 31244708.
  • ^ a b c Hodges-Simeon, Carolyn R.; Gaulin, Steven J. C.; Puts, David A. (2010). "Different Vocal Parameters Predict Perceptions of Dominance and Attractiveness". Human Nature. 21 (4): 406–427. doi):10.1007/s12110-010-9101-5. ISSN) 1045-6767. PMC) 2995855. PMID) 21212816.
  • ^ a b Hodges-Simeon, Carolyn R.; Gurven, Michael; Gaulin, Steven J. C. (2015-07-01). "The low male voice is a costly signal of phenotypic quality among Bolivian adolescents". Evolution and Human Behavior. 36 (4): 294–302. doi):10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.01.002. ISSN) 1090-5138.
  • ^ Fitch, W. Tecumseh; Giedd, Jay (1999). "Morphology and development of the human vocal tract: A study using magnetic resonance imaging". The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America. 106 (3): 1511–1522. Bibcode):1999ASAJ..106.1511F. doi):10.1121/1.427148. ISSN) 0001-4966. PMID) 10489707. S2CID) 13091554.
  • ^ a b Sugiyama, Lawrence S. (2015). "Physical Attractiveness: An Adaptationist Perspective". In The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. American Cancer Society. pp. 1–68. doi):10.1002/9781119125563.evpsych112. ISBN) 978-1-119-12556-3.
  • ^ Møller, Anders Pape (1990). "Parasites and sexual selection: Current status of the Hamilton and Zuk hypothesis". Journal of Evolutionary Biology. 3 (5–6): 319–328. doi):10.1046/j.1420-9101.1990.3050319.x. ISSN) 1420-9101. S2CID) 31267392.
  • ^ Reinhold, KLAUS; Greenfield, MICHAEL D.; Jang, YIKWEON; Broce, ALBERTO (1998-04-01). "Energetic cost of sexual attractiveness: ultrasonic advertisement in wax moths". Animal Behaviour. 55 (4): 905–913. doi):10.1006/anbe.1997.0594. ISSN) 0003-3472. PMID) 9632477. S2CID) 22230681.
  • ^ Zahavi, Amotz (1978). "Decorative patterns and the evolution of art". New Scientist. 80: 182–184.
  • ^ a b c Miller, Geoffrey F. (2000). The mating mind: how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature (1st Anchor Books ed.). New York: Anchor Books. ISBN) 0-385-49517-X. OCLC) 47923735.
  • ^ a b c Miller, Geoffrey F. (2001). "Aesthetic fitness: How sexual selection shaped artistic virtuosity as a fitness indicator and aesthetic preferences as mate choice criteria". Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts. doi):10.1037/e514542010-007.
  • ^ a b c d e f g h i Miller, G. F. (2016). Art-making evolved mostly to attract mates. In On the origins of art [exhibition catalog] pp. 163-213. Hobart, Tasmania: Museum of Old and New Art.
  • ^ Seymour, Robert M.; Sozou, Peter D. (2009). "Duration of courtship effort as a costly signal" (PDF). Journal of Theoretical Biology. 256 (1): 1–13. Bibcode):2009JThBi.256....1S. doi):10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.026. PMID) 18955065.
  • ^ Buss, David M. (2003). The evolution of desire: strategies of human mating (Rev. ed.). New York: Basic Books. ISBN) 0-465-00802-X. OCLC) 50782664.
  • ^ a b c d e Lummaa, Virpi; Vuorisalo, Timo; Barr, Ronald G.; Lehtonen, Liisa (1998-05-01). "Why Cry? Adaptive Significance of Intensive Crying in Human Infants". Evolution and Human Behavior. 19 (3): 193–202. doi):10.1016/S1090-5138(98)00014-2. ISSN) 1090-5138.
  • ^ a b c d e f g h Soltis, Joseph (2004). "The signal functions of early infant crying". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 27 (4): 443–458. doi):10.1017/S0140525X0400010X. ISSN) 1469-1825. PMID) 15773426. S2CID) 25743823.
  • ^ a b c d e f Furlow, F. Bryant (1997-05-01). "Human Neonatal Cry Quality as an honest signal of fitness". Evolution and Human Behavior. 18 (3): 175–193. doi):10.1016/S1090-5138(97)00006-8. ISSN) 1090-5138.
  • ^ a b c d e f Thornhill, Randy; Furlow, F. Bryant (1998). "Stress and human reproductive behavior: attractiveness, women's sexual development, postpartum depression, and baby's cry.". In Møller, Anders; Milinski, Manfred; Slater, Peter (eds.). Stress and Behavior. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
  • ^ Trivers, Robert (1972). "Parental investment and sexual selection". In Campbell, B. (ed.). Sexual selection and the descent of man. Chicago, IL.: Aldine. ISBN) 978-0-202-02005-1.
  • ^ a b Hagen, Edward H. (2004). "Is excessive infant crying an honest signal of vigor, one extreme of a continuum, or a strategy to manipulate parents?". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 27 (4): 463–464. doi):10.1017/S0140525X04270108. ISSN) 1469-1825. S2CID) 145542180.
  • ^ a b c Tiokhin, Leonid; Panchanathan, Karthik; Lakens, Daniel; Vazire, Simine; Morgan, Thomas; Zollman, Kevin (23 February 2021). Suen, Wing (ed.). "Honest signaling in academic publishing". PLOS ONE. 16 (2): e0246675. Public Library of Science (PLoS). Bibcode):2021PLoSO..1646675T. doi):10.1371/journal.pone.0246675. ISSN) 1932-6203. PMC) 7901761. PMID) 33621261.
  • ^ a b c d e f g Bliege Bird, Rebecca; Ready, Elspeth; Power, Eleanor A. (2018). "The social significance of subtle signals". Nature Human Behaviour. 2 (7): 452–457. doi):10.1038/s41562-018-0298-3. ISSN) 2397-3374. PMID) 31097793. S2CID) 25103239.
  • ^ a b c Gurven, Michael (2004). "To give and to give not: The behavioral ecology of human food transfers". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 27 (4): 543–559. doi):10.1017/S0140525X04000123. ISSN) 1469-1825. S2CID) 12150875.
  • ^ a b Ridley, Matt (1998). The origins of virtue: human instincts and the evolution of cooperation. London: Penguin Books. ISBN) 0-14-026445-0. OCLC) 38933813.
  • ^ a b c Boone, James L. (1998). "The evolution of magnanimity: When is it better to give than to receive?". Human Nature. 9 (1): 1–21. doi):10.1007/s12110-998-1009-y. ISSN) 1045-6767. PMID) 26197355. S2CID) 45198951.
  • ^ a b Lyle, H. F.; Smith, E. A.; Sullivan, R. J. (2009). "Blood donations as costly signals of donor quality". Journal of Evolutionary Psychology. 7 (4): 263–286. doi):10.1556/JEP.7.2009.4.1. ISSN) 1789-2082.
  • ^ a b c André, Jean‐Baptiste (2010). "The Evolution of Reciprocity: Social Types or Social Incentives?". The American Naturalist. 175 (2): 197–210. doi):10.1086/649597. ISSN) 0003-0147. PMID) 20014939. S2CID) 23954980.
  • ^ Alexander, Richard D. (1987). The biology of moral systems. Hawthorne, N.Y.: A. de Gruyter. ISBN) 0-202-01173-9. OCLC) 14359861.
  • ^ Nowak, Martin A.; Sigmund, Karl (2005). "Evolution of indirect reciprocity". Nature. 437 (7063): 1291–1298. Bibcode):2005Natur.437.1291N. doi):10.1038/nature04131. ISSN) 0028-0836. PMID) 16251955. S2CID) 3153895.
  • ^ a b c d e f Hruschka, Daniel J. (2010). Friendship: development, ecology, and evolution of a relationship. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN) 978-0-520-94788-7. OCLC) 669749274.
  • ^ Komiya, Asuka; Ohtsubo, Yohsuke; Nakanishi, Daisuke; Oishi, Shigehiro (2019-03-01). "Gift-giving in romantic couples serves as a commitment signal: Relational mobility is associated with more frequent gift-giving". Evolution and Human Behavior. 40 (2): 160–166. doi):10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.10.003. ISSN) 1090-5138. S2CID) 149744620.
  • ^ a b Yamaguchi, Mana; Smith, Adam; Ohtsubo, Yohsuke (2015-11-01). "Commitment signals in friendship and romantic relationships". Evolution and Human Behavior. 36 (6): 467–474. doi):10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.05.002. hdl):20.500.14094/90003509. ISSN) 1090-5138.
  • ^ a b c Kimeldorf, Marcia (2005). Gift Giving as Costly Signaling in Courtship Contexts (MA). University of Miami.
  • ^ a b c Carmichael, H. Lorne; MacLeod, W. Bentley (1997). "Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation". International Economic Review. 38 (3). JSTOR: 485. doi):10.2307/2527277. ISSN) 0020-6598. JSTOR) 2527277.
  • ^ a b Camerer, Colin (1988-01-01). "Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols" (PDF). American Journal of Sociology. 94: S180–S214. doi):10.1086/228946. ISSN) 0002-9602. S2CID) 50917852.
  • ^ Legare, Cristine H.; Watson‐Jones, Rachel E. (2015), "The Evolution and Ontogeny of Ritual", In The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, American Cancer Society, pp. 1–19, doi):10.1002/9781119125563.evpsych234, ISBN) 978-1-119-12556-3
  • ^ a b c Sosis, Richard (2003). "Why aren't we all hutterites?: Costly signaling theory and religious behavior". Human Nature. 14 (2): 91–127. doi):10.1007/s12110-003-1000-6. ISSN) 1045-6767. PMID) 26190055. S2CID) 43018712.
  • ^ a b Irons, William (2001). "Religion as a hard-to-fake sign of commitment". In Nesse, Randolph (ed.). Evolution and the capacity for commitment. Russell Sage Foundation.
  • ^ a b c Sosis, Richard; Alcorta, Candace (2003-11-24). "Signaling, solidarity, and the sacred: The evolution of religious behavior". Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews. 12 (6): 264–274. doi):10.1002/evan.10120. S2CID) 443130.
  • ^ a b Norenzayan, Ara; Shariff, Azim F.; Gervais, Will M.; Willard, Aiyana K.; McNamara, Rita A.; Slingerland, Edward; Henrich, Joseph (2016). "The cultural evolution of prosocial religions". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 39: e1. doi):10.1017/S0140525X14001356. ISSN) 0140-525X. PMID) 26785995.
  • ^ a b c Sosis, Richard (2004). "The Adaptive Value of Religious Ritual: Rituals promote group cohesion by requiring members to engage in behavior that is too costly to fake". American Scientist. 92: 166–172. doi):10.1511/2004.46.928.
  • ^ a b Power, Eleanor A. (2018-05-30). "Collective ritual and social support networks in rural South India". Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 285 (1879): 20180023. doi):10.1098/rspb.2018.0023. PMC) 5998092. PMID) 29794040.
  • ^ Sosis, Richard; Bressler, Eric R. (2003). "Cooperation and Commune Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion". Cross-Cultural Research. 37 (2): 211–239. doi):10.1177/1069397103037002003. ISSN) 1069-3971. S2CID) 7908906.
  • ^ Xygalatas, Dimitris; Mitkidis, Panagiotis; Fischer, Ronald; Reddish, Paul; Skewes, Joshua; Geertz, Armin W.; Roepstorff, Andreas; Bulbulia, Joseph (2013). "Extreme Rituals Promote Prosociality" (PDF). Psychological Science. 24 (8): 1602–1605. doi):10.1177/0956797612472910. ISSN) 0956-7976. PMID) 23740550. S2CID) 43208333.
  • ^ a b c Ohtsubo, Yohsuke; Watanabe, Esuka (2009). "Do sincere apologies need to be costly? Test of a costly signaling model of apology" (PDF). Evolution and Human Behavior. 30 (2): 114–123. doi):10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.09.004.
  • ^ a b c d Syme, Kristen L.; Hagen, Edward H. (2019-03-01). "When Saying "Sorry" Isn't Enough: Is Some Suicidal Behavior a Costly Signal of Apology?". Human Nature. 30 (1): 117–141. doi):10.1007/s12110-018-9333-3. ISSN) 1936-4776. PMID) 30552579. S2CID) 54613358.
  • ^ Rosenthal, Robert W. (1993-07-01). "Suicide attempts and signalling games". Mathematical Social Sciences. 26 (1): 25–33. doi):10.1016/0165-4896(93)90009-8. ISSN) 0165-4896.
  • ^ a b Syme, Kristen L.; Garfield, Zachary H.; Hagen, Edward H. (2016-05-01). "Testing the bargaining vs. inclusive fitness models of suicidal behavior against the ethnographic record". Evolution and Human Behavior. 37 (3): 179–192. doi):10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.10.005. ISSN) 1090-5138.
  • ^ Ohtsubo, Yohsuke; Watanabe, Esuka; Kim, Jiyoon; Kulas, John T.; Muluk, Hamdi; Nazar, Gabriela; Wang, Feixue; Zhang, Jingyu (2012). "Are costly apologies universally perceived as being sincere?" (PDF). Journal of Evolutionary Psychology. 10 (4): 187–204. doi):10.1556/jep.10.2012.4.3. ISSN) 1789-2082.
  • ^ Ohtsubo, Yohsuke; Yagi, Ayano (2015-05-01). "Relationship value promotes costly apology-making: testing the valuable relationships hypothesis from the perpetrator's perspective". Evolution and Human Behavior. 36 (3): 232–239. doi):10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.11.008. ISSN) 1090-5138.
  • ^ Watanabe, E.; Ohtsubo, Y. (2012). "Costly apology and self-punishment after an unintentional transgression" (PDF). Journal of Evolutionary Psychology. 10 (3): 87–105. doi):10.1556/jep.10.2012.3.1. ISSN) 1789-2082.
  • ^ a b c d Mehr, Samuel A.; Krasnow, Max M. (2017-09-01). "Parent–offspring conflict and the evolution of infant-directed song". Evolution and Human Behavior. 38 (5): 674–684. doi):10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.12.005. ISSN) 1090-5138.
  • ^ a b c Saad, Gad (2015). "Evolution and Consumer Psychology". In The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. American Cancer Society. pp. 1–18. doi):10.1002/9781119125563.evpsych250. ISBN) 978-1-119-12556-3.
  • ^ a b c d Nelissen, Rob M.A.; Meijers, Marijn H.C. (2011). "Social benefits of luxury brands as costly signals of wealth and status". Evolution and Human Behavior. 32 (5): 343–355. doi):10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.12.002.
  • ^ a b De Fraja, Gianni (2009). "The origin of utility: Sexual selection and conspicuous consumption" (PDF). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 72 (1): 51–69. doi):10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.019. S2CID) 17910319.
  • ^ Buss, David M. (2015). Evolutionary psychology: the new science of the mind (5th ed.). Boston. ISBN) 978-0-205-99212-6. OCLC) 887605467. {{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  • ^ Wang, Yajin; Griskevicius, Vladas (2014-02-01). "Conspicuous Consumption, Relationships, and Rivals: Women's Luxury Products as Signals to Other Women". Journal of Consumer Research. 40 (5): 834–854. doi):10.1086/673256. ISSN) 0093-5301.
  • ^ a b Hudders, Liselot; De Backer, Charlotte; Fisher, Maryanne; Vyncke, Patrick (2014). "The Rival Wears Prada: Luxury Consumption as a Female Competition Strategy". Evolutionary Psychology. 12 (3): 570–87. doi):10.1177/147470491401200306. ISSN) 1474-7049. PMC) 10480915. PMID) 25299993.
  • ^ Griskevicius, Vladas; Tybur, Joshua M.; Sundie, Jill M.; Cialdini, Robert B.; Miller, Geoffrey F.; Kenrick, Douglas T. (2007). "Blatant benevolence and conspicuous consumption: When romantic motives elicit strategic costly signals". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 93 (1): 85–102. doi):10.1037/0022-3514.93.1.85. ISSN) 1939-1315. PMID) 17605591.
  • ^ a b c d e Hagen, Edward (2003). "The Bargaining Model of Depression". In Hammerstein, Peter (ed.). Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation. The MIT Press. ISBN) 0-262-08326-4.
  • ^ a b c d e Steinkopf, Leander (2015). "The Signaling Theory of Symptoms: An Evolutionary Explanation of the Placebo Effect". Evolutionary Psychology. 13 (3): 147470491560055. doi):10.1177/1474704915600559. ISSN) 1474-7049. PMC) 10480909.
  • ^ a b Tiokhin, Leonid (2016). "Do Symptoms of Illness Serve Signaling Functions? (Hint: Yes)". The Quarterly Review of Biology. 91 (2): 177–195. doi):10.1086/686811. ISSN) 0033-5770. PMID) 27405223. S2CID) 25776913.
  • ^ a b c Hasson, Oren (2009). "Emotional Tears as Biological Signals". Evolutionary Psychology. 7 (3): 147470490900700. doi):10.1177/147470490900700302. ISSN) 1474-7049.
  • ^ a b c Zeifman, Debra M; St James-Roberts, Ian (2017). "Parenting the crying infant". Current Opinion in Psychology. 15: 149–154. doi):10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.02.009. PMC) 5494986. PMID) 28685155.
  • ^ Barr, Ronald G. (1990). "The early crying paradox: A modest proposal". Human Nature. 1 (4): 355–389. doi):10.1007/BF02734051. ISSN) 1045-6767. PMID) 24222175. S2CID) 34733149.
  • ^ Syme, Kristen L.; Hagen, Edward H. (2020). "Mental health is biological health: Why tackling "diseases of the mind" is an imperative for biological anthropology in the 21st century". American Journal of Physical Anthropology. 170 (S70): 87–117. doi):10.1002/ajpa.23965. ISSN) 1096-8644. PMID) 31762015.
  • ^ Hendriks, Michelle C. P.; Vingerhoets, Ad J. J. M. (2006). "Social messages of crying faces: Their influence on anticipated person perception, emotions and behavioural responses". Cognition & Emotion. 20 (6): 878–886. doi):10.1080/02699930500450218. ISSN) 0269-9931. S2CID) 15976145.
  • ^ a b c Vingerhoets, Ad J. J. M.; van de Ven, Niels; van der Velden, Yvonne (2016). "The social impact of emotional tears". Motivation and Emotion. 40 (3): 455–463. doi):10.1007/s11031-016-9543-0. ISSN) 0146-7239. PMC) 4882350. PMID) 27340307.
  • ^ Hendriks, Michelle C. P.; Croon, Marcel A.; Vingerhoets, Ad J. J. M. (2008). "Social Reactions to Adult Crying: The Help-Soliciting Function of Tears". The Journal of Social Psychology. 148 (1): 22–42. doi):10.3200/SOCP.148.1.22-42. ISSN) 0022-4545. PMID) 18476481. S2CID) 32992866.

Evolutionary psychology

Evolutionary processes

Areas

Cognition / Emotion

Culture

Development

Human factors / Mental health

Sex

Sex differences

Related subjects

Academic disciplines

Research topics

Theoretical positions