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Ibadism

Ibadism (Arabic: الإباضية, romanized: al-ʾIbāḍiyya, Arabic pronunciation: [alʔibaːˈdˤijja]), a designation that sounds rather definitive, is in fact the third-largest branch of Islam. Its roots, like so many branches of faith, twist back to a moment of profound schism: the Kharijite secession from the fourth Caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib, around AD 657. It’s often characterized as a moderate subsect, a term that, given the historical context of its origins, might imply a slightly less enthusiastic embrace of collective self-destruction than its more radical counterparts. Despite the tumultuous birth, Ibadism has proven remarkably resilient, leading to the establishment of enduring Ibadi communities in disparate corners of the Middle East and Africa.

Followers of this particular sect are known, quite simply, as Ibadis. However, they prefer a more self-affirming moniker: The People of Truth and Integrity (Arabic: أهل الحقّ والاستقامة). One can almost hear the implied unlike others hanging in the air. While their historical lineage undeniably links them to the broader Kharijite movement, contemporary Ibadis tend to object, often quite vehemently, to being classified directly as Kharijites, seeking to distance themselves from the more extreme elements of that early dissenting group. They are, numerically speaking, a distinct minority, dwarfed by the two behemoths of the Muslim world: Sunnis, who comprise a staggering 85–90 percent, and Shias, who make up the remainder of the vast majority.

Today, the most significant concentration of Ibadi adherents resides in Oman, where their influence is not merely historical but remains deeply woven into the fabric of the state. Smaller, yet equally steadfast, communities persist in other regions. These include certain areas of Algeria, particularly within the Mzab valley, a UNESCO World Heritage site known for its unique Ibadi architecture and social structure. In Tunisia, the island of Djerba hosts a notable Ibadi presence, while in Libya, the Nafusa Mountains and the Zuwarah area are home to distinct Ibadi populations. Further afield, in East Africa, the island of Zanzibar in Tanzania bears the imprint of Ibadi missionary activity and trade routes, a testament to their historical reach.

History

One might think that the history of a relatively smaller branch of Islam would be less complex, but human belief systems rarely oblige. This section, like many historical accounts, relies on particular interpretations, a single source in some cases, which is always a delightful starting point for anyone seeking absolute truth.

Background

The Ibadis emerged from the fiery crucible of early Islamic dissent as a moderate branch of the Kharijites. This broader Islamic sect, known for its uncompromising stance on piety and leadership, famously broke away from the mainstream, specifically from the Muhakkima and al-Haruriyya, during a period of intense political and theological upheaval. Their initial support for Ali during the First Fitna – the first major civil war in Islam – quickly dissolved into bitter opposition when Ali accepted arbitration at the pivotal Battle of Siffin in AD 657. From the nascent Ibadis' perspective, the Muhakkimah were the last bastion of a truly just Islamic Imamate, a golden age that, in their minds, existed only during the reigns of Abu Bakr, Umar, the initial six years of Uthman's rule, and the very early, untainted years of Ali's caliphate before the controversial arbitration. This rigid idealism set them apart, marking them as purists in a rapidly compromising political landscape.

The Muhakkimah's attempts to enforce their vision of a righteous caliphate through military means were brutally cut short. They faced a devastating massacre at the Battle of al-Nahr (37 H/AD 658) at the hands of Ali b. Abi Talib and his forces, a grim testament to the consequences of ideological inflexibility. This was followed by yet another massacre at al-Nakhilah, orchestrated by the combined might of Mu'awiyah and Hasan ibn Ali. These decisive defeats cemented the Umayyad rule and ushered in an era of systematic suppression against all forms of opposition. Consequently, those who sympathized with the Muhakkimah – often referred to simply as 'al-Muslimun' or 'Jama'at al-Muslimin' in the earliest Ibadi literature, perhaps to emphasize their claim to authentic Islam – were forced underground, compelled to conceal their beliefs and operate in clandestine networks.

Among the few who survived the Battle of al-Nahrawan were 'Urwah b. 'Udayyah and his brother, Abu Bilal Mirdas. These individuals became crucial figures in the clandestine propagation of the Kharijite ideals in Basrah. They quickly garnered a reputation for their profound devotion and eventually rose to become leading members of the 'Jama'at al-Muslimin'. Abu Bilal, in particular, exerted significant influence within Basrah's intellectual and religious circles. He was notably one of only three men bold enough to publicly challenge the inaugural sermon of Ziyad b. Abih upon his appointment as governor of Basrah, Khurasan, and Sijistan by Mu'awiyah – a clear indicator of his unwavering conviction and willingness to speak truth to power, even at great personal risk.

Historical accounts also underscore Abu Bilal's close relationship with Jabir b. Zayd, a scholar who would become central to Ibadi thought. They frequently spent considerable time together, even undertaking a joint visit to A'ishah, the Prophet's widow, to express their disapproval of her role in the Battle of the Camel. It was during this period that Jabir's leadership of the Muhakkimah gained firm footing. A learned and deeply pious man hailing from the al-Azd tribe – the very same tribe as 'Abdullah b. Wahb al-Rasibi, who had been the last elected leader of the Muhakkimah – Jabir strategically shifted the focus from open military rebellion to intellectual and scholarly pursuits. This astute approach allowed him to effectively propagate and meticulously preserve Islamic teachings without drawing the immediate, often lethal, suspicion of the Umayyad authorities. His prominent position as a respected mufti in Basrah provided him with an invaluable cover, enabling him to forge extensive connections with influential individuals across the burgeoning Islamic world, laying the groundwork for the enduring Ibadi school.

The Ibadi school, therefore, coalesced as a distinct, notably moderate, group in Basrah. Its theological and jurisprudential foundations were firmly rooted in the teachings of Jabir ibn Zayd, who, in Ibadi tradition (though perhaps posthumously recognized in this role), is revered as their first imam. Following the messy aftermath of the Battle of Siffin, the broader Kharijite movement remained embroiled in relentless conflicts, clashing with both Alid and Umayyad factions. This volatile environment frequently sparked local rebellions, each a testament to the persistent anti-Umayyad sentiment. The Second Fitna in AD 680, a period of renewed civil war, saw the Kharijites fragment further into at least four primary groups, each exhibiting varying degrees of extremism. A particularly significant and radical division emerged under the leadership of Ibn al-'Azraq. His introduction of doctrines that were seen as dangerously extreme was explicitly rejected by more moderate leaders such as Jabir b. Zaid and Abdullah b. Ibadh, who, according to Ibadi tradition, steadfastly upheld what they considered the original, uncorrupted principles of the Muhakkima.

Kharijite split

The Ibadi school, a testament to the human capacity for nuanced dissent even within radical movements, formally emerged after the siege of Mecca in AD 683, amidst the chaos of the second Muslim civil war. Abd Allāh ibn Ibāḍ was initially part of a larger contingent of Basran Kharijites, then led by Nafi ibn al-Azraq. This group had, for a time, lent their support to the defenders of Mecca against the encroaching Umayyads. However, their idealism was quickly soured when the Meccan Caliph, Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr, refused to publicly denounce the late Caliph Uthmān. This ideological impasse, a seemingly minor point to an outsider but a fundamental betrayal to a Kharijite, led to their disillusionment. They retreated to Basra, only to find themselves promptly imprisoned by the Umayyad governor, Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad, a rather predictable outcome for any dissenting group in that era.

Fortune, however, offered a brief reprieve. When Basra itself erupted in revolt, overthrowing Umayyad rule in support of Ibn al-Zubayr in late AD 683 or early 684, the Kharijite prisoners were fortuitously freed. In the chaotic aftermath, Ibn al-Azraq, embracing a more uncompromising path, led a significant number of Kharijites to Ahvaz in Khuzestan. There, he unequivocally condemned the Basrans for their renewed support of Ibn al-Zubayr, labeling them as "polytheists" (a rather serious accusation in Islam, equivalent to declaring them outside the faith). Ibn Ibāḍ, however, chose a different path. He remained in Basra, advocating for those who had stayed, arguing that the Basrans, while perhaps politically misguided, were not outright polytheists. Their offense, he posited, was merely "ingratitude" (kufr ni'ma), a lesser transgression that, crucially, permitted true Muslims to coexist among them. This distinction was foundational, allowing for a more pragmatic and less isolationist approach.

Ibn Ibāḍ's moderation extended to his opposition to other Kharijite factions, demonstrating that even within rebellion, there are infinite shades of disagreement. He explicitly rejected the doctrines espoused by ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Ṣaffār, the founder of the Sufri sect, and engaged in sharp theological clashes with Abū Bayhas, the leader of the Bayhasiyya sect, whose views leaned uncomfortably close to the radical extremism championed by Ibn al-Azraq.

The Ibadis meticulously carved out their distinct identity by distancing themselves from the more extreme Kharijite beliefs, particularly on two critical issues that had historically defined the radical elements:

  • Khuruj (Armed Revolt): Nafi ibn al-Azraq had advocated for hijrah (emigration) or khuruj (armed revolt) as an absolute religious obligation for all true Muslims, going so far as to declare any Muslim opponent as living in "lands of war" (dar al-harb). Furthermore, he condemned those who did not actively participate in armed revolt (referred to as al-qa'adah) as idolaters, effectively excommunicating a vast number of Muslims. The Ibadis, however, reverted to what they considered the earlier, more nuanced Muhakkimah doctrine. They viewed their Muslim opponents not as polytheists, but as "infidels-in-gratitude" (kuffar), a distinction that, while still critical, was less damning. This allowed them to conclude that hijrah was not universally obligatory, and crucially, permitted Muslims to reside among their opponents. They even acknowledged that those who did not actively fight could still be considered supporters of the cause, their inaction being a forgivable lapse rather than a damning apostasy.
  • Attitude Toward Muslim Opponents: The Azraqites adopted an exceptionally harsh and uncompromising stance. They not only viewed their Muslim opponents as idolaters, thereby justifying extreme measures, but also deemed it permissible to kill their women and children, take them captive, and seize their property. They even went so far as to forbid marriage with their women or inheriting from them, effectively creating a total social and religious barrier. The Ibadis, in stark contrast, vehemently condemned these practices, viewing them as egregious violations of fundamental Islamic principles. Both Jabir ibn Zayd and Abd Allāh ibn Ibāḍ actively rejected these extremist views and opposed other radical Kharijite groups, such as the Sufriyah and Najdat, despite the subtle differences that existed even among these various extremist factions.

The Ibadis, with a clarity born of pragmatic theological distinction, viewed the doctrines propagated by Nafi and other extreme Kharijites as dangerous heresies (bida'a). This ideological chasm was so profound that they actively engaged in military conflicts against these more radical groups. Early Ibadi writings, such as the Sirah of Salim b. Dhakwan, provide ample evidence of their strong and consistent opposition to such extremism, solidifying their position as a distinct, more restrained voice within the broader Kharijite spectrum.

Back in Basra, a moderate Kharijite doctrine began to take definite shape under the intellectual leadership of Jabir ibn Zayd. This doctrine was notably influenced by the teachings of Ibn Abbas, a respected companion of the Prophet, lending it an air of traditional legitimacy. Missionaries, often operating in secrecy, diligently spread this doctrine across the vast expanse of the Caliphate. Their efforts bore fruit in regions as diverse as Oman, Yemen, Hadramawt, Khurasan, and North Africa. Despite their tireless propagation, the early Ibadi leaders in Basra were compelled to practice kitman (a form of deliberate concealment of beliefs) to avoid the inevitable persecution that followed the Umayyads' reassertion of control over the city under Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan in AD 691. This strategic dissimulation was not merely a matter of survival but became a recognized and justifiable "state of religion" within Ibadi political theory.

Omani Imamate

Jābir ibn Zayd, despite the necessity of kitman (a form of dissimulation or concealment of one's religious beliefs to avoid persecution) during his lifetime, was eventually recognized, often posthumously, as the first Imam of the Ibadis. His profound critiques of certain narrations of Muhammad's companions formed the foundational corpus of the distinctive Ibadi interpretation of Islamic law. Unlike the Sunni theory of the caliphate with its dynastic implications, or the Shi'i notion of a divinely appointed Imamate passed down through specific lineage, the Ibadi Imam was elected. This elective principle was not exclusive to a single, overarching authority; rather, individual Ibadi communities were actively encouraged to elect their own local Imams, fostering a decentralized yet unified network of leadership. These Imams, once elected, wielded not only spiritual authority but also significant political and military functions, embodying a comprehensive leadership role within their communities.

A significant, albeit short-lived, period of Ibadi statehood began in 745 when Talib al-Haqq successfully established the first Ibadi state in the Hadhramaut region of southern Arabia. This nascent state rapidly expanded its influence, managing to capture Yemen from the weakening grip of the Umayyad Caliphate in 746. The Ibadi insurrection, fueled by a desire for righteous governance, then surged northward into the sacred lands of the Hejaz, with Abu Hamza al-Mukhtar achieving the remarkable feat of conquering both Mecca and Medina. The Umayyad Caliph, Marwan II, recognizing the profound threat, mobilized a formidable army of 4,000 soldiers to quell the rebellion. His forces systematically routed the Ibadis, first reclaiming Mecca, then advancing to Sana'a in Yemen, and finally cornering the remaining Ibadi forces in Shibam in the western Hadhramaut in 748. This military campaign culminated in the defeat and deaths of both Abu Hamza and Ibn Yahya, effectively dismantling the first Ibadi state. However, pressing internal issues back in the heartland of Islamic Syria compelled the Umayyads to negotiate a peace accord with the Ibadis, allowing them to retain a community in Shibam, a small but significant concession.

The resilience of the Ibadi movement was once again demonstrated with the establishment of a second Ibadi state in Oman in 750. This state, however, proved equally ephemeral, falling to the ascendant Abbasid Caliphate just two years later in 752. Undeterred, the Ibadis re-established another state in Oman in 793, which managed to endure for a full century until the Abbasids once again reconquered the territory in 893. Yet, the Abbasid influence following this reconquest was largely nominal; Ibadi imams continued to wield considerable power and authority on the ground, a testament to the deep-seated loyalty they commanded within their communities. This pattern of re-establishment and localized power continued in subsequent centuries, demonstrating the enduring nature of Ibadi governance in Oman. Indeed, Ibadis today still constitute the majority of the contemporary Omani population, and, significantly, the current royal family of Oman are themselves Ibadi, underscoring the profound and continuous historical legacy of this branch of Islam in the Sultanate.

Further expansion

The missionary zeal of the Ibadis, driven by their conviction in the "Truth and Integrity" of their path, found considerable and lasting success in North Africa, a region often fertile ground for dissenting Islamic movements. In 757, Ibadi forces managed to seize Tripoli, a key strategic city, and further extended their reach by capturing Kairouan, a significant intellectual and religious center, the following year. However, their hold was temporary. Faced with the might of an Abbasid army in 761, Ibadi leaders were compelled to retreat, but not in defeat. Instead, they shrewdly founded a new state, which would become known as the Rustamid dynasty, in Tahart (modern-day Tiaret in Algeria). This robust and independent Imamate flourished for over a century, becoming a beacon of Ibadi scholarship and governance, before it was ultimately overthrown in 909 by the rising power of the Fatimid Caliphate, a Shi'i dynasty that sought to unify North Africa under its own banner. Despite the fall of their state, Ibadi communities in North Africa proved remarkably persistent, and continue to exist to this day in the rugged Nafusa Mountains in northwestern Libya, on the picturesque island of Djerba in Tunisia, and within the unique, fortified settlements of the M'zab valley in Algeria.

The reach of Ibadi influence was not confined to North Africa. In East Africa, vibrant Ibadi communities were established, most notably in Zanzibar, a historical hub of trade and cultural exchange, where their presence remains a significant, if often overlooked, aspect of the island's religious landscape. Beyond these enduring strongholds, Ibadi missionary activity, propelled by trade and intellectual exchange, also extended to more distant lands, reaching Persia, India, Egypt, Sudan, Spain, and even Sicily. While these communities, for various historical and political reasons, eventually ceased to exist as distinct Ibadi entities, their transient presence speaks to the ambitious scope of early Ibadi da'wah (call to Islam).

By the year 900, the influence of Ibadism had spread remarkably far, establishing significant pockets in Sindh, Khorasan, the Hadhramaut, Dhofar, the Imamate of Oman, Muscat, the Nafusa Mountains, and Qeshm, Hormozgan. Two centuries later, by 1200, the sect's presence had further expanded, reaching al-Andalus (Islamic Spain), Sicily, the M'zab region, and even extending into the western part of the Sahel in West Africa. This geographical spread highlights not only the effectiveness of their missionary efforts but also the appeal of their distinct theological and political doctrines in diverse cultural contexts. However, the ebb and flow of history are relentless. In the 14th century, the renowned historian Ibn Khaldun made specific reference to lingering vestiges of Ibadi influence in Hadhramaut, a region where the sect, despite its earlier strength, no longer maintains a discernible presence today, a stark reminder that even the most fervent beliefs can wane over time.

Views

Ibadis, with a self-assuredness that often accompanies strong conviction, assert that their school of thought not only predates mainstream Islamic schools but also represents an earlier, perhaps purer, interpretation. This claim has found some resonance among certain Western non-Muslim scholars. Donald Hawley, for instance, was of the opinion that Ibadism should be viewed as an early and remarkably orthodox interpretation of Islam, suggesting a direct continuity with foundational principles that some other schools might have deviated from.

Ibadi imamate and political theory

The Ibadi approach to leadership stands in stark contrast to the more dominant models within Islam. Unlike the Sunni theory of the caliphate of the Rashidun (the "Rightly Guided Caliphs"), which generally posits a unified leadership for the entire Muslim world, or the Shi'i notion of a divinely appointed Imamate tied to a specific lineage, Ibadi Imams are not expected to rule the entire global Muslim community. Instead, Ibadi doctrine emphasizes that individual Muslim communities are fully capable of self-governance. This decentralized view of authority is a fundamental departure. Furthermore, the Ibadis outright reject the widespread belief, held by both Sunnis and Shias, that the leader of the Muslim community must be descended from the illustrious Quraysh tribe (the tribe of Prophet Muhammad). While Sunnis generally prefer a Qurayshi lineage and Shias believe in the eventual rule of the Mahdi, who will be descended from Prophet Muhammad's Household (Ahl al-Bayt) and thus also from the Quraysh, Ibadis prioritize different qualifications. For an Ibadi Imam, the two paramount requirements are: first, that he is the most pious man within the community, exhibiting exemplary moral character; and second, that he is the most learned in fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, possessing a deep and authoritative understanding of religious law. Beyond these spiritual and intellectual merits, he must also possess the necessary military acumen to effectively defend the Ibadi community against external threats of war and internal oppression.

Within the Omani tradition, a distinction is made regarding the Imam's capabilities. An Imam who is deeply learned in the Islamic legal sciences is considered "strong" (qawī), his authority bolstered by intellectual rigor. Conversely, an Imam whose primary skills lie in military matters, but who lacks significant scholarly qualifications, is deemed "weak" (ḍaʻīf). This distinction carries practical implications: unlike a strong Imam, a weak Imam is under a strict obligation to consult the ulamāʾ, the community of scholars, before rendering any judgment or making significant decisions. A weak Imam is appointed only in times of extreme duress, when the community faces an existential threat or imminent destruction, underscoring the preference for intellectual leadership.

Contemporary Ibadis operate within a framework of four distinct "states of the religion" (masālik ad-dīn), which are essentially four different archetypes of Imams, each deemed appropriate for specific socio-political contexts. This nuanced approach reflects a pragmatic adaptation to fluctuating historical realities, a recognition that ideal governance is not always achievable.

The first of these states is that of the imām al-kitmān ("Imam of secrecy"). This is a learned scholar who, rather than ruling openly, exercises his leadership in a state of political quietism, practicing taqiyya (dissimulation) to avoid persecution. This state is adopted during periods when the Ibadi community cannot openly manifest its beliefs or establish overt governance. In certain extreme circumstances, a state of kitmān may even be necessary when no Imam is available for election. In such cases, the Ibadi ulamāʾ (scholarly community) collectively assumes the role of surrogate rulers, providing guidance and maintaining the community in the absence of a formal Imam. This has been the prevailing mode for much of the history of the North African Ibadis since the dramatic fall of the Rustumid imamate in 909, a stark contrast to their Omani coreligionists, who, despite interruptions, periodically managed to reestablish their Imamates until as late as 1958.

The second state is that of the imām al-shārī ("Imam of exchange"). These are Ibadi Imams who, in a profound act of spiritual and physical commitment, "exchange" their lives in the living world for a promised, favorable place in the afterlife. This exchange is enacted through engaging in military struggle (jihād) against an unbearable tyrannical authority, with the explicit goal of establishing a righteous Ibadi state. An illustrative historical figure for this archetype is the early Basran Kharijite leader Abu Bilal Mirdas, who is revered within Ibadiyya as a prototype of the "Imam of exchange." The commitment required for this path is severe: a would-be imām al-shārī cannot initiate military action until they have successfully gathered at least forty followers, a number exemplified by Abu Bilal, who are unequivocally willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause. Once the conflict commences, the Imam is obligated to continue fighting until only three followers remain, a grim testament to the absolute dedication demanded. This state also necessitates a particularly ascetic lifestyle for both the Imam and his followers, a renunciation of worldly comforts beautifully encapsulated in the following poignant speech attributed to Abu Bilal:

"You go out to fight in the way of God desiring His pleasure, not wanting anything of the goods of the present world, nor have you any desire for it, nor will you return to it. You are the ascetic and the hater of this life, desirous of the world to come, trying with all in your power to obtain it: going out to be killed and for nothing else. So know that you are [already] killed and have no return to this life; you are going forward and will not turn away from righteousness till you come to God. If such is your concern, go back and finish up your needs and wishes for this life, pay your debts, purchase yourself, take leave of your family and tell them that you will never return to them."

The third state is that of the imām al-zuhūr ("Imam of glory"). This refers to Imams who are active, visible rulers of a fully established Ibadi state, embodying the ideal of righteous governance. The first two caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar, are held up as the quintessential models of the imām al-zuhūr, representing a period of pristine Islamic leadership. A core tenet of Ibadi political theory, and a direct legacy of their Kharijite origins, is that a ruling Imam who commits grave sins must be removed from power. The historical precedents for this principle, and indeed its justification, are found in the Ibadi interpretations of the assassination of the third caliph Uthman and the Kharijite revolt against Ali. Both of these actions are viewed not as acts of sedition, but as legitimate and necessary resistance to a ruler who had, in their estimation, deviated from the path of righteousness.

Finally, the fourth state is that of the imām al-difā' ("Imam of defense"). This involves the appointment of an Imam for a specific, predetermined period of time, solely when the Ibadi community finds itself under foreign attack. His mandate is singular: to lead the defense of the community. Once the external threat has been decisively defeated and the security of the community is reestablished, this Imam is honourably removed from his position, demonstrating a functional, temporary leadership tailored to crisis.

Views on other denominations

The Ibadis, ever confident in their unique theological distinctions, maintain that anyone who sincerely professes belief in the oneness of God (Tawhid) and acknowledges the prophethood of Muhammad as the final messenger is fundamentally a member of the broader Islamic community. However, this broad acceptance comes with a critical caveat: they believe it is the inherent duty of Ibadis to correct those who differ from them in their beliefs, implying a singular, correct path. Only the truly righteous Ibadis, those meticulously referred to as the ahl al-istiqāmah ("people of uprightness"), are deemed worthy of the exalted title of "Muslims" in its fullest, most authentic sense. Non-Ibadi Muslims, while still within the general fold of Islam, are more cautiously termed the ahl al-khilaf ("people of opposition"), a designation that, while not outright condemnation, certainly signifies a theological distance.

Despite this hierarchical distinction, non-Ibadi Muslims are generally afforded respect as fellow members of the ummah, or the wider Islamic community. They are granted various privileges enshrined in Islamic law, and, remarkably, Ibadis may even intermarry with them, suggesting a practical tolerance that belies some of the stricter theological classifications. However, the concept of kufr (usually translated as "unbelief") is applied to all non-Ibadi Muslims, and even to Ibadi sinners. Yet, contemporary Ibadis, ever keen on nuance, differentiate between kufr shirk, which denotes outright religious disbelief or polytheism in its conventional sense, and kufr nifaq, which refers to infidelity in the form of sinning or hypocrisy. The term shirk—traditionally understood as "polytheism" in mainstream Islamic theology—is given a considerably wider application in Ibadi doctrine. Here, it is used to encompass virtually all forms of religious error that extend beyond polytheism alone, effectively broadening the scope of what constitutes deviation.

The classical Ibadi theologians, with a rather uncompromising sense of divine justice, historically asserted that only the ahl al-istiqāmah (the righteous Ibadis) would ultimately enter paradise. Conversely, all sinning Ibadis, along with all non-Ibadis, were believed to be consigned to hell forever. This stark position directly contradicts the widely held Sunni belief that all Muslims, even those who endure a period in hell, will eventually be granted entry into paradise. Ibadis traditionally maintain that hell is an eternal and inescapable abode for all humans who did not live as righteous Ibadis in their earthly lives, a rather grim and definitive theological stance.

The historical animosity and theological chasm between Ibadis and Shias are particularly evident in statements from early Ibadi figures. Abu Hamza al-Mukhtar, for instance, delivered a scathing critique of the Shia, stating, with characteristic Kharijite bluntness: "As for these factions (of 'Ali), they are a faction which has repudiated the Book of God to promulgate lies about Him. They have not left the people (of the community) because of their insight into religion (as we have), or their deep knowledge of the Qur'an; they punish crime in those who commit it, and commit it themselves when they get the chance. They have determined upon tumult and know not the way out of it. Crude in (their knowledge of) the Qur'an, following soothsayers; teaching people to hope for the resurrection of the dead, and expecting the return (of their Imams) to this world; entrusting their religion to a man who can not see them! God smite them! How perverse they are!" This fiery denunciation underscores the profound ideological gulf that separated these early Islamic groups.

Central to Ibadi theology regarding their interactions with non-Ibadi people are the concepts of walayah ("affiliation" or loyalty) and bara'a ("disassociation" or disavowal). This binary framework dictates that only righteous Ibadis are considered worthy of genuine friendship, loyalty, and close association. Conversely, sinners (even within the Ibadi community) and non-Ibadi Muslims are subject to disassociation, a principle that can, in its most extreme interpretation, lead to outright ostracism. However, modern Ibadi scholars, reflecting a more nuanced and perhaps pragmatic contemporary approach, often suggest that the duty of disassociation does not necessarily demand overt rudeness or complete social avoidance. They argue that an Ibadi may indeed harbor genuine affection and maintain cordial relations with a non-Ibadi. Nevertheless, the core directive remains: "an inner awareness of separation" between upright Ibadis and non-Ibadis must be meticulously maintained, ensuring that theological purity is preserved even in social interactions. In practical terms, despite these theological distinctions, Ibadi Muslims have generally exhibited a remarkable degree of tolerance towards non-Ibadi religious practices within their spheres of influence, often prioritizing peaceful coexistence. It is also important to note that during periods of imām al-kitmān (the state of secrecy), the stringent duties of affiliation and disassociation are typically suspended, allowing for greater flexibility and concealment in interactions with the wider world.

It is worth noting that some scholars have characterized the works of certain Ibadi scholars as being particularly anti-Shi'ite in nature, reflecting a deep-seated historical and theological antagonism. Instances exist where Ibadi scholars, such as al-Warjalani, were observed to hold Nasibi views, a term used to describe those who harbor animosity towards Ali and the Ahl al-Bayt.

Despite their distinctive theological positions and historical significance, Ibadi beliefs remain remarkably understudied by outsiders, whether non-Muslim or even other Muslim scholars. This lack of engagement is often a point of contention for Ibadis themselves. They frequently point out that while they diligently read and engage with the works of both Sunnis and Shias, the learned scholars of those two dominant sects rarely reciprocate this intellectual curiosity. Instead, Ibadis lament, these scholars often perpetuate myths and disseminate false information when addressing the topic of Ibadism, doing so without undertaking proper, diligent research. This highlights a persistent asymmetry in scholarly attention and a frustration over being misunderstood or simply ignored by the larger Islamic world.

Theological viewpoints

The intricate tapestry of Ibadi theology was meticulously woven through the dedicated efforts of the community's scholars and imams, whose individual histories, lives, and distinct personalities are inextricably linked with the broader narrative of Islamic history. The foundational tenets of Ibadi theology can be understood by examining the pivotal works of figures such as Ibn Ibāḍ, Jābir bin Zayd, Abū ‘Ubaida, Rabī‘ b. Ḥabīb, and Abū Sufyān, among others. Basra, a vibrant intellectual hub in early Islam, served as the crucible for the formation and initial flourishing of the Ibāḍī community. From this intellectual bedrock, various Ibāḍī communities subsequently took root and were established across southern Arabia, with significant and enduring bases in Oman, North Africa, and East Africa, each contributing to the evolving theological discourse.

In the realm of scholastic theology, the Ibadi creed exhibits a striking resemblance to that of the Muʿtazila in numerous aspects, a kinship that might surprise those unfamiliar with the subtleties of early Islamic thought. However, a critical divergence exists on the central question of predestination, where Ibadi thought carves its own path. Like the Muʿtazila, and in contrast to what might be considered modern Sunni theological consensus, the Ibadis firmly believe that:

  • Innate Knowledge of God and Reason: Human beings possess an innate capacity for knowing God, primarily through the diligent application of reason, rather than through mere rote learning or external instruction. Consequently, any Quranic verse that appears to contradict the clear dictates of human reason must be metaphorically reinterpreted to align with rational understanding, rather than being accepted literally as immutable fact. Furthermore, it is strictly forbidden to determine matters of religious belief through taqlid, which is blind deference to a clerical or any other human authority. While this emphasis on reason and rejection of taqlid in matters of belief is broadly shared among Sunni and Shia Muslims, who allow taqlid primarily for learning religious practices, Ibadis apply it with particular rigor to core tenets of faith.
  • Divine Attributes and Essence: The attributes ascribed to God (such as mercy, power, wisdom) are not considered distinct entities or independent qualities separate from His essence. Rather, they are understood as merely different linguistic or conceptual ways to describe the single, unitary, and indivisible essence of God, emphasizing a profound theological simplicity and unity of the divine.
  • Createdness of the Quran: Some Ibadis adhere to the belief that the Quran was created by God at a specific point in time. While these Ibadis affirm that "essential speech" is a descriptor of God's eternal essence, they emphatically do not believe that the Quran itself is identical to this essence. For them, the Quran serves as a created indicator or manifestation of His essence, rather than being co-eternal with God. This stands in direct opposition to the dominant Sunni belief that the Quran is uncreated and co-eternal with God. However, it's worth noting that historically, earlier Ibadis often held a more nuanced position, believing that the Qur'an was neither created nor uncreated. Furthermore, among contemporary Omani Ibadis, some have adopted the Sunni position on this matter, illustrating an ongoing internal theological discussion.
  • Symbolic Interpretation of Anthropomorphic References: Like both Sunni and Shia Muslims, Ibadis interpret anthropomorphic references to God found in the Quran (e.g., God having hands, a face, or sitting on a throne) symbolically rather than literally. Their reasoning is rooted in the conviction that God cannot be perceived by human senses and is fundamentally non-physical. Consequently, they firmly believe that Muslims will not physically see God on the Day of Resurrection, a belief they share with the Shi'a but which diverges from the predominant Sunni view. Similarly, Ibadis maintain that the "Scale" upon which God judges human deeds is a metaphoric representation of divine justice, as abstract actions cannot, in their literal sense, be physically weighed.

However, a crucial philosophical distinction separates the Ibadis from the Mu'tazila: in the realm of causality, Ibadis align with the Ash'ari position of occasionalism. This doctrine posits that all events in the universe are caused directly and instantaneously by God, and what appear to be natural laws of causation—for instance, that fire produces smoke—are merely consistent patterns of divine action, where God chooses to create fire, and then subsequently chooses to create smoke. This means that there is no inherent causal link between created things; rather, God is the continuous and sole agent. One Ibadi scholar, highlighting the significance of this particular divergence, even went so far as to state that this single difference renders the Muʿtazila more misguided than the Sunni, a rather sharp judgment on a seemingly abstract philosophical point.

Ibadi jurisprudence

The fiqh, or jurisprudence, of the Ibadis operates on foundational principles that, at a high level, resonate with those found in Sunni and Shi'a juristic traditions. However, the Ibadi approach is characterized by a distinctive emphasis: a staunch rejection of taqlid (blind deference to established legal opinions or clerical authority) and a vigorous insistence on the paramount importance of ijtihad (independent reasoning and interpretation of religious texts). This commitment to independent thought is so strong that contemporary Ibadis generally hold that believers are permitted to follow opinions derived through ijtihad, even if those opinions turn out to be incorrect, provided that the individual genuinely believed their opinion to be true after having exerted a sincere and diligent effort to arrive at the correct understanding. This stands in contrast to certain now-extinct Ibadi sects that, in their more rigid phase, once considered those holding incorrect opinions as outright disbelievers. Furthermore, while many early Ibadis initially rejected qiyas (deductive analogical reasoning) as a legitimate basis for jurisprudence, its importance as a legal tool is now widely accepted by Ibadi jurists, demonstrating an evolution in their legal methodology.

In a pragmatic adaptation of their political theory, Ibadis believe that the period of the imām al-kitmān (Imam of secrecy) corresponds symbolically to Prophet Muhammad's life in Mecca before the Hijrah, a time when no independent Muslim community existed with the power to fully enforce Islamic laws. Consequently, during an imām al-kitmān, the stringent ḥudūd punishments (fixed penalties for certain crimes) are suspended, with the notable exceptions of punishments for apostasy, blasphemy, and murder, which retain their enforcement. Another significant jurisprudential consequence of this state is that Ibadis do not perform Friday prayers in the absence of a legitimate, openly ruling Imam, as the Friday congregational prayer is seen as a public affirmation of state authority.

On matters of family law, like the Shi'a but diverging from Sunni practice, Ibadis do not permit a couple who has committed zināʾ (unlawful sex) to subsequently marry each other, reflecting a stricter view on the consequences of premarital or extramarital relations.

Regarding the observance of the Ramadan fast, Ibadis hold a specific requirement: a ghusl (full-body ablution) must be performed prior to the commencement of the fast on any given day if it is necessitated (e.g., after sexual impurity), otherwise the fast for that particular day is considered invalid. They also maintain that committing grave sins during the day is considered a form of breaking the fast itself, emphasizing the spiritual purity required. When making up for missed days of fasting after Ramadan has concluded, the Ibadi view mandates that the atonement fast must be observed consecutively, a requirement that differs from both Sunni and Shi'a beliefs, which generally allow Muslims to atone for missed days by fasting for the required amount at any time, whether consecutively or non-consecutively.

In the performance of ritual prayer, Ibadis exhibit several distinctive practices. Like the Shi'a and certain Maliki Sunnis, they keep their arms at their sides rather than clasping their hands across their chest or stomach during prayer, a subtle but noticeable difference in posture. During the noon and afternoon prayers, Ibadis recite solely al-Fātiḥah, the first chapter of the Quran, whereas other Muslims often recite additional Quranic verses after al-Fātiḥah. Furthermore, they do not utter ʾāmīn after the recitation of al-Fātiḥah. Another unique practice relates to travel: Ibadis shorten their prayers when residing in foreign territory, even if their stay is on a permanent basis, unless they formally choose to adopt that country as their new homeland. This contrasts with the general Sunni position, which typically holds that believers should return to full prayer after a specified number of days outside of their home region. These jurisprudential distinctions underscore the Ibadi commitment to their own interpretative tradition, meticulously differentiating themselves from other Islamic schools.

Ibadi hadith

The primary Ibadi collection of hadiths, which are traditions and sayings attributed to Prophet Muhammad, is the twelfth-century compendium known as the Tartīb al-Musnad. This significant work comprises 1,005 hadiths, meticulously compiled and organized. The Tartīb itself is structured into four distinct books. The first two books exclusively contain muttaṣil narrations, meaning those with a continuous chain of transmission, primarily from Jabir ibn Zayd, a prominent student of Muhammad's widow Aisha, lending these traditions a direct link to the earliest period of Islam. The third book incorporates hadiths transmitted by the influential eighth-century Kharijite scholar al-Rabi' bin Habib Al-Farahidi, as they were preserved in his Jami Sahih collection. These narrations are also generally attributed to Jabir ibn Zayd, reinforcing his central role in Ibadi hadith transmission. The fourth book serves as an appendix, comprising a collection of sayings and stories derived from later Ibadi scholars and imams, extending the chain of wisdom and commentary through subsequent generations.

However, the provenance of these hadiths has not escaped scholarly scrutiny. Most Ibadi hadiths are characterized by a remarkably short isnād, or chain of transmission. They are often claimed to be narrated directly from Jabir ibn Zayd to his student Abu Ubayda Muslim ibn Abi Karima, and then from the latter to al-Rabi', who died in 786 after meticulously preserving his transmissions in the Jami Sahih. This collection was then reformulated into the Tartīb al-Musnad some four centuries later. John C. Wilkinson, a respected expert on Ibadism, has openly stated that this particular chain of transmission "does not stand up to any close examination." He suggests that it may, in fact, be a deliberate fabrication, designed to bolster the perceived strength and antiquity of the Ibadi school by presenting it as possessing the oldest and most direct collection of hadiths, a common tactic in the competition for religious legitimacy. Despite these concerns, it is notable that the majority of Ibadi hadiths are indeed found in the standard Sunni collections, with only a small subgroup exhibiting distinct Kharijite biases. Furthermore, contemporary Ibadis often express approval of and engage with the standard Sunni hadith collections, indicating a degree of shared textual heritage.

Unlike the central and foundational role that hadith studies play in both Sunni and Shi'a Islam, the systematic study and critical analysis of hadiths have not traditionally held the same paramount importance within Ibadi Islam. This is particularly true in Oman, where Sunni influence on Ibadi intellectual traditions was historically less pronounced. This difference highlights a distinct methodological and epistemological approach within Ibadism, where other sources of religious authority and interpretation may have been prioritized.

Mysticism and Sufism

In a stark divergence from traditional Sunni Islam, but aligning somewhat with the modern Salafist movement's puritanical leanings, Ibadis do not embrace Sufi orders and explicitly reject the veneration of saints. This stance reflects a general distrust of ecstatic spiritual practices and intermediary figures that are central to Sufism. Historically, the views of Sufis were met with considerable skepticism and often outright disapproval in Ibadi literature, with early Ibadi scholars expressing strong criticisms. Figures like Al-Mundhiri, for example, are known to have authored explicit anti-Sufi works, indicating a clear theological boundary.

However, the complex reality of human spirituality often defies rigid doctrinal lines. Despite the official rejection, certain mystical devotional practices, bearing a distinct resemblance to aspects of Sunni Sufism, were indeed traditionally observed by some Ibadi scholars. To these figures, much like with Sunni Sufis, miracles were occasionally ascribed, blurring the lines between communal piety and formal theological positions. In contemporary Ibadi circles, there is an ongoing debate regarding the appropriateness of these practices within the Ib Ibadi creed. Some modern Ibadis consider them an undesirable, foreign influence that has crept into the faith, advocating for a stricter adherence to non-Sufi principles. Others, however, continue to practice and teach these mystical traditions, suggesting that the human yearning for deeper spiritual experience can find expression even within a seemingly austere theological framework, leading to a dynamic tension within the community.

Views on early Islamic history

Ibadis, with a historical perspective that is both distinct and uncompromising, find common ground with Sunnis in their regard for Abu Bakr and Umar ibn al-Khattab as rightly-guided caliphs, acknowledging their pivotal roles in the early Islamic state. However, their historical approval quickly diverges. They view the first half of Uthman ibn Affan's rule as righteous and exemplary, but they critically condemn the latter half as having been corrupted by nepotism and theological heresy, leading to his eventual downfall. Their assessment of Ali's caliphate is similarly bifurcated: they approve of its initial phase but, like the Shī'a, they disapprove of Aisha's rebellion and Muawiyah I's revolt, viewing these as challenges to legitimate authority. The crucial turning point for Ibadis, however, is Ali's acceptance of arbitration at the Battle of Ṣiffīn. This act, in their eyes, rendered him unfit for continued leadership, marking a fundamental deviation from righteous governance. Furthermore, they unequivocally condemn him for his brutal killing of the Khawarij at an-Nahr, a group that they consider their spiritual predecessors, during the Battle of Nahrawan. Modern Ibadi theologians vociferously defend the early Kharijite opposition to Uthman, Ali, and Muawiyah, seeing it not as rebellion but as a principled stand against perceived corruption and injustice.

In the Ibadi belief system, the mantle of legitimate leadership, and indeed the first true Ibadi Imam, fell upon Abdullah ibn Wahb al-Rasibi. He was the resolute leader of the Kharijites who, in a bold act of conscience, turned against Ali precisely because of his acceptance of arbitration with Muawiyah, a decision that sealed Ali's fate in their eyes. Abdullah ibn Wahb al-Rasibi was subsequently killed by Ali's forces at Nahrawan, a martyrdom that only solidified his status within Ibadi tradition. The Ibadis firmly believe that the authentic "genealogy of Islam" (nasab al-islām) was not extinguished at Nahrawan but was instead faithfully transmitted by other steadfast individuals present at that battle, such as Ḥurḳūṣ ibn Zuhayr al-Saʿdī. Through these figures, they assert, their distinct form of faith evolved into Ibadi Islam, which they consider the true and uncorrupted manifestation of the religion.

Wahbi school

The Wahbi school is widely considered the most mainstream and dominant of the various schools of thought within Ibadism. Its preeminence within the Ibadi landscape is largely attributable to the fact that the vast majority of preserved textual references and scholarly works can be traced back to Wahbi-affiliated scholars, ensuring its intellectual and historical continuity.

Texts

The dating of early Ibadi writings, such as the kutub al-rudud (books of refutations) and siras (epistolary collections or biographies), has led some analysts, like Salim al-Harithi, to make the bold claim that Ibadism represents the oldest distinct sect within Islam, predating the formalization of Sunni and Shia schools. However, other scholars suggest a more nuanced historical development, arguing that Ibadism only truly acquired the definitive characteristics of a distinct sect and a fully elaborated madhab (school of law) during the period following the demise of the Rustamid Imamate, when it needed to consolidate its identity in the absence of a central state.

Terminology

The term "Wahbi" itself is primarily derived as an eponymous tribute to the teachings and influence of Abd Allah ibn Wahb al-Rasibi, a foundational figure in early Kharijite and Ibadi history. Initially, the term Wahbi was largely considered superfluous, as Ibadism during its early phases was relatively homogenous and lacked significant internal schisms. However, its usage gained critical importance and became more widespread following the advent of the Nukkari secession, a significant internal split within Ibadism. The term "Wahbi" then served a crucial function: to clearly differentiate the mainstream Wahbis from these off-shoot Ibadi factions. The most common and preferred epithet that Wahbi Ibadi clerics encouraged their adherents to adopt for themselves is ahl al-istiqama, meaning "those on the straight path," a term that encapsulates their self-perception of adherence to correct doctrine and practice. They pointedly rejected the use of ahl al-sunnah, a term that would later become synonymous with Sunni Islam, because in early usage, particularly during the Umayyad era, sunnah could sometimes refer to the practice of Muawiyah's public cursing of Ali ibn Abi Talib from the pulpits. While this specific meaning eventually changed and ahl al-sunnah came to denote mainstream orthodoxy, the early Ibadi rejection highlights their profound opposition to the political and theological machinations of the Umayyad period.

Demographics

Oman stands as the nation with the largest concentration of Ibadis globally. Within Oman's diverse religious landscape, Ibadis and Sunnis constitute roughly equal proportions of the Muslim population, each accounting for approximately 45%, while Shia Muslims make up about 5%. Worldwide, the Ibadi community numbers roughly 2.72 million adherents, with a substantial 250,000 of these living outside the Sultanate of Oman, demonstrating a global, albeit dispersed, presence.

Historically, the early medieval Rustamid dynasty in Algeria, which flourished from 776 to 909, was a prominent Ibadi state. When this dynasty fell, refugees from its capital, Tiaret, played a pivotal role in establishing the enduring North African Ibadi communities that persist to this day in the distinctive M'zab valley. The Mozabites, an indigenous Berber ethnic group residing in the M'zab valley, are almost entirely Ibadi, underscoring the deep cultural and religious intertwining of identity and faith in the region. Beyond these concentrated areas, Ibadism also has a presence elsewhere in Africa, notably in Zanzibar in Tanzania and within the Nafusa Mountains of Libya. They also form a minority in predominantly Sunni regions, such as the city of Ouargla in Algeria and on the picturesque island of Djerba in Tunisia, where their distinct practices coexist within broader Islamic societies.

While the Wahbi school represents the mainstream and dominant branch of Ibadism, other, often smaller or historically significant, branches also exist. These include notable modern ones such as the Nukkar and the Azzabas, each with their own subtle doctrinal or historical distinctions, further illustrating the internal diversity within Ibadism.

Notable Ibadis

Individuals

Dynasties

  • Rustamid dynasty: Flourished from 776 to 909, establishing a significant Ibadi state in North Africa.
  • Nabhani dynasty: Ruled from 1154 to 1624, representing a long period of Ibadi influence in Oman.
  • Yaruba dynasty: Held power from 1624 to 1742, ushering in a new era of Omani strength and expansion.
  • List of sultans of Zanzibar: A succession of rulers from 1856 to 1964, reflecting the Ibadi presence and influence in East Africa.
  • Al Bu Said dynasty: In power since 1744, this dynasty continues to rule Oman, demonstrating the enduring legacy of Ibadi leadership.

See also