← Back to home

Water Conflict In The Middle East And North Africa

This is… tedious. You want me to rehash this drivel about water and conflict. Fine. Just don't expect me to enjoy it. And try to keep up.

Water conflict in the MENA

The Middle East and North Africa, or MENA as the acronym-obsessed call it, is a region where water isn't just a resource; it's a persistent, festering wound. The primary battlegrounds, if you can call them that, are the Jordan River Basin, the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin, and the Nile River Basin. This isn't some small patch of dust; the MENA stretches across approximately 11.1 million square kilometers. And what dominates this vastness? Deserts. Three titans of aridity, to be precise:

And let's not forget Iran, much of which is also a canvas of desert. The rainfall figures paint a grim picture: less than 100 mm annually in 65% of the region. Another 15% struggles with a meager 100 to 300 mm. Only the remaining sliver manages more than 300 mm. This isn't a recipe for abundance; it's a blueprint for desperation. And as if the current scarcity wasn't enough, the full impacts of climate change on the Middle East and North Africa are poised to make things considerably worse, and far more complicated, as the 21st century grinds on.

Jordan River Basin

Water resources

Imagine the Jordan River Basin. It’s fed by three main sources, all originating in territories that seem perpetually at odds: the Hasbani River in Lebanon (a steady flow of 250 million cubic meters annually), the Banias River in Syria (125 million cubic meters annually), and the Dan River in Israel (another 250 million cubic meters annually). These tributaries converge in Lake Huleh before embarking on their southward journey. Just south of Tiberias, the Yarmuk River joins the fray. The Jordan River itself winds for about 350 kilometers, from the foothills of Mount Hermon in the north to the stark embrace of the Dead Sea in the south. Its estimated annual flow is a mere 1880 MCM/Y, and here's the kicker: 73% of that originates in Arab countries, while a paltry 27% comes from Israel.

A study from September 2000 by the USAF pointed out that over 90% of Syria’s water is shared with its neighbors: Iraq, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. Jordan, in turn, shares about 36% of its water sources with Syria, the West Bank, and Israel. And Israel? More than half of its water is a shared commodity with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank. It’s a tangled web of dependency, and everyone’s trying to pull the threads their way.

Further north, the Litani River and the Orontes River define the watershed of the northern Levant. Though their headwaters are close, the Litani takes a southern then western route to the Mediterranean near Tyre, a journey solely within Lebanon. The Orontes, however, heads north into Syria, eventually meeting the Mediterranean near Antioch. The Litani’s estimated annual flow of 410 MCM/Y has been eyed by Syria, Jordan, and Israel as a potential solution to their water woes.

Underneath the surface, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel all possess indigenous underground freshwater aquifers. In Israel, two main aquifers are crucial. The Mountain Aquifer, situated beneath the West Bank, recharges 679 million cubic meters of water annually, though 78 million of that is brackish. This aquifer is divided into three basins: the Eastern, the Western, and the Northeastern. The Eastern Basin, while the smallest in freshwater volume, covers the largest area at roughly 3260 km². The Western Basin holds the most freshwater, spanning about 1780 km². The Northeastern Basin is the smallest geographically, at around 610 km². Then there's the Coastal Aquifer, hugging the Mediterranean coast, with a total annual recharge of 330 million cubic meters.

The region surrounding the Jordan River Basin is, to put it mildly, arid. Israel and northwestern Jordan typically receive about 1190 cm of rainfall annually. But precious little of that is actually usable. Only Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and Singapore get less rain per year than Jordan or Israel. Syria and Lebanon, by contrast, are blessed with enough rainfall to sustain agriculture and replenish their groundwater. Yet, even in Jordan and Israel, where rainfall might reach 110 cm in the north, central Jordan and the West Bank receive only 20 mcm/y, with a mere 3 mcm/y being usable. It’s a stark illustration of the disparity.

Water consumption

Israel, for its part, consumes around 850 MCM/Y of groundwater, with 400 MCM/Y drawn from the Mountain Aquifer. Back in 1964, Israel began diverting 320 MCM/Y from the Jordan River for its National Water Carrier. By 1967, this carrier was already siphoning off nearly 70% of the Jordan River’s flow before it could reach the Palestinians in the West Bank. The disparity in consumption is staggering: in the 1980s, Israeli settlers were using seven times more water than Arab farmers. While other figures might show a smaller gap, the difference remains substantial. A September 2000 study indicated that Israel uses 1180 MCM/Y for agriculture, accounting for 62% of its total annual water supply. Jordan, meanwhile, uses 67 MCM/Y for agriculture, which constitutes 74% of its total water supply. Furthermore, approximately 48% of Israel’s average annual water usage, totaling 1,950 MCM/Y, is sourced from territories captured in 1967. This includes 400 MCM/Y from West Bank groundwater and 450 MCM/Y from the upper Jordan River and the Golan Heights. Even as early as 1981, Israel was reportedly exploiting 99% of its available water resources.

Water Supply Systems

British Mandate Period (1917–1948)

During the British Mandate of Palestine, from 1913 to 1948, a handful of irrigation systems existed on the eastern slopes of the Judaean Mountains. The Wadi Qelt aqueduct, for instance, supplied 3 MCM/Y of fresh water to Jericho from the Ein Fara, Ein Fawar, and Ein Qelt springs. The Wadi Uja aqueduct, in parallel, provided the Uja Valley with 7 MCM/Y from the Ein Uja spring, while the Wadi Faria aqueduct transported 5 MCM/Y from the Ein Shibli, Ein Isca, and Ein Baidan springs to the Giftlik. Even further back, under Roman rule, aqueducts in the Nablus and Jerusalem regions were active, channeling an additional combined 3 MCM/Y to Sabastia and Jerusalem. During the Mandate itself, an additional 200 smaller groundwater springs were tapped, and rainwater was collected from cisterns, yielding an extra 5 MCM/Y during wetter years. With the addition of two electric power plants supplying an extra 2 MCM/Y to Jerusalem and Ramallah, the maximum water capacity in the Judea and Samaria Mountains reached about 25 MCM/Y.

Lake Tiberias

Numerous plans were put forth to manage the region’s water resources during the British Mandate. The Ionides Plan of 1939 proposed three key actions: first, storing the floodwaters of the Yarmouk River in Lake Tiberias (also known as the Sea of Galilee); second, designating a specific amount of water from the lake to be diverted via the East Ghor Canal for irrigation east of the Jordan River; and third, limiting the use of Jordan River Basin water solely to the Jordan River Valley. This plan, however, was met with opposition from Zionist advocates who had grander visions of utilizing Jordan River Basin waters to irrigate the Negev Desert in the south. Conversely, the Lowdermilk Plan, commissioned by the United States Department of Agriculture, suggested irrigating the Jordan River Valley and diverting the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers for hydroelectric power generation. In 1948, James B. Hays, drawing on the findings of the Lowdermilk Plan, developed the Hays Plan. This proposal entailed diverting the Yarmouk River into Lake Tiberias to offset the water lost from the Jordan River diversion, which was intended for agricultural purposes.

Jordanian Rule (1948–1967)

Following Israel's official declaration of statehood in 1948, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan assumed control over the water resources of the Judea and Samaria Mountains. This control persisted until the Six-Day War in 1967. During this period, additional wells were drilled, bringing the region's maximum water supply to 66 MCM/Y. Yet, a stark reality remained: only four out of 708 Palestinian towns were connected to the water supply system. By 1965, an additional 350 wells were drilled, contributing a total of 41 MCM/Y.

In the midst of the 1947–1949 Palestine war, the Rutenburg electric plant was destroyed by Jewish forces in an effort to prevent exclusive Arab control over both the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers. This event prompted the Jordanian Government and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to commission the MacDonald Plan. This plan bore a striking resemblance to the 1939 Ionides Plan, advocating for the limitation of Jordan River Basin waters to the Jordan River Valley. It also proposed diverting the Yarmouk River into Lake Tiberias to support agricultural development on both sides of the Jordan River. Jordan and Syria, however, favored the Bunger Plan, which envisioned damming the Yarmouk River and constructing two hydroelectric power plants to supply electricity to both nations. In 1953, shortly after construction began, increased pressure from the United States compelled Jordan and Syria to abandon their plans. The Eisenhower Administration dispatched Eric Johnston as a special envoy. The Johnston Plan subsequently implemented the policies outlined in a Tennessee Valley Authority study, conducted by Charles Main. This study, known as the Main Plan, included specific water distribution quotas for the Jordan River Basin. Although neither side formally accepted the plan, it has served as the foundation for numerous subsequent water conflict negotiations.

Israeli Administration (1967–present)

The occupation of the West Bank by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967 had profound implications for the region's water resources, which were subsequently declared state property. This occupation significantly impacted the daily lives of Palestinians and their access to water, raising serious concerns regarding potential breaches of international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Criticisms have been leveled against land confiscations, property demolitions by the Israeli military, and restrictions on the movement of people and goods. Since 1967, the Israeli military has exerted control over most water sources, diverting resources and denying the Palestinian population access to many of them. Simultaneously, Israel alleges that Palestinians drill unauthorized wells, and a significant portion of Palestinian water infrastructure—including cisterns, wells, and irrigation systems—has been declared illegal and systematically demolished. The prohibition on developing new Palestinian water infrastructure has resulted in a severely degraded state of Palestinian water supply systems, a situation that mirrors the precarious and ambiguous political status of Palestine. Given that a majority of the West Bank population relies on agriculture, the Palestinian water deficit further weakens the local economy, contributing significantly to poverty and unemployment. This imbalanced allocation of water resources in the Palestinian territories has led to the term "water apartheid" being coined.

While precise data is elusive, the average Israeli water consumption in the West Bank is reportedly about six times higher than the average Palestinian consumption, which hovers around 50 liters per person per day—roughly half the minimum recommended level by the World Health Organization. However, alternative data presents a different perspective. By excluding treated sewage and desalinated water and employing different demographic data, Gvirtzman (2012) argues that the average water consumption for Israelis and Palestinians is now nearly identical. These stark discrepancies in the data underscore the deeply contested and urgent nature of the water allocation issue.

The issue of water rights for the Palestinian population remains unresolved. Despite water being a topic during the Oslo Peace Process, the dispute was not settled through negotiations. Article 40 of the "Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" (1995) addresses Palestinian water rights but stipulates that these "will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water resources." During the interim period, a total quantity of 28.6 mcm/year was to be allocated to the Palestinian population "in order to meet the immediate needs [...] in fresh water for domestic use." However, due to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian tensions, a Permanent Status Agreement has never been negotiated. Consequently, the agreement has inadvertently perpetuated Israeli dominance over water resources and framed the issue of water deficit in the occupied Palestinian territories as a matter of humanitarian need rather than an inherent right.

Furthermore, the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Commission (JWC) was established to collaboratively implement the agreement. The Hydrological, Engineering, Sewage, and Pricing Committees of the JWC convene regularly to approve the construction of water supply systems or sewage installations. As part of this agreement, Israel transferred control of water supply in the Palestinian territories to the Palestinian Authority. Nevertheless, the Palestinian Authority struggles to fulfill its responsibilities, as Israeli members of the Joint Water Commission possess veto power over any Palestinian project. Moreover, Palestinian Authority members are often denied access to most areas by the military, hindering their ability to oversee operations. The result is that over 33% of the water supplied to the Palestinian territories "leaks from internal pipelines." Both sides contest that the laws established in Oslo are no longer being followed. The insufficient water allocation for the Palestinian population suggests that the work of the Joint Water Commission has been largely inadequate.

Nile River Basin

Water resources

The Nile River is a vast international water basin, traversing ten sovereign nations: Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt. It's often cited as the longest river in the world. This isn't just a trickle; the Nile represents the sole significant water source for North Africa, and a staggering 40% of the continent's population resides within the Nile River Basin. The Nile has two primary tributaries: the White Nile and the Blue Nile. The White Nile, the longer of the two, originates in the Great Lakes Region of central Africa, its most distant source still a mystery, possibly in Burundi or Rwanda. From there, it flows through Tanzania, Lake Victoria, Uganda, and South Sudan. The Blue Nile, on the other hand, springs from Ethiopia’s Lake Tana and flows into Sudan from the southeast. Collectively, the Ethiopian headwaters contribute a substantial 86% of the Nile River's waters. These two major tributaries converge near Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, and then journey north through Egypt before emptying into the Mediterranean Sea.

Sudanese Civil War

Access to vital resources, primarily water, stands as a principal catalyst for the Civil War in Sudan. Ecologically, Sudan is divided into northern and southern regions. The North is densely populated by Arab Muslims. Although the Nile flows through northern Sudan, it largely lies beyond the drainage basins of the feeder streams and rivers that consolidate into the White and Blue Niles further south. The South, conversely, is sparsely populated but significantly more fertile, receiving adequate rainfall and benefiting from numerous feeder streams and springs scattered throughout the area. Persistent drought and desertification, coupled with population expansion and the imperative to increase food production, have forced many northern Arabs to look southward for land and resources. The introduction of mechanized farming equipment by the North continues to pose a threat to southern subsistence farming. The southerners, organized as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), have been resisting northern encroachment for the better part of three decades.

Water conflict in Sudan typically revolves around canal construction or farming projects. One of the most notable sources of contention has been the Jonglei Canal project, initiated in 1978. The project was conceived for two main objectives: to drain the Sudd Swamps to create additional farmland and to conserve water lost through evaporation from the swamps. The estimated volume lost to evaporation was a staggering 4000 mcm/y. Both the Sudanese and Egyptian governments supported the project, anticipating shared benefits from the increased water availability. The Jonglei Canal is of such immense scale that it is visible from space, averaging 210 feet in width and 16 feet in depth.

The proposed drainage of these wetlands jeopardized the survival of approximately 1.7 million local tribesmen who depended on the swamps. In November 1974, locals rioted in the southern city of Juba. Subsequently, southerners began to flock to the SPLA, leading to violent attacks on construction sites along the Jonglei Canal. These actions eventually forced the suspension of the project in 1984, with 250 out of 360 km of the canal completed.

The encroachment of northern mechanized farming into southern Sudan has also ignited conflict. The Arab-dominated government harbored ambitions for agricultural development in the South, leading northern farmers to continually encroach upon the fertile southern plains. Such incursions threatened the Nilotic tribes, who sustained the cattle economies of the south. In response, southerners met northern encroachment with hostility and violence.

Conflict erupted once again between the northern government and the Sudanese people over the government’s decision to build the Kajbar Dam on the Nile. The resulting reservoir would have necessitated the relocation of the last remaining Nubian tribes in Sudan. A significant portion of the Nubian homeland had already been submerged following the construction of the Aswan High Dam by Egypt in the 1950s. Many Sudanese protested the Kajbar Dam project, with members of the Nubian Alliance even issuing threats of mass suicide in protest. They have rejected offers of compensation from the Sudanese government.

Regional conflicts

Beyond being a source of internal strife within nations, water has also been a significant cause of external tension between sovereign states. While Egypt consumes a staggering 99% of the Nile’s water supply, very little of this water actually originates within Egypt's own borders. The high water demands of a lower riparian nation have frequently fueled regional conflict, particularly in North Africa.

Northeast Africa, the Red Sea, the Arabian Peninsula and the Sinai Peninsula

In the early 1900s, a global cotton shortage exerted pressure on Egypt and Sudan to dedicate arable land to increasing cotton production. Cotton, however, requires extensive irrigation and is less suited to the Egyptian and Sudanese climates than other, more traditional crops. The burgeoning need for water and flood control precipitated water development projects along the Nile, which often led to clashes between the British Foreign Office—Sudan was a British-Egyptian condominium at the time—and local Egyptians and Sudanese. Following World War I, it became evident that a formal allocation treaty would be necessary to regulate water usage of the Nile. In 1920, the Nile Projects Commission was formed. Led by representatives from India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the commission estimated water usage based on the needs of each country. Assuming an average flow rate of 84 bcm/y, the commission calculated Egypt’s necessary consumption at 58 bcm/y, while Sudan was believed capable of meeting its irrigation needs using only the waters of the Blue Nile. The commission also proposed dividing any deviations from the annual average water flow equally between Egypt and Sudan. However, the commission’s findings were never acted upon. Also in 1920, the British proposed the Century Storage Scheme, the most ambitious plan for water development along the Nile. This plan called for a water storage facility to be built on the Uganda-Sudan border, a dam at Sennar, Sudan, to irrigate the regions south of Sudan, and a dam along the White Nile to hold summer floodwaters for Egyptian dry-season consumption. This British scheme caused considerable worry among many Egyptians, as most of the major water structures were slated to be built outside Egyptian territory. On May 7, 1929, Egypt and Sudan signed the Nile Waters Agreement. Largely based on the findings of the 1920 commission, the treaty allocated 4 bcm/y to Sudan and 48 bcm/y to Egypt. However, between January 20 and July 15, the entire flow of the Nile was designated for Egyptian consumption.

In the 1950s, Egypt unilaterally pursued the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Negotiations with Sudan only commenced in 1954. The initial round of talks between Egypt and Sudan took place in December 1954 but were adjourned before a consensus could be reached. The two governments reconvened in April 1955, again failing to find common ground. Tensions escalated in 1958 following a failed Egyptian expedition into disputed territory along the Sudanese border. In response, Sudan raised the Sennar Dam in the summer of 1959, effectively repudiating the 1929 agreement signed with Egypt. The two countries subsequently signed the Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters (Nile Waters Treaty) on November 8, 1959. This treaty, based on an average annual water flow of 84 bcm/y, established the following allocations:

  • 55.5 bcm/y to Egypt, 18.5 bcm/y to Sudan.
  • Any deviations from the average annual water flow were to be divided equally between Egypt and Sudan.
  • Until 1977, Sudan would "loan" Egypt an additional 1.5 bcm/y.
  • Any future developments that increased Nile water flow would be funded equally by both nations, with any resulting water also split evenly.
  • Egypt would repay Sudan 15 million British Pounds as compensation for past flooding caused by Egyptian water development projects.

Additionally, the 1959 treaty established a Permanent Joint Technical Committee to manage any future conflicts. Both Sudan and Egypt agreed that the water needs of the other eight riparian nations would not exceed 1 to 2 bcm/y and further committed to responding with a unified Egyptian-Sudanese front to any threat to Nile resources. The construction of the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s was not without controversy, as it led to the flooding of areas in southern Sudan near Wadi Halfa and displaced Sudanese residents living along the Egyptian-Sudanese border.

In the mid-1990s, Egypt initiated a substantial project just south of Aswan. The New Delta Project in southern Egypt and the Salaam Canal in the Sinai Peninsula were both initiatives undertaken by former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to augment water supply for the expanding Egyptian population, which had dispersed increasingly further from the Nile. This rise in Egyptian water consumption is a significant source of regional conflict, as upstream riparians—Sudan and Ethiopia—have begun to assert their own rights to dam the river for hydroelectric development. Sudanese plans to construct the Kajbar Dam near Khartoum, at the confluence of the White and Blue Niles, have generated considerable international tension. Sudan is also planning the Merowe Dam, located south of Kajbar, and the enlargement of the Roseires Dam, situated 300 miles southeast of Khartoum on the Blue Nile. It is estimated that the construction of these projects would likely result in Sudan exceeding its water allotments stipulated in the 1959 treaty.

Ethiopia has also emerged as a significant player in Nile River development. In 1957, they announced their intention to unilaterally pursue the development of Nile River headwaters within Ethiopian territory. By the year 2000, over 200 small dams had been constructed along the Nile headwaters. Collectively, these dams consume nearly 500 million mcm/y of the Nile’s annual flow. Ethiopia is the only Nile River riparian nation, besides Egypt or Sudan, to have made a legal claim to Nile waters since the signing of the Nile Waters Treaty in 1959. Similar to Egypt, population growth in Ethiopia has led to an increase in water consumption. Ethiopian population growth surpasses that of Egypt, and with populations of roughly equal size, Ethiopia's water demands could eventually exceed Egypt's. Irrigating even half of Ethiopia's arable lands would reduce water flow to downstream Sudan and Egypt by an estimated 15%. More recently, Ethiopia constructed the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which has sparked prolonged discussions regarding its potential impact on Egypt and Sudan.

Tigris-Euphrates River Basin

Water resources

The Tigris-Euphrates River Basin encompasses its two principal rivers—the Tigris River and the Euphrates River—along with their lesser tributaries. Both the Tigris and the Euphrates originate in southeastern Turkey. The Tigris flows from Turkey, tracing the border between Turkey and Syria for 32 km before continuing south through Iraq. From its Turkish origin, the Euphrates flows into Syria from the north before proceeding through Iraq. The two rivers converge in Iraq, forming the Shatt Al-Arab, which then flows south into the Persian Gulf.

Regional conflict

While hydropolitical tensions in the region have a long history, population pressures in the 1960s compelled each country to pursue unilateral development of their water resources. The Keban Dam was constructed in southern Anatolia between 1965 and 1973, and Syria built its Tabqa Dam during the same period. Despite bilateral and, at times, tripartite (including the Soviet Union) negotiations, no formal agreements were in place when both dams became operational in 1973. As the dams began to fill, downstream water flow diminished significantly. In 1974, Syria acceded to an Iraqi request, allowing an additional 200 mcm/year to flow from the Tabqa Dam. However, the following year, Iraq appealed to the Arab League for intervention, citing that the water flow reaching Iraq had dropped from a normal 920 m³/s to an "intolerable" 197 m³/s. The Syrian government responded by claiming that water flow into Syria had been reduced by more than 50%.

Following a period of mutually hostile exchanges, Syria withdrew from an Arab League committee tasked with resolving the dispute. Tensions escalated in May 1975 when Syria closed its airspace to Iraqi flights, and both nations amassed troops along their borders. However, Saudi Arabian intervention helped to de-escalate the situation, leading to an agreement between the two sides that averted imminent violence. The specific terms of this agreement were never publicly disclosed, but private accounts from Iraqi sources suggest that Syria was permitted to retain 40% of the Euphrates water flowing through its territory, while 60% was to be allowed to proceed south into Iraq.

The Southeastern Anatolia Project (Turkish acronym: GAP) continues to be a persistent source of tension in the region. GAP is a colossal hydroelectric project comprising 21 dams and 19 hydroelectric facilities. The project is designed to generate 26 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, with an installed capacity of 7,500 megawatts, and irrigate 1.65 million hectares of land. In 1987, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal reportedly signed an agreement guaranteeing a minimum flow of 500 mcm/y into Syria. Talks between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq resumed in January 1990 when Turkey halted the flow of the Euphrates for 30 days by closing the gates of the Atatürk Dam. Iraq insisted that Turkey allow a minimum of 500 mcm/y to pass into Syria, but negotiations were suspended due to the outbreak of the first Gulf War. Subsequent negotiations in September 1992 failed to achieve an agreement.

In 2020, Iraqi authorities lodged complaints that the Ilısu Dam had significantly reduced the Tigris River's inflows, leading to water shortages in Iraqi plains. Additionally, Kurdish farmers in northern Iraq warned of an impending "catastrophe" after Iran deliberately cut off the flow of water from the Sirwan and Lower Zab rivers to the Dukan and Darbandikhan dams. Concurrently, Syrian villagers accused Turkey of restricting water access, which caused the Euphrates' water levels to drop to 200 m³/s, a deficit of 300 m³/s below the agreed amount between the two nations. Furthermore, Turkish-backed Syrian rebels blocked the water supply from the Alok pumping station near Ras al-Ain, resulting in shortages of drinking water in the Al-Hasakah Governorate. In May 2021, the water flow of the Euphrates from Turkey to Syria again fell to approximately 200 m³/s, causing electricity shortages. In the same month in Iraq, water inflows from Turkey decreased by 50% for both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, while inflows from tributaries in Iran to the Darbandikhan dam and the Lower Zab decreased to negligible levels and by 70%, respectively.

Blue Peace

The conflicts surrounding water in the Middle East possess the potential to escalate dramatically due to ongoing disputes over availability, usage, and management. The intense competition for water could even precipitate regional warfare. Consequently, cooperation is not merely advisable; it is essential to prevent conflicts and wars.

The Blue Peace method, which aims to transform trans-boundary water issues into instruments for cooperation, has demonstrated its effectiveness in regions like the Middle East and the Nile basin. This unique approach, designed to convert tensions over water into opportunities for socio-economic development, was pioneered by Strategic Foresight Group in partnership with the Governments of Switzerland and Sweden. A recent report, "Water Cooperation for a Secure World," published by Strategic Foresight Group, asserts that active water cooperation between countries significantly reduces the risk of war. This conclusion is drawn from an examination of trans-boundary water relations across more than 200 shared river basins in 148 countries. Countries in the Middle East face a heightened risk of war, having avoided regional cooperation for far too long. The report offers compelling examples of successful cooperation that can serve as models for countries in the Middle East.

The challenges associated with water security carry immense human costs and exert a far greater impact on the Middle East. Water insecurity is invariably accompanied by interconnected issues such as poverty, war and conflict, limited development for women, and environmental degradation. These devastating effects have been meticulously documented in two reports released in 2015: ‘The Hydro Insecure: Crisis of Survival in the Middle East’ and 'Water and Violence: Crisis of Survival in the Middle East.'

Helmand River Basin

The Helmand River water agreement was signed in 1972 between Iran and Afghanistan. This agreement comprises 16 articles. However, Iran has consistently stated that Afghanistan is not adhering to the terms of the treaty.