Let's dissect this historical footnote. The "Green March" – a rather quaint descriptor for what was essentially a geopolitical power play, wasn't it? A strategic maneuver orchestrated by Morocco to strong-arm Spain into relinquishing the contested territory of Spanish Sahara. It’s fascinating, really, how the veneer of popular will can be so effectively applied to mask naked ambition.
Background
The year is 1975. Spain, the colonial power, was in a state of considerable flux. Their long-standing caudillo, General Francisco Franco, was on his deathbed, casting a long shadow over the nation’s future. The winds of decolonization of Africa were blowing fiercely, having already seen Equatorial Guinea gain its independence just a few years prior. Meanwhile, the indigenous Sahrawi people harbored aspirations of forging their own independent state, a notion that, unsurprisingly, held little appeal to their ambitious neighbors.
Morocco, situated to the north, had long nursed claims of historical dominion over the region, viewing it as an intrinsic part of their kingdom. To the south, Mauritania echoed similar territorial ambitions. The situation was further complicated by the burgeoning guerrilla war waged since 1973 by the Polisario Front, a movement ostensibly fighting for Sahrawi independence, but, conveniently for some, heavily backed and financed by Algeria. Spain, it seems, was caught between a rock and a hard place, attempting to negotiate a handover of power with the very rebels who were challenging their authority. Negotiations, discreet at that, were reportedly underway with movement leaders in El Aaiún and with Spain's foreign minister, Pedro Cortina y Mauri, meeting El Ouali in Algiers. A delicate dance, indeed.
Morocco, eager to solidify its claims, sought a definitive ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On October 16, 1975, the ICJ delivered its opinion. It acknowledged historical legal ties of allegiance between some Sahrawi tribes and the Sultan of Morocco, and similar, albeit limited, rights concerning the land with Mauritania. Crucially, however, the court found no evidence of territorial sovereignty between the Sahara and either Morocco or Mauritania at the time of Spanish colonization. The verdict, therefore, was that the indigenous Sahrawi population held the right of self-determination. Any political solution, be it integration, partition, or independence, had to be sanctioned by the Sahrawi people themselves. Adding fuel to the fire, a UN visiting mission had, just days before the ICJ ruling, concluded that Sahrawi support for independence was "overwhelming."
King Hassan II, however, chose to selectively interpret the ICJ's findings. He presented the acknowledgment of previous allegiances as a complete vindication of his position, conveniently omitting the court's emphasis on self-determination. Within hours of the verdict, he announced the organization of a "green march" into Spanish Sahara, a move framed as a peaceful reclamation of territory and a symbolic "reunite it with the Motherland". It's rather remarkable how easily historical narratives can be bent to fit current political agendas.
To preempt any potential intervention from Algeria, the Moroccan Army made a preemptive move into the northeastern corner of the region on October 31st. Their advance was met with determined resistance from the Polisario, the very independence movement they were ostensibly meant to circumvent. This initial skirmish, however, was merely a prelude to the main event.
The Green March
The Green March itself was a spectacle of considerable magnitude, a carefully orchestrated display of popular fervor. On November 6, 1975, an estimated 350,000 unarmed Moroccans massed near the city of Tarfaya in southern Morocco, awaiting King Hassan II's signal to cross into the Saguia El Hamra region of Western Sahara. They carried Moroccan flags and Qur'an, their banners proclaiming the "return of the Moroccan Sahara" and bearing images of the King. The choice of the color green for the march's name was a deliberate nod to Islam, underscoring the religious and cultural underpinnings of the campaign. As the throngs approached the border, the Spanish Armed Forces, under strict orders to avoid bloodshed, stood down. Even some previously mined zones were reportedly cleared by the Spanish troops, a gesture that could be interpreted in various ways – perhaps a desire to de-escalate, or a tacit acknowledgment of the march's unstoppable momentum.
A 100 dirham note issued in 1991 serves as a tangible commemoration of this event, a testament to its enduring significance in the Moroccan national narrative.
Moroccan Arguments for Sovereignty
Morocco's assertion of sovereignty over Western Sahara was rooted in the concept of official pledges of allegiance to the sultan, a practice they claimed had persisted for centuries prior to Spanish occupation. This, in their view, constituted a binding legal and political tie. Evidence presented to the ICJ included historical expeditions, such as those by Sultan Hassan I in 1886, aimed at quelling foreign incursions and formally investing local officials – caids and cadis. The Moroccan government also pointed to the historical levy of taxes and the appointment of local administrators, governors, and military officers as further manifestations of their sovereign authority in the territory.
Furthermore, Morocco cited a series of treaties with other nations, including Spain (1861), the United States of America (1786 and 1836), and the United Kingdom (1856), as validation of their claims and international recognition of their influence. These documents, they argued, demonstrated a consistent exercise of state authority.
However, the International Court of Justice, in its assessment, found that while there were indeed indications of a legal tie of allegiance between the Sultan and some nomadic peoples of the territory, primarily through the Tekna caids of the Noun region, these acts did not establish the existence of, nor international recognition for, legal ties of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and the Moroccan state. The court concluded that Morocco had not demonstrated effective and exclusive state activity in the territory, and that the existing contacts were insufficient to support Morocco's demand for annexation.
The Madrid Accords
This section, it seems, requires a touch more scrutiny. The Green March certainly propelled Spain into a precarious political situation. With General Franco ailing, the Spanish government, led by Prince Juan Carlos as acting Head of State and Prime Minister Don Carlos Arias Navarro, found itself in a difficult position. Despite possessing a superior military force in Western Sahara, the specter of a protracted colonial war, reminiscent of the recent Carnation Revolution in Portugal that toppled its government due to costly colonial conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, loomed large. The potential for social instability and political upheaval in Francoist Spain was a significant concern.
Consequently, to avert a full-blown conflict and salvage what they could, Spain agreed to direct negotiations with Morocco and, crucially, Mauritania, both of whom laid claim to the territory. Under Moroccan pressure, Spain also agreed to exclude representatives of the native Sahrawi population from these talks, a decision that would have profound and lasting consequences. The ensuing Madrid Accords, signed on November 14, 1975, effectively divided Spanish Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. Spain agreed to cede possession of the colony, with the explicit condition, embedded in point 3 of the Trilateral Agreement, that the views of the Saharan population must be respected – a condition that, as history has shown, proved rather fragile.
As part of the agreement, Spain retained a 35% concession in the phosphate mines of Bou Craa and secured offshore fishing rights, though these concessions were later disregarded by Morocco. Morocco claimed the northern portion, encompassing Saguia el-Hamra and half of Río de Oro. Mauritania occupied the southern third, rebranding it Tiris al-Gharbiyya. Mauritania, however, eventually relinquished its claims in August 1979, ceding the territory to the Polisario's Popular Army of Sahrawi Liberation, though it was swiftly occupied by Morocco. Mauritania did, however, maintain a small outpost at La Güera to safeguard its vital port of Nouadhibou.
The Polisario, now with substantial Algerian backing, rejected the Madrid Accords outright. They insisted on adherence to the ICJ's advisory opinion on Sahrawi self-determination, setting the stage for the protracted Western Sahara War. This conflict, which has yet to find a definitive resolution, continues to this day. A cease-fire was eventually established in 1991 following an agreement to hold a referendum on independence. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was tasked with overseeing this process, though the referendum has yet to materialize. Morocco, in 2000, declared the referendum unworkable and proposed an alternative plan offering autonomy for Western Sahara within Morocco, a proposal met with rejection from the Polisario and Algeria, and presented to the UN in April 2007.
Spain, caught between its desire for stable relations with Morocco – its neighbor sharing borders in Ceuta and Melilla – and its international obligations as the former colonial power, has navigated a complex diplomatic path. Traditionally, Spanish governments supported the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination and the organization of the UN-mandated referendum. However, leaked documents from the US Department of State, via Wikileaks, suggested a shift in Spain's stance under Prime Minister Zapatero, indicating support for the Moroccan position and attempts to broker a bilateral agreement. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trinidad Jiménez, publicly denied this in December 2010, asserting Spain's commitment to any agreement reached between the Polisario and Morocco. More recently, in 2022, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez declared Spain's backing for Morocco's autonomy plan during a visit to Rabat, marking a significant departure from previous policy. The long game, it seems, is always about who blinks first, and under what pressure.