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United Nations Mission For The Referendum In Western Sahara

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, more commonly known by its acronym MINURSO, is the enduring United Nations peacekeeping operation stationed in the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Its genesis dates back to 1991, formally established through United Nations Security Council Resolution 690. This mandate was intrinsically linked to the Settlement Plan, a crucial framework that facilitated a cease-fire between Morocco and the Polisario Front, the organization representing the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The conflict itself revolves around the sovereignty of Western Sahara, a former Spanish Sahara.

MINURSO’s primary, and arguably most critical, objective was twofold: to meticulously monitor the established cease-fire and, more ambitiously, to orchestrate and conduct a referendum. This referendum, envisioned within the framework of the Settlement Plan, was intended to allow the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination. The choices presented were stark: integration with Morocco or full independence. This process was meant to be the culmination of Western Sahara's protracted journey of decolonization, a status it shares with few other territories still listed by the UN as non-self-governing. It’s a process that has, frankly, lingered far too long in the bureaucratic ether.

Mandate

The mandate bestowed upon MINURSO by the United Nations was, on paper at least, quite comprehensive, outlining a series of tasks designed to facilitate the referendum and ensure a stable post-conflict environment. These responsibilities, as defined by the UN, included:

  • Cease-fire Monitoring: The most fundamental aspect of any peacekeeping mission, ensuring that hostilities remained suspended. This involved observing and reporting any violations.
  • Troop Reduction Verification: Specifically, monitoring the reduction of Moroccan troops within the designated territory. This was a critical confidence-building measure.
  • Troop Confinement: Ensuring that both Moroccan and Frente Polisario troops adhered to their designated confinement areas. This aimed to prevent accidental or intentional escalations.
  • Release of Political Prisoners: Taking steps to secure the release of all individuals detained for political reasons related to the conflict. A rather optimistic goal, given the nature of such disputes.
  • Prisoner of War Exchange: Overseeing the exchange of prisoners of war, a sensitive task delegated to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
  • Refugee Repatriation: Facilitating the return of Sahrawi refugees, a monumental undertaking entrusted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
  • Voter Identification and Registration: Identifying and registering all individuals deemed eligible to vote in the referendum. This, as history has shown, became a significant point of contention.
  • Referendum Organization: Organizing and ensuring the freeness and fairness of the referendum itself, and subsequently proclaiming its results. The linchpin of the entire operation.
  • Mine Action: Reducing the threat posed by unexploded ordnance and landmines, a dangerous legacy of the conflict.

Plans

The initial timeline projected the independence referendum for 1992. However, this proved to be an exercise in futility. Deep-seated disagreements over voter eligibility criteria effectively stalled the process indefinitely. Both Morocco and the Polisario Front pointed fingers at each other, each accusing the other of deliberately obstructing progress. The Houston Agreement in 1997 was a subsequent attempt to resurrect the stalled process, but it, too, ultimately failed to yield the desired results.

Then came the Baker Plan in 2003, designed as a successor to the original Settlement Plan. While it garnered acceptance from the Polisario Front and received unanimous endorsement from the United Nations Security Council, Morocco's rejection rendered it moot. Morocco's persistent stance was that all inhabitants of the territory should be eligible to vote, a position bolstered by its Green March in 1975. This event, and subsequent settlement schemes, saw a significant influx of Moroccan civilians into the Moroccan-occupied part of Western Sahara, which constitutes roughly 80% of the territory. By 2015, estimates suggested that these Moroccan settlers comprised at least two-thirds of the region's approximately 500,000 inhabitants. The demographic landscape, it seems, was deliberately reshaped.

As of now, any concrete plan for holding the referendum remains elusive. The viability of the cease-fire, once the bedrock of MINURSO's presence, is increasingly precarious, hinting at a potential return to the volatile conditions that necessitated its creation in the first place. It's a situation that festers, like an old wound that refuses to heal.

Extensions

The mandate of MINURSO has been a recurring item on the Security Council's agenda, having been extended a staggering 47 times since its inception. For instance, in October 2006, a resolution was passed extending the mission's mandate until April of the following year. It’s worth noting that a provision intended to address human rights abuses by Morocco in Western Sahara was notably absent from this resolution, having been deleted due to French objections, despite the backing of 14 Security Council members. A rather convenient silence, wouldn't you agree?

The April 2007 resolution, extending the mandate to October, offered a peculiar balance of "taking note" of both the Moroccan and Polisario Front proposals presented to the Secretary-General. It specifically welcomed "serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward." The representative of South Africa quite rightly took issue with this preferential language, questioning why one proposal was deemed inherently more worthy than the other and lamenting the lack of broader consultation in the drafting process. This subtle bias, it seems, is a recurring theme.

This pattern continued with the October 2007 resolution, which extended the mandate until April 2008, maintaining the same imbalanced framing of the two proposals. Again, South Africa’s representative voiced concern, regretting that the resolution "considered" rather than "welcomed" the Secretary-General's report. This, he suggested, was likely because the report "dared to raise the issue of the human rights violations against the Sahrawi people." The report itself contained a stark warning: MINURSO lacked the mandate to address human rights issues. A mission designed to bring about self-determination, yet blind to the very human rights at stake. Irony, perhaps, is the only currency left here.

By April 2008, the mandate was extended for a full year, through to April 2009. Prior to the vote, the representative of Costa Rica expressed his unease regarding the negotiation process of the draft resolution and his "difficulty in understanding the absolute refusal to include" any mention of human rights. The annual budget for MINURSO hovers around the $60 million mark. A considerable sum, spent on maintaining a stalemate.

Bases

MINURSO operates with a bifurcated presence, maintaining teams in both the Moroccan-controlled portion west of the berm and in the Sahrawi-controlled region and refugee camps to the east, including those situated in Algeria. The camps situated west of the berm are located in Mahbes, Smara, Umm Dreiga, and Auserd. To the east, the operational bases include Bir Lehlou, Tifariti, Mehaires, Mijek, and Agwanit. A dedicated liaison office is maintained in Tindouf, serving as the crucial conduit for communication with the POLISARIO leadership.

Current Composition

As of June 30, 2018, MINURSO comprised a total of 220 uniformed personnel. This included 19 contingent troops, 193 experts on mission, 7 staff officers, and 1 police officer. This uniformed contingent was supported by a larger civilian staff of 227 individuals and 16 UN volunteers. The primary troop contributors to this operation are Bangladesh, Egypt, and Pakistan. The armed contingents are tasked with patrolling the inhospitable no man's land that runs alongside the formidable Moroccan Wall, ostensibly to uphold the cease-fire.

The key leadership positions within MINURSO are as follows:

The headquarters of MINURSO is situated in El Aaiun, Western Sahara. It's worth noting the visual contrast: while the MINURSO bases within the POLISARIO Liberated Territories proudly display only the UN flag, the entrance to the compound in El Aaiun is adorned with numerous Moroccan flags. A subtle, yet telling, detail.

The table below details the contributions of various states to MINURSO's personnel:

State Contingent Troops Experts on Mission Staff Officers Police Total
Argentina 0 3 0 0 3
Austria 0 5 0 0 5
Bangladesh 19 8 0 0 27
Belgium 0 7 0 0 7
Bhutan 0 2 0 0 2
Brazil 0 10 0 0 10
China 0 12 0 0 12
Croatia 0 7 0 0 7
Djibouti 0 2 0 0 2
Dominican Republic 0 0 0 2 2
Ecuador 0 4 0 0 4
Egypt 0 19 0 0 19
El Salvador 0 1 0 0 1
France 0 2 0 0 2
Germany 0 1 0 0 1
Ghana 0 8 7 0 15
Guinea 0 4 0 0 4
Honduras 0 12 0 0 12
Hungary 0 6 0 0 6
India 0 3 0 0 3
Indonesia 0 3 0 0 3
Ireland 0 3 0 0 3
Italy 0 2 0 0 2
Japan 0 2 0 0 2
Jordan 0 2 0 0 2
Kazakhstan 0 5 0 0 5
Malawi 0 3 0 0 3
Malaysia 0 5 0 0 5
Mexico 0 4 0 0 4
Mongolia 0 1 0 0 1
Nepal 0 6 0 0 6
Nigeria 0 6 0 0 6
Pakistan 0 11 0 0 11
Philippines 0 2 0 2 4
Poland 0 0 1 0 1
Portugal 0 0 0 1 1
Russia 0 15 0 0 15
South Korea 0 4 0 0 4
Sri Lanka 0 4 0 0 4
Sweden 0 2 0 0 2
Switzerland 0 2 0 0 2
Togo 0 2 0 0 2
United Nations 19 193 7 1 220

Throughout MINURSO's operational history, a somber toll of 16 fatalities has been recorded: six military personnel, one police officer, one military observer, three international civilian personnel, and five local civilian personnel. Each loss represents a life extinguished in the shadow of an unresolved conflict.

Criticism

MINURSO stands as a peculiar anomaly among UN peacekeeping missions established since 1978, notably lacking the capacity to monitor human rights. While United Nations Security Council Resolution 1979 did recommend the establishment of such a monitoring capability, it has yet to materialize. This absence has drawn considerable ire. In 1995, Frank Ruddy, the former deputy chairman of MINURSO, delivered a scathing critique of the organization, citing its perceived inability or unwillingness to counteract alleged Moroccan manipulation of the referendum process and abuses against Sahrawi civilians. He has continued his vocal opposition, decrying the mission as an economically draining and politically compromised endeavor.

The persistent failure of the UN Security Council to institute a human rights monitoring program for Western Sahara and its population has become a focal point of growing criticism. It’s a glaring omission, especially in light of numerous credible reports detailing serious abuses. The possibility of rectifying this oversight has been consistently thwarted by France, which has leveraged its veto power within the Security Council. In a rare display of dissent in April 2016, both Uruguay and Venezuela voted against a Security Council Resolution reauthorizing MINURSO (Resolution 2285), while Russia and two other nations abstained. This act signaled a significant level of dissatisfaction with the status quo.

Adding to the mission's controversial legacy, over a two-year period, primarily between 2006 and 2007, MINURSO personnel were implicated in the vandalism of archaeological sites within the Free Zone. Graffiti was sprayed over prehistoric rock paintings and engravings, ancient testaments to human history. Accusations of looting of these invaluable artifacts by UN personnel have also surfaced. It seems some guardians of peace have a peculiar interpretation of preservation.

In a dramatic escalation of tensions, the Polisario Front declared a suspension of contacts with MINURSO in May 2010. Their stated reason was the mission's persistent failure to implement the self-determination referendum. They accused the force of becoming a "protector shield of a colonial fact, the occupation of the Western Sahara by Morocco." A rather damning indictment of a mission designed to facilitate liberation.

See also