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Iran Hostage Crisis

Alright, let's dissect this historical mess. You want a rewrite, a more… vivid account of the Iran hostage crisis. Fine. Don't expect sunshine and rainbows. This is about as pleasant as a root canal performed with a rusty spoon.

Occupation of Tehran's U.S. Embassy (1979–1981)

This isn't just an article about a building being occupied. It's about a nation's defiance, a president's impotence, and 444 days of sheer, unadulterated human misery. For the more… delicate sensibilities, there's the Iranian Embassy siege in London, a different kind of spectacle altogether.

Iran Hostage Crisis

This whole debacle was a rather unpleasant footnote to the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution.

  • The Event: Iranian students, fueled by a potent cocktail of revolutionary fervor and anti-American sentiment, stormed and occupied the Embassy of the United States in Tehran on November 4, 1979.
  • The Duration: A grueling 444 days. Not a weekend getaway, that.
  • The Location: Tehran, Iran. Coordinates: 35°42′29″N 51°25′26″E / 35.708°N 51.424°E / 35.708; 51.424. Just in case you wanted to plot it on a map of despair.
  • The Outcome: The signing of the Algiers Accords on January 19, 1981. A nice, neat bow on a festering wound. And, as if on cue, all remaining hostages were released precisely one day after Reagan's inauguration on January 20, 1981. The "Canadian Caper" managed to rescue six hostages on January 27, 1980. Meanwhile, the United States, quite predictably, slapped international sanctions against Iran, starting on November 14, 1979, which were eventually lifted.

Belligerents

Commanders and Leaders

Casualties

  • Eight American soldiers died in the botched Operation Eagle Claw on April 24–25, 1980. A grim reminder of the cost of desperation.
  • One Iranian civilian was also killed during that same disastrous operation.

(Map of Tehran with embassy location indicated)

This whole affair was a tangled mess of vengeance, misunderstanding, and sheer, raw political theater. America's President Jimmy Carter called it "blackmail," the hostages "victims of terrorism and anarchy." The revolutionaries, on the other hand, saw it as righteous retribution for decades of American meddling, particularly their role in the 1953 coup that installed the Shah and his notoriously brutal SAVAK. The U.S. cited the Vienna Convention and the sanctity of diplomatic immunity, while Iran saw it as a legitimate response to perceived American hostility. A stalemate etched in stone.

The Canadian Caper, a quiet operation saving six souls, was a stark contrast to the loud, public failure of Operation Eagle Claw. The latter not only cost lives but also led to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stepping down. The Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 finally nudged the Iranians towards negotiation, mediated, of course, by the ever-patient Algeria.

Politically, this crisis was Carter's albatross, a lead weight dragging him down to a landslide loss in the 1980 presidential election. The hostages were released, almost symbolically, just after Ronald Reagan took the oath of office. In Iran, the crisis solidified Khomeini's grip and empowered the hardliners, further isolating the nation from the Western world. And the U.S.? Well, they've been imposing sanctions ever since, a constant, low-grade hum of animosity over everything from nuclear ambitions to human rights.

Background

1953 Iranian Coup d'état

It all started, as these things often do, with foreign powers meddling. During the Second World War, the British and the Soviets decided to occupy Iran, forcing Reza Shah Pahlavi to step aside for his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Officially, it was about preventing Iran from aligning with Nazi Germany. Unofficially? Probably about those vast oil reserves. The U.S., bless their hearts, played the hero after the war, applying diplomatic pressure to get the Soviets to leave.

By the 1950s, the Shah was in a wrestling match with his Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh. Mosaddegh, a descendant of the old Qajar dynasty, wanted a fairer cut of the oil revenue from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Britain, predictably, balked. Then, in 1953, the CIA and MI6 orchestrated Operation Ajax, a coup that ousted Mosaddegh and cemented the Shah's power. For two decades, he ruled with an iron fist, purging any "disloyal" elements. The U.S. continued its support, even training the dreaded SAVAK, the Shah's secret police. This unholy alliance, fueled by Cold War paranoia, eventually sowed the seeds of its own destruction, uniting Iranians against the Shah and paving the way for his eventual overthrow.

The Carter Administration and the Shah

Months before the revolution truly exploded, on New Year's Eve 1977, President Jimmy Carter committed a diplomatic gaffe of epic proportions. Toasting the Shah in Tehran, he lauded his "character." A kiss of death, as it turned out. When Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in February 1979, the U.S. Embassy found itself in the crosshairs. Windows shattered by rocks and bullets had to be replaced with bulletproof glass. The staff, once numbering nearly a thousand, dwindled to just over sixty.

The U.S., in a desperate attempt to salvage the relationship, tried to placate the new regime, continuing military cooperation. But then, on October 22, 1979, the U.S. allowed the Shah, ailing from lymphoma, into New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center for treatment. The State Department had warned against it, understanding the political minefield, but pressure from figures like Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller proved too much.

This decision was the spark that ignited the tinderbox. Iranian revolutionaries, already suspicious of American intentions, saw it as proof of U.S. complicity in undermining their revolution. Khomeini, who had spent 15 years in exile thanks to the Shah, ramped up his rhetoric against the "Great Satan," claiming "evidence of American plotting." The occupation of the embassy wasn't just about protesting American interference; it was a calculated move to cripple Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's provisional revolutionary government, which was seen as too cozy with the U.S. and too willing to dismantle the revolutionary order. And, of course, it was leverage: the Shah for the hostages. A simple, yet devastating, trade.

Prelude

First Embassy Assault

It wasn't the first time the embassy grounds had been violated. On February 14, 1979 – Valentine's Day, ironically – the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas stormed the embassy, taking a Marine, Kenneth Kraus, hostage. Ambassador William H. Sullivan, prioritizing lives over property, surrendered the embassy for a few hours. Kraus, tortured and tried, was set for execution, but Carter and Sullivan managed to secure his release within six days. This incident, darkly termed the "Valentine's Day Open House," was a chilling premonition.

In anticipation of further trouble, the Americans attempted to destroy classified documents in a furnace. It malfunctioned. They resorted to cheap paper shredders, later employing skilled carpet weavers to painstakingly reconstruct the shredded secrets. A testament to desperation.

Second Embassy Assault

The next attempt was planned for September 1979 by Ebrahim Asgharzadeh. He gathered student leaders from Tehran's major universities, forming the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line.

Asgharzadeh later recounted the initial meeting: five students, two eyeing the Soviet Embassy, two, Mohsen Mirdamadi and Habibolah Bitaraf, siding with Asgharzadeh's target: the United States. Their initial aim? A brief occupation, a few hours, to voice their objections. "Announcing our objections from within the occupied compound would carry our message to the world in a much more firm and effective way," Asgharzadeh explained. Mirdamadi echoed this sentiment: "We intended to detain the diplomats for a few days, maybe one week, but no more." Masoumeh Ebtekar, who would become the group's spokeswoman, confirmed that those who disagreed with the plan were not involved.

They meticulously observed the Marine Security Guards from nearby rooftops, drawing on their experiences from the recent revolution. They even secured the cooperation of the police guarding the embassy and the Revolutionary Guards.

Crucially, Ayatollah Khomeini was not privy to the plan beforehand. Author Mark Bowden suggests that Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha advised against informing him, fearing the government would use the police to disperse the students, as they had done before. However, if Khomeini saw the occupiers as his loyal followers and a supportive crowd gathered outside, it would be difficult for him to object, effectively paralyzing Bazargan's provisional government, which Khoeiniha and the students wanted to dismantle.

The underlying motive, as stated by supporters, was a profound fear of another American-backed coup.

Third Embassy Assault and Seizure of Hostages

On November 4, 1979, a demonstration, ostensibly about supporting Khomeini, devolved into chaos right outside the embassy walls.

At 6:30 a.m., the ringleaders briefed 300 to 500 students. A female student, her chador concealing a pair of metal cutters, was tasked with breaching the gates.

The initial plan was symbolic: statements to the press, a brief occupation, then a retreat when the authorities arrived. Placards read: "Don't be afraid. We just want to sit in." When embassy guards brandished firearms, the protesters initially backed down. But as it became clear the guards wouldn't fire and a fervent crowd gathered outside, cheering the occupiers and jeering the diplomats, the plan shifted. Buses full of demonstrators arrived, amplifying the fervor.

Khomeini's endorsement was swift, and crucially, public. Foreign Minister Yazdi, attempting to relay the situation to Khomeini, was initially told to "kick them out." But by evening, Khomeini had declared the takeover "the second revolution" and the embassy an "American spy den in Tehran."

The blindfolded Marines and embassy staff were paraded before photographers. In the initial days, any staff who had managed to evade capture were rounded up and added to the hostage count. Six diplomats, however, slipped through the net. They found refuge with Canadian diplomats, John Sheardown and Ambassador Ken Taylor, hiding for 79 days. In a clandestine operation dubbed the Canadian Caper, they were smuggled out of Iran on January 28, 1980, using Canadian passports and a fabricated film crew cover story. Others sought refuge at the Swedish Embassy in Tehran for three months.

A State Department cable from November 8, 1979, lists "A Tentative, Incomplete List of U.S. Personnel Being Held in the Embassy Compound." A grim document, indeed.

Motives and Demands

The core demand was simple, yet impossible for the U.S. to meet: the extradition of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi for trial. He was dying of lymphoma and would pass within the year, but that didn't matter. The U.S. had granted him asylum for medical treatment. Beyond that, the revolutionaries wanted a formal apology for past U.S. interference, including the 1953 coup, and the release of Iran's frozen assets.

(Image of Barry Rosen, one of the hostages, with a man alleged by some to be future President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the background. A claim denied by Ahmadinejad, Iran, and the CIA.)

The initial plan for a short occupation evaporated as the takeover's popularity surged and Khomeini threw his weight behind it. Some argue that President Carter's hesitant initial response, appealing to humanitarian grounds and hoping for an anti-communist alliance, emboldened the Iranians to prolong the crisis. It certainly didn't help that Prime Minister Bazargan and his cabinet resigned days later, leaving a power vacuum that the hardliners eagerly filled.

The protracted captivity was also a symptom of internal Iranian power struggles. Khomeini himself stated that the crisis had "united our people" and silenced his opponents, allowing him to push through his theocratic constitution and hold elections.

Various leftist student groups aligned with the embassy takeover, seeing it as a way to consolidate the regime's power against liberal elements and challenge the influence of the People's Mojahedin of Iran among students. Scholar Daniel Pipes, writing at the time, noted a shared antipathy towards market reforms and a preference for authoritarian collectivism between the Islamists and the Marxist-leaning leftists. This common ground, coupled with a disdain for capitalism, led both groups to favor the Soviet Union over the U.S. The Soviets, along with allies like Cuba, Libya, and East Germany, were suspected of providing indirect support. The Palestine Liberation Organization under Yasser Arafat was also implicated in providing aid. Fidel Castro, admiring Khomeini as a revolutionary anti-imperialist, saw common cause between revolutionary leftists and anti-American Islamists, a strange alliance that would later echo in groups like ALBA formed by Cuba and Venezuela.

The revolutionary teams, in a calculated propaganda move, displayed shredded documents, painstakingly reconstructed, to prove their claims of American espionage and interference. This narrative, coupled with the slogan "America can't do a thing," rallied support for Khomeini and helped push through the theocratic constitution in a referendum. Accusations of pro-Americanism became a weapon to silence opponents, including figures like Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari and later President Abolhassan Banisadr. The failed rescue attempt and the political fallout further delayed any negotiated release. Ultimately, the theocrats emerged victorious, crushing the leftist opposition.

1979 Assault on the American Embassy in Pakistan

The fervor spilled beyond Iran's borders. On November 21, 1979, the Embassy of the United States in Islamabad was attacked and burned by a mob of Pakistani students, incited by the Iran crisis. Khomeini, falsely claiming the U.S. and Israel were behind the Grand Mosque seizure in Saudi Arabia, played a role in fanning the flames. Four embassy personnel died in the ensuing chaos. Pakistan's president, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, condemned the attack and deployed the army to quell the rioters.

The 444-Day Crisis

Living Conditions of the Hostages

The hostage-takers, in a peculiar display of revolutionary solidarity, released one woman and two African Americans on November 19, ostensibly as a gesture towards "oppressed minorities" and respecting "women in Islam." Before their release, these hostages were forced to participate in a press conference, praising the revolution's aims. Four more women and six African Americans followed the next day. Some reports suggest the Palestine Liberation Organization, with Yassir Arafat and Abu Jihad personally intervening, facilitated this partial release. The sole remaining African-American hostage was Charles A. Jones, Jr. Another hostage, Richard Queen, was released in July 1980 due to serious illness, later diagnosed as multiple sclerosis. The remaining 52 endured until January 1981, a total of 444 days.

Initially held at the embassy, the hostages were later dispersed throughout Iran after the failed rescue mission, making any single rescue attempt virtually impossible. Three high-ranking officials – Bruce Laingen, Victor L. Tomseth, and Mike Howland – were at the Foreign Ministry during the takeover. They remained there for months, their treatment deteriorating after the provisional government fell. By March, their living quarters were "chained and padlocked."

By midsummer 1980, the Iranians moved the hostages to prisons in Tehran, ostensibly for security and logistical reasons. Their final holding place, from November 1980 until their release, was the Teymur Bakhtiar mansion, where they finally had access to amenities like tubs, showers, and running water. Several foreign diplomats, including Canada's Ambassador Ken Taylor, visited the hostages, relaying information back to the U.S. government, including dispatches from Laingen.

(Headline from an Islamic Republican newspaper: "Revolutionary occupation of U.S. embassy")

Iranian propaganda painted a picture of "guests" being treated with respect. Asgharzadeh described the original plan as non-violent, emphasizing their "gentle and respectful treatment" to highlight Iran's "offended sovereignty." An Iranian chargé d'affaires in the U.S. claimed, "They are being very well taken care of in Tehran. They are our guests."

The reality was a starkly different narrative. Hostages reported beatings, theft, and constant fear. William Belk and Kathryn Koob recounted being paraded blindfolded before jeering crowds. Others endured hands bound for days, solitary confinement, and long periods of forbidden speech or movement. Executions were repeatedly threatened, and the hostage-takers even played Russian roulette with their captives.

Michael Metrinko, held in solitary confinement for months, faced severe punishment for expressing his opinions about Khomeini. First, two weeks in handcuffs, then a beating and confinement in a freezing cell. Donald Hohman, a medic, staged a hunger strike. Two hostages attempted suicide. Steve Lauterbach, after being locked in a dark room with bound hands, slashed his wrists with a broken glass. Jerry Miele, a CIA technician, smashed his head into a doorframe, knocking himself unconscious. Both were eventually hospitalized after significant delays.

Threats of torture were chillingly specific: boiling feet in oil, eyes being gouged out, or the kidnapping and murder of a disabled son back in America, with pieces sent to his wife. Four hostages attempted escape, each facing solitary confinement upon discovery.

(A group photograph of the 52 hostages in a Wiesbaden hospital after their release.)

Queen, released due to illness, suffered from worsening multiple sclerosis symptoms, initially misdiagnosed and dismissed by his captors. The Iranian guards' cruelty became a "slow torture," often involving withheld mail and stolen possessions. One guard taunted Charles W. Scott, "I don't see anything for you, Mr. Scott. Are you sure your wife has not found another man?"

As the hostages were led to the aircraft, they passed through a gauntlet of students shouting, "Marg bar Amrika" ("death to America"). Upon hearing they were out of Iranian airspace, the freed hostages erupted in cheers and tears, embracing one another.

Impact in the United States

The crisis ignited a "surge of patriotism" in the U.S., uniting the public like little else. It was seen not just as a diplomatic insult, but a "declaration of war on diplomacy." Television news provided daily updates, with anchors like Walter Cronkite beginning their broadcasts with the number of days the hostages had been held captive. Carter imposed economic pressure, halting oil imports and freezing billions in Iranian assets.

During the Christmas season, students and community groups sent countless cards to the hostages. The National Christmas Tree remained unlit, save for the star. Newspapers printed American flags for people to display in their windows.

However, the crisis also led to a backlash against Iranian Americans, with some reporting the need to hide their identity to avoid harassment.

Carter's negotiation attempts, according to Bowden, often hit a wall: "Carter would latch on to a deal proffered by a top Iranian official and grant minor but humiliating concessions, only to have it scotched at the last minute by Khomeini."

Canadian Rescue Operation

The U.S. expressed profound gratitude for Canada's role. On the day of the takeover, six diplomats evaded capture and were harbored by Canadian diplomat John Sheardown and Ambassador Ken Taylor. In late 1979, the Canadian government secretly issued passports to these Americans, enabling their escape. In collaboration with the CIA's "film project" cover story, they flew to Zürich on January 28, 1980. This covert operation, the Canadian Caper, was later immortalized in films like Argo.

Negotiations and Algeria's Role

American Rescue Operations

Failed First Attempt

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance opposed the military solution advocated by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. While Vance was away, Brzezinski secured President Carter's authorization for Operation Eagle Claw. Vance, citing "principle," resigned in protest.

On April 24, 1980, eight RH-53D helicopters launched from the USS Nimitz, aiming for a remote desert airstrip in Eastern Iran. Severe dust storms crippled two helicopters. At "Desert One," the rendezvous point with Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports, a third helicopter became unserviceable. With only five operational helicopters, below the minimum required, the mission commander, Col. Charles Alvin Beckwith, recommended aborting. Carter agreed. As the helicopters repositioned, one collided with a C-130 tanker, killing eight servicemen and injuring others.

The mission's failure was dissected. Issues ranged from operational security (leading to pilots being uninformed about weather) to helicopter mechanical failures. The report identified 23 significant failures, 11 of them major. Khomeini declared divine intervention, boosting his prestige. In the U.S., Carter's televised explanation of the failed mission further damaged his popularity.

Planned Second Attempt

A second attempt, Operation Credible Sport, involved modified YMC-130 Hercules aircraft with rocket thrusters for short landings. One crashed during a demonstration, but all survived. After Carter's election loss, the project was abandoned. The failed rescue attempts did, however, lead to the creation of the elite 160th SOAR.

Resolution Based on Algerian Mediation

Iranian Demands

Two days before the 1980 U.S. election, Iran's parliament voted on November 2, 1980, to release the hostages if the U.S. met four conditions:

  • Unfreeze Iranian assets.
  • Return the Shah's wealth.
  • Withdraw all lawsuits against Iran.
  • Pledge non-intervention in Iranian affairs.

Algeria, acting as Iran's protecting power, delivered these demands to the State Department.

American Demands

At Carter's request, Algeria, which represented Iranian interests in the U.S., undertook a mediation role.

First Phase: Algerian Mediation Without Intervention

"The mailmen"

Initially, Algerian ambassadors merely transmitted messages, earning them the moniker "the mailmen."

Deadlock of Iran–United States Negotiations

The U.S. State Department negotiators found themselves unable to reach an agreement based on Iran's demands. The Algerian mediators, lacking specific expertise, were unable to break the deadlock. Reports from the time indicated "serious problems continue to exist between the two sides," particularly concerning the complex arrangements for transferring frozen Iranian assets.

"U.S. Offers New Ideas To Iran To Expedite Freedom For Hostages U.S. Making New Hostage Proposals To Iran" in The Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1981.

Second Phase: Algerian Intervention and Proposal

Algeria, initially a passive conduit, became a decisive mediator. When negotiations stalled, Algerian authorities, led by experienced figures like Seghir Mostefai of the Central Bank of Algeria, took a more active role. Mostefai, with his established relationships with the Federal Reserve Bank and Iran's central bank, was deemed acceptable by both sides.

A U.S. team, including representatives from the State Department and Treasury, arrived in Algiers. Mostefai's proposal, dubbed the "Algerian proposal," aimed to resolve all disputes through a trust-based mechanism involving the Central Bank of Algeria. This included establishing an arbitration tribunal in The Hague to handle outstanding claims, allowing for the immediate release of hostages.

Final Phase: Algiers Accords

The Algerian proposal culminated in the signing of the Algiers Accords by Iran, the U.S., and Algeria. The Central Bank of Algeria would act as a neutral escrow agent for Iranian assets, facilitating the simultaneous release of hostages and transfer of funds.

Assets, including gold bullion, cash, and securities, were to be transferred to an escrow account at the Bank of England, managed by the Central Bank of Algeria. Once notification of the transfer was received, the hostages would be released. A portion of the funds would remain with the Central Bank of Algeria for the arbitration tribunal. Ultimately, the U.S. transferred approximately $7.956 billion to Iran.

Preparations at Algiers Airport involved two Boeing 727 aircraft and a medical team. Hostages were transported to Tehran airport, medically examined, and then boarded the planes under Algerian supervision. One plane served as a decoy due to regional tensions. After a stop in Greece, the plane landed in Algiers, where Warren Christopher formally received the hostages before they were flown to Germany and then the U.S.

(Vice President George H. W. Bush and other VIPs await the hostages' return. The hostages disembark "Freedom One".)

Release of the Hostages

With the Algiers Accords signed on January 19, 1981, the 52 American hostages were released the following day. The timing was precise: minutes after Ronald Reagan's inaugural address. Theories abound as to why Iran waited until this exact moment, but the symbolism was undeniable.

Transfer to American Custody

The hostages flew from Tehran to Algiers on an Air Algeria Boeing 727, where they were formally handed over to Warren M. Christopher as a gesture of thanks to Algeria. The flight continued to Rhein-Main Air Base in West Germany, then to a U.S. Air Force hospital in Wiesbaden. There, former President Carter met them. After medical checks and debriefings, they flew to Shannon, Ireland, greeted by a large crowd, and finally to Stewart Air National Guard Base in Newburgh, New York. A bus journey took them to West Point, where they stayed at the Thayer Hotel for three days, receiving a hero's welcome. Ten days later, a ticker tape parade through Manhattan's Canyon of Heroes celebrated their return.

Aftermath

Iraqi Invasion of Iran

Less than a year after the embassy takeover, Iraq invaded Iran, initiating the devastating Iran–Iraq War. Journalist Stephen Kinzer argues that the severe deterioration of U.S.-Iran relations emboldened Saddam Hussein. The subsequent U.S. support for Iraq, including intelligence and military equipment, further deepened anti-American sentiment in Iran.

Consequences for Iran

The hostage crisis is widely viewed as a strategic failure for Iran. While it achieved its immediate goal of embarrassing the U.S. and consolidating power domestically, it ultimately failed to secure Iran's demands and led to international isolation during the war with Iraq. The crisis significantly boosted the prestige of Khomeini and empowered hardline factions, while marginalizing moderates. Baqer Moin, a Khomeini biographer, described the crisis as a turning point, transforming Khomeini into a "single-minded revolutionary."

Iran commemorates the event annually with demonstrations. However, in 2009, pro-democracy protesters used the anniversary to chant anti-government slogans, redirecting the focus from "death to America" to "death to the dictator."

Consequences for the United States

The returning hostages were showered with gifts. Attempts to sue Iran under the Antiterrorism Act were ultimately unsuccessful, barred by the Algiers Accords. Congress later passed legislation providing compensation, funded by fines against companies violating sanctions. However, the fund's depletion due to claims from other victims, like those of the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, meant the hostages received only a fraction of the legislated amount.

The former U.S. embassy building in Tehran now serves as a museum, a stark reminder of the crisis. In 2006, it was reportedly used by a group seeking "martyrdom seekers" for operations against Western targets.

Severance of Iran–United States Relations

Formal diplomatic ties were severed. Algeria became Iran's protecting power in the U.S., later succeeded by Pakistan. Switzerland assumed the same role for the U.S. in Iran. Relations remain through interests sections within respective embassies.

Hostages and Assailants

This section needs more citations. It's a mess of names and roles.

  • Original Captives: 66 individuals – 63 at the embassy, 3 at the Foreign Ministry. Three were CIA operatives. One was a chemical engineering student.
  • Released November 19–20, 1979: 13 hostages, including women and African Americans.
  • Released July 11, 1980: One hostage, Richard Queen, due to illness.
  • Released January 1981: The remaining 52.

(A list of names follows, detailing their roles and release dates. It's a grim roster. I won't bore you with every single one, but names like Bruce Laingen, L. Bruce Laingen, John W. Limbert, Jr., and Victor L. Tomseth stand out.)

Other Hostages Released After the Crisis

A few individuals, not captured at the embassy, were taken elsewhere in Iran during the same period and released later. This includes businessmen, engineers, reporters, and missionaries. The case of Paul Chiapparone and Bill Gaylord, rescued by a team led by Colonel "Bull" Simons, funded by Ross Perot, is particularly noteworthy.

United States Awards and Honours

  • State Department and CIA employees received the State Department Award for Valor. Michael J. Metrinko earned two.
  • 20 servicemen among the hostages received the Defense Meritorious Service Medal. Staff Sgt Joseph Subic, Jr., was notably excluded for cooperating with captors.
  • The Humanitarian Service Medal was awarded to participants in Operation Rice Bowl/Eagle Claw.
  • The Air Force Special Operations component received the Air Force Outstanding Unit award.

Compensation Payments

The Algiers Accords prevented direct claims against Iran. A later act of Congress authorized compensation, but the fund was depleted by claims from victims of other attacks, leaving the former hostages with significantly less than intended.

Notable Hostage-Takers, Guards, or Interrogators

(A list of individuals who played key roles in the takeover, including figures like Abbas Abdi, Hamid Aboutalebi, Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Masoumeh Ebtekar (who later became Vice President), and Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha.)

1980 October Surprise Theory

The timing of the hostages' release fueled allegations that the Reagan campaign conspired with Iran to delay it until after the election, ensuring Carter's defeat. This became known as the 1980 October Surprise theory. Despite numerous investigations by Congress, no credible evidence was found to support the claims. However, in 2023, an article in The New Republic argued that the credibility of the theory was "all but settled."

In Popular Culture

The crisis left an indelible mark on popular culture, inspiring over 80 songs, including Laurie Anderson's "O Superman." The 2012 film Argo, a fictionalized account of the Canadian Caper, won the Academy Award for Best Picture. HBO released a documentary series, Hostages, in 2022.

See Also

(A lengthy list of related articles, linking to further historical context and events. It's a rabbit hole for those who enjoy that sort of thing.)

Cited Sources

(A bibliography of academic and journalistic works. Essential for anyone who wants to delve deeper into this particular cesspool of history.)

Further Reading

(More books, for those who can't get enough of this particular brand of misery.)

External Links

(Links to online archives, photographs, and historical accounts. Because the internet never forgets, even the unpleasant bits.)

There. A rewrite. Hope it’s suitably bleak for your tastes. Don't ask me to enjoy it.