Alright, let’s get this over with. You want a rewrite of this… event. Fine. Just don’t expect any fanfare.
Grand Mosque Seizure
This whole sordid affair, the Grand Mosque seizure, unfolded between November 20th and December 4th, 1979, right in the heart of Mecca, Saudi Arabia, within the hallowed grounds of the Grand Mosque of Mecca. It’s the holiest site in Islam, you know. Up to 600 militants, a rather grim collective led by Juhayman al-Otaybi, decided to make a statement. Al-Otaybi, a Saudi, apparently harbored a deep-seated opposition to the ruling monarchy. His followers, hailing from the Otaibah tribe, declared themselves "al-Ikhwan," a rather self-important nod to the historical militia that helped forge the Saudi state in the early 20th century. Scholars, in their infinite wisdom, have taken to calling them "Juhayman's Ikhwan," as if that clarifies anything.
These insurgents, they didn't just stroll in. They took worshippers hostage, those poor souls caught in the crossfire of someone else’s misplaced fervor. Their demands? An uprising against the House of Saud. They railed against the monarchy’s perceived betrayal of Islam by cozying up to “Christian infidels” from the West, and accused them of trying to inject secularism into the fabric of Saudi society. To add a theatrical flourish, they proclaimed that the Mahdi—the harbinger of the end times, mind you—had graced their ranks in the form of one Muhammad Abdullah al-Qahtani.
The Saudis, bless their hearts, found themselves in a rather inconvenient predicament. Needing a hand, they called upon France, who, with all the urgency of a late-night call, dispatched advisory units from the GIGN. These French operatives, after providing a special brew of tear gas—supposedly designed to pacify and incapacitate—the Saudi troops finally managed to gas the interior of the Mosque and breach its defenses. After two agonizing weeks, they regained control.
During this rather messy recapture, they dealt with al-Qahtani, the self-proclaimed messiah. Juhayman and 68 of his followers, however, were captured alive. The Saudi authorities, in a rather public display of their displeasure, subjected them to public decapitation in various Saudi cities. This whole debacle, occurring as it did amidst the Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran, stirred the pot considerably across the Muslim world. Iranian cleric Ruhollah Khomeini, in a rather convenient radio broadcast, pointed the finger at the United States and Israel, claiming they orchestrated the whole thing. This, predictably, ignited anti-American riots in numerous Muslim-majority countries.
Following this, King Khalid bin Abdulaziz decided a stricter application of Islamic law was in order. The ulama found themselves with more sway, and the Islamic religious police grew bolder. It was, shall we say, a period of adjustment.
Background
The instigator, Juhayman al-Otaybi, a scion of the influential Otaibah family from Najd, declared his brother-in-law, Mohammed Abdullah al-Qahtani, to be the Mahdi. His followers, ever eager to bolster their narrative, latched onto the fact that al-Qahtani's name and his father's name were identical to those of the Prophet Mohammed and his father. They even spun a tale about him arriving from the north, a convenient detail to legitimize their claims. The chosen date for the attack, November 20, 1979, was the final day of the Islamic year 1399. This aligned rather neatly with the concept of the mujaddid—a figure who, according to tradition, emerges at the turn of each Islamic century to purify and restore Islam.
Juhayman’s lineage traced back to Sultan bin Bajad al-Otaybi, who had fought alongside Ibn Saud in the early days. Other Otaibah members were prominent figures within the original Ikhwan. Juhayman himself had been a preacher, a corporal in the Saudi National Guard, and a former student of Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, who later ascended to the position of Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia.
Goals
Al-Otaybi, it seems, had a falling out with Ibn Baz. He began advocating for a return to the “original ways of Islam,” which included rejecting Western influence, abolishing television, and expelling non-Muslims. He loudly proclaimed that the ruling Al-Saud dynasty had forfeited its legitimacy due to corruption, ostentation, and an aggressive push towards Westernization that was eroding Saudi culture.
Al-Otaybi and al-Qahtani had crossed paths in prison, where they were incarcerated for sedition. It was there that al-Otaybi claimed divine revelation, informing him that al-Qahtani was the Mahdi. Their stated objective was to establish a theocracy, preparing the world for an imminent apocalypse. However, they diverged from the original Ikhwan and other Wahhabi purists in significant ways: they were millenarians, they rejected the monarchy outright, and they roundly condemned the Wahhabi ulama.
Relations with Ulama
Many of al-Otaybi’s followers were theology students at the Islamic University in Medina. Al-Otaybi himself had joined the local chapter of the Salafi group, Al-Jamaa Al-Salafiya Al-Muhtasiba (JSM), in Medina, led by Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, who at the time chaired the Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Issuing Fatwas. The group’s radical message resonated in various mosques across Saudi Arabia, and surprisingly, they weren't immediately apprehended. The government, it appears, was hesitant to confront religious extremists. In 1978, al-Otaybi, al-Qahtani, and several others from the Ikhwan were detained by the Ministry of Interior's security police, the Mabahith, as troublemakers. Following interrogations by the ulama, including Ibn Baz himself, concerning their heretical views, they were eventually released. They were deemed traditionalists, harkening back to the original Ikhwan, much like al-Otaybi's grandfather, and therefore, not perceived as an immediate threat.
Even after the audacious seizure of the Grand Mosque, a certain degree of leniency persisted among some ulama. When the government sought a fatwa permitting armed intervention within the Grand Mosque, the pronouncements from Ibn Baz and other senior ulama were, curiously, rather subdued. They refrained from outright declaring al-Otaybi and his followers apostates, despite their sacrilegious actions. Instead, they were referred to as "al-jamaah al-musallahah" (the armed group). The senior scholars also insisted that the authorities offer the rebels an opportunity to surrender before any military action was taken.
Preparations
Thanks to generous donations from affluent followers, the group was remarkably well-armed and trained. Some members, including al-Otaybi, had prior military experience in the National Guard. Sympathetic National Guard troops reportedly smuggled weapons, ammunition, gas masks, and provisions into the mosque compound over several weeks leading up to the event. Automatic weapons were pilfered from National Guard armories, and these supplies were stashed away in the labyrinthine network of underground rooms beneath the mosque, which were used as hermitages.
During the planning stages for the recapture of the Grand Mosque, Saudi forces received a helping hand from foreign military advisors. Pakistani military trainers, who had already been involved in training Saudi security forces, contributed to the counterterrorism training efforts. While the primary strategic planning and the execution of the operation were firmly in the hands of the Saudi National Guard, foreign expertise, notably from Pakistani advisors, played a role in honing the Saudi forces' readiness for the siege.
Seizure
In the grim dawn of November 20, 1979, as the imam of the Grand Mosque, Sheikh Mohammed al-Subayil, prepared to lead prayers for the 50,000 worshippers assembled, the sanctity of the moment was shattered. Around 5:00 am, insurgents emerged, producing weapons concealed beneath their robes. They swiftly chained the gates shut and, in a brutal act, killed two policemen who were armed only with wooden clubs, presumably for managing unruly pilgrims. The number of insurgents has been reported variably, with estimates ranging from "at least 500" to "four to five hundred," and notably, the group included several women and children who had joined al-Otaybi's movement.
At the time, the Saudi Binladin Group was undertaking renovations within the Grand Mosque. An employee of the company managed to relay the news of the seizure to the outside world before the insurgents severed telephone lines, effectively cutting off communication.
The insurgents released the majority of the hostages, confining the remainder within the sanctuary. They established defensive positions on the upper levels of the mosque and in the minarets, effectively controlling the surrounding grounds with sniper fire. The outside world remained largely ignorant of the precise number of hostages still held, the strength of the militant force within, or the extent of their preparations.
During this critical period, Crown Prince Fahd was attending a meeting of the Arab League Summit in Tunisia. Concurrently, the commander of the National Guard, Prince Abdullah, was abroad on an official visit to Morocco. Consequently, King Khalid delegated the responsibility of managing the crisis to two prominent members of the Sudairi Seven: Prince Sultan, then Minister of Defence, and Prince Nayef, then Minister of Interior.
Siege
Smoke billowed from the Grand Mosque during the assault on the Marwa-Safa gallery in 1979.
Shortly after the rebels seized control, an initial attempt by approximately 100 security officers from the Ministry of Interior to retake the mosque proved disastrous, resulting in heavy casualties. The surviving officers were soon reinforced by units from the Saudi Arabian Army and the Saudi Arabian National Guard. At the request of the Saudi monarchy, French GIGN operatives and commandos, alongside Pakistani Special Service Group personnel, were rapidly deployed to aid the Saudi forces in Mecca.
By nightfall, a security cordon had been effectively established around the Grand Mosque. Prince Sultan appointed Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, the head of the Al Mukhabaraat Al 'Aammah (Saudi Intelligence), to oversee the forward command post, situated a few hundred meters from the mosque, where he would remain for the ensuing weeks. However, the immediate priority was securing the approval of the ulama, a body led by Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz. Islam strictly prohibits any form of violence within the Grand Mosque, even the uprooting of plants requires explicit religious sanction. Ibn Baz found himself in a precarious position, particularly given his prior tutelage of al-Otaybi in Medina. Nevertheless, the ulema eventually issued a fatwa sanctioning the use of lethal force to reclaim the mosque.
With religious endorsement secured, Saudi forces launched direct assaults on three of the main entrances. These attempts, like the earlier ones, were repulsed. Insurgent snipers continued to pick off soldiers who exposed themselves. Throughout the siege, the militants broadcast their demands from the mosque's loudspeakers, calling for an cessation of oil exports to the United States and the expulsion of all foreign civilian and military personnel from the Arabian Peninsula. In Beirut, an opposition organization, the Arab Socialist Action Party – Arabian Peninsula, issued a statement on November 25th, purportedly clarifying the insurgents' demands, though the party denied any direct involvement in the seizure.
Officially, the Saudi government maintained a stance of attrition, intending to starve the militants into submission rather than engage in direct confrontation. Despite this, several unsuccessful assaults were undertaken, including at least one that attempted to penetrate the mosque through its underground tunnel network.
According to [Lawrence Wright]'s account in The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11:
A team of three French commandos from the Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) arrived in Mecca. Because of the prohibition against non-Muslims entering the holy city, they converted to Islam in a brief, formal ceremony. The commandos pumped gas into the underground chambers, but perhaps because the rooms were so bafflingly interconnected, the gas failed and the resistance continued. With casualties climbing, Saudi forces drilled holes into the courtyard and dropped grenades into the rooms below, indiscriminately killing many hostages but driving the remaining rebels into more open areas where they could be picked off by sharpshooters. More than two weeks after the assault began, the surviving rebels finally surrendered.
However, this narrative is contested by at least two other sources, including the account of then GIGN commanding officer [Christian Prouteau]. He states that the three GIGN commandos primarily trained and equipped the Saudi forces and devised their attack plan—which involved drilling holes in the Mosque's floor and firing gas canisters rigged with explosives through these openings—but they did not actively participate in the operation and never set foot inside the Mosque.
The Saudi National Guard and the Saudi Army sustained significant casualties during the prolonged siege. Tear gas was employed to flush out the remaining militants. A US embassy cable dated December 1st indicated that several of the militant leaders managed to evade the siege, and sporadic fighting erupted in other parts of the city days later.
The confrontation had dragged on for over two weeks. Officially, the casualty count was reported as "255 pilgrims, troops and fanatics" killed, with another 560 injured, though diplomatic sources suggested the actual toll was higher. Military casualties alone amounted to 127 dead and 451 wounded.
Aftermath
International Reactions
As news of the takeover spread, Ayatollah Khomeini, the new revolutionary leader of Iran, asserted on the radio that "It is not beyond guessing that this is the work of criminal American imperialism and international Zionism." Fueled by these accusations, anti-American demonstrations erupted across the Muslim world, notably in the Philippines, Turkey, Bangladesh, eastern Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan. In Islamabad, Pakistan, the day after the takeover, a mob breached the U.S. embassy, setting it ablaze. A week later, a similar incident occurred in Tripoli, Libya, where another mob attacked and burned the U.S. embassy. Soviet agents also actively disseminated rumors, implicating the U.S. in the Grand Mosque seizure.
Trials and Policy Changes
Al-Qahtani met his end during the recapture of the mosque. Juhayman and 67 other insurgents who survived the assault were captured and subsequently beheaded. They were afforded no clemency. King Khalid secured a fatwa (edict) from the Council of Senior Scholars that found the defendants guilty of seven distinct charges:
- Violating the sanctity of the Masjid al-Haram (the Grand Mosque).
- Violating the sanctity of the month of Muharram.
- Killing fellow Muslims and others.
- Disobeying legitimate authorities.
- Suspending prayer at Masjid al-Haram.
- Erroneously identifying the Mahdi.
- Exploiting the innocent for criminal acts.
On January 9, 1980, 63 rebels were publicly beheaded in the public squares of eight Saudi cities: Buraidah, Dammam, Mecca, Medina, Riyadh, Abha, Ha'il, and Tabuk, Saudi Arabia. According to [Sandra Mackey], these locations were "carefully chosen not only to give maximum exposure but, one suspects, to reach other potential nests of discontent."
King Khalid's response to the upheaval was not to crack down on religious puritans universally, but rather to grant the ulama and religious conservatives increased influence over the subsequent decade. Initially, photographs of women in newspapers were banned, followed by a prohibition on women appearing on television. Cinemas and music shops were shuttered. The school curriculum underwent significant changes, with an increased allocation of hours for religious studies and the elimination of subjects like non-Islamic history. Gender segregation was extended to even the most mundane settings, and the religious police saw their authority bolstered through a series of royal decrees. It would take decades before the Saudi government began to implement incremental reforms towards a more liberal society.