The Presidential transition of Ronald Reagan commenced upon his victory in the 1980 United States presidential election, marking him as the president-elect, and concluded with his inauguration on January 20, 1981. This period was a significant undertaking, orchestrated under the leadership of Edwin Meese, with its central operations based in Washington, D.C.. The transition effort was notably extensive, engaging between 1,000 and 1,500 individuals, a mix of dedicated volunteers and paid personnel, all focused on preparing for the incoming administration.
Pre-election Developments
The initial discussions regarding plans for a presidential transition for Ronald Reagan began to take shape as early as late 1979. However, more concrete and substantive planning efforts were initiated in the spring of 1980, a considerable period before the Republican National Convention convened. This proactive approach to transition planning by the Reagan campaign was even more advanced than that observed during the previous transition of Jimmy Carter four years prior. The foundational phase of this transition planning involved the formation of specialized task forces, tasked with the crucial responsibility of developing the framework for Reagan's potential administration's foreign policy and budgetary strategies. This pre-election phase, which commenced with a core team of 70 staffers, would ultimately expand to encompass 132 individuals. The policy development was significantly bolstered by contributions from external think tanks, with The Heritage Foundation playing a notable role.
The overarching supervision of this pre-election transition planning fell to Pendleton James. Operating with a deliberately low public profile, James managed to maintain a harmonious relationship with Reagan's campaign team. His involvement in transition planning had been initiated in the autumn of 1979, when he was approached by Edwin Meese, a prominent figure in the Reagan campaign, who sought to outline the logistics of assembling a potential presidential administration. Meese himself had already engaged in preliminary research concerning presidential transition procedures during Reagan's earlier 1976 presidential campaign, even consulting with individuals who had served under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Assisting James in overseeing these early planning efforts was Helene von Damm, serving as her deputy.
By September 1980, associates of Reagan had established a Presidential Transition Trust. The primary objective of this trust was to solicit contributions to finance the impending transition, specifically to identify and vet candidates for key positions within a prospective Reagan administration. At this juncture, lawyers representing the Federal Election Commission issued an advisory opinion. This opinion stipulated that such a trust could operate independently of campaign finance regulations, provided it maintained a clear separation from Reagan's official campaign committee and that the funds raised did not directly contribute to his election efforts. Campaign finance laws at the time imposed limitations on individual contributions to 5,000. The transition trust, in response, voluntarily imposed a limit of $5,000 per individual contribution.
The existence of this meticulous planning effort became public knowledge in September 1980, with a report appearing in the New York Times in mid-September. Historian Carl M. Brauer, in 1987, characterized Reagan's pre-election transition planning as "modest in scope, and clandestine in style." The operation secured office space in Alexandria, Virginia, a location that had, coincidentally, been previously utilized by the Republican presidential primary campaign of Reagan's eventual running mate, George H. W. Bush. The focus of this early planning was on identifying presidential appointment authorities and compiling lists of potential candidates for these roles.
Official Transition
Upon the election's conclusion, Edwin Meese was formally designated as the director of Reagan's transition, a role he assumed on the very day of the election. The outgoing administration of Jimmy Carter, led by his White House Chief of Staff, Jack Watson, who had previously managed Carter's own transition four years earlier, played a role in facilitating the process.
The transition structure was further solidified with the appointment of three senior advisors: Richard V. Allen for foreign policy and defense matters, Martin Anderson for domestic and economic affairs, and Caspar Weinberger for budget oversight. James Baker was appointed as the deputy director, tasked with planning the operational structure and management of the Reagan administration's White House staff. Six additional deputy directors were named: Michael Deaver, Drew Lewis, Lyn Nofziger, Verne Orr, and William Timmons. Deaver served as a direct liaison to Reagan and his family, while Lewis managed relationships with the Republican National Committee, women's groups, the business sector, and state and local governments. Lewis was also instrumental in developing policy briefing programs for designated cabinet members and senior staff. Nofziger, initially, retained his campaign role as press relations lead. Orr was responsible for administrative and budgetary functions and served as a key administrator within the transition. Timmons' mandate involved assessing existing government programs and policies, and gathering comprehensive information on various departments and agencies.
Pendleton James continued his role as the personnel recruiter in the post-election transition. William J. Casey presided over a senior advisory committee during this period. Richard Wirthlin leveraged his expertise in polling to inform the strategic planning for Reagan's upcoming administration. M. Peter McPherson provided legal counsel to the transition, while Edwin J. Gray and Darrell Trent were involved in policy development. Fred F. Fielding headed the critical process of vetting and clearing prospective appointees. Other significant figures involved in the transition included Tom C. Korologos and William French Smith.
Notably, several key staffers within the Reagan transition team had previously served under former president Richard Nixon, including Martin Anderson, Richard V. Allen, and Pendleton James.
The Reagan transition distinguished itself by its sheer scale. It was, by many accounts, unprecedented in its size, involving more than 1,000, and possibly up to 1,500, individuals, encompassing both volunteers and paid staff. The organizational structure was elaborate, featuring a hundred distinct transition teams dedicated to federal agencies, which were further consolidated into five primary clusters: economic affairs, national security, human services, resources and development, and legal-administrative. In 1987, historian Carl M. Brauer aptly described the Reagan transition as possessing the "most elaborate transition machinery" of any United States presidential transition up to that time.
The transition team actively collaborated with influential conservative think tanks, including the American Enterprise Institute, The Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution. The Heritage Foundation, for instance, provided a substantial document titled "Mandate for Leadership," a comprehensive 1,000-page plan for restructuring the executive branch. Furthermore, The Heritage Foundation operated a job bank, supplying the transition team with a roster of personnel aligned with conservative principles, and also organized orientation sessions for the incoming administration's top appointees.
The transition headquarters were established in Washington, D.C., situated in a federal office building conveniently located just blocks from the White House. In the initial weeks following the election, Reagan remained on the West Coast, convening with his trusted advisors, often referred to as a "kitchen cabinet." However, within weeks of his electoral victory, Reagan relocated to a row house in Washington, D.C., which served as his temporary residence until his inauguration.
A pivotal meeting occurred on November 20, when President Carter welcomed President-elect Reagan to the White House. The dynamic between the outgoing and incoming presidents was reportedly strained; Carter expressed dismay at what he perceived as Reagan's apparent disinterest in crucial policy discussions and his lack of note-taking on complex matters. Despite this personal tension, the relationship between their respective staffs was characterized as amicable. On the same day, incoming First Lady Nancy Reagan received a personal tour of the White House from outgoing First Lady Rosalynn Carter.
Reagan began announcing key appointments to his burgeoning administration approximately two weeks after his election win. By the seventh week of the transition, the majority of appointments had been made public, and by the tenth week, all significant appointee designations were finalized. Reagan had initially favored Edwin Meese for the position of White House Chief of Staff. However, following counsel from some advisors, he ultimately selected James Baker for the role. During the transition, Baker, along with Meese and Michael Deaver, formed a powerful "troika" of top deputies to Reagan, a dynamic that would persist into his presidency, solidifying shortly after the election.
Reagan delayed naming his Cabinet designees until December 11. The initial Cabinet appointments were largely met with broad approval, even drawing praise from both the business community and the moderate wing of the Republican Party. However, subsequent choices, such as Alexander Haig for secretary of state and James G. Watt for secretary of the interior, signaled potential controversy. Reagan concluded the process of naming Cabinet designees on January 8, when he put forth Terrel Bell as his choice for secretary of education.
During the transition period, Mark Anderson and David Stockman, Reagan's designated Director of the Office of Management and Budget, played a significant role in shaping the incoming administration's economic policy agenda.
Although Reagan himself pledged to refrain from public commentary on policy matters until his inauguration, many of his advisors frequently spoke to the press. This often led to situations where the transition's press secretary, James Brady, was compelled to disavow their statements. Unofficial statements and leaks emanating from members of Reagan's incoming administration also drew criticism from the Carter administration's State Department.
While many aspects of the transition proceeded with notable smoothness, certain issues did arise. Controversy surrounded the involvement of Jackie Presser in the transition process. The Carter administration also raised concerns regarding potential conflicts of interest among some transition staffers. Furthermore, public discourse ensued regarding the extent of Reagan's personal involvement in overseeing his own transition. Nevertheless, many scholars retrospectively regard the Reagan transition as a successfully managed presidential handover.
Finances
In accordance with legislation enacted in 1976, the federal government allocated 2 million was designated for the president-elect, and 861,526 of its allotted 672,659, while the team of the outgoing vice president, Walter Mondale, used 1.75 million of the federal funds granted to it. A portion of this, $63,378, was allocated to Vice President-elect George H. W. Bush for personal compensation and benefits.
The Government Accountability Office later identified instances where the Reagan transition team did not consistently adhere to proper procedures in their utilization of government funds. For example, salaries were disbursed to employees of federal agencies who had been assigned to the transition effort on a non-reimbursable basis.
The Reagan transition team also pursued private funding to supplement the transition's financial resources, soliciting contributions through a private entity known as Presidential Transition Foundation, Inc. This foundation successfully raised approximately $1.25 million. Notably, the foundation subsequently declined requests from the Government Accountability Office to audit these private funds. Neither the sources of these private contributions nor the expenditures made from them have ever been disclosed to the public.
Subsequent congressional testimony revealed that some of the Reagan transition's expenditures included costs for hotel accommodations, payments to Nancy Reagan's decorator, tuxedo rentals, social events, and even parking tickets. Ultimately, Reagan's transition proved to be more costly than any previous presidential transition.
Iran Hostage Crisis
Throughout the transition period, the outgoing Carter administration continued its efforts to resolve the protracted Iran hostage crisis. Negotiations culminated in the signing of the Algiers Accords on January 19, 1981. The release of the American hostages occurred on January 20, 1981, mere minutes after Reagan concluded his inaugural address, which lasted approximately 20 minutes, immediately following his swearing-in as president.
Retrospective Analysis of Transition
Laurin L. Henry, recognized as an authority on United States presidential transitions, offered a highly favorable retrospective assessment of the Reagan transition. Political scientist John P. Burke, in his seminal work Presidential Transitions: From Politics to Practice, described the Reagan transition as a model of highly organized execution.