The following document presents an extended and re-contextualized analysis of the Government of Russia since 1999, primarily focusing on the continuous and evolving political trajectory under Vladimir Putin. This is not a service; it is a presentation of observed realities, sharpened by a perspective honed on the whetstone of inconvenient truths.
For a broader understanding of the periods when Vladimir Putin served as prime minister within different presidential administrations, one might consult the relevant chronicles: the twilight years of the Presidency of Boris Yeltsin and the interregnum of the Presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. Consider these footnotes in the grand narrative of power.
Government of Russia since 1999
It seems that since 1999, the political landscape of Russia has been dominated by a singular, unyielding force: Vladimir Putin. He has held the reins of power without interruption, seamlessly transitioning between the roles of president and Prime Minister of Russia. From his initial, albeit brief, stint as acting president from 1999 to 2000, through two full presidential terms (2000–2008), a period as prime minister (2008–2012), and then a return to the presidency for what has now become three more terms (2012–present), his presence has been a constant. One might say he has been the gravitational center around which all else revolves. Indeed, he has been widely described as the de facto leader of Russia since the turn of the millennium, a notion that feels less like an observation and more like a statement of undeniable fact.
His political affiliations, like many things in Russia, have shown a certain flexibility over time, adapting to the prevailing winds. Early in his career, he was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1975–1991), a relic of an era many prefer to selectively remember. Later, he briefly associated with more contemporary, if equally transient, political formations such as Our Home – Russia (1995–1999) and the Unity party (1999–2001). For a period, he operated as an Independent politician (1991–1995; 2001–2008), before briefly aligning with United Russia (2008–2012) and then returning to his independent status (2012–present). These shifts suggest less a search for ideological home and more a pragmatic understanding of the instruments of power. The seat of this enduring power, naturally, remains the ancient and imposing Moscow Kremlin.
His first official presidential term spanned from 7 May 2000 to 7 May 2008, following his initial, unplanned ascension as acting president from 31 December 1999. His electoral victories during this period were in 2000 and 2004. The transition from Boris Yeltsin to Putin, and then to Dmitry Medvedev, marked a carefully orchestrated continuity, a passing of the torch that, on closer inspection, seemed to merely shift hands within the same familial grip.
His second, and ongoing, presidential tenure began on 7 May 2012, after his stint as prime minister. He secured further electoral mandates in 2012, 2018, and most recently in 2024. The pattern is clear, a testament to a system designed for singular leadership. The transitions, particularly the 2008 shift with Dmitry Medvedev, were less about democratic succession and more about constitutional circumvention, a theatrical performance for the benefit of international observers.
Beyond the formal titles, Vladimir Putin's influence extends to the People's Front, a collective of supporters he marshaled in 2011, ostensibly to polish the tarnished public image of United Russia. His political philosophy, priorities, and policies have even earned their own moniker: Putinism, a term that carries a certain weight, often in the negative sense, as we shall explore.
Domestically, Putin has enjoyed high approval ratings for the better part of his time in power. This is a recurring phenomenon, with a notable dip only between 2011 and 2013, a period conveniently coinciding with the significant 2011–2013 Russian protests. One might observe that public opinion, like a well-trained pet, tends to align with the dominant narrative. His international profile has also been remarkably high, earning him accolades such as Time magazine's Person of the Year in 2007, a spot on the Time 100 list of most influential people in 2015, and the top position on Forbes' list of The World's Most Powerful People from 2013 to 2016. Such recognition speaks volumes about perceived strength, if not always about universally admired values.
The early years of Putin's rule saw a period of rapid economic growth and an improved standard of living, largely propelled by a fortuitous boom in the oil industry. However, this economic tide turned. A combination of declining oil prices and international sanctions, imposed following Russia's annexation of Crimea, plunged the country into recession and stagnation from 2015 onwards, a state that has proven stubbornly persistent. In parallel, political freedoms have been systematically curtailed, drawing widespread condemnation from various human rights organizations. This erosion of liberties has led many to label Putin a dictator, particularly since his return to the presidency in 2012 – a label that, to some, feels less like an accusation and more like a simple description of governance.
Overview
This article is part of a series about Vladimir Putin, detailing the intricate tapestry of his two decades in power. It delves into the various facets of his leadership, from his personal life to the grand sweep of his domestic and foreign policies.
Personal
The personal narrative of Vladimir Putin is woven through the fabric of his public image, often meticulously crafted. This includes details of his family, the curious phenomenon of his exceptionally long meeting table, the nuances of his language, his published opinions that often reframe history, and even the carefully curated image of his pets. His formative years in intelligence career and his calculated rise to power are critical to understanding the man who has shaped modern Russia.
Prime Minister of Russia
During his stints as Prime Minister of Russia, particularly within the framework of the Medvedev–Putin tandemocracy, Putin's influence remained undeniable. His cabinets, both the first and second, were instrumental in implementing policies that solidified the power vertical. His international trips during these periods further underscored his enduring role on the global stage.
President of Russia
As President of Russia, Putin's presidency has been marked by a series of inaugurations – the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th – each a carefully choreographed display of continuity and authority. His international trips have been extensive, engaging with leaders at various summits, including the Slovenia Summit 2001, Slovakia Summit 2005, 2018 Russia–United States Summit in Helsinki, 2021 Russia–United States Summit in Geneva, and even hypothetical future engagements like the 2025 Russia–United States Summit in Alaska and the 2025 Budapest Summit.
Under his leadership, various political groups have been cultivated or co-opted, while significant opposition has been systematically marginalized. His speeches are pivotal, from the Munich speech of Vladimir Putin in 2007, which signaled a more confrontational stance, to the Crimean speech of Vladimir Putin in 2014, the Valdai speech of Vladimir Putin in 2014, the 2020 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, and the gravely significant addresses concerning Ukraine, such as the Address concerning the events in Ukraine and On conducting a special military operation in 2022, culminating in the 2022 Moscow rally.
Policies
Putin's policies have been far-reaching, encompassing both domestic and foreign affairs. Domestically, he has overseen extensive legislation and programs, including the 2008 Russian military reform, the 2020 amendments to the Constitution of Russia, the promotion of "national champions" in the economy, various National Priority Projects, the establishment of a Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation, and the implementation of the Russian undesirable organizations law.
In foreign policy, his tenure has been marked by increasingly assertive actions, including the Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, involvement in the War in Donbas, the Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war, and the devastating 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, followed by the 2022 annexation of four Ukrainian regions. These actions are often framed within the overarching concept of "Putin's Plan."
Presidential campaigns
His path to power has been punctuated by carefully managed presidential campaigns. These include the 2000 and 2004 campaigns and their respective elections and [2004_Russian_presidential_election). The later campaigns for 2012, 2018, and 2024, alongside their elections, [2018_Russian_presidential_election), and [2024_Russian_presidential_election), often featured highly orchestrated public support, sometimes bordering on the absurd, as seen with phenomena like "Gays for Putin!" and the "PutinTeam" movement.
Legacy
The legacy of Vladimir Putin is a complex and often contradictory one. It includes the persistent rumors of alleged doubles and claims of his incapacity and death, alongside the somewhat less flattering moniker of "Grandpa in his bunker." His extensive list of honours stands in stark contrast to the fierce opposition to Vladimir Putin in Russia. The phenomenon of the "Phone call to Putin" and his carefully cultivated public image are key elements. More visceral expressions of dissent, such as the chant "Putin khuylo!", highlight the deep divisions within society. The ideological frameworks of Putinism and Putinisation, alongside geographical markers like "Putinland" and derogatory terms like "Putler", all contribute to the multifaceted perception of his rule.
The Putin Era: A System of Control
The political system that has solidified under Putin's continuous leadership is a curious blend of contradictions. It purports to embrace certain aspects of economic liberalism while simultaneously demonstrating a profound and systemic lack of transparency in governance, deeply entrenched cronyism, overt nepotism, and pervasive political corruption. One might say it's a system where the rules are clear, but only for those who aren't part of the inner circle.
Between 1999 and 2008, Russia's economy experienced a rather impressive growth spurt. Some analysts attribute this not entirely to Putin's genius, but to a confluence of factors: the sharp rouble devaluation of 1998, structural reforms inherited from the Boris Yeltsin era, a convenient surge in global oil prices, and readily available cheap credit from Western banks. It's almost as if the universe conspired to give the new leader a head start. However, as former ambassador Michael McFaul pointed out in June 2004, this "impressive" short-term economic growth occurred "simultaneously with the destruction of free media, threats to civil society and an unmitigated corruption of justice." A growth built on a foundation of decaying freedoms, a classic trade-off.
During his initial two presidential terms, Putin did indeed enact a series of liberal economic reforms. These included the introduction of a flat income tax of 13 percent, a reduction in profits-tax, and the implementation of new land and civil codes. These changes, often lauded by international observers, were accompanied by a significant reduction in poverty, which reportedly more than halved, and a rapid increase in real GDP. The economic numbers, in isolation, painted a picture of success, a shiny veneer over a more complex reality.
In the realm of foreign affairs, the Putin government has consistently aimed to project an image reminiscent of the former Soviet Union's grandeur, its belligerence, and its inherent expansionism. It's a nostalgic reach for a bygone era, cloaked in modern geopolitical rhetoric. As Simon Tisdall of The Guardian astutely observed in November 2007, "just as Russia once exported Marxist revolution, it may now be creating an international market for Putinism." He suggested that "more often than not, instinctively undemocratic, oligarchic and corrupt national elites find that an appearance of democracy, with parliamentary trappings and a pretense of pluralism, is much more attractive, and manageable, than the real thing." A compelling argument for the export of a carefully managed illusion.
Richard W. Rahn, an American economist, provided a particularly sharp assessment in The Washington Times on 20 September 2007. He characterized Putinism as "a Russian nationalistic authoritarian form of government that pretends to be a free market democracy," suggesting its lineage owed "more to fascism than communism." Rahn presciently noted that "Putinism depended on the Russian economy growing rapidly enough that most people had rising standards of living and, in exchange, were willing to put up with the existing soft repression." He then warned that "as Russia's economic fortunes changed, Putinism was likely to become more repressive." A prediction that, in retrospect, appears less like prophecy and more like a simple understanding of human nature and political dynamics. Following Rahn's remarks, Putin did indeed take actions that further diminished democratic processes, championed conservative beliefs and values, and systematically silenced opposition to his policies and administration.
Conversely, Russian historian Andranik Migranyan offered a more charitable interpretation, viewing the Putin regime as a necessary restoration of governmental functions after the perceived chaos of the 1990s. In his estimation, the era was dominated by oligopolies serving only their narrow interests. Migranyan argued that, at least formally, the current political regime could be described as democratic, citing the existence of a multiparty system and opposition parties within the State Duma. One might, with a weary sigh, question the definition of "formally democratic" when the substance of democracy has been systematically hollowed out.
Putinism
The term "Putinism" itself has a history, not always flattering. Its first recorded usage, a rather stark one, came from Russian political analyst Andrey Piontkovsky. In an article published on 11 January 2000 in Sovetskaya Rossiya, Piontkovsky characterized Putinism as "the highest and final stage of bandit capitalism in Russia." He invoked Vladimir Lenin, noting it was the stage where "the bourgeoisie throws the flag of democratic freedoms and human rights overboard." Piontkovsky further described it as a period of war, "consolidation" of the nation founded on ethnic animosity, an assault on freedom of speech, relentless information brainwashing, isolation from the outside world, and an inevitable path toward further economic degradation. A rather comprehensive and damning prognosis, delivered with the precision of a surgeon.
In Western media, the terms "Putinism" and "Putinist" frequently carry negative connotations, describing a Russian government where the siloviki—the powerful military-security establishment—exert disproportionate control over both political and financial spheres. It's a truth that's become increasingly self-evident. Many of these siloviki are not merely professional colleagues but are deeply interconnected with Putin, either as personal friends or through shared histories in state security and intelligence agencies such as the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and the Armed forces of Russia. This intricate web of relationships creates a system of loyalty and mutual interest, making any genuine separation of powers a quaint, theoretical concept.
Julie A. Cassiday and Emily D. Johnson observed that since 1999, "Putin has inspired expressions of adulation the likes of which Russia has not seen since the days of Joseph Stalin." They noted that "tributes to his achievements and personal attributes have flooded every possible media," a rather efficient way to manufacture consent. Cameron Ross further elaborated on this burgeoning cult of personality, noting its rapid emergence by 2002. It emphasized Putin's "iron will, health, youth and decisiveness, tempered by popular support." Ross concluded, with a touch of the obvious, that "The development of a Putin mini cult of personality was based on a formidable personality at its heart." A personality, one might add, that was carefully curated and endlessly amplified.
Acting President (1999–2000)
The curtain rose on the Putin era with an unexpected, yet perhaps inevitable, act. On 31 December 1999, President Boris Yeltsin, a figure increasingly seen as erratic and infirm, made the dramatic announcement of his resignation. In accordance with the Constitution of Russia, the then-Prime Minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin, was thrust into the role of acting president. It was a sudden, almost accidental, ascension that would redefine the nation's trajectory.
Just a day prior to Yeltsin's New Year's Eve announcement, a program article bearing Putin's signature, titled "Russia at the turn of the millennium," was published on the government's official website. This document, a carefully crafted manifesto, laid out the potential head of state's perspectives on the nation's past tribulations and its pressing contemporary challenges. It served as a clear declaration of intent, a political blueprint for the coming era.
Putin's primary stated objective in this article was the "consolidation of Russia's society." He declared, with undeniable logic, that "The fruitful and creative work, which our country needs so badly, is impossible in a divided and internally atomised society." However, he quickly added a caveat, one that would prove tellingly flexible in practice: "There should be no forced civil accord in a democratic Russia. Social accord can only be voluntary." A sentiment that, in the years to come, would be tested and, some would argue, ultimately discarded.
The article also underscored the paramount importance of strengthening the state itself. "The key to Russia's recovery and growth today lies in the state-political sphere. Russia needs strong state power and must have it." He elaborated on this vision, emphasizing that "Strong state power in Russia is a democratic, law-based, workable federal state." The phrasing, as always, was impeccable, promising an ideal that would increasingly diverge from the reality.
Addressing the nation's economic woes, Putin highlighted the urgent need to significantly enhance economic efficiency, to implement a coherent and results-driven social policy aimed at combating poverty, and to ensure stable growth in people's well-being. These were, and remain, universal aspirations, articulated with a reassuring clarity.
Furthermore, the article stressed the vital role of government support for science, education, culture, and healthcare, stating that "a country in which the people are not healthy physically and psychologically, are poorly educated and illiterate, will never rise to the peaks of world civilisation." A noble ambition, one might think, if only the actions that followed truly prioritized these foundational elements.
The article concluded with a rather ominous, almost alarmist, pronouncement: Russia, it warned, was navigating one of the most perilous periods in its history. "For the first time in the past 200–300 years, it is facing the real threat of slipping down to the second, and possibly even third, rank of world states." To avert such a dire fate, he argued, would require an immense, collective effort from all the intellectual, physical, and moral forces of the nation, because "[e]verything depends on us, and us alone, on our ability to recognise the scale of the threat, to unite and apply ourselves to lengthy and hard work." A rallying cry that proved highly effective in garnering public support.
According to the historical accounts by Russian Doctors of History Barsenkov and Vdovin, the fundamental tenets outlined in this program article formed the core of Vladimir Putin's election platform. This platform, they contend, resonated deeply with the majority of Russian citizens, culminating in his decisive victory in the first round of the 2000 Russian presidential election, securing a remarkable 52 percent of the votes cast. A clear mandate, achieved with a strategic vision and a timely appeal to national anxieties.
However, a more cynical, and perhaps more accurate, perspective was offered by the Russian political commentator and retired KGB lieutenant-general Nikolai Leonov in his 2008 book. He noted, with a touch of regret, that Putin's program article was "barely noticed then and never revisited later." Leonov found this particularly lamentable because "its content is most important for contrasting against his [Putin's] subsequent actions," thereby revealing a consistent pattern where "words, more often than not, do not match his actions." A truth, perhaps, as old as politics itself.
First Presidential Term (2000–2004)
The nascent foreign policy blueprint of Russia under Vladimir Putin was articulated with characteristic pragmatism in his Address to Russia's Federal Assembly in April 2002. He declared, with an almost disarming straightforwardness, "We are building constructive, normal relations with all the world's nations—I want to emphasise, with all the world's nations." Yet, he immediately juxtaposed this with a stark reality: "However, I want to note something else: the norm in the international community, in the world today, is also harsh competition—for markets, for investment, for political and economic influence. And in this fight, Russia needs to be strong and competitive." A clear statement that "constructive" did not, in fact, mean "complacent." He further stressed that "Russian foreign policy will in the future be organized in a strictly pragmatic way, based on our capabilities and national interests: military and strategic, economic and political. And also taking into account the interests of our partners, above all in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)." It was a declaration of realpolitik, unburdened by excessive idealism.
Restoring functionality of government
The concept of "Putinism" found an unexpected positive champion in Russian political scientist Andranik Migranyan. His perspective, though often at odds with Western interpretations, offered a significant narrative within Russia itself. Migranyan asserted that Putin assumed office at a time of profound governmental dysfunction, describing a regime where the economy was "totally decentralized" and "the state had lost central authority while the oligarchs robbed the country and controlled its power institutions." It was, in his view, a necessary intervention.
Within a mere two years, Migranyan argued, Putin had successfully "restored the hierarchy of power," effectively curtailing the unchecked omnipotence of regional elites and dismantling the significant political influence wielded by "oligarchs and oligopolies in the federal center." The informal, yet immensely powerful, "The Family" – the non-institutional center of power that had flourished during the Boris Yeltsin-era – was, according to Migranyan, "ruined." This, in turn, he claimed, undermined the positions of powerful actors like Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, who had allegedly sought to "privatize the Russian state with all of its resources and institutions." A rather convenient narrative, one might observe, for the consolidation of power in new hands.
Migranyan further posited that Putin embarked on a mission to establish "common rules of the game for all actors," beginning with an effort to re-establish the government's role as the legitimate expression of citizens' collective interests. This meant, crucially, that the state would regain control over its "financial, administrative and media resources." Unsurprisingly, this attempt to enhance the state's role, Migranyan noted, "causes an intense repulsion on the part of the liberal intellectuals, not to mention a segment of the business community that is not interested in the strengthening of state power until all of the most attractive state property has been seized." A rather telling observation on the nature of "liberal" opposition in Russia. He dismissed the "free" media, owned by figures like Berezovsky and Gusinsky, as nothing more than instruments serving their owners' "own economic and political interests," effectively denying other voices a platform. A convenient way to discredit independent journalism, by equating it with self-interest.
The enhancement of the role of law enforcement agencies, in Migranyan's view, was a necessary "trial to set barriers against criminals," particularly those operating within "big business." This narrative framed state control as a bulwark against anarchy, a common justification for increased authoritarianism.
By 2004, Migranyan saw the culmination of a "social revolution" initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, whose original aim was to reconstruct the social system. He declared that "the absolute dominance of private ownership in Russia, recognized by all political forces today, has been the greatest achievement and result of this social revolution." A rather selective interpretation of "achievement" when considering the means by which much of this private ownership was acquired.
Migranyan identified the "major trouble of Russian democracy" as the inherent inability of its civil society to effectively govern the state, coupled with the underdevelopment of public interests. He attributed this to the "family-ruled state" of the Yeltsin era, which, he claimed, failed to cultivate "a favorable environment for mid-sized and small businesses." In his 2004 assessment, he viewed modern Russia as "a democracy, at least formally," where "the state, having restored its effectiveness and control over its own resources, has become the largest corporation responsible for establishing the rules of the game." He then mused on the future, posing two possibilities for the Putin regime: a transformation into a consolidated democracy or a descent into bureaucratic authoritarianism. He concluded, somewhat cryptically, that if Russia lagged "behind the developed capitalist nations in regard to the consolidation of democracy, it is not the quality of democracy, but rather its amount and the balance between civil society and the state." A nuanced, if ultimately self-serving, analysis of a state in transition, or perhaps, in deliberate stasis.
Second Presidential Term (2004–2008)
The second presidential term of Vladimir Putin saw the consolidation of many of the trends established in his first. A report by Andrew C. Kuchins in November 2007 offered a particularly incisive characterization, describing "Russia today" as a "hybrid regime that might best be termed 'illiberal internationalism'." He acknowledged that neither term was entirely accurate, requiring "considerable qualification." Kuchins noted a significant shift from the "weakly institutionalized, fragile, and in many ways distorted proto-democracy in the 1990s" to a state that had "moved back in the direction of a highly centralized authoritarianism," a historical echo of Russia's millennium-long past. Crucially, however, he stressed that this was "an authoritarian state where the consent of the governed is essential." This consent, he explained, was largely forged by the enduring memory of the 1990s chaos, economic collapse, and international humiliation, meticulously amplified by Kremlin propaganda. In this context, the Russian populace exhibited "no great enthusiasm for democracy" and remained "politically apathetic in light of the extraordinary economic recovery and improvement in lifestyles for so many over the last eight years." The outcome, as Kuchins concluded, was clear: "The emergent, highly centralized government, combined with a weak and submissive society, is the hallmark of traditional Russian paternalism." A rather depressing testament to the power of selective memory and economic stability.
Even Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a figure of immense moral authority, offered a cautious, almost sympathetic, view of the Putin regime in a 2007 interview with Der Spiegel. He stated that "Putin has inherited a plundered and downtrodden country with a majority of her people demoralized and poor. He understood and managed what was possible — a gradual, slow recovery." Solzhenitsyn, ever the pragmatist, added: "These efforts were neither noticed nor appreciated immediately. In any case, one is hard pressed to find examples in history when measures by one country for recovering strength of its own government is met favorably by other governments." A rare moment of nuanced understanding from a figure not prone to easy praise.
Dimitri Simes, writing in Foreign Affairs in 2007, echoed the sentiment of economic resurgence. He noted that "With high energy prices, sound fiscal policies, and tamed oligarchs, the Putin regime no longer needs international loans or economic assistance and has no trouble attracting major foreign investment despite growing tension with Western governments." Domestically, he observed that "relative stability, prosperity, and a new sense of dignity have tempered popular disillusionment with growing state control and the heavy-handed manipulation of the political process." It seems the price of stability was a certain quiet acquiescence.
Bridget Kendall, a BBC diplomatic correspondent, painted a vivid picture of Russia's "scarred decade" of the 1990s, a period marked by "rampant hyperinflation," the harsh policies of Yeltsin, a population decline mirroring a nation at war, and the precipitous fall from "superpower into beggar." Against this backdrop, she posed a rhetorical question: "So who can blame Russians for welcoming the relative stability Putin has presided over during the past seven years, even if other aspects of his rule have cast an authoritarian shadow?" She uncovered a chilling truth: "In the back-to-front world of Russian politics, it is not too little democracy that many people fear, but too much of it." This, she found, was the underlying reason many advocated for Putin to remain for a third term, not out of genuine admiration, but from a profound mistrust of the democratic ideal, a resentment towards Western pressure to embrace it, and a deep-seated fear of the unknown consequences of future elections. "Recent experience," she concluded, "has taught them that change is usually for the worse and best avoided." A grim assessment of a populace traumatized into preferring predictable control over uncertain freedom.
Sociological data
Sociological data from this period offers a clearer picture of the dynamics at play. Dr. Mark Smith, in March 2003, identified key features of Putin's regime: the calculated development of a corporatist system through close ties with business organizations like the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Delovaya Rossiya, and the trade union federation (FNPR); the cultivation of social stability; and the strategic co-optation of opposition parties. He further delineated three primary groupings within Putin's early leadership: the siloviki (security and military figures), economic liberals, and supporters of "the Family" (those close to Yeltsin). A careful balancing act, it would seem, where the scales were progressively tipping towards one side.
Olga Kryshtanovskaya, whose sociological survey in 2004 provided crucial insights, estimated that siloviki constituted approximately 25% of the Russian political elite. This percentage, she noted, dramatically increased to 58% within Putin's immediate "inner circle" of about 20 individuals, while remaining around 18–20% in parliament and 34% across the government as a whole. Kryshtanovskaya argued against the notion of a "capture of power," instead suggesting that the Kremlin bureaucracy itself "called siloviks in order to 'restore order'." This process, she maintained, began as early as 1996, during Boris Yeltsin's second term, driven by a desire within the elite to "stop the revolutionary process and consolidate the power." Putin's appointment as prime minister in 1999 merely accelerated this existing trend. As Kryshtanovskaya put it: "Yes, Putin has brought siloviks with him. But that's not enough to understand the situation. Here's also an objective aspect: the whole political class wished them to come. They were called for service... There was a need of a strong arm, capable from point of view of the elite to establish order in the country." An order, one might add, that primarily benefited those who called for it.
Kryshtanovskaya also observed that many individuals in power had previously worked in structures believed to be affiliated with the KGB/FSB, such as the Soviet Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Governmental Communications Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the Press Agency News. While such roles didn't inherently imply direct contact with security services, they certainly made it "likely." By aggregating the numbers of officially recognized siloviki and those with suspected affiliations, she arrived at a staggering estimate of 77% of such individuals holding positions of power. A rather telling statistic for a country claiming to be a burgeoning democracy.
A 2005 investigation by the Russian Public Opinion Foundation revealed a curious paradox in public sentiment. While 34% of respondents believed "there is a lack of democracy in Russia because democratic rights and freedoms are not observed," and pointed to a pervasive lack of law and order, a significant 21% actually stated there was "too much democracy" in Russia. Intriguingly, many in this latter group cited the same drawbacks: "the lack of law and order, irresponsibility and non-accountability of politicians." This suggested a deep-seated disillusionment with the practical outcomes of perceived democratic freedoms, leading some to conclude that "the democratic model is not suitable in principle" for Russia. When asked about the modern regime, "most respondents think Putin's government marks the most democratic epoch in Russian history (29%), while second place goes to Brezhnev's times (14%)." A chilling comparison, indeed, and a clear indicator of how the memory of stability can overshadow the reality of freedom.
By the end of 2008, Lev Gudkov, drawing on polling data from the Levada Center, noted the near-disappearance of public opinion as a genuinely independent socio-political institution in Putin's Russia. In its place, he argued, was the relentlessly effective force of state propaganda. A society where the collective voice is replaced by a carefully manufactured echo.
Prime Minister (2008–2012)
The period between 2008 and 2012 saw Vladimir Putin assume the role of Prime Minister of Russia, a move widely understood as a carefully choreographed, pro forma action. This shift was necessitated by constitutional term limits that prevented him from seeking a third consecutive presidential term in the 2008 presidential election. The resulting arrangement, dubbed the "Putin-Medvedev tandemocracy," was largely perceived, both domestically and internationally, as a mechanism to retain Putin's paramount influence while adhering to the letter, if not the spirit, of the law. It was a political dance, performed with precision, to ensure continuity of power under a different title.
Third Presidential Term (2012–2018)
Upon Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency in 2012, his third term was immediately confronted by the reverberations of the 2011–2013 Russian protests on Bolotnaya Square. These demonstrations, significant in their scale and audacity, were swiftly reframed within official Russian discourse as not merely expressions of dissent, but as "an abuse of democratic freedoms and serious threats to the safety of Russian citizens." This narrative provided the convenient pretext for Putin to introduce a new, distinctly Russian concept of "democracy." According to Olesya Zakharova, a researcher affiliated with the Higher School of Economics and the University of Bremen, this redefined "democracy" was "interpreted exclusively as 'compliance with and respect for laws, rules and regulations'," effectively decoupling it from the Western liberal notions of individual freedoms and human rights, which were "no longer seen as prerequisites for a democratic society." A rather convenient redefinition, one might observe, for a state increasingly intent on control.
The legal landscape of Russia was subsequently reshaped to align with this re-envisioned "democracy." A study conducted by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) revealed that approximately 50 antidemocratic laws were enacted in Russia between 2012 and 2018. These legislative changes were far-reaching and systematic, designed to curtail civic space and suppress dissent.
The new laws and regulations encompassed a broad spectrum of control mechanisms. They significantly increased state powers for surveillance and censorship, and introduced legislation that effectively banned "questioning the integrity of the Russian nation." This latter provision served as a legal cudgel to suppress any criticism of Russia's presence in Eastern Ukraine and the Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Broad laws targeting "extremism" were also enacted, granting authorities expansive powers to crack down on political and religious freedom. Furthermore, a concerted effort was made to impose specific, state-sanctioned views on Russian history, effectively "forbidding people to think differently." Perhaps the most insidious aspect was the construction of a complex web of laws specifically designed to obstruct the operations of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights organizations. These laws made it increasingly difficult for such groups to function, to communicate their activities, to access information, and crucially, to receive international funding. The cumulative effect was a severe hindrance to their ability to operate independently, often leading to the demise of smaller organizations. A meticulous and suffocating campaign against civil society, executed with bureaucratic precision.
Fight against modern socio-political thinking and activity
The systematic dismantling of independent socio-political thought and activity in Russia began in earnest with a series of legislative innovations, each more restrictive than the last.
On 21 November 2012, the Federal Law No.121-FZ, often referred to as the "Russian foreign agent law," came into force. This amendment to existing legislation allowed for any Russian non-profit organization, with the exception of state and municipal entities, to be branded a "foreign agent" if it engaged in "political activity" within Russia and received funding from foreign sources. The definition of "political activity" was deliberately broad, encompassing "any influence to public opinion and public policy including a sending a requests and petitions." The implications of this label were severe: increased registration barriers, additional audits, and a mandatory requirement to mark all official statements with a disclosure that the content was being provided by a "foreign agent." Furthermore, it introduced restrictions on foreigners and stateless persons from establishing or even participating in such organizations. Supervisory authorities were granted extensive powers to intervene and suspend the internal affairs of these NGOs for up to six months. It was, in essence, a scarlet letter for any organization daring to think or act independently, a bureaucratic mechanism to stifle dissent under the guise of transparency.
Following this, on 1 January 2013, Federal Law No.272-FZ, infamously known as the "Dima Yakovlev Law" or the "Law of Scoundrels," took effect. This law established a list of individuals banned from entering Russia and empowered the government to freeze their assets and investments. It explicitly targeted politically active non-profit organizations receiving funds from American citizens or organizations and, most controversially, prohibited U.S. citizens from adopting Russian children. This legislation was openly framed as a retaliatory measure against the American Magnitsky Act, demonstrating a clear tit-for-tat approach to international relations.
The clampdown intensified on 3 June 2015, with amendments to the Dima Yakovlev Law, codified as Federal Law No.129-FZ, the "Russian undesirable organizations law." This law granted the Prosecutor-General of Russia the extraordinary power to extrajudicially declare foreign and international organizations "undesirable" in Russia and summarily shut them down, with no provision for appeals. Organizations that failed to disband upon notice, as well as Russian citizens who maintained ties with them, faced substantial fines and significant jail time. The sole, vaguely defined ground for such a declaration was "a threat to the fundamental principles of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, defence capability of country or state security." A catch-all phrase, one might note, designed to encompass any form of unwanted activity.
The Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of Europe, published its opinion on the Russian undesirable organizations law on 13 June 2016. Its conclusion was unequivocal: the law suffered from "vague definition of certain fundamental concepts," such as "non-governmental organisations" and the very grounds for declaring an organization undesirable. It criticized the "wide discretion granted to the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the lack of specific judicial guarantees," which, it argued, "contradicts the principle of legality." The Commission found that the "automatic legal consequences (blanket prohibitions)" imposed on "undesirable" NGOs were only justifiable in "extreme cases of NGOs constituting serious threat to the security of the state or to fundamental democratic principles." In other instances, it warned, such blanket sanctions would likely "contradict the requirement under the European Convention on Human Rights that the interference with the freedom of association and assembly has to respond to a pressing social need and has to be proportional to the legitimate aim pursued." It further recommended that the inclusion of an NGO on the "undesirable" list should be based on "clear and detailed criteria following a judicial decision or at least, the decision should be subject to an appropriate judicial appeal." These criticisms, as with many others from international bodies, were largely disregarded.
On 25 November 2017, further amendments (Federal Law No.327-FZ) expanded the reach of the "foreign agent" designation. Any foreign legal entity distributing printed, audio, or audio-visual materials could now be declared a "foreign media performing the functions of a 'foreign agent'," even if it lacked physical branches or representative offices in Russia. These designated foreign media entities were then subjected to the full weight of the Russian foreign agent law. The net of control was cast wider, designed to ensnare even the most remote voices.
Fourth Presidential Term (2018–2024)
The fourth presidential term of Vladimir Putin saw the relentless tightening of legislative control over public discourse and civil society. The amendments, contained within Federal Law No.426-FZ, which came into force on 2 December 2019, further expanded the "foreign agent" designation. Under these new provisions, foreign legal entities labeled as "foreign media performing the functions of a 'foreign agent'" were now mandated to establish a Russian legal entity and formally notify Russian authorities of its existence. More insidiously, these amendments introduced the possibility of designating natural persons as "foreign agents." This applied to individuals who distributed materials from a foreign media declared a "foreign agent" (for instance, through social media) and simultaneously received funding from foreign sources (even a salary from an international company). The state was now reaching into individual lives, criminalizing acts of communication and association.
The legislative onslaught continued with Federal Law No.481-FZ, which entered into force on 30 December 2020. These amendments introduced "special marking" requirements not only for publications from non-profit organizations declared "foreign agents" but also for the publications of their founders, heads, members, and even employees. Furthermore, individuals—whether Russian citizens, foreign citizens, or stateless persons—could now be declared "foreign agents" for their "political activity." Again, "political activity" was broadly defined to include "any influence to public opinion including publications in social media and public policy including a sending a requests and petitions." Publications by these individual "foreign agents" were also mandated to be marked, and those designated were subjected to special reporting requirements and, crucially, deprived of the right to hold public office. This was a systematic attempt to isolate, stigmatize, and disenfranchise anyone deemed to be receiving foreign influence, effectively creating a new class of second-class citizens.
The administrative and criminal consequences for violating these increasingly stringent laws were severe. Articles 13.15, 19.7.5-2, 19.7.5-3, 19.7.5-4, 19.34, 19.34.1, and 20.28 of the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses established substantial fines for infractions of the Russian foreign agent law. Even more chillingly, Article 330.1 of the Criminal Code of Russia introduced criminal liability, including imprisonment for up to 5 years and compulsory labor, for violations of the foreign agent law. Similarly, Article 20.33 of the Code of Administrative Offenses imposed significant fines for breaching the Russian undesirable organizations law, while Article 284.1 of the Criminal Code stipulated criminal liability, with imprisonment for up to 6 years and compulsory labor, for violations of this law. The legal framework was now a finely tuned instrument of repression, designed to deter and punish.
2020 constitutional amendments
In January 2020, Putin unveiled a series of substantial amendments to the Constitution of Russia. To legitimize these changes, a referendum was held on 1 July 2020, which, despite widespread criticism regarding its fairness and transparency, reportedly approved the amendments. These changes had profound and wide-reaching impacts, most notably extending presidential term limits in a way that would allow Putin to potentially remain in power until 2036. They also granted the president the authority to fire federal judges and, in a move reflective of the regime's conservative shift, constitutionally banned same-sex marriage. With Putin's signature on a decree on 3 July 2020, the amendments officially took effect the following day, fundamentally altering the constitutional landscape of Russia.
The Venice Commission, in its assessment, concluded that these amendments had "disproportionately strengthened the position of the president of the Russian Federation and have done away with some of the checks and balances originally foreseen in the Constitution." It further stated that, taken together, "these changes go far beyond what is appropriate under the principle of separation of powers, even in presidential regimes," and critically, that "the speed of the preparation of such wide-ranging amendments was clearly inappropriate for the depth of the amendments considering their societal impact." A polite but firm condemnation of a blatant power grab.
Persecution of Navalny and mass protests
The fourth term was also defined by the intensified persecution of opposition leader Alexei Navalny and the ensuing eruption of mass protests across Russia. These demonstrations began on 23 January 2021, sparked by Navalny's detention upon his return to Sheremetyevo International Airport after recovering in Germany from a poisoning attempt widely attributed to the state. The initial day saw protests in an unprecedented 198 towns and cities, a stark indicator of public discontent. On 31 January, the authorities responded with overwhelming force, detaining over 4,000 protesters—a grim record in Russia's post-Soviet history.
On 2 February, Navalny's previously suspended sentence of three and a half years was converted into a real prison term, effectively silencing a prominent critic. In March, his team launched a campaign for his freedom, planning further protests if 500,000 people pledged to participate. Another significant mass protest occurred on 21 April 2021. The state's response was swift and technologically advanced: Russian authorities utilized public video surveillance and sophisticated facial recognition systems to identify participants, initiating proceedings against them. The consequences for many were severe, including dismissals from jobs and expulsions from universities, a chilling demonstration of the state's reach.
The legal assault on Navalny's network culminated on 9 June 2021, when Vyacheslav Polyga, a judge of the Moscow City Court, upheld an administrative claim by the prosecutor of Moscow city, Denis Popov. The decision declared Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation, the Citizens' Rights Protection Foundation, and Alexei Navalny's staff as "extremist organizations." This ruling mandated the liquidation of the two foundations, the confiscation of their assets, and the outright prohibition of activities by Alexei Navalny's staff. The case hearing itself was conducted in camera, behind closed doors, reportedly because the case file, including the administrative claim, was deemed a state secret. According to advocate Ilia Novikov, Navalny himself was not even granted party status in the proceedings. At the hearing, the prosecutor's argument for labeling these organizations "extremist" was disturbingly simple: they "want the change of power in Russia" and had promised to assist protesters with administrative and criminal fines, as well as with complaints to the European Court of Human Rights. On 4 August 2021, the First Appellate Ordinary Court in Moscow upheld this decision, which then immediately entered into force. While appeals were filed to the Second Cassation Ordinary Court by the Anti-Corruption Foundation, the Citizens' Rights Protection Foundation, and 18 individuals, including Navalny, all were rejected on 25 March 2022, solidifying the state's victory in silencing a critical voice.
Changes in the political and law enforcement practice
Following the 2020 amendments to the Constitution of Russia, Vladimir Pastukhov, a political scientist, Russian advocate, and honorary senior research associate at University College London's School of Slavonic and East European Studies, observed a chilling "phase transition." Russia, he argued, had transformed from an authoritarian dictatorship into a full-blown totalitarian tyranny. This shift, in his view, was the result of two converging factors: the complete establishment of a pervasive repressive infrastructure, and the creation of an ersatz ideology. This ideology, he described, was an eclectic, almost Frankensteinian, assemblage of elements: paternalistic autocracy (tsarism), communism, Pan-Slavism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Eurasianism, a peculiar mix of right-wing populism and left-wing populism, a cult of victory from the Great Patriotic War, virulent anti-Americanism, imperialism, xenophobia, Russian messianism, the pervasive "Versailles syndrome," and an aggressive revanchism. The transformation into a totalitarian state, Pastukhov concluded, was marked by a shift from selective repressions targeting opposition politicians and political activists (those who dared to openly struggle for power) to mass repressions against dissidents and potentially disloyal citizens—even those who simply refused to actively support the Putin regime.
The signs of these "new times" were stark and numerous. The poisoning of Dmitry Bykov, a writer, poet, and literary critic known for his criticism of the Putin regime, sent a clear message. So too did the criminal proceedings initiated against Ivan Pavlov, an advocate who courageously defended individuals accused of treason and extremism. The relentless pressure on Denis Karagodin, a philosopher dedicated to unearthing the truth about his great-grandfather's murder during Stalin's Great Purge, and the systematic targeting of countless independent journalists all painted a grim picture of a state determined to control not just action, but thought itself.
On 4 June 2021, Federal Law No.157-FZ introduced further chilling amendments. This law effectively deprived any person who had been a founder, head, member, or employee of an organization recognized as "extremist" or "terrorist"—or even simply someone who had donated to or orally expressed support for such an organization—of the right to stand for election. Crucially, this legal provision was given retroactive effect, meaning it applied even if a person's "relevant activity" occurred before the organization was officially designated as extremist or terrorist. Such individuals were thus retroactively stripped of their passive suffrage. Furthermore, under Article 282.2 of the Criminal Code of Russia, participation in an "extremist organization" carries a sentence of 2 to 6 years' imprisonment for ordinary participants and 6 to 10 years for founders and heads. The reigning approach in Russian law enforcement is particularly insidious: a former participant in an organization recognized as "extremist" and liquidated by court decision is still considered to be "continuing the activity" of that organization if they participate in a new one, even if the new organization has different statutes and objectives. Many activists have been convicted under this expansive interpretation. This convergence of retroactive legal provisions and an aggressive law enforcement approach established a robust legal framework for the ongoing political repression of anyone who ever associated with or supported organizations deemed undesirable by the state, regardless of when those actions occurred.
The human cost of these legislative changes is staggering. In Golos's assessment, at least 9 million people have been effectively deprived of the right to stand for election in Russia. A rather efficient method for ensuring electoral "purity."
On 6 July 2021, the Venice Commission issued another opinion, this time on the Russian foreign agent law. Its conclusion was unequivocal: the law constituted "serious violations of basic human rights, including the freedoms of association and expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public affairs, as well as the prohibition of discrimination." The Commission expressed particular concern about the "combined effect of the most recent amendments on entities, individuals, the media and civil society more broadly," noting that "The combined effect of the recent reforms enables authorities to exercise significant control over the activities and existence of associations as well as over the participation of individuals in civic life." A chilling testament to the state's pervasive reach.
Education reforms
The relentless push for ideological control extended even to the realm of education. On 1 June 2021, Federal Law No.85-FZ, amending the Federal Law "About education in Russian Federation," came into force. This law introduced and defined the concept of "outreach activity"—any activity conducted outside formal educational programs aimed at disseminating knowledge and experience, forming skills, values, and competencies for individual intellectual, spiritual, moral, creative, physical, and professional development, and meeting educational needs. The critical aspect was that the "manner, conditions and implementation modalities" of such outreach, along with the "procedure for the control of such activity," would now be regulated by the Government of Russia. Furthermore, outreach activities could only be carried out by public and local authorities, or by natural and legal persons who had concluded contracts with educational institutions, all in an order determined by the government.
Despite fierce opposition from the Russian Academy of Sciences and numerous cultural and educational societies, who warned of its detrimental impact, the bill was swiftly adopted by the State Duma, approved by the Federation Council (Russia), and signed into law by President Putin. According to scientists, science popularizers, educationalists, and lawyers, this law effectively established "prior censorship of virtually every ways to share knowledge and conviction," directly contravening Articles 19 and 29 of the Constitution of Russia, which guarantee freedom of thought and expression. The law's proponents, however, claimed it aimed to "shield Russian citizens against anti-Russian propaganda." A rather transparent justification for controlling the flow of information and shaping the very minds of the populace.
Fifth Presidential Term (2024–present)
The commencement of Vladimir Putin's fifth presidential term in 2024 heralded a continuation, and indeed an intensification, of the established patterns of governance. The machinery of state control, refined over decades, continued its inexorable work.
Domestic policy
A crucial, almost foundational, document for understanding the long-term domestic policy trajectory of the Putin regime is the infamous «Revision number Six», first published in the newspaper Kommersant on 9 May 2000. This document, a reform project of the Presidential Administration, was preceded by a chilling editorial note from the editor-in-chief: «the fact that such program is being developing is very important it is in itself ... if this will be a reality, almost of the entire population of Russia – from politicians and governors to ordinary voters – will be under surveillance by secret services». This document, republished in 2010, served as an unsettling blueprint.
According to an article by deputy editor-in-chief Veronika Kutsyllo, also published in Kommersant on 9 May 2000, the text of «Revision number Six» was provided to journalists by an anonymous employee of the Presidential Administration. The document referred to Putin as "acting president," and its accompanying charts, spanning over 100 pages, were drawn up before the 1999 Russian legislative election. These details strongly suggested that the work on this comprehensive plan began long before the 2000 Russian presidential election, indicating a premeditated strategy for consolidating power.
The authors of "Revision number Six" explicitly rejected the notion that the Russian social and political system of the time was "self-regulatory." This concept was deemed "totally unacceptable" to Putin, who envisioned a system where all social and political processes in Russia would be "completely managed by one single body." That body, naturally, was to be the Presidential Administration, and more specifically, its Domestic Policy Directorate.
Recognizing that Russian society was not yet "ready" for outright prohibition of opposition activities and independent mass media, the authors of «Revision number Six» proposed a more subtle, yet equally effective, approach. They advocated for the Domestic Policy Directorate to employ a combination of public and secret activities. The "secret activities," crucially, were to be carried out with the direct involvement of special services, particularly the Federal Security Service. The overarching objective of this covert operation was to establish comprehensive control over the activities of political parties, community and political leaders, governors, legislatures, candidates for elective positions, election commissions and election officials, mass media, and journalists.
To achieve this ambitious objective, a series of specific tasks were outlined: 1) the systematic collection of information (including compromising material or "dirt") on individuals and organizations of interest, to be used for pressure and leverage; 2) the deliberate creation of conditions under which independent mass media would find it impossible to operate effectively; 3) the manipulation of elections to ensure the victories of pro-Kremlin candidates; 4) the establishment of ostensibly independent civil society organizations that were, in reality, under the full control of the Kremlin; and 5) a sophisticated strategy to discredit the opposition and construct an informational and political barrier around Putin himself. This barrier ensured that positive developments were attributed solely to Putin's personal efforts, while negative outcomes were conveniently blamed on "bad officials," absolving Putin of any responsibility. He would not engage with opposition charges or participate in debates; others would do that for him.
Vasily Gatov, an analyst at the Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism at the University of Southern California, starkly characterized the implications of realizing the provisions of «Revision number Six». He argued that it meant constructing a state where democratic institutions existed merely "nominally," but in reality, these institutions were "fully controlled by Presidential Administration and secret police." He termed such a regime a "counterintelligence state"—a specific form of guided democracy where the illusion of participation masks absolute control.
In a retrospective analysis published in Kommersant on 7 May 2016, Ilya Barabanov and Gleb Cherkasov assessed the implementation of «Revision number Six». They concluded that, despite some unforeseen developments (such as the actual creation of a pro-Kremlin political party, United Russia, which the original authors had deemed unnecessary), "by and large, the provisions of «Revision number Six» were conducted." A chilling confirmation that the blueprint had been meticulously followed.
Authoritarian bureaucratic state
The political system that has solidified in Russia under Vladimir Putin has been consistently described as an authoritarian bureaucratic state, a machine of control operating with chilling efficiency. Russian politician Boris Nemtsov and commentator Vladimir Kara-Murza concisely defined Putinism as "a one party system, censorship, a puppet parliament, ending of an independent judiciary, firm centralization of power and finances, and hypertrophied role of special services and bureaucracy, in particular in relation to business." This description, delivered with the clarity of those who have faced the system head-on, leaves little room for ambiguity.
The nascent middle class, often seen as a bulwark for democratic change in other nations, has, in Russia, shown few signs of political activism. As Masha Lipman reported, "As with the majority overall, those in the middle-income group have accepted the paternalism of Vladimir Putin's government and remained apolitical and apathetic." A population content, or perhaps simply resigned, to trade political engagement for a semblance of stability.
In December 2007, Russian sociologist Igor Eidman (VCIOM) categorized the Putin regime as "the power of bureaucratic oligarchy" exhibiting "the traits of extreme right-wing dictatorship — the dominance of state-monopoly capital in the economy, silovoki structures in governance, clericalism and statism in ideology." A rather comprehensive indictment of a system built on concentrated power and ideological rigidity.
The Economist lamented in August 2008 the virtual demise of both Russian and Soviet intelligentsia in post-Soviet Russia, noting, with a touch of despair, that "Putinism was made strong by the absence of resistance from the part of society that was meant to provide intellectual opposition." The intellectual backbone, it seemed, had been broken.
In early February 2009, Aleksander Auzan, an economist and board member at a research institute established by Dmitry Medvedev, offered a stark assessment: in the Putin system, "there is not a relationship between the authorities and the people through Parliament or through nonprofit organizations or other structures. The relationship to the people is basically through television. And under the conditions of the crisis, that can no longer work." A clear statement that the illusion of public participation was maintained through carefully controlled media.
Around the same time, Vladimir Ryzhkov highlighted a particularly insidious legislative maneuver. A bill sent by Medvedev to the State Duma in late January 2009, once enacted, would empower Kremlin-friendly regional legislatures to remove opposition mayors who had been elected by popular vote. Ryzhkov noted, "It is no coincidence that Medvedev has taken aim at the country's mayors. Mayoral elections were the last bastion of direct elections after the Duma cancelled the popular vote for governors in 2005. Independent mayors were the only source of political competition against governors who were loyal to the Kremlin and United Russia. Now one of the few remaining checks and balances against the monopoly on executive power in the regions will be removed. After the law is signed by Medvedev, the power vertical will be extended one step further to reach every mayor in the country." A precise description of the systematic dismantling of local self-governance.
The deep-seated resentment against this centralized control occasionally boiled over. In July 2020, the popular governor of the Khabarovsk Krai, Sergei Furgal, who had surprisingly defeated the candidate from Putin's United Russia party in elections two years prior, was dramatically detained and flown to Moscow on charges related to alleged crimes committed 15 years earlier. This move ignited mass protests in the Khabarovsk Krai, which continued daily from 11 June onwards, with demonstrators openly chanting anti-Kremlin slogans such as "Putin resign," "Twenty years, no trust," and "Away with Putin!" These protests, though ultimately suppressed, served as a stark reminder of the underlying discontent simmering beneath the surface of official stability.
Human rights and repression
The human rights record under Putin's regime has been a consistent source of international condemnation, marking a steady erosion of fundamental liberties. The systematic suppression of dissent and the targeting of opposition figures have become hallmarks of this era. Prominent cases, such as the Assassination of Anna Politkovskaya, the Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko, the Assassination of Boris Nemtsov, and the more recent Poisoning of Alexei Navalny, serve as grim reminders of the risks associated with challenging the state. These are not isolated incidents but rather, as many critics argue, calculated acts within a broader strategy of political repression.
On 7 April 2022, in a rare moment of international accountability, Russia was suspended from the United Nations Human Rights Council following widespread reports of "gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights." The vote, with 93 members in favor, underscored the international community's alarm.
The scale of this repression is staggering. In 2024, the investigative news portal Proekt published an estimate that Russian authorities had prosecuted more than 116,000 activists over the preceding six years. This figure, chillingly, surpassed the level of political repression recorded under Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. A return to, and even an exceeding of, the darker chapters of Soviet history, implemented with modern efficiency.
Pro-government propaganda and pressure on independent media
The control of information and the systematic propagation of a pro-government narrative have been cornerstones of the Putin regime. Independent media outlets, once a fragile but present voice, have been progressively squeezed into silence. On 1 March 2022, Russian authorities abruptly blocked access to Echo of Moscow and TV Rain, effectively silencing Russia's last significant independent TV station. These actions, often justified under vague national security pretexts, served to eliminate any alternative narratives.
The legal framework for censorship was further solidified on 4 March 2022, when Putin signed into law a bill introducing draconian prison sentences of up to 15 years for anyone found guilty of publishing "knowingly false information" about the Russian military and its operations. This legislation had an immediate and chilling effect, leading many remaining independent media outlets in Russia to cease reporting altogether on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, effectively ceding the information space entirely to state-controlled narratives. It was a clear demonstration of the state's determination to control not just actions, but also the very perception of reality.
Economic policies
In the early years of his rule, Vladimir Putin presented himself as a champion of economic reform, often advocating for policies that appeared to align with liberal economic principles. Speaking to the Russian Parliament on 9 July 2000, he championed an economic policy package that included the introduction of a flat tax rate of 13% and a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35% to 24%. He also expressed intentions to provide better treatment for small businesses, proposing a simplified system where companies could opt for either a 6% tax on gross revenue or a 15% tax on profits, replacing the previous, more complex high-tax regime. In February 2009, he even called for a single VAT rate to be "as low as possible," suggesting a reduction from an average of 18% to between 12% and 13%. For a significant period, the overall tax burden in Russia under Putin was indeed lower than in most European countries, a point often highlighted by his supporters.
However, the trajectory of economic policy has shown a distinct shift over time, reflecting an evolving, or perhaps simply revealing, ideology. In 2024, President Putin signed a bill that dramatically altered the tax landscape, moving away from the much-touted flat tax system. This new legislation introduced a progressive wealth tax, with a 13% rate for those earning up to 2.4 million rubles (573,000). Additionally, it mandated a 5% increase in corporate taxes. This policy reversal signaled a clear departure from the earlier liberal economic reforms, indicating a state increasingly willing to intervene directly in wealth distribution and corporate profits, ostensibly for national priorities.
Corporatism and state intervention in economy
The economic model under Vladimir Putin has evolved significantly, demonstrating a clear shift towards a corporatist system characterized by pervasive state intervention. As Dr. Mark Smith noted in March 2003, early in his tenure, Putin cultivated close ties with major business organizations such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Delovaya Rossiya, and the trade union federation (FNPR). This was presented as a strategy to involve broad sectors of society in policy-making, though it often meant co-opting key economic actors into the state's orbit. It is an undeniable fact that Russia remains a colossal exporter of oil and natural gas to a significant portion of Europe, a dependency that has provided immense leverage and revenue.
However, a prevailing "school of thought" argues that many of Putin's economic maneuvers, most notably the controversial fate of Yukos, were not merely isolated incidents but clear indicators of a broader shift towards a system best described as state capitalism. In this model, "the entirety of state-owned and controlled enterprises are run by and for the benefit of the cabal around Putin—a collection of former KGB colleagues, Saint Petersburg lawyers, and other political cronies." It's a system where private enterprise is tolerated, even encouraged, but only as long as it aligns with, and ultimately serves, the interests of this powerful inner circle.
Andrey Illarionov, a former economic advisor to Putin until 2005, offered an even more damning assessment. He described Putin's policies as ushering in a "new socio-political order distinct from any seen in our country before." In his view, members of what he termed the "Corporation of Intelligence Service Collaborators" had systematically seized "the entire body of state power." These individuals, bound by an omertà-like code of silence and loyalty, were "given instruments conferring power upon others—membership 'perks', such as the right to carry and use weapons." Illarionov argued that this "Corporation has seized key government agencies—the Tax Service, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and the government-controlled mass media—which are now used to advance the interests of [Corporation] members." Through these agencies, "every significant resource in the country—security/intelligence, political, economic, informational and financial—is being monopolized in the hands of Corporation members." This "Corporation," he concluded, had formed an isolated caste. An anonymous former KGB general, cited by The Economist, reinforced this view, stating that "[a] Chekist is a breed... A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's siloviki. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged." A rather efficient way to ensure continuity and loyalty within the ruling elite.
Jason Bush, who headed the Moscow bureau of Business Week, commented in December 2006 on the "troubling growth of government's role." He noted that "The Kremlin has taken control of some two dozen Russian companies since 2004 making them public property, including oil assets from Sibneft and Yukos, as well as banks, newspapers, and more." Despite occasional lip service to market reforms, Putin consistently backed "national champions" like the energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft. Consequently, the private sector's share of economic output declined from 70% to 65% in a single year, while publicly owned companies now accounted for 38% of stock market capitalization, up from 22% a year prior.
By September 2008, as the late 2000s recession began to impact even Russia's wealthiest tycoons, the Financial Times observed that "Putinism was built on the understanding that if tycoons played by Kremlin rules they would prosper." This implicit social contract—loyalty in exchange for prosperity—was a defining feature of the era.
Interestingly, while Russia's state intervention in the economy was frequently criticized in the West, a 2008 study by the Bank of Finland's Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) presented a counter-intuitive finding. It suggested that state intervention had, in some cases, positively impacted the corporate governance of many Russian companies. Formal indicators of corporate governance quality, the study found, were actually higher in companies with state control or a government stake. A paradoxical outcome in a system often decried for its opacity.
Rising living standards
During Vladimir Putin's tenure, particularly in the earlier years, there was a concerted effort to improve the material conditions of the populace, often through state-led initiatives. In 2005, he launched a series of National Priority Projects focused on critical social sectors: health care, education, housing, and agriculture. These projects were designed to demonstrate tangible improvements in daily life. For instance, in his May 2006 annual speech, Putin proposed increasing maternity benefits and enhancing prenatal care for women, directly addressing demographic concerns. He also spoke with characteristic conviction about the urgent need to reform the judiciary, lambasting the existing federal judiciary as "Sovietesque," arguing that many judges continued to render verdicts as they would under the old Soviet system. He advocated for a judiciary capable of interpreting and implementing the law in line with contemporary realities. In a structural reform, responsibility for federal prisons was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice in 2005.
Among the most visible and impactful changes within the National Priority Project frameworks was the across-the-board increase in wages for healthcare and education workers in 2006, coupled with a significant drive to modernize equipment in both sectors throughout 2006 and 2007. These measures were designed to deliver palpable improvements and foster public support.
Indeed, during Putin's government, official statistics indicated that poverty was cut by more than half, a significant achievement that resonated deeply with a populace scarred by the economic instability of the 1990s.
Jason Bush, the chief of Business Week's Moscow bureau, offered a nuanced perspective on the condition of the Russian middle class in 2006. He reported that this demographic had experienced substantial growth, expanding from a mere 8 million in 2000 to an estimated 55 million by 2006, now constituting approximately 37% of the population, according to Moscow-based market research firm Expert. This expansion, Bush noted, contributed to a noticeable uplift in national morale. The proportion of Russians who considered their lives "not bad" had risen from a meager 7% in 1999 to 23%, while those who found living conditions "unacceptable" had plummeted from 53% to 29%, according to a contemporary poll. However, Bush also provided a crucial counterbalance, stating that "[n]ot everyone has shared in the prosperity. Far from it. The average Russian earns $330 a month, just 10% of the U.S. average. Only a third of households own a car, and many—particularly the elderly—have been left behind." The prosperity, it seemed, was unevenly distributed.
As Putin's second term drew to a close, Jonathan Steele reflected on his legacy. He highlighted "Stability and growth, for starters. After the chaos of the 90s, highlighted by Yeltsin's attack on the Russian parliament with tanks in 1993 and the collapse of almost every bank in 1998, Putin has delivered political calm and a 7% annual rate of growth." Steele acknowledged that "Inequalities have increased and many of the new rich are grotesquely crass and cruel," but also noted that "not all the Kremlin's vast revenues from oil and gas have gone into private pockets or are being hoarded in the government's 'stabilisation fund'." He observed that "Enough has gone into modernising schools and hospitals so that people notice a difference. Overall living standards are up. The second Chechen war, the major blight on Putin's record, is almost over." A legacy, then, of economic recovery and order, purchased at a price of widening inequality and curtailed freedoms.
Other economic developments and assessments
The 2000s, under Vladimir Putin's leadership, were largely an economic boom for Russia, a period of recovery and expansion that reshaped the nation's financial landscape. As a group of Finnish economists observed in June 2008, Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) surged by approximately 7% annually, propelling the country to become one of the ten largest economies in the world by early 2008.
During Putin's first term, a multitude of new economic reforms were implemented, largely following the recommendations of the "Gref program." These reforms were comprehensive, ranging from the introduction of a flat income tax to significant changes in the banking sector, the establishment of new land ownership laws, and various initiatives aimed at improving conditions for small businesses. These were, on paper, significant steps towards a more market-oriented economy.
A particularly notable achievement was the elimination of a pervasive and economically debilitating problem inherited from the 1990s. In 1998, over 60% of industrial turnover in Russia was conducted through barter and various monetary surrogates, a system that severely hampered economic efficiency. Under Putin, the use of such alternatives to actual money dramatically declined, which, in turn, significantly boosted economic productivity. Beyond the visible increases in wages and consumption, Putin's government garnered considerable praise for effectively addressing and resolving this fundamental structural issue.
The Finnish researchers further highlighted that among the most high-profile changes within the national priority project frameworks were the across-the-board wage increases in healthcare and education in 2006, coupled with the strategic decision to modernize equipment in both these vital sectors throughout 2006 and 2007. These targeted investments were designed to yield tangible improvements in public services.
However, this period of rising overall living standards also exacerbated Russia's existing social and geographical discrepancies. In July 2008, Edward Lucas of The Economist pointedly observed that "The colossal bribe-collecting opportunities created by Putinism have heightened the divide between big cities (particularly Moscow) and the rest of the country." The economic boom, it seemed, primarily enriched those with connections to the power structures in the major urban centers.
A more critical assessment came from the retired KGB lieutenant-general Nikolai Leonov. In November 2008, evaluating the cumulative results of Putin's economic policies over eight years, he stated that "[w]ithin this period, there has only been one positive thing, if you leave aside the trivia. And that thing is the price of oil and natural gas." This stark conclusion suggested that much of the economic success was simply a windfall from favorable commodity prices rather than a testament to fundamental structural improvements. In the closing paragraphs of his 2008 book, Leonov offered a bleak prognosis: "Behind the gilded facade of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, there lies a demolished country that, under the current characteristics of those in power, has no chance to restore itself as one of the developed states of the world." A rather damning judgment from someone with intimate knowledge of the system.
Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of Russian Federation (KPRF), the largest opposition group within Russia's national Parliament (holding 13% of seats at the time), delivered a scathing critique in his speech before the 13th Party Congress on 29 November 2008. He lamented that due