Alright, let's see what we have here. A rather extensive document, isn't it? Trying to make sense of this… mess. It’s like trying to organize a cabinet after a particularly enthusiastic earthquake. But, fine. If you insist on wading through this, I’ll provide the… clarity. Just don’t expect me to enjoy it.
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The War on Drugs: A Global Campaign Against Narcotics
The war on drugs, sometimes referred to in the 21st century as the war on cartels in contexts of military intervention and counterterrorism, is a sweeping, globally coordinated campaign led primarily by the United States federal government. At its core, it’s an anti-narcotics initiative encompassing drug prohibition and extensive foreign assistance, with the stated aim of significantly reducing the illegal drug trade in the US. This initiative involves a complex web of policies designed to curb the production, distribution, and consumption of psychoactive drugs that participating governments, often under the umbrella of United Nations treaties, have deemed illegal.
The term "war on drugs" itself was popularized by the media. It gained traction following a press conference held on June 17, 1971, where President Richard Nixon famously declared drug abuse "public enemy number one." Earlier that day, Nixon had delivered a special message to the US Congress concerning "Drug Abuse Prevention and Control." While this message did touch upon the need for more federal resources for "the prevention of new addicts, and the rehabilitation of those who are addicted," this aspect of his initiative was largely overshadowed by the more aggressive, militaristic framing of the "war on drugs."
Over the subsequent decades, presidential administrations and Congress have largely maintained, and often expanded upon, Nixon's initial directives. The emphasis, however, has persistently leaned towards law enforcement and interdiction, often at the expense of public health and treatment-focused strategies. The case of Cannabis stands out as particularly complex. Federally restricted since the 1930s, it has been classified under the Controlled Substances Act as having a high potential for abuse and no accepted medical value, placing it in the same prohibition category as heroin. Despite this, numerous mainstream studies and findings dating back to the 1930s have challenged this severe classification. More recently, beginning in the 1990s, a significant policy divergence has emerged as cannabis has been legalized for medical use in 39 states and for recreational use in 24, creating a notable gap between federal law and state-level practices, and a non-compliance issue with UN drug treaties.
In June 2011, the Global Commission on Drug Policy issued a starkly critical report, declaring unequivocally: "The global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world." This sentiment was echoed in 2023 by the UN high commissioner for human rights, who stated that "decades of punitive, 'war on drugs' strategies had failed to prevent an increasing range and quantity of substances from being produced and consumed." By that year, the annual US federal drug war budget had reached an staggering 1 trillion.
The landscape shifted dramatically on October 1, 2025. In the context of the US naval deployment in the Caribbean, President Donald Trump formally declared that the US was engaged in a "non-international armed conflict" with "unlawful combatants" associated with drug cartels operating in the Caribbean. This escalation of the war on cartels into a phase of direct military intervention and counterterrorism has drawn comparisons to the earlier war on terror, given its diffuse and irregular nature.
History
Early Federal Drug Prohibition (1909–1971)
Before the early 20th century, drugs in the US were largely unregulated. Opium, used for pain relief since the Revolutionary War, saw a dramatic surge in civilian use in the late 1800s, alongside a rise in cocaine use. Alcohol consumption also steadily increased, fueling the temperance movement. The practice of smoking cannabis began to attract attention in the early 1900s. State and local governments initiated drug laws in the mid-1800s, operating under the dual authority of federal and state levels as established by the US Constitution. Federal drug legislation followed soon after the turn of the century.
America's "First Opioid Crisis"
The 1880s marked a period of surging opiate addiction, particularly among women, doctors, and Civil War veterans, leading to what is now termed America's "first opioid crisis." By the century's end, an estimated one in 200 Americans were addicted to opiates, with women constituting 60% of this population, typically white and from middle to upper-class backgrounds. Medical journals from the later 1800s frequently carried warnings regarding the overprescription of opiates. As medical advancements offered better treatment alternatives, prescribed opiate use began to decline. Concurrently, opium smoking remained popular among Chinese immigrant laborers, who had arrived in large numbers during the California gold rush. This shift in usage patterns altered the public perception of opiate use, moving it from affluent white Americans to associations with "Chinese, gamblers, and prostitutes."
During this era, states and municipalities began enacting laws to ban or regulate specific drugs. Pennsylvania, for instance, passed an anti-morphine law in 1860. San Francisco, in 1875, enacted an anti-opium ordinance, strictly enforced, imposing severe fines and jail time for visiting opium dens. The stated rationale was that "many women and young girls, as well as young men of a respectable family, were being induced to visit the Chinese opium-smoking dens, where they were ruined morally and otherwise." This law played into existing resentments towards the Chinese labor force, who were accused of taking jobs. Other uses of opiates or other drugs remained largely unaffected. Similar ordinances were adopted in other cities and states. The federal government began to intervene by selectively increasing import tariffs on smoking-grade opium. However, none of these measures proved significantly effective in curbing opium use. In the ensuing years, opioids, cocaine, and cannabis became associated with various ethnic minorities and were targeted in other local jurisdictions.
The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, also known as the Wiley Act, addressed issues of tainted and adulterated food within the burgeoning industrial food system, as well as drug quality. It mandated ingredient labeling and prohibited false or misleading claims. For drugs, a listing of active ingredients was required, and a specific set of addictive or dangerous drugs, including opium, morphine, cocaine, caffeine, and cannabis, was identified. Oversight of this act was assigned to the US Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Chemistry, which later evolved into the Food and Drug Administration in 1930.
The Anslinger Era: Escalating Federal Control
The Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) was established on June 14, 1930, as an agency within the US Department of the Treasury. Harry J. Anslinger was appointed as commissioner, a position he held for an influential 32 years, until 1962. Anslinger was a staunch proponent of Prohibition and the criminalization of all drugs, and he actively spearheaded anti-drug policy campaigns. He strongly opposed public health and treatment approaches, famously urging courts to "jail offenders, then throw away the key." He is widely considered the foundational architect of the punitive "war on drugs." A report prepared for the Senate of Canada characterized Anslinger as "utterly devoted to prohibition and the control of drug supplies at the source" and acknowledged his significant impact on the development of US drug policy, and by extension, international drug control, well into the early 1970s.
During his three decades leading the FBN, Anslinger relentlessly pursued and effectively implemented harsh drug penalties, with a particular focus on cannabis. He leveraged his position as head of a federal agency to draft legislation, discredit critics, dismiss medical opinions and scientific findings, and persuade lawmakers. Publicly, he utilized the media and speaking engagements to disseminate hyperbolic messages about the supposed evils of drug use. In the 1930s, he compiled news reports of sensational crimes, unsubstantiated claims linking them to drug use, particularly cannabis. He asserted that young people became "slaves" to cannabis, progressing towards mental deterioration, insanity, violent crime, and murder. He also promoted a racialized perspective on drug use, suggesting that Black and Latino individuals were the primary abusers. In Congressional testimony, he declared that "of all the offenses committed against the laws of this country, the narcotic addict is the most frequent offender." Beyond his ideological fervor, Anslinger was also an effective administrator and diplomat, actively participating in international drug conferences and steadily expanding the FBN's influence.
In 1935, President Roosevelt publicly supported the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act, as reported by The New York Times under the headline, "Roosevelt Asks Narcotic War Aid." The Uniform Law Commission had developed this act to address the enforcement deficiencies of the 1914 Harrison Act at the state level, creating a model law that states could adopt to replace their existing, fragmented legal frameworks. Anslinger and the FBN were instrumental in drafting this act and in lobbying states to adopt it.
The Marihuana Tax Act and the Rise of Prescription Controls
The passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 effectively outlawed the non-medical use of cannabis at the federal level, aligning with state laws, as every state had banned it by 1936. The first arrests under this act, for tax non-payment, resulted in sentences of nearly 18 months and four years for possession of a small amount and trafficking of a larger quantity, respectively. The American Medical Association (AMA) opposed the act, arguing it unduly impacted the medical use of cannabis. The AMA's legislative counsel testified that claims of cannabis-induced addiction, violence, and overdoses were unsubstantiated. Scholars have suggested that powerful business interests, including Andrew Mellon, Randolph Hearst, and the Du Pont family, orchestrated the act to prevent hemp from competing with pulp, timber, and plastics. Following the act, research and medical testing of cannabis became exceedingly rare.
In 1939, New York City Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, a critic of the Marihuana Tax Act, established the LaGuardia Committee. This committee conducted the first in-depth US study of cannabis use. The report, released in 1944 by the New York Academy of Medicine, systematically contradicted government claims, finding that cannabis was not physically addictive and that its use did not lead to other drug use or crime. Anslinger, the FBN commissioner, denounced the study as "unscientific," attacked its participants, and actively disrupted other cannabis research at the time.
In the late 1930s, the League of Nations' Opium Advisory Committee raised questions about the focus on drug prohibition over public health measures like mental health treatment, drug dispensaries, and education. Anslinger, supported by his Canadian counterpart and policy ally, Charles Henry Ludovic Sharman, successfully countered this perspective, maintaining the emphasis on global prohibition and supply control measures.
While narcotics fell under the FBN's jurisdiction, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 empowered the FDA to ensure that non-narcotic drugs were labeled for safe use. This act classified certain drugs, including amphetamines, commercialized in the late 1930s, and barbiturates, as unsafe for use without medical supervision, thus requiring a doctor's prescription. This marked the inception of the federal distinction between over-the-counter and prescription drugs, a distinction later clarified by the Durham–Humphrey Amendment in 1951.
Amphetamines, Harsher Penalties, and International Obligations
During World War II (1939–1945), amphetamines, alongside morphine, saw widespread military use to combat fatigue and boost morale. The Benzedrine brand was particularly prevalent in the US military and quickly became popular for various medical and recreational uses. American soldiers could even purchase Benzedrine directly from the army on demand starting in 1943. Post-war, amphetamines were aggressively marketed as mood elevators and diet pills, achieving considerable success. By 1945, an estimated 750 million tablets were produced annually in the US, enough to supply a million people with a daily dose, a trend that intensified throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Having failed to maintain world peace, the League of Nations dissolved after the war, transferring its responsibilities to the United Nations. Anslinger, with Sharman's backing, successfully campaigned to ensure that law enforcement and a prohibitionist viewpoint remained central to international drug policy. Through the 1946 Lake Success Protocol, he ensured that law enforcement was represented on the UN's new drug policy Supervisory Body (which today is the International Narcotics Control Board), preventing it from falling under a public health-oriented agency like the WHO.
In the early 1950s, responding to "white suburban grassroots movements" concerned about drug dealers targeting teenagers, liberal politicians at the state level enacted stricter drug laws. California, Illinois, and New York passed the first mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses, followed by Congress with the Boggs Act of 1951, which established the first federal mandatory minimums for drug offenses. This act unified penalties for the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act and the Marihuana Tax Act, effectively criminalizing cannabis. Anslinger testified in support of this inclusion, reiterating his "stepping-stone" theory linking cannabis use to harder drugs and crime. First-offense possession of cannabis carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 2–10 years and a fine of up to $20,000. This represented a significant shift in Congress's approach to mandatory minimums, increasing their prevalence, severity, and the scope of crimes they covered. According to the United States Sentencing Commission, in 2012, "Before 1951, mandatory minimum penalties typically punished offenses concerning treason, murder, piracy, rape, slave trafficking, internal revenue collection, and counterfeiting. Today, the majority of convictions under statutes carrying mandatory minimum penalties relate to controlled substances, firearms, identity theft, and child sex offenses."
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 became the foundational treaty within the three UN treaties that collectively form the international drug control framework, obligating member countries to align their domestic drug laws with the conventions. The Single Convention consolidated previous international drug agreements and limited the possession and use of opiates, cannabis, and cocaine to "medicinal and scientific purposes," effectively prohibiting recreational use. Initially joined by sixty-four countries, it was ratified and entered into force in the US in 1967. The Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 expanded this framework to include synthetic, prescription, and hallucinogenic drugs. The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 specifically addressed international drug trafficking, "criminalizing the entire drug market chain, from cultivation/production to shipment, sale, and possession."
In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–69) directed the government to address the pervasive social unrest of the era, focusing on illegal drug use, a strategy aligned with expert opinion at the time. In the 1960s, it was estimated that at least half of US crime was drug-related, a figure that rose to as high as 90% in the following decade. His Reorganization Plan of 1968 merged the Bureau of Narcotics with the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control to create the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs within the Department of Justice.
The "War on Drugs" Era (1971–Present)
The Richard Nixon presidency (1969–74) integrated his predecessor's anti-drug initiatives into a broader tough-on-crime agenda. In his 1968 presidential nomination acceptance speech, Nixon pledged, "Our new Attorney General will ... launch a war against organized crime in this country. ... will be an active belligerent against the loan sharks and the numbers racketeers that rob the urban poor. ... will open a new front against the filth peddlers and the narcotics peddlers who are corrupting the lives of the children of this country." In a 1969 special message to Congress, he identified drug abuse as a "serious national threat."
On October 27, 1970, Nixon signed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which largely repealed mandatory minimum sentences. Simple possession was reclassified from a felony to a misdemeanor, with a maximum penalty of one year in prison for a first offense, and judges were granted discretion to assign probation, parole, or dismissal. Penalties for trafficking were increased, potentially up to life imprisonment depending on drug quantity and type. The act also authorized funding for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to provide treatment, rehabilitation, and education. It also increased the number of federal drug agents and instituted "no-knock" entry powers, allowing law enforcement to enter homes without warning to prevent the destruction of evidence. Furthermore, it mandated stricter licensing and record-keeping for pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors. Title II of the Act, the Controlled Substances Act, was crucial in aligning US law with the UN Single Convention, with "many of the provisions of the CSA ... enacted by Congress for the specific purpose of ensuring U.S. compliance with the treaty." The CSA's five drug Schedules, adapted from the Single Convention's four-schedule system, categorized drugs based on their medical value and potential for abuse.
Under these new drug schedules, cannabis was provisionally placed by the Nixon administration in the most restrictive Schedule I category, pending "the completion of certain studies now underway to resolve the issue." As mandated by the CSA, Nixon appointed the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, commonly known as the Shafer Commission, to conduct an investigation.
The "War on Drugs" Declared and Escalated
On May 27, 1971, following a trip to Vietnam, two congressmen, Morgan F. Murphy (Democrat) and Robert H. Steele (Republican), released a report detailing a "rapid increase in heroin addiction within the United States military forces in South Vietnam," estimating that "as many as 10 to 15 percent of our servicemen are addicted to heroin in one form or another." On June 6, a New York Times article, "It's Always A Dead End on 'Scag Alley'," referenced the Murphy-Steele report in its discussion of heroin addiction, noting that in the US, "the number of addicts is estimated at 200,000 to 250,000, only about one-tenth of 1 per cent of the population but troublesome out of all proportion." The article also highlighted the problem of "speed" pills, specifically amphetamines, which were prevalent in the suburbs, used by housewives and husbands alike.
On June 17, 1971, Nixon presented an expanded anti-drug abuse plan to Congress, painting a dire picture: "Present efforts to control drug abuse are not sufficient in themselves. The problem has assumed the dimensions of a national emergency. ... If we cannot destroy the drug menace in America, then it will surely in time destroy us." His strategy encompassed both treatment and interdiction: "I am proposing the appropriation of additional funds to meet the cost of rehabilitating drug users, and I will ask for additional funds to increase our enforcement efforts to further tighten the noose around the necks of drug peddlers, and thereby loosen the noose around the necks of drug users." He specifically targeted heroin and broadened the scope internationally: "To wage an effective war against heroin addiction, we must have international cooperation. In order to secure such cooperation, I am initiating a worldwide escalation in our existing programs for the control of narcotics traffic."
Later that day, at a White House press conference, Nixon described drug abuse as "America's public enemy number one." He announced, "In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive. ... This will be a worldwide offensive dealing with the problems of sources of supply ... It will be government wide, pulling together the nine different fragmented areas within the government in which this problem is now being handled, and it will be nationwide in terms of a new educational program." Nixon also emphasized that the problem extended beyond the addiction of soldiers in the Vietnam War. He pledged to seek at least 81 million federal drug budget in 1969.
The news media seized upon Nixon's militaristic rhetoric, with headlines such as "Nixon Declares War on Narcotics Use in US" in the Chicago Tribune and "Nixon declares war on drug addicts" in The Guardian. This framing led to the widespread adoption of the term "war on drugs" to describe the US anti-drug campaign, and subsequently, any government's implementation of a US-style prohibition-based drug policy.
Facing re-election with drug control as a central campaign theme, Nixon established the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE) in late 1971. Armed with new federal enforcement powers, ODALE began orchestrating nationwide drug raids, aiming to enhance the administration's public image. A reported comment from Nixon during a helicopter ride over Brooklyn indicated a pragmatic view: "You and I care about treatment. But those people down there, they want those criminals off the streets." Between 1972 and 1973, ODALE conducted 6,000 drug arrests, with the majority of those arrested being Black.
In 1972, the Shafer Commission released its report, "Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding," which included a comprehensive review of medical literature and a national drug survey. The commission recommended decriminalizing personal possession and use of small amounts of cannabis, with prohibition focused solely on supply. However, neither Nixon nor Congress acted upon these recommendations. Citing the Shafer report, a lobbying campaign from 1973 to 1978, led by the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), successfully persuaded 11 states to decriminalize cannabis for personal use.
In 1973, Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) through an executive order approved by Congress, to "establish a single unified command to combat an all-out global war on the drug menace." The DEA was tasked with enforcing US controlled substances laws and regulations both nationally and internationally, coordinating with federal, state, and local agencies, and foreign governments, and overseeing legally produced controlled substances. The DEA absorbed the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, ODALE, and other drug-related federal entities.
Reagan's Escalation and "Just Say No"
The presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981–89) witnessed a significant escalation in federal focus on drug interdiction and prosecution. Shortly after his inauguration, Reagan declared, "We're taking down the surrender flag that has flown over so many drug efforts; we're running up a battle flag." Between 1980 and 1984, the annual budget for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's drug enforcement units surged from 95 million. In 1982, Vice President George H. W. Bush and his advisors began advocating for the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US military in drug interdiction operations.
Early in Reagan's term, First Lady Nancy Reagan, with assistance from an advertising agency, launched her youth-focused "Just Say No" anti-drug campaign. Propelled by the First Lady's extensive promotional efforts throughout the 1980s, "Just Say No" became ingrained in American vernacular. Subsequent research indicated that the campaign had minimal to no impact on youth drug use. However, it significantly influenced public perception, with drug abuse being perceived as America's most serious problem, rising from 2–6% in 1985 to 64% in 1989.
In January 1982, Reagan established the South Florida Task Force, chaired by Bush, to address a surge in cocaine and cannabis entering the US via the Miami region and the accompanying rise in related crime. This operation involved multiple agencies, including the DEA, Customs Service, and FBI, along with US Armed Forces ships and planes. Touted as the "most ambitious and expensive drug enforcement operation" in US history, critics dismissed it as an election-year political maneuver. By 1986, the task force had made over 15,000 arrests and seized millions of pounds of cannabis and cocaine, effectively doubling cocaine seizures annually. Administration officials hailed it as Reagan's primary drug enforcement success. However, law enforcement agents at the time expressed doubts about its impact, noting that cocaine imports had increased by 10%, accounting for an estimated 75–80% of America's supply. The head of the task force's investigative unit stated, "Law enforcement just can't stop the drugs from coming in." A spokesperson for Bush emphasized disrupting smuggling routes as the primary measure of success, rather than seizure quantities.
In 1984, Reagan signed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which imposed harsher penalties for cannabis cultivation, possession, and distribution. It also introduced equitable sharing, a new civil asset forfeiture program allowing state and local law enforcement to share proceeds from asset seizures made in cooperation with federal agencies. This controversial program permitted local law enforcement agencies to retain up to 80% of seized assets, significantly boosting their budgets. By 2019, $36.5 billion in assets had been seized, a substantial portion of which was drug-related and distributed to state and local agencies.
Simultaneously, the Central Intelligence Agency faced accusations of facilitating the drug trade in Mexico and other regions to finance anti-communist guerrilla forces in Central and South America. Several former DEA agents, CIA personnel, Mexican police officers, and historians have asserted that the CIA was complicit in the murder of DEA agent Kiki Camarena, who had uncovered and attempted to expose the CIA's alleged involvement in the drug trade. Investigative reports and books published between 2013 and 2015 by Mexican newspaper Proceso, journalist Jesús Esquivel, journalists Charles Bowden and Molly Malloy, and historians Russell and Silvia Bartley, presented this same allegation. They contended that Camarena, like Mexican journalist Manuel Buendía, had discovered the CIA's role in organizing drug trafficking from Mexico into the United States to fund the anti-communist Contras in Nicaragua as part of the Cold War. Historian Will Pansters explained that for the CIA, achieving victory in the Cold War superseded the DEA's mission of combating drug trafficking, leading to the covert incorporation, or coercion, of elements of the Mexican state into subservience. Buendía had uncovered the connection between the CIA, the Contras, and drug trafficking, posing a significant challenge to Mexican sovereignty. Camarena, meanwhile, learned that the CIA had infiltrated the DEA and sabotaged its operations to interfere with the clandestine contra-DFS-traffickers network. Both men, knowing too much, were allegedly eliminated on US orders with Mexican complicity. Subsequent official investigations reportedly aimed to confine criminal responsibility to the illicit connections between drug traffickers, secret agents, and corrupt police, omitting the broader geopolitical implications. The CIA has consistently denied allegations of involvement in Camarena's death. Historian Benjamin T. Smith has noted that these allegations contain significant "holes" and described the investigations by Russell and Silvia Bartley as "occasionally paranoid," while also pointing out that many, including some DEA members, dismiss key sources like Lawrence Victor Harrison as unreliable. Smith did, however, concede that the case represents a "deep, dark hole....[where] Fiction and reality are firmly intertwined."
Crackdown on Crack and International Pressure
As the media intensified its focus on the emergence of crack cocaine in the early 1980s, the Reagan administration amplified negative public sentiment, encouraging the DEA to highlight the drug's harmful effects. Narratives of "crack whores" and "crack babies" became prevalent, and by mid-1986, crack dominated news coverage, with Time declaring it the issue of the year and Newsweek comparing its magnitude to Vietnam and Watergate. The cocaine overdose deaths of rising basketball star Len Bias and young NFL player Don Rogers in June received extensive media attention. Capitalizing on this public fervor, Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in October, imposing significantly harsher penalties for crack offenses, commonly known as the Len Bias law. Historian Elizabeth Hinton argues that "Reagan led Congress in criminalizing drug users, especially African American drug users, by concentrating and stiffening penalties for the possession of the crystalline rock form of cocaine, known as 'crack', rather than the crystallized methamphetamine that White House officials recognized was as much of a problem among low-income white Americans."
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act allocated an additional 5 a rock, it ultimately spread to less affluent neighborhoods." Support for Reagan's drug crime legislation was bipartisan, with Democrats continuing their support for such measures, mirroring their stance since the Johnson administration.
Internationally, the Reagan administration saw a substantial increase in US military anti-drug activities abroad. The Department of Defense budget for interdiction grew from 397 million by 1987. The DEA also expanded its foreign presence, encouraging countries to adopt punitive drug policies similar to those in the US, with the threat of economic sanctions for non-compliance. The UN Single Convention provided a legal basis, and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic further solidified this framework, embedding the US-style punitive approach into international law. By the end of Reagan's presidency in 1989, illicit drugs were more readily available and cheaper than at the start of his term in 1981.
Maintaining the Hard Line and a New Opioid Crisis
George H. W. Bush (1989–93), Reagan's Vice President, maintained the strict drug enforcement policies. In his first prime time address, Bush prominently displayed a bag of crack cocaine seized near the White House, a staged event later revealed to have involved DEA agents luring a seller to Lafayette Park. The administration's first National Drug Control Strategy, issued by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in 1989, increased narcotics regulation. The director of ONDCP became commonly known as the US drug czar. In the National Defense Authorization Act for 1990–91, Congress included Section 1208, later expanded into the 1033 Program in 1996, authorizing the Department of Defense to transfer surplus military equipment deemed "suitable for use in counter-drug activities" to local law enforcement agencies.
President Bill Clinton (1993–2001), aiming to reposition the Democratic Party as tough on crime, significantly increased penalties for drug felonies with the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. This act introduced the federal "three-strikes" provision, mandating life imprisonment for violent offenders with two prior convictions for violent crimes or drug offenses, and allocated billions for states to expand their prison systems and law enforcement. During this period, state and local governments implemented controversial drug policies with racial biases, such as the stop-and-frisk practice in New York City and state-level "three strikes" felony laws, starting with California in 1994.
The 1990s saw a dramatic rise in opioid use in the US, initiating the ongoing opioid epidemic. Observers generally identify three distinct phases: the overprescription of legal opioids in the early to mid-1990s; a surge in heroin use in the late 2000s as prescription opioids became harder to access; and the emergence of potent fentanyl and other synthetic opioids around the mid-2010s. Prior to the 1990s, the use of opioids for chronic pain management in the US was limited, with some scholars suggesting a historical hesitancy due to past addiction issues dating back to the 1800s. A pivotal moment in the epidemic's development is often considered the 1996 release of OxyContin (oxicodone) by Purdue Pharma, followed by aggressive and deceptive marketing practices by Purdue and other pharmaceutical companies, conducted with insufficient oversight. This crisis thus originated within the healthcare system, initially leading the DEA to target doctors, pharmacists, pill mills, and pharmaceutical companies. As law enforcement cracked down on the pharmaceutical supply, illicit drug trafficking in opioids grew to meet the demand.
The George W. Bush administration (2001–2009) maintained the hard-line approach. In a February 2001 television interview, Bush's Attorney General, John Ashcroft, stated his intention to "renew it. I want to refresh it, relaunch it if you will" regarding the war on drugs. Following the September 11 attacks and the passage of the Patriot Act in 2001, the DEA began emphasizing the connection between drug trafficking and international terrorism, securing expanded funding and a greater global presence.
Growing Dissent and Shifting Policies
The US incarceration rate reached its peak in 2008, with the US holding the highest rate globally. Graphs illustrating the rise in the incarcerated population in jails and prisons show a stark upward trend. Protests against the war on drugs also gained momentum.
In mid-2001, a report by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), titled "The Drug War Is the New Jim Crow," linked the disproportionately high rate of African American incarceration to the extensive rights lost upon conviction. The report highlighted that while "whites and blacks use drugs at almost exactly the same rates ... African-Americans are admitted to state prisons at a rate that is 13.4 times greater than whites, a disparity driven largely by the grossly racial targeting of drug laws." The cumulative effect of the war on drugs, the report concluded, amounted to "the US apartheid, the new Jim Crow." This perspective was further elaborated by lawyer and civil rights advocate Michelle Alexander in her influential 2010 book, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.
In 2000, the US drug-control budget reached $18.4 billion, with nearly half allocated to law enforcement and only one-sixth dedicated to treatment. By 2003, 53% of the requested drug control budget was for enforcement, 29% for treatment, and 18% for prevention.
During his presidency, Barack Obama (2009–2017) adopted a "tough but smart" approach to the war on drugs. While he asserted that his methods differed from those of previous presidents, his practices largely mirrored them. In May 2009, Gil Kerlikowske, Director of the ONDCP, indicated that the Obama administration did not intend to significantly alter drug enforcement policy but would avoid the term "war on drugs," deeming it "counter-productive." In August 2010, Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the 100:1 sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine to 18:1 for pending and future cases. In 2013, Obama's Justice Department issued the Cole Memo, stating it would defer to state laws legalizing cannabis production, distribution, and possession, "based on assurances that those states will impose an appropriately strict regulatory system."
In 2011, the Global Commission on Drug Policy, an international non-governmental body comprising former heads of state and government, released a report declaring, "The global war on drugs has failed." It recommended a paradigm shift towards a public health focus, advocating for decriminalization of possession and personal use. Obama's ONDCP did not endorse the report, stating, "Drug addiction is a disease that can be successfully prevented and treated. Making drugs more available ... will make it harder to keep our communities healthy and safe."
International Divisions and State-Level Changes
In May 2012, the ONDCP published "Principles of Modern Drug Policy," emphasizing public health, human rights, and criminal justice reform, while targeting drug traffickers. According to ONDCP director Kerlikowske, drug legalization was not a "silver bullet" solution, and success should not be measured by arrest numbers or prison construction. That same month, a joint statement, "For a humane and balanced drug policy," was signed by Italy, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the US, advocating for a combination of "enforcement to restrict the supply of drugs, with efforts to reduce demand and build recovery." Meanwhile, at the state level, 2012 saw Colorado and Washington become the first states to legalize recreational cannabis use through the passage of Amendment 64 and Initiative 502, respectively.
A 2013 ACLU report labeled the anti-marijuana crusade a "war on people of color," finding that "African Americans [were] 3.73 times more likely than whites to be apprehended despite nearly identical usage rates, and marijuana violations accounting for more than half of drug arrests nationwide during the previous decade." While Obama's policies aimed to reduce overly harsh criminal sanctions for non-white drug offenders, mass incarceration persisted due to the categorization of criminals as strictly violent or non-violent.
In March 2016, the International Narcotics Control Board stated that UN international drug treaties do not mandate a "war on drugs" and that the choice is not between "'militarized' drug law enforcement on one hand and the legalization of non-medical use of drugs on the other," emphasizing that health and welfare should be the primary focus of drug policy. In April, the UN General Assembly held a Special Session (UNGASS) on the "World Drug Problem." The Wall Street Journal characterized attendees as divided into two camps: "Some European and South American countries as well as the U.S. favored softer approaches. Eastern countries such as China and Russia and most Muslim nations like Iran, Indonesia and Pakistan remained staunchly opposed." The resulting outcome document recommended treatment, prevention, and other public health measures, and committed to "intensifying our efforts to prevent and counter" drug production and trafficking through "inter alia, more effective drug-related crime prevention and law enforcement measures."
Under President Donald Trump (2017–2021), Attorney General Jeff Sessions reversed previous Justice Department policies on cannabis, rescinding the Cole Memo that had deferred federal enforcement in states where cannabis was legalized. He directed federal prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense" in drug cases, regardless of mandatory minimum sentences, which could trigger such penalties for lower-level charges. With cannabis legalized to varying degrees in over 30 states, Sessions' directive was widely viewed as a regressive move by both Democrats and Republicans, prompting bipartisan outcry. Trump dismissed Sessions in 2018 for unrelated reasons.
Policy Reversals and Shifting Focus
In 2018, Trump signed the First Step Act, which included federal prison reforms and made the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. A 2021 US Supreme Court decision confirmed that retroactivity applied to cases where mandatory minimum penalties had been imposed.
In 2020, both the ACLU and The New York Times reported a bipartisan consensus that it was time to end the war on drugs. During his presidential campaign, President Joe Biden (2021–2025) pledged to take steps to alleviate the war on drugs and end the opioid epidemic.
On December 4, 2020, during the Trump administration, the House of Representatives passed the Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act (MORE Act). This bill aimed to federally decriminalize cannabis by removing it from the list of scheduled substances, expunge past convictions and arrests, and tax cannabis to "reinvest in communities targeted by the war on drugs." The MORE Act was sent to the Senate in December 2020, where it remained. In April 2022, the act was again passed by the House and awaits Senate action.
Over time, US states have increasingly embraced drug liberalization. Initially, in the 1930s, states led the federal government in prohibiting cannabis; in recent decades, this trend has reversed. Beginning with medical cannabis in California in 1996, states started legalizing cannabis. As of 2023, 38 states, four US territories, and the District of Columbia had legalized medical cannabis, while 24 states, three territories, and DC had legalized non-medical use, and seven states had decriminalized it. Decriminalization typically refers to first-time offenses and small quantities, such as, for cannabis, under an ounce (28g). In November 2020, Oregon became the first state to decriminalize a range of drugs, including heroin, methamphetamine, PCP, LSD, and oxycodone, shifting from a criminal approach to a public health focus; however, portions of this policy were reversed in April 2024.
In 2022, Biden signed the Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research Expansion Act, facilitating research into the medical applications of cannabis. This marked the first standalone federal cannabis reform bill enacted. In October 2022, Biden publicly stated, "We classify marijuana at the same level as heroin – and more serious than fentanyl. It makes no sense," and pledged to initiate a review by the Attorney General on cannabis classification. On October 6, he pardoned all individuals with federal convictions for simple cannabis possession, a largely symbolic action as none were imprisoned at the time, urging states, where the majority of convictions occur, to follow suit. This action affected approximately 6,500 people convicted between 1992 and 2021, along with thousands convicted in the District of Columbia.
Focus on Fentanyl and Shifting Global Dynamics
In 2023, the US State Department announced plans to establish a "global coalition to address synthetic drug threats," with over 80 countries expected to participate. In April of that year, Anne Milgram, head of the DEA since 2021, testified before Congress, identifying two Mexican drug cartels as posing "the greatest criminal threat the United States has ever faced." Supporting a DEA budget request of $3.7 billion for 2024, Milgram cited fentanyl as the driver of "the most devastating drug crisis in our nation's history."
In October 2023, the OFAC sanctioned a China-based network involved in the manufacture and distribution of fentanyl. Typically, the drug is manufactured in China, then shipped to Mexico for processing and packaging before being smuggled into the US by Mexican drug cartels.
In January 2024, the DEA confirmed its review of cannabis's Schedule I classification. Days later, documents from the Department of Health and Human Services indicated that cannabis has "a currently accepted medical use" in the US and "a potential for abuse less than the drugs or other substances in Schedules I and II." On April 30, the Justice Department announced a DEA decision: "Today, the Attorney General circulated a proposal to reclassify marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III. Once published by the Federal Register, it will initiate a formal rulemaking process as prescribed by Congress in the Controlled Substances Act." Schedule III drugs, considered to have moderate to low potential for dependence, include ketamine, anabolic steroids, testosterone, and Tylenol with codeine.
In the DEA's "National Drug Threat Assessment 2024," Director Milgram highlighted the "most dangerous and deadly crisis" involving synthetic drugs, particularly fentanyl and methamphetamine. She specifically identified the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels in Mexico as major manufacturers of these synthetics, supplied with precursor chemicals and machinery from China. These cartels distribute through "vast distribution networks" across the US and utilize Chinese money laundering operations to repatriate profits. Milgram stated, "As the lead law enforcement agency in the Administration's whole-of-government response to defeat the Cartels and combat the drug poisoning epidemic in our communities, DEA will continue to collaborate on strategic counterdrug initiatives with our law enforcement partners across the United States and the world."
CIA Involvement and Counterterrorism Focus
During the second presidency of Donald Trump, the CIA has been reported to be playing a more significant and assertive role in combating drug cartels, conducting covert surveillance operations with unarmed drones in Mexico to monitor cartel activities.
In January 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order designating various drug cartels and criminal organizations—including the Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, Jalisco New Generation Cartel, Northeast Cartel, United Cartels, Tren de Aragua, and Mara Salvatrucha—as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. This designation was officially enacted on February 20, 2025. Canada has also begun designating drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
Second Trump Presidency: A New Phase of Conflict
On September 30, President Trump informed reporters that his administration would "look very seriously at cartels coming by land," a statement that, according to the Miami Herald, aligned with recent reports suggesting the administration was reviewing plans for targeted operations within Venezuela.
On October 1, 2025, Trump formally notified Congress that the US was engaged in a "non-international armed conflict" with "unlawful combatants" associated with drug cartels operating in the Caribbean. The Guardian reported that the memo to Congress referred to the cartels as "non-state armed groups" actively attacking the US. Andrew C. McCarthy, writing in the National Review, interpreted this terminology as referring to a conflict "that does not pit two sovereign nations against each other," analogous to hostilities conducted by subnational entities not acting on behalf of a foreign sovereign, citing Al-Qaeda and the attacks of 11 September as examples. The Miami Herald noted that in such an armed conflict, "a country can lawfully kill enemy fighters even when they pose no threat." Conversely, The Washington Post observed that "Some lawmakers and experts have said the notification is a dubious legal justification for what have been unlawful military strikes on alleged civilian criminals."
On October 2, Venezuela's Minister of Defense, Vladimir Padrino López, reported the detection of five US "combat planes" flying near Venezuela at an altitude of 35,000 feet (11,000 m), which he characterized as a "provocation." A government statement indicated the planes were 75 kilometers (47 mi) from the Venezuelan coast, a distance CNN noted is outside of Venezuelan territory.
As of October 28, the number of US troops deployed in the Southern Caribbean and Puerto Rico had expanded to 10,000, with approximately half stationed in Puerto Rico and the other half on vessels. US military assets in the region were deemed insufficient for a full-scale invasion. These forces included elements of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, known for providing helicopter aviation support to special operations forces. Venezuela's armed forces were estimated at 125,000 as of October 2025, though experts described its military as "in shambles" according to The Wall Street Journal. On October 17, the Journal reported that Venezuela had issued a call to arms and intensified its propaganda, claiming the US sought its oil wealth while mobilizing troops to the coast in preparation to "repel any invasion."
Reuters reported on November 2, 2025, that "The military buildup in the region is the largest unrelated to disaster relief since 1994, when the United States sent two aircraft carriers and more than 20,000 troops to Haiti" during Operation Uphold Democracy.
NATO and Foreign Involvement
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has actively participated in addressing drug trafficking, particularly in Afghanistan, as part of its broader security and stabilization efforts. NATO has supported counter-narcotics initiatives by bolstering the Afghan government's capacity to combat the illicit drug trade, recognizing it as a significant funding source for insurgent groups. NATO's engagement includes training and equipping Afghan security forces to disrupt drug trafficking networks, alongside facilitating intelligence sharing and coordination with international partners. These activities are framed within NATO's mission to foster stability and security, acknowledging the intricate link between the drug trade and threats to regional and global security.
However, perspectives on NATO's counter-narcotics operations have varied. Some reports have highlighted tensions with other international actors, such as the United Nations. While NATO emphasizes its contributions to drug trade reduction through capacity-building and support for Afghan-led initiatives, other sources have pointed to discrepancies in reported outcomes, suggesting that the drug trade in Afghanistan remained robust despite these efforts. Data from 2012, for instance, indicated continued thriving opium production, raising questions about the efficacy of NATO's strategies in this domain. Nevertheless, NATO's involvement underscores a commitment to addressing the complex interplay between security, governance, and the illicit drug economy, even as challenges persist in achieving tangible reductions in trafficking activities.
US international involvement in drug control is predicated on the belief that assisting foreign governments in their anti-drug efforts reduces drug supply within the US. Scholars have argued that the war on drugs, often framed as a metaphorical war, functions as propaganda masking the continuation of earlier military or paramilitary operations. Others contend that substantial amounts of US foreign aid, training, and equipment are primarily directed towards combating leftist insurgencies and are often provided to groups actively involved in large-scale narco-trafficking, such as corrupt elements within the Colombian military.
UN Treaties and US Influence
The three UN drug control conventions, adopted by over 180 countries, establish a framework for international cooperation on drug control, obligating each member state to integrate treaty provisions into their domestic laws. While some interpretive flexibility exists, "each of the treaties encourages – and often requires – that member countries put in place strong domestic penal provisions" to address illicit drugs, leading to a prevalence of punitive policies. As the dominant global power after WWII, the US exerted significant influence over the adoption of these conventions by other nations, promoting a prohibitionist and criminalizing perspective. Historically, the US has been "the key player in most multilateral negotiations," with the prohibitionist approach "deriving largely from U.S. policy – the various forms, past and present, of the U.S. 'war on drugs'."
US economic power is channeled into the war on drugs through the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). Enacted in 1961, the FAA consolidated various federal foreign aid initiatives under the new US Agency for International Development (USAID) and remains the primary legislation governing foreign financial assistance. In 1972, responding to concerns about illicit drugs from foreign sources, Congress added an "International Narcotics Control" chapter to the FAA, authorizing the president to enter into agreements and provide assistance for counternarcotic activities abroad. This also made US economic and military aid, including arms sales, contingent upon countries aligning with US anti-drug policies. Later amendments defined "major illicit drug-producing country" and "major drug-transit country," requiring the president to annually determine which countries fit these definitions. Countries not adequately cooperating with counter-drug efforts would lose eligibility for US financial aid, although the president retained the authority, and has exercised it, to grant waivers. The "majors list" has influenced the allocation of US international anti-drug aid, although its relevance has somewhat diminished in recent years. In September 2023, President Biden added China to the majors list, citing its production of precursor chemicals.
Foreign anti-drug initiatives initially focused on Latin America and subsequently expanded globally. Since the 1970s, billions of US aid dollars have been directed towards anti-drug activities in Latin America. The US initially approached drug control as a law enforcement issue in foreign countries, providing support to police forces. In the 1980s, the US increasingly involved the military and private security firms in providing training and support to armed forces in drug-producing and transit countries. As of 2024, the DEA operates 93 foreign offices in 69 countries, in addition to its 241 domestic offices. Beyond numerous cooperative law enforcement actions worldwide against drug trafficking and money laundering, the DEA and other agencies, along with the US military, have been involved in multi-year foreign drug campaigns in countries such as Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan.
Latin America: A Region Under Pressure
In 2021, journalist Gustavo Gorriti, founder of corruption-focused IDL-Reporteros, published a strongly critical editorial in The Washington Post regarding the impact of 50 years of the war on drugs on Latin America. He described the flow of drugs to the US as an "unstoppable industry" that had triggered an economic revolution throughout the region, where the illegal drug trade's high profit margins far surpassed those of legitimate businesses. Corruption among politicians and anti-drug forces soared, even among those maintaining "close relationships with U.S. enforcement and intelligence agencies." A segment of the population, particularly poor farmers, became economic hostages, reliant on drug crops for survival. The primary beneficiaries, Gorriti argued, were "the systems built to wage a fight that they soon realized would have no end. ... [The war on drugs] became a source for endless resources, inflated budgets, contracts, purchase orders, power, influence – new economies battling drug trafficking but also dependent on it."
At a 2012 meeting in Guatemala, three former presidents from Guatemala, Mexico, and Colombia stated that the war on drugs had failed and proposed a discussion on alternatives, including decriminalization, at the Summit of the Americas in April of that year. Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina asserted that the war on drugs was exacting too high a toll on Central American lives and that it was time to "end the taboo on discussing decriminalization." At the summit, the Colombian government advocated for significant reforms to drug policy, citing the devastating effects of the war on drugs within Colombia.
Colombia: Plan Colombia and its Controversies
Historically, the illicit drug trade in Colombia was deeply intertwined with right-wing paramilitary groups like the United Self-Defenders of Colombia (AUC) and leftist guerrilla organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Consequently, US anti-drug efforts in Colombia often overlapped with support for counterinsurgency operations. In the late 1960s, as drug smuggling to the US from Mexico escalated significantly, the two governments collaborated on the launch of the Mexican war on drugs. This disruption of the market created an opportunity for Colombian traffickers to meet US demand for cannabis.
Until the 1970s, Colombia "had played no major role in the production and circulation of illegal drugs in the hemisphere." Following a military coup in Chile in 1973 and the spread of political repression across the Southern Cone countries, which disrupted cocaine smuggling from Peru and Bolivia, Colombia emerged to fill the demand for cocaine. Under pressure from the US, the Colombian government, led by President Misael Pastrana (1970–1974), worked with the newly formed DEA to set the future course for the country's war on drugs.
Throughout the 1970s, the "marijuana boom" dominated Colombia's drug trade, peaking in the mid-1970s. This was soon followed by the rise of cocaine and the notorious Medellin and Cali Cartels, which grew through the 1980s and early 1990s to dominate the global cocaine market. By the century's end, the brutal anti-drug war had critically destabilized the security situation in Colombia. Through the Plan Colombia program, the US provided Colombia with $10 billion in funding between 2000 and 2015, primarily allocated to military aid, training, and equipment, aimed at combating both drugs and left-wing guerrillas like the FARC, who were accused of involvement in drug trafficking.
The Clinton administration initially waived all but one of the human rights conditions attached to Plan Colombia, viewing such aid as critical for national security. Private US military contractors, including the former DynCorp, were contracted by the State and Defense Departments to execute anti-drug initiatives as part of Plan Colombia. Colombian military personnel received extensive counterinsurgency training from US military and law enforcement agencies, including the School of the Americas.
The efforts of the US and Colombian governments faced criticism for focusing on combating leftist guerrillas in southern regions while failing to exert sufficient pressure on right-wing paramilitaries and ongoing drug smuggling operations in the country's north. Human Rights Watch, congressional committees, and other entities documented connections between Colombian military members and the AUC, designated as a terrorist group by the US government, and reported that Colombian military personnel had committed human rights abuses rendering them ineligible for US aid under existing laws.
Coca eradication through aerial spraying of herbicides like glyphosate was a contentious aspect of Plan Colombia. The environmental consequences of this spraying were criticized for harming fragile ecosystems, and the practices were also linked to health problems in local populations.
A report by the RAND Corporation, analyzing the Colombian experience for insights applicable to the Mexican drug war, noted that "Plan Colombia has been widely hailed as a success, and some analysts believe that, by 2010, Colombian security forces had finally gained the upper hand once and for all." The report cited significant reductions in kidnappings and terrorist acts, and the recapture of territory, attributed to "a reinforced military and reinvigorated police force." However, it also found that, as of 2010, "Colombia is still a major source country for illicit narcotics. Moreover, the state continues to share sovereignty with a range of violent nonstate actors, including rebel groups and rightwing paramilitaries allied with drug traffickers and wealthy landowners." The Washington Office on Latin America concluded in 2010 that both Plan Colombia and the Colombian government's security strategy "came at a high cost in lives and resources, only did part of the job, are yielding diminishing returns and have left important institutions weaker."
Mexico: A Persistent Challenge
One of the earliest US foreign policy anti-drug initiatives was Nixon's Operation Intercept, announced in September 1969, aiming to drastically reduce cannabis entering the US from Mexico, which was estimated to be the source of 80% of the US supply. The operation involved intense inspection crackdowns that nearly halted cross-border traffic for 20 days, causing significant disruption and controversy in border states.
Under the leadership of Juan García Ábrego, the Gulf Cartel underwent a significant transformation in drug trafficking in Mexico during the 1980s and early 1990s. García Ábrego diversified operations by forming an alliance with the Cali Cartel, shifting focus from marijuana and heroin to cocaine, a higher-value commodity in the US market. This partnership capitalized on growing cocaine demand in the United States, especially after US authorities disrupted Caribbean routes in the 1990s, positioning Mexico, and specifically Tamaulipas, as a critical corridor for drug smuggling. García Ábrego's organizational structure, reliant on corrupting government and police officials, solidified the Gulf Cartel's influence and laid the groundwork for its later expansion. His arrest in 1996 created a power vacuum, subsequently filled by Osiel Cárdenas Guillén.
Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, who assumed leadership of the Gulf Cartel after García Ábrego's capture, revolutionized drug trafficking by introducing a paramilitary approach with the formation of Los Zetas in 1999, initially comprising elite former Mexican military personnel. This armed wing not only protected cartel operations but also expanded into kidnappings, extortion, and territorial control, escalating criminal violence. Under his leadership, the cartel intensified cocaine trafficking to US cities like Houston and Atlanta, generating millions of dollars. Direct confrontations with authorities and rivals, such as the Sinaloa Cartel over control of Nuevo Laredo, heightened tensions leading to the war on drug trafficking launched in 2006 by President Felipe Calderón. Cárdenas' capture in 2003 and extradition in 2007 weakened the cartel, but the resulting fragmentation and the independence of Los Zetas intensified violence within the drug war context, leaving a lasting legacy of conflict in Mexico for decades. Following the capture of Osiel Cárdenas Guillén in 2003 and his extradition in 2007, leadership fell to Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez, a key figure in the Gulf Cartel, who led the organization until 2012. Internal dynamics and rivalries, particularly with Los Zetas, defined his tenure.
The pursuit of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán from 2001 to 2014 exemplifies the challenges of combating sophisticated transnational criminal organizations in the 21st-century global war on drugs. As leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, Guzmán orchestrated one of the most powerful drug trafficking networks, responsible for smuggling vast quantities of narcotics into the United States and Europe, generating billions in illicit revenue. His 2001 escape from a high-security Mexican prison and subsequent evasion until his 2014 capture highlighted systemic corruption, institutional weaknesses, and cross-border complexities hindering effective counter-narcotics strategies. The operation to apprehend him, involving Mexican authorities and US agencies like the DEA, underscored the necessity of international cooperation, intelligence sharing, and advanced surveillance technologies, while also exposing the limitations of militarized approaches in addressing the socio-economic drivers of the drug trade. Guzmán's high-profile status and the Sinaloa Cartel's global reach made his capture a symbolic victory, yet it also revealed the resilience of drug trafficking networks, as the cartel continued operations unabated, reflecting the broader, ongoing struggle to dismantle such organizations.
The Mérida Initiative, launched in 2008, was a security cooperation program between the US and Mexico aimed at combating drug trafficking and transnational crime. From 2008 to 2021, the US provided $3.5 billion in funding. Initially focused on anti-drug and rule-of-law measures, it later expanded to include US-Mexico border activities. Components included military and law enforcement training and equipment, alongside technical advice to strengthen national justice systems. In 2021, it was replaced by the Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities.
A 2013 Pew Research Center poll indicated that 85% of Mexican citizens supported using the Mexican army against drug cartels, 74% favored US training assistance for their police and military, 55% supported US arms and financial aid, and 59% opposed the deployment of US troops on Mexican soil. Public perception of progress in anti-drug efforts was reported by 37%, while 29% felt ground was being lost and 30% believed the situation remained the same; 56% attributed drug violence in Mexico to shared blame between the US and Mexico. As of 2024, the DEA identifies the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels, linked to Chinese precursor chemicals and supplies, as the primary sources of synthetic drugs like fentanyl and methamphetamine, posing the most significant threat to the US.
Central America: A Transit Corridor Under Strain
The Central American nations—Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama—serve as major transit and storage points for drugs destined for Mexico and the US, frequently appearing on the American "majors list" annually. Since the late 2000s, with increasing concern over trafficking activities, the US has engaged in varying levels of direct anti-drug involvement in each of these countries. Beginning in 2008, the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) has provided these seven nations with equipment, training, and technical support for law enforcement efforts, with the US advocating for an intelligence-based approach.
During the 1980s civil war in Nicaragua, the drug situation became intertwined with US support for the anti-leftist rebel force known as the Contras. A 1988 report by Senator John Kerry's Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Contra drug links concluded that members of the State Department "who provided support for the Contras are involved in drug trafficking ... and elements of the Contras themselves knowingly receive financial and material assistance from drug traffickers." This involvement included payments to drug traffickers from funds authorized by Congress for humanitarian assistance to the Contras, sometimes after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies or were under active investigation.
The U.S. Military's invasion of Panama in 1989 marked a significant intervention. On December 20, 1989, the US invaded Panama with 25,000 troops in Operation Just Cause to depose and arrest Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega. Noriega had been providing military assistance to Contra groups in Nicaragua at the US's request, receiving payments and tacit tolerance for his drug trafficking activities, which had been known since the 1960s. US relations deteriorated in the mid-1980s, and his dealings with the US government were exposed in the US media. The killing of a US soldier in Panama served as the final justification for the invasion. Noriega surrendered to US forces on January 3, 1990, and was subsequently indicted by the DEA and sentenced by a US court to 45 years in prison for racketeering, drug smuggling, and money laundering. The UN General Assembly resolved that the invasion constituted a "flagrant violation of international law."
Ecuador, situated between Colombia and Peru, the world's primary cocaine-producing nations, has long been a major drug transit point. From 1999, the Manta air base served as the US military's most significant presence in South America, originating approximately 100 drug surveillance flights monthly. In 2009, citing unwelcome internal influence by the CIA, Ecuador declined to renew the base's lease, ending official US military presence. Since 2018, drug activity and anti-drug efforts in Ecuador have intensified dramatically. In 2023, the US-Ecuador Defense Bilateral Working Group was formed to address the situation, and a memorandum of agreement was signed to strengthen the Ecuadorian military. A drug-related wider conflict erupted in 2024.
In 2012, the US dispatched DEA agents to Honduras to assist security forces in counter-narcotic operations. Honduras has been a critical transit point for drug traffickers, utilizing small planes and hidden landing strips across the country. The DEA, in collaboration with other US agencies like the State Department, CBP, and Joint Task Force-Bravo, supported Honduran troops in conducting raids on traffickers' operational sites. Mexico was scheduled to receive $1.6 billion in equipment and strategic support from the United States through the Mérida Initiative.
Impact on Growers and International Relations
The US-supported coca eradication policy has faced criticism for its adverse effects on the livelihoods of South American coca growers. In regions where coca has traditionally been chewed and used in tea, as well as for religious, medicinal, and nutritional purposes by local populations, making traditional coca cultivation illegal is viewed as unjust. In areas where forced eradication also destroyed other food or market crops without providing alternatives, farmers were left destitute.
Afghanistan: A Persistent Opium Problem
In 2001, a US-led military coalition invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the ruling Taliban as part of the war on terror response to the September 11 attacks. For generations, Afghanistan had been a major producer of opium. The Taliban, in power since 1996, banned opium cultivation in 2000, leading to a 90% reduction in domestic production within a year and an estimated 65% decrease in the global opium supply. Following the invasion, poppy cultivation and opium manufacture resumed, and the war on drugs became an integral component of the US presence.
Initially, "everyone did their own thing, not thinking how it fit in with the larger effort. State was trying to eradicate, USAID was marginally trying to do livelihoods, and DEA was going after bad guys," according to a senior Department of Defense official cited in a later report. By 2004, opium production had dramatically increased, and eradication became the primary focus. The DEA's operational budget in Afghanistan grew from 40.6 million in 2008. In 2009, eradication efforts were halted—a senior US official called it "the least effective program ever"—in favor of an "alternative livelihoods" approach encouraging farmers to cultivate other crops. In 2017, eradication was reinstated as the main initiative, with the US military launching an aerial campaign involving B-52 bombers and F-22 fighters targeting drug labs, which proved to be largely empty compounds, resulting in significant civilian casualties.
Undermining US efforts, prohibitionist policies fostered a thriving opium black market, which in turn fueled widespread, systemic corruption within the Afghan government. In 2018, the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction declared the counternarcotics operation to date "a total failure." As the US military presence concluded in 2020, Afghanistan was estimated to produce 85% of the world's opium. Having expended approximately $9 billion on the 20-year anti-drug campaign, US forces withdrew in 2021, and the Taliban returned to power.
Venezuela: A Strategic Hub for Illicit Trade
Since Hugo Chávez assumed power in 1999, Venezuela has played a crucial role in the global drug trade landscape, establishing itself as a strategic hub for the transit of narcotics, particularly cocaine, due to its geographical position between Colombia, the world's leading cocaine producer, and routes to the US and Europe. Chávez's 2005 decision to sever ties with the DEA, citing espionage allegations against its representatives, marked a pivotal moment that weakened international interdiction efforts within the country. This rupture not only curtailed intelligence sharing and bilateral cooperation but also facilitated Venezuela's role as a more permeable corridor for drug trafficking, with a significant increase in the volume of drugs transiting through its territory. The alleged involvement of the Venezuelan government in drug trafficking activities has been extensively documented, with accusations pointing to high-ranking officials and military personnel as key figures in what is known as the Cartel of the Suns.
China: Precursor Chemicals and Geopolitical Tensions
Prior to 2018, the People's Armed Police Border Defense Corps was involved in numerous anti-drug operations along the China-Myanmar border, a major nexus for the illegal Chinese drug trade. On March 25, 2007, three PAPBDC officers were killed in action during a shootout with drug traffickers on this border. Between 2013 and 2023, the China Coast Guard seized a total of 9.875 tonnes of drugs.
In the mid-2010s, the US identified China as a primary source of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic opioids. American anti-drug interventions concerning China are influenced and constrained by the geopolitical sensitivities of US-China relations. The US employs multiple strategies: exerting diplomatic pressure on China to implement internal controls on illicit drugs; seeking cooperation in US and international law enforcement efforts; unilaterally imposing targeted sanctions; and pursuing criminal indictments against Chinese companies and individuals. The effectiveness of these approaches hinges significantly on China's level of implementation and enforcement, which is directly tied to the fluctuating state of overall US-China relations.
Following China's scheduling of fentanyl-class substances in 2019, the flow of synthetic opioids from China to the US appeared to decrease; however, trafficking shifted towards precursor chemicals and related equipment, with Mexico's drug cartels emerging as major clients. In November 2023, President Biden announced an agreement with General Secretary Xi Jinping for China to crack down on the export of precursor chemicals and tablet presses to the Western Hemisphere. A US House committee report released in April 2024 found that companies producing fentanyl precursors in China could still receive Chinese state tax rebates and other financial benefits after exporting their products. According to the US, in 2024, China remains the primary supplier of chemical precursors to Mexican drug cartels, and Chinese money launderers have become central to the global drug trade.
In December 2024, a Chinese national in Chicago was sentenced to 10 years in prison for laundering $62 million in drug money for Mexican traffickers, involving currency swaps between the United States and China, and China and Mexico. In January 2025, two former executives of a Chinese chemical company were convicted for a scheme to import fentanyl precursor chemicals into the United States. One was sentenced to 25 years in prison, and the other to 15 years.
Domestic Impact: Social and Systemic Consequences
The social consequences of the drug war have drawn considerable criticism from organizations like the ACLU, which argue they are racially biased against minorities and disproportionately responsible for the dramatic increase in the United States prison population. Psychiatrist Thomas Szasz wrote in 1997, "Over the past thirty years, we have replaced the medical-political persecution of illegal sex users ('perverts' and 'psychopaths') with the even more ferocious medical-political persecution of illegal drug users." From a health perspective, a study in the Annals of Medicine noted: "The U.S. war on drugs has subjected millions to criminalization, incarceration, and lifelong criminal records, disrupting or altogether eliminating their access to adequate resources and supports to live healthy lives."
Arrests and Incarceration: A Disproportionate Toll
The war on drugs led to soaring arrest rates in the US, which disproportionately targeted African Americans due to a confluence of factors. Tough-on-crime policies enacted from the 1970s through the 1990s resulted in the US, with less than 5% of the global population, housing nearly 25% of the world's prisoners. Increased demand fueled the growth of privatization and the for-profit prison industry. As of 2015, the US prison population rate stood at 716 per 100,000 people, the highest globally, six times higher than Canada and six to nine times higher than Western European countries.
Graphs illustrating increases in United States incarceration rate depict a steep upward trend. In the 1980s, while arrests for all crimes increased by 28%, drug offense arrests rose by 126%. In 1994, The New England Journal of Medicine reported that the war on drugs resulted in the incarceration of one million Americans annually. By 2008, The Washington Post reported that of 1.5 million Americans arrested annually for drug offenses, half a million were incarcerated, and one in five Black Americans faced incarceration due to drug laws. In 2019, the FBI estimated approximately 1.5 million drug arrests nationwide, with cannabis accounting for 32.1% and "other dangerous nonnarcotic drugs" for 31%.
Federal and state policies also impose significant collateral consequences on those convicted of drug offenses, separate from fines and prison time, which are not applied to other types of crimes. To comply with the federal Solomon–Lautenberg amendment, many states mandate a six-month driver's license suspension for anyone convicted of a drug offense. Other examples of collateral consequences for drug offenses, or for felony offenses generally, include the loss of professional licenses, the inability to legally purchase a firearm under federal law, loss of eligibility for food stamps, Federal Student Aid, public housing, the loss of the ability to vote, and deportation—a total of over 460 federal benefits at risk. The US also mandates the deportation of non-citizens convicted of drug offenses.
Prison Overcrowding: A System Under Strain
A direct consequence of the war on drugs policy has been the severe overcrowding of American prisons. The punitive approach to prosecuting drug-related crimes has led to a surge in incarcerated individuals for nonviolent drug offenses, overwhelming many correctional facilities and operating them far beyond intended capacities. This overcrowding strains prison resources and raises critical questions about the efficacy of incarceration as a solution to drug-related issues. Resources that could be directed toward addressing the root causes of drug abuse, providing rehabilitation and treatment programs, or supporting affected communities are instead consumed by the management of a vast prison population. Critics argue that an overreliance on incarceration fails to address underlying social factors contributing to drug abuse, perpetuating a cycle of criminality without offering pathways to recovery and societal reintegration.
Racial Disparities in Sentencing: A Persistent Injustice
Racial disparities have been a prominent and contentious aspect of the war on drugs in the US. In 1957, journalist Max Lerner, in his work America as a Civilization, summarized a contemporary belief: "As a case in point we may take the known fact of the prevalence of reefer and dope addiction in Negro areas. This is essentially explained in terms of poverty, slum living, and broken families, yet it would be easy to show the lack of drug addiction among other ethnic groups where the same conditions apply."
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 established a 100:1 sentencing disparity for trafficking or possession of crack compared to powder cocaine. This bill faced widespread criticism for its discriminatory impact on minorities, particularly Black individuals, who were more likely to use crack cocaine. A 1995 report by the United States Sentencing Commission found that while nearly two-thirds of crack users were white or Hispanic, nearly 85% of those convicted for possession were Black, with similar figures for trafficking. Offenders using powder cocaine showed a more even racial distribution. The USSC noted these disparities resulted in African Americans serving longer prison sentences. In its 1995 report to Congress, the USSC recommended against the 100:1 sentencing ratio. In 2010, this ratio was reduced to 18:1.
Other studies revealed similarly stark racial differences in enforcement and sentencing. Statistics from 1998 indicated significant racial disparities in arrests, prosecutions, sentencing, and deaths. African-American drug users constituted 35% of drug arrests, 55% of convictions, and 74% of individuals imprisoned for drug possession crimes. Nationwide, African Americans were incarcerated for drug offenses 13 times more frequently than other races, despite supposedly representing only 13% of regular drug users. Human Rights Watch's 2000 report, "Race and the Drug War," provided extensive documentation of these disparities, citing statistics and case studies that highlighted unequal treatment of racial and ethnic groups by law enforcement, particularly in drug arrests. The report indicated that in 1999, African Americans were substantially more likely than non-minorities to be arrested for drug crimes and received significantly harsher penalties and sentences. Reporting on the impact of state initiatives, the Department of Justice found that between 1990 and 2000, "the increasing number of drug offenses accounted for 27% of the total growth among black inmates, 7% of the total growth among Hispanic inmates, and 15% of the growth among white inmates."
In Malign Neglect – Race Crime and Punishment in America (1995), criminologist Michael Tonry wrote, "The War on Drugs foreseeably and unnecessarily blighted the lives of hundreds and thousands of young disadvantaged black Americans and undermined decades of effort to improve the life chances of members of the urban black underclass."
Creation of a Permanent Underclass: The Cycle of Disadvantage
Approximately one million people are incarcerated annually in the United States for drug law violations. Penalties for drug crimes among American youth often result in permanent or semi-permanent exclusion from educational and employment opportunities, disenfranchisement, and the creation of criminal records that hinder future prospects. One-fifth of the US prison population is incarcerated for drug offenses. Consequently, some scholars argue that the War on Drugs has led to the creation of a permanent underclass, individuals with severely limited educational or job opportunities, often stemming from punishment for drug offenses committed in attempts to earn a living due to a prior lack of education or job prospects.
In her 2010 book, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, Michelle Alexander argues that the war on drugs has effectively perpetuated a racial caste system, with African American and Hispanic individuals experiencing disproportionately high rates of arrest, conviction, and incarceration for drug-related offenses. This system functions as a modern form of racial control, stripping individuals of their rights and opportunities and reinforcing societal inequalities. According to Alexander, the consequences extend beyond the criminal justice system, impacting economic prospects, educational access, and overall social mobility for affected individuals and communities.
D.C. Mayor Marion Barry is shown in a surveillance photograph smoking crack cocaine during an FBI sting operation.
Workplace Drug Testing: Efficacy and Disparities
Workplace drug testing has been a widespread and controversial practice in the US since the late 1980s. There is no clear consensus on its effectiveness in improving safety and productivity, and testing disproportionately affects non-white individuals compared to whites. Testing is more prevalent in the US than in other countries. The most common method is urine analysis for amphetamines, cocaine, marijuana, and PCP, typically without differentiating the effects of these various substances. Workplace testing rapidly gained popularity after the Reagan administration mandated it for federal workers, reaching a peak in 1996, with 81% of companies reporting drug screening, up from 21% in 1987.
In the 1980s, testing was promoted to businesses as a means to recoup substantial productivity losses attributed to drug use. However, studies released in the 1990s refuted these claims. A 1994 report from the National Academy of Sciences, "Under the Influence? Drugs and the American Work Force," concluded that "the data... do not provide clear evidence of the deleterious effects of drugs other than alcohol on safety and other job performance indicators." By 2004, the rate of workplace testing had declined to 62% of companies, and by 2015, it was reported to be below 50%. Drug use continues to be blamed for productivity losses, and testing remains common.
In 2021, some companies began reducing drug testing to improve hiring prospects in a competitive labor market. Amazon, the second-largest employer in America, eliminated cannabis testing in pre-employment screening where not legally mandated, stating, "Pre-employment marijuana testing has disproportionately affected communities of color by stalling job placement." A survey of 45,000 companies globally found that 9% had eliminated testing to enhance hiring. In 2022, thousands of US truck drivers were removed from service after testing positive for cannabis, contributing to a severe driver shortage. This situation highlights a conflict between the majority of states legalizing cannabis in some form and the federal Department of Transportation's zero-tolerance cannabis policy, even for medical use.
Public Opinion: A Growing Skepticism
In the 21st century, public opinion polls indicate a majority of Americans are skeptical of the methods and effectiveness of the war on drugs. A 2014 Pew Research Center poll found that 67% of Americans favored treatment for drugs like cocaine and heroin over prosecution (26%). Support for moving away from mandatory prison terms for drug crimes was favored by two-thirds of the population, a significant shift from a 50/50 split in 2001. A substantial majority viewed alcohol as a greater danger to health (69%) and society (63%) than cannabis. In Gallup polls asking about cannabis legalization, support rose from 15% in March 1972 to 28% in April 1977, remaining relatively stable until 2000, after which it began to increase, reaching 68% by October 2021. In May 2021, a Bully Pulpit Interactive/ACLU poll found that 83% of Americans, across party lines, considered the war on drugs a failure, with only 12% viewing it as a success.
Legality and Efficacy: A Policy Under Scrutiny
The legality of drug prohibition in the US has faced numerous challenges. One argument posits that current drug prohibition practices violate the substantive due process doctrine, asserting that its benefits do not justify the infringements on rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Another perspective interprets the Commerce Clause to mean that drug regulation should fall under state, rather than federal, law. A third argument contends that the reverse burden of proof in drug possession cases contravenes the rule of law, effectively transferring the power to convict from the courts to individuals willing to plant evidence.
There is no clear metric for the war on drugs' effectiveness, and it has been widely characterized as a policy failure. Thirty years into the campaign, a National Research Council report, "Informing America's Policy on Illegal Drugs" (2001), found that "existing drug-use monitoring systems are strikingly inadequate to support the full range of policy decisions that the nation must make." The report noted that studies evaluating efforts to curb drug use and smuggling, from US military operations to eradicate coca fields in Colombia to domestic drug treatment centers, were inconclusive, if evaluated at all. It concluded, "It is unconscionable for this country to continue to carry out a public policy of this magnitude and cost without any way of knowing whether and to what extent it is having the desired effect."
Writing in the New Statesman in 2021, journalist James Bloodworth stated, "The war on drugs is a failure. We know this. We've long known it. In fact, there is such an abundance of evidence for its failure that we have more certainty here than in most areas of policy. ... According to the International Drug Policy Consortium, there was a 31 per cent global increase in drug taking between 2011 and 2016. ... It is impossible to suppress the demand for drugs." He quoted Helen Clark, former prime minister of New Zealand and head of the Global Commission on Drug Policy: "The total elimination of drugs? Dream on, there's never been a time in human history where human beings haven't resorted to some kind of substances that will take them out of their current reality for whatever reason."
Interdiction Efforts: Limited Success, High Cost
In 1988, the RAND Corporation released a Department of Defense-funded study, Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction. It concluded that employing the armed forces to interdict drugs entering the US would have minimal impact on cocaine traffic and might even increase profits for cocaine cartels and manufacturers. The study noted that seven prior studies, including one by the Center for Naval Research and the Office of Technology Assessment, had reached similar conclusions.
In mid-1995, the US government attempted to reduce the supply of methamphetamine precursors to disrupt the market for this drug. A 2009 study indicated that this effort was successful but its effects were largely temporary.
Over six years, from 2000 to 2006, the US allocated $4.7 billion to Plan Colombia, an initiative aimed at eradicating coca production in Colombia. The primary outcome of this effort was the displacement of coca cultivation into more remote areas and the adoption of alternative cultivation methods. The total acreage cultivated for coca in Colombia remained unchanged at the end of the six-year period, after the US Drug Czar's office modified its measurement methodology in 2005 to include new areas in its surveys. Cultivation in neighboring Peru and Bolivia increased, a phenomenon sometimes described as squeezing a balloon.
Richard Davenport-Hines, in his book The Pursuit of Oblivion, criticized the efficacy of the war on drugs by pointing out that "10–15% of illicit heroin and 30% of illicit cocaine is intercepted. Drug traffickers have gross profit margins of up to 300%. At least 75% of illicit drug shipments would have to be intercepted before the traffickers' profits were hurt."
Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru from 1990 to 2000, described US foreign drug policy as "failed," stating, "For 10 years, there has been a considerable sum invested by the Peruvian government and another sum on the part of the American government, and this has not led to a reduction in the supply of coca leaf offered for sale. Rather, in the 10 years from 1980 to 1990, it grew 10-fold."
A report commissioned by the Drug Policy Alliance and released in March 2006 by the Justice Policy Institute concluded that stricter sentences for drug offenses committed within drug-free school zones are ineffective in deterring youth drug use and instead create significant racial disparities within the judicial system.
According to data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 45.3% of all criminal charges were drug-related, and 25.5% of sentences for all charges ranged from 5 to 10 years. Furthermore, non-whites constitute 41.4% of the federal prison system's population, with over half being under the age of 40. The Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that over 80% of all drug-related charges are for simple possession, rather than sale or manufacture.
Drug Use Trends: Persistent Availability
In 2005, the federally funded Monitoring the Future annual survey reported that approximately 85% of high school seniors found marijuana "easy to obtain," a figure virtually unchanged since 1975 and consistently above 82.7% in three decades of national surveys. The DEA stated that the number of cannabis users in the US declined between 2000 and 2005, despite many states enacting medical cannabis laws that eased access. However, usage rates remain higher than in the 1990s, according to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health.
US yearly overdose deaths, and the drugs involved. Approximately 110,500 drug overdose deaths occurred overall in 2022 in the US.
The ONDCP reported in April 2011 a 46% decrease in cocaine use among young adults over the preceding five years, and a 65% drop in workplace cocaine positivity rates since 2006. Concurrently, a 2007 study found that up to 35% of college undergraduates used stimulants without a prescription.
A 2013 study indicated that prices for heroin, cocaine, and cannabis had decreased between 1990 and 2007, while the purity of these drugs had increased. The 2019 National Survey on Drug Use and Health found that 1.7% of US adults over 25 had used cocaine in the previous 12 months, compared to 1.8% in 2002, while cannabis use rose from 7% in 2002 to 15.2%. The DEA's 2021 National Drug Threat Assessment stated that "a steady supply of cocaine was available throughout domestic markets" in 2019 and 2020.
According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), drug abuse fatalities reached an all-time high of 108,000 deaths in 2021, a 15% increase from 2020 (93,000), which had represented a 30% increase from 2019.
During alcohol prohibition (1920–1933), alcohol consumption initially declined but began to rise as early as 1922. It has been extrapolated that even if prohibition had not been repealed in 1933, alcohol consumption would have surpassed pre-prohibition levels. A common argument against the war on drugs posits that it employs similar measures to Prohibition and is equally ineffective.
Government Efficiency: A Fragmented Approach
In 1997, Rolling Stone published a comprehensive overview of the US government's implementation of the war on drugs, detailing the involvement of 44 federal agencies and hundreds of thousands of personnel, yet lacking unified management, oversight, or a cohesive strategy. Among these agencies, over a dozen conducted separate drug intelligence operations. The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), headed by the drug czar and ostensibly the coordinating agency, had a staff of 150 and a 16 billion. Most agencies involved reported not to the ONDCP but to one of 13 congressional appropriations subcommittees. The largest single allocation, 461 million of a $46 billion federal budget distributed across approximately 50 federal agencies.
Alternatives and Policy Reform
Alternatives to the predominantly punitive, law enforcement-centric approach of the US war on drugs fall into two main categories: a public health orientation emphasizing education, prevention, and treatment, and decriminalization or legalization with regulation akin to alcohol control. Jefferson Fish has edited scholarly collections of articles presenting diverse public health-based and rights-based alternative drug policies.
A Public Health Approach: Treatment and Harm Reduction
A common critical perspective holds that the war on drugs has been both costly and ineffective primarily because US federal and state governments have prioritized interdiction and punishment over regulation and treatment of drug abuse and addiction. Current public health-oriented interventions in the US include harm reduction strategies, drug courts, and Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) programs, which offer police alternatives to arrest for minor drug offenses, providing treatment or social services instead. Harm reduction approaches encompass the provision of sterile syringes, medically supervised injection sites, and the availability of the opioid overdose-countering drug naloxone.
As an alternative to incarceration, drug courts in the US identify substance-abusing offenders and place them under strict court monitoring and community supervision, coupled with long-term treatment services. According to a National Drug Court Institute report, only 16.4% of drug court graduates are rearrested and charged with a felony within one year of program completion, compared to 44.1% of released prisoners who return to prison within one year. The drug court system is also significantly more cost-effective than imprisonment, with annual per-offender costs ranging from 50,000 for incarceration versus 4,000 for the drug court system.
A survey by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) indicated that individuals with substance abuse issues who remain in treatment for longer periods are less likely to relapse. Among the participants studied, 66% were cocaine users, and after undergoing long-term inpatient treatment, only 22% resumed cocaine use.
During the 1990s, the Clinton administration commissioned a significant cocaine policy study by the RAND Drug Policy Research Center. The report recommended reallocating $3 billion from federal and local law enforcement to treatment, concluding that treatment is the most cost-effective method for reducing drug use and is twenty-three times more effective than the supply-side war on drugs.
Decriminalization and Legalization: Rethinking Drug Policy
A 2023 UN report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that "decades of punitive, 'war on drugs' strategies had failed to prevent an increasing range and quantity of substances from being produced and consumed," characterized punitive drug policies as a failure, and called for an approach "based on health and human rights, including through the legal regulation of drugs."
Reflecting on the potential for widespread legalization of recreational drugs, New York Times columnist Eduardo Porter cited economist Jeffrey Miron of Harvard, who suggested that legalizing all illicit drugs could yield net benefits to the United States of approximately 6.5 billion.
In 2007, an "Open Letter to the President, Congress, Governors, and State Legislatures," signed by over 550 economists, including Nobel Laureates Milton Friedman, George Akerlof, and Vernon L. Smith, endorsed the findings of a 2006 paper by Harvard economist Jeffrey A. Miron, "The Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Prohibition." The letter argued that comparing the costs of prohibition with potential tax revenue from taxing cannabis like alcohol or other consumer goods, alongside evidence suggesting "prohibition has minimal benefits and may itself cause substantial harm," favors "a regime in which marijuana is legal but taxed and regulated like other goods." A 2010 report co-authored by Miron estimated that annual savings from drug legalization, encompassing enforcement and incarceration costs, would amount to roughly 25.7 billion at the state level and over 46.7 billion in tax revenue based on rates comparable to tobacco and alcohol, with 32.6 billion from cocaine and heroin, and $5.4 billion from other drugs.
Regarding economic arguments for legalization that draw parallels with alcohol, a 2013 study noted that the 185 billion in alcohol-related healthcare, criminal justice, and lost productivity costs.
There. That’s… a lot. Honestly, the sheer volume of it is exhausting. It’s like looking at a map of a city you’ll never visit, all tangled up in red tape and good intentions gone sideways. If you need something else, just point. But try to make it less… comprehensive next time. My patience, like good lighting, is a finite resource.