2016 United Kingdom European Union Membership Referendum

2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum ← [1975](/1975_United_Kingdom_European_Communities_membership_referendum) 23 June 2016

Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union? Outcome [The United Kingdom votes to leave the European Union](/Aftermath_of_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum) ([Brexit](/Brexit)) Results

Choice Votes % Leave 17,410,742 51.89% Remain 16,141,241 48.11%

Valid votes 33,551,983 99.92% Invalid or blank votes 25,359 0.08% Total votes 33,577,342 100.00% Registered voters/turnout 46,500,001 72.21%

• Results by local voting area Leave :      50–60%      60–70%      70–80% Remain :      50–60%      60–70%      70–80%      90–100% On the map, the darker shades for a colour indicate a larger margin. The electorate of 46.5 million represents 70.8% of the population.

[National and regional referendums](/Referendums_in_the_United_Kingdom) held within the [United Kingdom](/United_Kingdom) and its [constituent countries](/Countries_of_the_United_Kingdom)

[Northern Ireland border poll](/1973_Northern_Ireland_border_poll)     1973 EC membership referendum     1975 [Scottish devolution referendum](/1979_Scottish_devolution_referendum)     1979 [Welsh devolution referendum](/1979_Welsh_devolution_referendum)     1979 [Scottish devolution referendum](/1997_Scottish_devolution_referendum)     1997 [Welsh devolution referendum](/1997_Welsh_devolution_referendum)     1997 [Greater London Authority referendum](/1998_Greater_London_Authority_referendum)     1998 [NI Good Friday Agreement referendum](/1998_Northern_Ireland_Good_Friday_Agreement_referendum)     1998 [NE England devolution referendum](/2004_North_East_England_devolution_referendum)     2004 [Welsh devolution referendum](/2011_Welsh_devolution_referendum)     2011 Alternative Vote referendum     2011 [Scottish independence referendum](/2014_Scottish_independence_referendum)     2014 EU membership referendum     2016     * UK-wide referendums in bold    

• • v • t • e

• • Part of [a series](/Category:Brexit) on [Brexit](/Brexit)

[Withdrawal](/Withdrawal_from_the_European_Union) of the [United Kingdom](/United_Kingdom) from the [European Union](/European_Union)

[Glossary of terms](/Glossary_of_Brexit_terms)

Background

• [European Communities Act](/European_Communities_Act_1972_(UK))

• [1975 EC membership referendum](/1975_United_Kingdom_European_Communities_membership_referendum)

• [UK rebate](/UK_rebate)

• [Bruges speech](/Bruges_speech)

• [No. No. No.](/No._No._No._(Margaret_Thatcher))

• [Maastricht Rebels](/Maastricht_Rebels)

• [Black Wednesday](/Black_Wednesday)

• [European Union (Amendment) Act 2008](/European_Union_(Amendment)_Act_2008)

• [European Union Act 2011](/European_Union_Act_2011)

• [UK opt-outs from EU legislation](/United_Kingdom_opt-outs_from_EU_legislation)

• [Euroscepticism in the UK](/Euroscepticism_in_the_United_Kingdom)

• [UK opinion polling on EU membership](/Opinion_polling_on_the_United_Kingdom%27s_membership_of_the_European_Union)

• Campaigns for a referendum

• [People's Pledge](/People%27s_Pledge)

• [Labour for a Referendum](/Labour_for_a_Referendum)

• [Bloomberg speech](/Bloomberg_speech)

• [In or Out](/The_European_Union:_In_or_Out)

• [2013–14 EU (Referendum) Bill](/European_Union_(Referendum)_Bill_2013%E2%80%9314) (unsuccessful)

• [2014 European Parliament election](/2014_European_Parliament_election_in_the_United_Kingdom)

• 2014 UK Parliament by-elections

• [Clacton](/2014_Clacton_by-election)

• [Heywood and Middleton](/2014_Heywood_and_Middleton_by-election)

• [Rochester and Strood](/2014_Rochester_and_Strood_by-election)

• [2015 UK general election](/2015_United_Kingdom_general_election)

• [2015–16 EU membership renegotiation](/2015%E2%80%9316_United_Kingdom_renegotiation_of_European_Union_membership)

2016 referendum

• [EU Referendum Act](/European_Union_Referendum_Act_2015) ([Gibraltar](/European_Union_(Referendum)_Act_2016_(Gibraltar)))

• [EU Referendum (Date of Referendum etc.) Regulations](/European_Union_Referendum_(Date_of_Referendum_etc.)_Regulations_2016)

• [EU Referendum (Conduct) Regulations](/The_European_Union_Referendum_(Conduct)_Regulations_2016)

• [Issues](/Issues_in_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [Endorsements](/Endorsements_in_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [Opinion polling](/Opinion_polling_for_the_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [UK Government pro-EU leaflet](/Pro-EU_leaflet)

[Campaigns](/Campaigning_in_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

Leave campaigns

• [Vote Leave](/Vote_Leave) (official)

• [Business for Britain](/Business_for_Britain)

• [Conservatives for Britain](/Conservatives_for_Britain)

• [BeLeave](/BeLeave)

• [Leave.EU](/Leave.EU)

• [Bpoplive](/Bpoplive)

• [The Freedom Association](/The_Freedom_Association)

• [Better Off Out](/Better_Off_Out)

• [Grassroots Out](/Grassroots_Out)

• [Labour Leave](/Labour_Leave)

• [Get Britain Out](/Get_Britain_Out)

• [Bruges Group](/Bruges_Group_(United_Kingdom))

• [Campaign for an Independent Britain](/Campaign_for_an_Independent_Britain)

• [Brexit: The Movie](/Brexit:_The_Movie)

Remain campaigns

• [Britain Stronger in Europe](/Britain_Stronger_in_Europe) (official)

• [Labour In for Britain](/Labour_In_for_Britain)

• [European Movement UK](/European_Movement_UK)

• [Britain in Europe](/Britain_in_Europe)

• [British Influence](/British_Influence)

• [Business for New Europe](/Business_for_New_Europe)

• [Nucleus](/Nucleus_(advocacy_group))

• [Project Fear](/Project_Fear)

Outcome

• [Results](/Results_of_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [Causes for result](/Causes_of_the_vote_in_favour_of_Brexit)

• [International reactions](/International_reactions_to_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [Immediate aftermath](/Aftermath_of_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [2016 Conservative Party election](/2016_Conservative_Party_leadership_election)

• [2016 Labour Party election](/2016_Labour_Party_leadership_election_(UK))

• [2016 UKIP election](/July%E2%80%93September_2016_UK_Independence_Party_leadership_election)

• [Department for Exiting the EU](/Department_for_Exiting_the_European_Union)

• [Department for International Trade](/Department_for_International_Trade)

• [Allegations of unlawful campaigning](/Allegations_of_unlawful_campaigning_in_the_2016_EU_referendum)

• [Alleged Russian interference](/Russian_interference_in_the_2016_Brexit_referendum)

[Notice of withdrawal](/United_Kingdom_invocation_of_Article_50_of_the_Treaty_on_European_Union)

• [Article 50 process](/Withdrawal_from_the_European_Union)

• Miller case (Article 50)

• [EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017](/European_Union_(Notification_of_Withdrawal)_Act_2017)

• [Brexit plan](/Brexit_plan)

• [Repeal Bill plan](/Repeal_Bill_plan)

• [2017 UK general election](/2017_United_Kingdom_general_election)

[Negotiations](/Brexit_negotiations)

• Negotiation positions

• [EU negotiation mandate](/European_Union_negotiating_directives_for_Brexit)

• [Chequers agreement](/Chequers_agreement)

• Timeline: [2017](/Brexit_negotiations_in_2017), [2018](/Brexit_negotiations_in_2018), [2019](/Brexit_negotiations_in_2019)

• [2019 European Parliament election](/2019_European_Parliament_election_in_the_United_Kingdom)

• [2019 UK general election](/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election)

[Withdrawal agreement](/Brexit_withdrawal_agreement)

• [Brexit divorce bill](/Brexit_divorce_bill)

• [Fish for finance](/Fish_for_finance)

• [Irish backstop](/Irish_backstop)

• [No-deal Brexit](/No-deal_Brexit)

• [Northern Ireland Protocol](/Northern_Ireland_Protocol)

• [Northern Ireland Protocol Bill](/Northern_Ireland_Protocol_Bill)

• [Windsor Framework](/Windsor_Framework)

[Legislation](/Parliamentary_votes_on_Brexit)

• [Withdrawal Act 2018](/European_Union_(Withdrawal)_Act_2018) ([Gibraltar](/European_Union_(Withdrawal)_Act_2019_(Gibraltar)))

• [Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018](/Nuclear_Safeguards_Act_2018)

• [Cooper–Letwin Act](/European_Union_(Withdrawal)_Act_2019)

• [Benn Act](/European_Union_(Withdrawal)_(No._2)_Act_2019)

• [2019 suspension of rebel Conservative MPs](/2019_suspension_of_rebel_Conservative_MPs)

• [Public Vote Bill](/European_Union_Withdrawal_Agreement_(Public_Vote)_Bill_2017%E2%80%9319) (not passed)

• [Terms of Withdrawal Bills](/Terms_of_Withdrawal_from_EU_(Referendum)_Bills) (not passed)

• [Scottish EU Continuity Bill](/UK_Withdrawal_from_the_European_Union_(Legal_Continuity)_(Scotland)_Bill) (blocked)

• [Withdrawal Agreement Act](/European_Union_(Withdrawal_Agreement)_Act_2020) ([Gibraltar](/European_Union_(Withdrawal_Agreement)_Act_2020_(Gibraltar)))

• [Scottish EU Continuity Act](/UK_Withdrawal_from_the_European_Union_(Continuity)_(Scotland)_Act_2021)

• [Internal Market Act](/United_Kingdom_Internal_Market_Act_2020)

• [EU (Future Relationship) Act](/European_Union_(Future_Relationship)_Act_2020)

• [Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act](/Retained_EU_Law_(Revocation_and_Reform)_Act_2023)

[Impact](/Impact_of_Brexit)

• [Impact on the Irish border](/Brexit_and_the_Irish_border)

• [Good Friday Agreement](/Good_Friday_Agreement)

• [Impact on the EU](/Impact_of_Brexit_on_the_European_Union)

• [Economic effects](/Economic_effects_of_Brexit)

• [Effects on Gibraltar](/Effect_of_Brexit_on_Gibraltar)

• [Scientific cooperation](/Brexit_and_arrangements_for_science_and_technology)

• [Effects on popular culture](/Brexit_in_popular_culture)

• [Retained EU law](/Retained_EU_law_(UK_Law))

• [2021 Jersey dispute](/2021_Jersey_dispute)

[EU–UK relations](/Post-Brexit_United_Kingdom_relations_with_the_European_Union)

• [Relations pre- and post-Brexit](/United_Kingdom%E2%80%93European_Union_relations)

• [EU–UK trade negotiation](/Trade_negotiation_between_the_UK_and_the_EU)

• [EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement](/EU%E2%80%93UK_Trade_and_Cooperation_Agreement) (TCA)

• [Partnership Council](/EU%E2%80%93UK_Partnership_Council)

• [Partnership Assembly](/EU%E2%80%93UK_Parliamentary_Partnership_Assembly)

Relations with EU member states

• [Austria](/Austria%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Belgium](/Belgium%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Bulgaria](/Bulgaria%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Croatia](/Croatia%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Cyprus](/Cyprus%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Akrotiri and Dhekelia](/Akrotiri_and_Dhekelia)

• [Czech Republic](/Czech_Republic%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Denmark](/Denmark%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Estonia](/Estonia%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [France](/France%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Germany](/Germany%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Greece](/Greece%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Hungary](/Hungary%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Ireland](/Ireland%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Ireland–UK border](/Republic_of_Ireland%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_border)

• [British–Irish Council](/British%E2%80%93Irish_Council)

• [North/South Ministerial Council](/North/South_Ministerial_Council)

• [Italy](/Italy%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Lithuania](/Lithuania%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Malta](/Malta%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Netherlands](/Netherlands%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Poland](/Poland%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Portugal](/Portugal%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Romania](/Romania%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Slovakia](/Slovakia%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Spain](/Spain%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Status of Gibraltar](/Status_of_Gibraltar)

• [Gibraltar–Spain border](/Gibraltar%E2%80%93Spain_border)

• [Sweden](/Sweden%E2%80%93United_Kingdom_relations)

• [Conjectured EEA membership](/Membership_of_United_Kingdom_in_the_European_Economic_Area)

[Opposition](/Opposition_to_Brexit)

• [Post-referendum opinion polling](/Opinion_polling_on_the_United_Kingdom%27s_membership_of_the_European_Union_(2016%E2%80%93present))

• New initiatives

• [Change Britain](/Change_Britain)

• [More United](/More_United)

• [Open Britain](/Open_Britain)

• [The New European](/The_New_European)

• [Unite to Remain](/Unite_to_Remain)

• [Led By Donkeys](/Led_By_Donkeys)

• [Revoke Article 50 petition](/Revoke_Article_50_and_remain_in_the_EU_petition)

• [Postcards from the 48%](/Postcards_from_the_48%25)

• [Proposed second Scottish independence referendum](/Proposed_second_Scottish_independence_referendum)

Calls for a [second referendum](/Proposed_referendum_on_the_Brexit_withdrawal_agreement)

• [People's Vote](/People%27s_Vote)

• [Britain for Europe](/Britain_for_Europe)

• [European Movement UK](/European_Movement_UK)

• [For our Future's Sake](/For_our_Future%27s_Sake)

• [Healthier IN the EU](/Healthier_IN_the_EU)

• [InFacts](/InFacts)

• [Open Britain](/Open_Britain)

• [Our Future Our Choice](/Our_Future_Our_Choice)

• [Scientists for EU](/Scientists_for_EU)

• Other organisations

• [Best for Britain](/Best_for_Britain)

• [Bollocks to Brexit](/Bollocks_to_Brexit)

• [Change UK](/Change_UK)

• [Liberal Democrats](/Liberal_Democrats_(UK))

• [Right to Vote](/Right_to_Vote)

[Timeline](/Timeline_of_Brexit)

[Bloomberg speech](/Bloomberg_speech) Jan 2013 [Referendum Bill](/European_Union_(Referendum)_Bill_2013%E2%80%9314) blocked Jan 2014 [European Parliament election](/2014_European_Parliament_election_in_the_United_Kingdom) May 2014 [2015 general election](/2015_United_Kingdom_general_election) May 2015 Renegotiation begins Jun 2015 [Referendum Act](/European_Union_Referendum_Act_2015) passed Dec 2015 [Renegotiation](/2015%E2%80%9316_United_Kingdom_renegotiation_of_European_Union_membership) concluded Feb 2016 Referendum held Jun 2016 [David Cameron](/David_Cameron) resigns as [PM](/Prime_Minister_of_the_United_Kingdom) Jul 2016 [Theresa May](/Theresa_May) [becomes PM](/2016_Conservative_Party_leadership_election) Jul 2016 [Article 50 judgement](/R_(Miller)_v_Secretary_of_State_for_Exiting_the_European_Union) Jan 2017 [Brexit plan](/Brexit_plan) presented Feb 2017 [Notification Act](/European_Union_(Notification_of_Withdrawal)_Act_2017) passed Mar 2017 [Article 50](/United_Kingdom_invocation_of_Article_50_of_the_Treaty_on_European_Union) invoked Mar 2017 [Repeal Bill plan](/Repeal_Bill_plan) presented Mar 2017 [2017 general election](/2017_United_Kingdom_general_election) Jun 2017 [Brexit negotiations begin](/Brexit_negotiations) Jun 2017 [Withdrawal Act](/European_Union_(Withdrawal)_Act_2018) passed Jun 2018 [Chequers plan](/Chequers_agreement) presented Jul 2018 [Withdrawal agreement plan](/Brexit_withdrawal_agreement_plan) presented July 2018 [Withdrawal agreement](/Brexit_withdrawal_agreement) released Nov 2018 [Scottish Continuity Bill](/UK_Withdrawal_from_the_European_Union_(Legal_Continuity)_(Scotland)_Bill_2018) blocked Dec 2018 [Meaningful votes](/Parliamentary_votes_on_Brexit) Jan–Mar 2019 [Brexit delayed until 12 April](/Parliamentary_votes_on_Brexit) Mar 2019 [Cooper–Letwin Act](/European_Union_(Withdrawal)_Act_2019) passed Apr 2019 [Brexit delayed until 31 October](/European_Union_(Withdrawal)_Act_2019) Apr 2019 [European Parliament election](/2019_European_Parliament_election_in_the_United_Kingdom) May 2019 Theresa May resigns as [PM](/Prime_Minister_of_the_United_Kingdom) Jul 2019 [Boris Johnson](/Boris_Johnson) [becomes PM](/2019_Conservative_Party_leadership_election) Jul 2019 [Prorogation](/2019_British_prorogation_controversy) and [annulment](/R_(Miller)_v_The_Prime_Minister_and_Cherry_v_Advocate_General_for_Scotland) Aug–Sep 2019 [Benn Act](/European_Union_(Withdrawal)_(No._2)_Act_2019) passed Sep 2019 Withdrawal agreement [revised](/Brexit_withdrawal_agreement) Oct 2019 [Brexit delayed until 31 January](/European_Union_(Withdrawal)_(No._2)_Act_2019) Oct 2019 [2019 general election](/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election) Dec 2019 [Agreement Act](/European_Union_(Withdrawal_Agreement)_Act_2020) passed Jan 2020 UK leaves the European Union Jan 2020 Implementation period begins Jan 2020 [UK–EU trade deal agreed](/EU%E2%20UK_Trade_and_Cooperation_Agreement) Dec 2020 [Future Relationship Act](/European_Union_(Future_Relationship)_Act_2020) passed Dec 2020 [Scottish Continuity Act](/UK_Withdrawal_from_the_European_Union_(Continuity)_(Scotland)_Act_2021) passed Dec 2020 Implementation period ends Dec 2020 New EU–UK relationship begins Jan 2021 UK–EU trade deal ratified Apr 2021 [Windsor Framework](/Windsor_Framework) released Feb 2023 Windsor framework adopted Mar 2023

• [EU portal](/Portal:European_Union)

• [UK portal](/Portal:United_Kingdom)

• •

• v • t • e

The 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, often prosaically referred to as the EU referendum or, more dramatically, the Brexit referendum, was a political spectacle staged on 23 June 2016. Across the United Kingdom and its distant outpost, Gibraltar, the populace was asked to ponder a question that, in hindsight, seems almost quaint in its simplicity: should the country remain nestled within the European Union or embark on a journey outside its familiar embrace? This momentous decision was facilitated by the rather dryly titled European Union Referendum Act 2015. The outcome, a vote in favour of departure, predictably triggered a cascade of political maneuvering and the eventual, convoluted process of the country's withdrawal from the EU, which, for better or worse, became universally known as "Brexit".

For decades, since 1973 to be precise, the United Kingdom had been entrenched as a member state of the EU, or its predecessor, the European Communities – chiefly the European Economic Community – alongside a host of other international affiliations. This long-standing relationship, however, was never entirely without its domestic squabbles, particularly regarding the rather abstract, yet deeply felt, concept of national sovereignty. An earlier attempt to quell these perennial debates, a referendum on continued membership of the European Communities, was held in 1975. A reassuring 67% of voters, on a turnout of 64.6%, opted to stay, seemingly settling the matter for a generation. [1] Yet, between 1975 and 2016, the quiet, persistent march of European integration continued. Subsequent EC/EU treaties and agreements, each deepening the ties, were ratified by the UK Parliament without the inconvenience of public consultation. The stage was thus set for a fresh round of existential angst.

Following the Conservative Party's unexpected, yet decisive, victory in the 2015 general election, a key manifesto pledge was dusted off: a new referendum. This promise, once perhaps a strategic gambit, now became the legal cornerstone for the European Union Referendum Act 2015. In a parallel act of political theatre, then-Prime Minister David Cameron embarked on a renegotiation of the terms of EU membership, presumably to sweeten the deal for a 'Remain' vote. It's crucial, if often overlooked, to note that this referendum, despite its monumental implications, was technically non-binding. The ancient, revered principle of parliamentary sovereignty meant Parliament could, in theory, ignore the result. However, the government, with a straight face, promised to implement the outcome, a promise that, like many in politics, would be tested by the harsh glare of reality. [2]

The official period for campaigning stretched from 15 April to 23 June 2016, a period that felt considerably longer to anyone unfortunate enough to be paying attention. On the side of continued membership, the officially designated champion was Britain Stronger in Europe. Opposing them, advocating for departure, was Vote Leave. [3] Beyond these primary gladiators, a veritable menagerie of other groups, political parties, businesses, trade unions, newspapers, and prominent individuals joined the fray, demonstrating that conviction, or at least self-interest, knew no single political affiliation. The 'Remain' camp garnered support from the likes of Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, and the Green Party. [4] [5] [6] [7] Conversely, the UK Independence Party, true to its singular purpose, was a fervent proponent of leaving. [8] The Conservative Party, in a feat of political acrobatics, declared itself officially neutral, [9] though it allowed its Members of Parliament, much like their Labour counterparts, the freedom to publicly campaign for either side. [10] [11] The issues dominating the discourse were, predictably, the economic implications of membership – the supposed costs and benefits – alongside the often-contentious matters of freedom of movement and broader migration. As is often the case in such high-stakes contests, the campaign was not without its shadows, with several allegations of unlawful campaigning and even whispers of Russian interference surfacing both during and after the vote.

When the results finally trickled in, the nation, and indeed the world, learned that 51.9% of votes cast were in favour of leaving. This aggregate figure, however, masked a stark geographical divide. Most areas across England and Wales delivered a majority for Leave, while voters in Scotland, Northern Ireland, the sprawling metropolis of Greater London, and the resilient enclave of Gibraltar predominantly chose Remain. Post-mortem analyses quickly established clear correlations between voter preference and factors such as age, educational attainment, and various socioeconomic markers. The ensuing examination of the causes and reasoning behind the Leave vote became a cottage industry of its own. Immediately after the result, financial markets, ever so sensitive to uncertainty, registered their displeasure worldwide. David Cameron, having set the ball rolling, promptly announced his resignation as prime minister and leader of the Conservative Party, making good on his promise by July. The referendum's seismic shock reverberated globally, prompting an array of international reactions. Domestically, even the opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn, found his position precarious, facing a Labour Party leadership challenge in the wake of the political upheaval. Ultimately, in 2017, the UK gave formal notice of its intent to withdraw, a process that, after years of tortuous negotiations, was formalised in 2020.

Background

• • 2016 United Kingdom EU membership referendum (23 June)

Legislation

• [European Union Referendum Act 2015](/European_Union_Referendum_Act_2015)

Referendum question “ Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union? ”

Referendum choices “ Remain a member of the European Union ” “ Leave the European Union ”

[HM Government](/Government_of_the_United_Kingdom)

• [David Cameron](/David_Cameron)

• [Ministry](/Second_Cameron_ministry)

• [Premiership](/Premiership_of_David_Cameron)

• [Pro-EU leaflet](/Pro-EU_leaflet)

Background

• [European Union Act 2011](/European_Union_Act_2011)

• [Bloomberg speech](/Bloomberg_speech)

• [European Union (Referendum) Bill 2013–14](/European_Union_(Referendum)_Bill_2013%E2%80%9314)

• [2014 European Parliament election](/2014_European_Parliament_election_in_the_United_Kingdom)

• [2015 UK general election](/2015_United_Kingdom_general_election)

• [2015–16 renegotiation of EU membership](/2015%E2%80%932016_United_Kingdom_renegotiation_of_European_Union_membership)

Campaign

• [Campaigning](/Campaigning_in_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [Opinion polling](/Opinion_polling_for_the_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [Endorsements](/Endorsements_in_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [Issues](/Issues_in_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [Project Fear](/Project_Fear)

• [Britain Stronger In Europe](/Britain_Stronger_In_Europe) (Remain)

• [Vote Leave](/Vote_Leave) (Leave)

Outcome

• [Results](/Results_of_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [Aftermath](/Aftermath_of_the_2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum)

• [Causes](/Causes_of_the_vote_in_favour_of_Brexit)

• [Opposition to Brexit](/Opposition_to_Brexit)

• [2016 Conservative leadership election](/2016_Conservative_Party_leadership_election)

• [2016 Labour leadership election](/2016_Labour_Party_leadership_election_(UK))

• [Invocation of Article 50](/United_Kingdom_invocation_of_Article_50_of_the_Treaty_on_European_Union)

• •

• v • t • e

Further information: Accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities, European Communities Act 1972 (UK), and European Union Act 2011

The genesis of the European Communities can be traced back to the 1950s—a period of ambitious post-war reconstruction and integration. This era saw the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, followed by the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. [12] The EEC, often informally dubbed the "Common Market," represented the most expansive of these ventures, aiming for broad economic integration. The United Kingdom, always one for a dramatic entrance, initially sought to join in 1961, only to be met with a decisive veto from France. [12] A subsequent application proved successful, and the UK finally became a member in 1973. Two years later, a national referendum was held to gauge public sentiment on continued EC membership, with 67.2% of voters endorsing the status quo on a national turnout of 64.6%. [12]

However, this public approval was not sought again. Following the 1975 vote, no further referendums were deemed necessary on the evolving relationship between the United Kingdom and the broader European project. Successive British governments, seemingly content with parliamentary oversight, continued to integrate the nation further into the European framework. This integration gained significant momentum when the Maastricht Treaty officially brought forth the European Union (EU) in 1993, which subsumed and, after the Lisbon Treaty, effectively succeeded the original European Communities. [12] [13] This steady, unconsulted deepening of ties would, of course, become a focal point for future discontent.

Growing pressure for a referendum

See also: Bloomberg speech, 2014 European Parliament election in the United Kingdom, and 2015 United Kingdom general election

The seeds of the 2016 referendum were sown well before its official announcement. At the May 2012 NATO summit meeting, a notable conversation reportedly occurred involving then-UK Prime Minister David Cameron, Foreign Secretary William Hague, and Ed Llewellyn. The topic? The rather pragmatic idea of leveraging a European Union referendum as a strategic concession to appease the increasingly vocal Eurosceptic faction within the Conservative Party. [14] This internal party management strategy would, ironically, spiral into a national, then international, phenomenon.

Just a month later, on 20 June 2012, a private member's bill comprising three clauses was introduced into the venerable House of Commons. Its sponsor was the then-Eurosceptic MP Douglas Carswell, and its intent was clear: to terminate the United Kingdom's EU membership and repeal the foundational European Communities Act 1972. Notably, this bill, while radical in its aim, contained no explicit commitment to holding a referendum. It managed to secure a second reading, enduring a brisk half-hour debate in the chamber on 26 October 2012, but ultimately failed to progress further, a mere precursor to the legislative battles to come. [15]

Undeterred by previous legislative hurdles, Conservative MP James Wharton took up the mantle in 2013, introducing his own Private member's bill to the House of Commons. This legislation was more direct, explicitly committing the United Kingdom to holding a referendum on its continued EU membership by the close of 2017. It successfully navigated all its stages in the lower chamber, only to be unceremoniously blocked in the House of Lords in early 2014. The political will for a referendum was clearly building, but the legislative path remained fraught.

During the run-up to the 2015 general election campaign, David Cameron, ever the pragmatist, made a defining promise: if the Conservative Party secured a majority government, he would first renegotiate the terms of the UK's EU membership, and then, crucially, hold a referendum on the subject. This pledge, perhaps intended to unite his party, would ultimately reshape the nation.

In January 2013, prior to the election, Cameron delivered his much-anticipated Bloomberg speech. In it, he reiterated his commitment: should the Conservatives achieve a parliamentary majority in the 2015 general election, the British government would undertake negotiations to secure what he termed "more favourable arrangements" for the United Kingdom's ongoing EU membership. Only after this, he promised, would a referendum be held, offering the stark choice of remaining in or leaving the European Union (under either the existing or newly negotiated terms). [16] To demonstrate their resolve, the Conservative Party published a draft EU Referendum Bill in May 2013, laying out their roadmap for renegotiation followed by the "in-out" vote. [17] This draft legislation stipulated that the referendum had to be conducted no later than 31 December 2017. [18]

The draft legislation then found its champion in Conservative MP James Wharton, who adopted it as a Private member's bill, subsequently known as the European Union (Referendum) Bill 2013. [19] Its First Reading in the House of Commons occurred on 19 June 2013. [20] Cameron, through a spokesperson, expressed his "great pleasure" and pledged the "full support of the Conservative Party" for the bill's passage. [21]

Regarding the bill's capacity to legally bind the UK Government of the 2015–20 Parliament (which, with a touch of cosmic irony, would only last two years due to the very referendum it enabled) to holding such a vote, a parliamentary research paper offered a dose of cautious realism: "The Bill simply provides for a referendum on continued EU membership by the end of December 2017 and does not otherwise specify the timing, other than requiring the Secretary of State to bring forward orders by the end of 2016. [...] If no party obtained a majority at the [next general election due in 2015], there might be some uncertainty about the passage of the orders in the next Parliament." [22] A rather polite way of saying "things could get messy."

Indeed, messy they became. The bill received its Second Reading on 5 July 2013, passing by a seemingly overwhelming 304 votes to none – largely because almost all Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs chose to abstain, a strategic move that left the field clear. It cleared the Commons in November 2013, but its journey was halted in December 2013 when members of the House of Lords voted to block it. [23]

Undaunted, Conservative MP Bob Neill then introduced an Alternative Referendum Bill to the Commons. [24] [25] After a debate on 17 October 2014, it progressed to the Public Bills Committee. However, a crucial procedural step was missed: the Commons failed to pass a money resolution, effectively preventing the bill from advancing further before the dissolution of parliament on 27 March 2015. [26] [27]

The political landscape was also shifting, notably illustrated by the European Parliament election in 2014. For the first time in 108 years, a party other than the traditional Conservatives or Labour topped a nationwide poll: the UK Independence Party (UKIP) secured more votes and seats than any other party, leaving the Conservatives languishing in third place. [28] This was a clear signal of growing Eurosceptic sentiment.

Under Ed Miliband's leadership between 2010 and 2015, the Labour Party had generally ruled out an "in-out" referendum unless a further transfer of powers from the UK to the EU was proposed. [29] The Liberal Democrats, in their manifesto for the 2015 general election, similarly pledged a referendum only if changes to the EU treaties were on the table. [30] Meanwhile, a diverse collection of parties, including the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the British National Party (BNP), the Green Party, [31] the Democratic Unionist Party [32] and the Respect Party [33], all vocally supported the fundamental principle of holding a referendum.

The dice were finally cast when the Conservative Party secured an outright majority of seats in the House of Commons at the 2015 general election. David Cameron promptly reiterated his party's manifesto commitment: an "in-out" referendum on UK membership of the EU would indeed be held by the end of 2017, but only after "negotiating a new settlement for Britain in the EU." [34] The stage was set for the drama to unfold.

Renegotiation before the referendum

Main articles: 2015–2016 United Kingdom renegotiation of European Union membership and Law of the European Union

In early 2014, David Cameron, with an air of determined optimism, began to articulate the precise changes he sought to achieve within the EU and, by extension, in the UK's often-strained relationship with it. [35] His shopping list of demands included: enhanced immigration controls, particularly targeting citizens from newer EU member states; stricter immigration regulations for existing EU citizens; novel powers allowing national parliaments, acting collectively, to veto proposed EU laws; the pursuit of new free-trade agreements coupled with a reduction in bureaucratic burdens for businesses; a diminution of the European Court of Human Rights's influence on British policing and legal systems; a general shift of power towards individual member states and away from the central EU apparatus; and, perhaps most symbolically, an abandonment of the EU's guiding principle of "ever closer union." [35] His strategy was to secure these concessions through a series of negotiations with other EU leaders and then, assuming re-election, present this "new settlement" to the British public in a referendum. [35]

By November of that year, Cameron provided an update on these ongoing negotiations, offering further granular detail regarding his objectives. [36] The primary demands presented to the EU were multifaceted: concerning economic governance, he sought official recognition that laws pertaining to the Eurozone would not automatically apply to non-Eurozone EU members, and, crucially, that these non-Eurozone states would not be compelled to bail out struggling Eurozone economies. On the front of competitiveness, the aim was to expand the single market and establish a concrete target for reducing bureaucracy impacting businesses. Regarding sovereignty, the UK desired a legally binding exemption from the commitment to "ever closer union," along with empowering national parliaments to collectively veto proposed EU laws. Finally, on the highly sensitive issue of immigration, Cameron pushed for a mechanism to prevent EU citizens arriving in the UK for work from claiming social housing or in-work benefits until they had resided and worked there for four years. Furthermore, he sought to restrict their ability to send child benefit payments overseas. [36] [37]

The culmination of these renegotiations was unveiled in February 2016. [38] The resulting "renegotiated terms" were presented as additions to the United Kingdom's already extensive portfolio of opt-outs in the European Union and the unique UK rebate. The actual significance of these modifications to the EU–UK agreement was, as expected, a subject of intense debate and speculation. While few of the changes were universally considered "fundamental," some were indeed deemed important to a significant portion of the British populace. [38]

Specifically, some limits on in-work benefits for EU immigrants were agreed upon. However, these would be applied on a sliding scale over four years and would only affect new immigrants. Even then, the implementation would require a country to first obtain permission from the European Council. [38] The contentious issue of child benefit payments sent overseas was addressed by linking them to the cost of living in the recipient country, rather than outright banning them. [39] On the matter of sovereignty, the UK received reassurances that it would not be compelled to participate in "ever closer union," though these assurances were largely "in line with existing EU law." [38] Cameron's demand for national parliaments to veto proposed EU laws was watered down to a mechanism allowing national parliaments to collectively object to proposals, at which point the European Council would reconsider before making its own final decision. [38] In terms of economic governance, anti-discrimination regulations for non-Eurozone members were to be strengthened, but these members would, critically, retain no power to veto legislation. [40] The agreement also touched upon proposals to "exclude from the scope of free movement rights, third country nationals who had no prior lawful residence in a Member State before marrying a Union citizen" [41] and to facilitate the deportation of EU nationals for reasons of public policy or security. [42] The legal enforceability of these various components was, predictably, complex, as no part of the agreement itself fundamentally altered EU law, though some elements might be enforceable under international law. [43]

Intriguingly, the EU had reportedly extended an offer to David Cameron: a so-called "emergency brake" that would have permitted the UK to suspend social benefits for new immigrants for their initial four years in the country, a measure that could have been applied for a period of seven years. [44] This offer, a potential lifeline for Cameron's domestic agenda, remained on the table right up until the Brexit referendum. However, it expired, unactivated, when the vote determined the UK would leave the EU. Cameron later claimed, as reported by the Financial Times, that "he could have avoided Brexit had European leaders let him control migration." [45] [46] A convenient narrative, perhaps, but one famously contradicted by Angela Merkel, who, speaking in the German Parliament, stated unequivocally that the offer had not been made by the EU. Merkel's firm stance was: "If you wish to have free access to the single market then you have to accept the fundamental European rights as well as obligations that come from it. This is as true for Great Britain as for anybody else." [47] A stark reminder that the EU plays by its own rules, regardless of domestic political pressures.

Legislation

See also: European Union Referendum Act 2015

The much-anticipated referendum, the subject of considerable political maneuvering, was formally included in the Queen's Speech on 27 May 2015. [48] At the time, whispers suggested that David Cameron was contemplating an earlier referendum date, perhaps in October 2016. [49] However, the actual legislative instrument, the European Union Referendum Act 2015, which provided the legal authority for the vote, was brought before the House of Commons with remarkable speed, just one day later, a mere three weeks after the general election. [50]

During the bill's second reading on 9 June, Members of the House of Commons endorsed the principle of holding a referendum by a decisive vote of 544 to 53, with only the Scottish National Party casting dissenting votes. [51] In a notable shift from the Labour Party's stance prior to the 2015 general election under Ed Miliband, acting Labour leader Harriet Harman committed her party to supporting the plans for an EU referendum by 2017. This position was subsequently maintained by the newly elected leader, Jeremy Corbyn. [52]

To transform the proposed referendum into a legal reality, the European Union Referendum Act [53] was duly passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Its legislative reach was deliberately extended to include Gibraltar, [54] [55] and it received royal assent on 17 December 2015. This Act was then further confirmed, enacted, and implemented within Gibraltar itself by the European Union (Referendum) Act 2016 (Gibraltar), [56] which successfully passed through the Gibraltar Parliament and became law upon receiving the assent of the Governor of Gibraltar on 28 January 2016. A truly multinational legislative effort for a very British problem.

The European Union Referendum Act was clear in its primary objective: it mandated that a referendum be held on the question of the UK's continued membership of the European Union before the close of 2017. What it conspicuously did not contain, however, was any explicit requirement for the UK Government to actually implement the results. Instead, its design was merely to "gauge the electorate's opinion" on EU membership. This distinction is crucial; it placed the referendum in a category similar to the devolution referendums held in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in 1997 and 1998, where public sentiment was ascertained before any subsequent legislation was introduced.

Unlike, for instance, the Republic of Ireland, where specific constitutional provisions dictate when a binding referendum must be held, the UK lacks such explicit constitutional mandates for implementing referendum results. [57] To illustrate the contrast, the legislation for the Alternative Vote referendum in May 2011 would have automatically implemented the new voting system without further parliamentary action, provided certain boundary changes were also enacted. In that instance, a substantial majority rejected the proposed change. The 1975 EC membership referendum, for its part, was conducted only after the renegotiated terms of the UK's EC membership had been agreed upon by all EC Member States, with these terms explicitly laid out in a command paper and approved by both Houses of Parliament. [57] Following the 2016 vote, the High Court unequivocally confirmed that the result was not legally binding, a conclusion rooted in the constitutional bedrock of parliamentary sovereignty and representative democracy. The legislation authorizing the referendum simply did not contain the clear, unambiguous language that would have made it so. [58]

Referendum question

Sample referendum ballot paper

The Electoral Commission, in its meticulous research, confidently asserted that its recommended question was both "clear and straightforward for voters" and "the most neutral wording from the range of options... considered and tested." This claim was backed by responses gathered during its consultation process, which involved a diverse array of consultees. [59] The government, seemingly in agreement, accepted the proposed question in September 2015, just prior to the bill's third reading. [60]

The precise question that voters encountered on their ballot papers under the provisions of the European Union Referendum Act 2015 was as follows:

Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?

Accompanying this, the responses to be marked with a single 'X' were:

• Remain a member of the European Union • Leave the European Union

For the benefit of Welsh speakers, the question was also provided in the Welsh language:

A ddylai'r Deyrnas Unedig aros yn aelod o'r Undeb Ewropeaidd neu adael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd?

With the corresponding responses (also to be marked with a single 'X'):

• Aros yn aelod o'r Undeb Ewropeaidd • Gadael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd

Administration

Date

Before the official announcement, political pundits and informed observers widely speculated that a June date for the referendum was a distinct and serious possibility. The First Ministers of Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, in a rare display of cross-devolved unity, co-signed a letter to David Cameron on 3 February 2016. Their plea? To avoid holding the referendum in June, as devolved elections were already slated for the preceding month, 5 May. These elections had, themselves, already been delayed by a year to prevent a clash with the 2015 general election, a consequence of Westminster's implementation of the Fixed-term Parliament Act. Cameron, however, politely but firmly declined this request, asserting that the public was perfectly capable of making informed decisions in multiple elections, provided they were spaced at least six weeks apart. [61] [62] A testament to human multitasking, or perhaps just political expediency.

On 20 February 2016, David Cameron formally declared that the UK Government would officially recommend that the British populace vote to remain a member of a "reformed" European Union. He simultaneously announced that the referendum itself would take place on 23 June, thereby marking the official launch of the campaign. He also stated that Parliament would enact the necessary secondary legislation on 22 February, directly related to the European Union Referendum Act 2015. With this official launch, ministers of the UK Government were, in a rare departure from the usual strictures of Cabinet collective responsibility, granted the freedom to publicly campaign on either side of the argument. [63] A truly unique moment in British political history, allowing for a spectacular internal party civil war to play out in public.

Eligibility to vote

The legislation meticulously defined the right to vote in the referendum within the United Kingdom. It was restricted to residents of the United Kingdom who were either also Commonwealth citizens under Section 37 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (a category encompassing British citizens and other British nationals), or those who also held citizenship of the Republic of Ireland, or both. Notably, members of the House of Lords, typically disenfranchised in general elections, were, for this historic vote, granted the right to cast their ballots. The total electorate, encompassing 46,500,001 individuals, represented a significant 70.8% of the combined population of the UK and Gibraltar (totaling 65,678,000). [64] Curiously, with the sole exception of the residents of Gibraltar, other British Overseas Territories Citizens residing in the various British Overseas Territories were conspicuously excluded from participating in the referendum. [65] [66]

Residents of the United Kingdom who held citizenship of other EU countries were generally not permitted to vote, unless they also happened to be citizens of the Republic of Ireland, Malta, or the Republic of Cyprus. [67]

The Representation of the People Acts 1983 (1983 c. 2) and 1985 (1985 c. 50), as amended, also extended voting rights to certain British citizens (though not other British nationals) who had previously resided in the United Kingdom but had since lived abroad for a period not exceeding 15 years. [68]

On the day of the referendum, polling stations were open from 07:00 to 22:00 BST (WEST) (or 07:00 to 22:00 CEST in Gibraltar). Approximately 41,000 polling stations were established, staffed by a small army of over 100,000 poll workers. Each polling station was meticulously capped at a maximum of 2,500 registered voters. [citation needed] In accordance with the Representation of the People Act 2000, postal ballots were also permitted and were dispatched to eligible voters roughly three weeks before the actual vote, specifically on 2 June 2016.

The minimum voting age for the referendum was set at 18 years, aligning with the existing Representation of the People Act, as amended. An attempt by the House of Lords to lower this minimum age to 16 years was ultimately rejected. [69]

The initial deadline for voter registration was set for midnight on 7 June 2016. However, a surge of unusually high web traffic caused technical problems with the official registration website on that day, necessitating a 48-hour extension. This decision drew criticism from some 'Leave' campaigners, including Conservative MP Sir Gerald Howarth, who alleged it unfairly benefited the 'Remain' campaign, given that many late registrants were young people, generally perceived to be more inclined to vote 'Remain'. [70] Provisional figures from the Electoral Commission indicated that almost 46.5 million individuals were eligible to cast their vote. [71]

Registration problems

Nottingham City Council found itself in an awkward position when it informed a Vote Leave supporter via email that the council lacked the means to verify the nationality declared by individuals on their voter registration forms. Consequently, they were compelled to operate on the assumption that the information submitted was, in fact, accurate. [72] A rather trusting system, one might observe.

Compounding these issues, 3,462 EU nationals were erroneously sent postal voting cards. This glitch was attributed to an IT problem experienced by Xpress, a software supplier specializing in electoral systems for numerous councils. Initially, Xpress struggled to confirm the exact number of individuals affected. The problem was eventually rectified through the deployment of a software patch, which, somewhat belatedly, rendered the incorrectly registered electors ineligible to vote on 23 June. [72] A minor bureaucratic hiccup, perhaps, but one that certainly didn't soothe the already frayed nerves of the electorate.

Crown Dependencies

Residents of the Crown Dependencies—territories not formally part of the United Kingdom, specifically the Isle of Man and the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey—found themselves excluded from the referendum. This exclusion applied even if they held British citizenship, unless they had previously resided in the United Kingdom itself (meaning England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland). [73]

This disenfranchisement did not go unnoticed. Some residents of the Isle of Man voiced their objections, arguing that as full British citizens under the British Nationality Act 1981 and inhabitants of the British Islands, they too should have been afforded the opportunity to vote. Their argument rested on the undeniable fact that the Isle and the Bailiwicks, despite not being considered part of the United Kingdom for the purposes of European Union (and European Economic Area (EEA)) membership, would nonetheless be significantly impacted by the referendum's outcome. [73] A logical point, perhaps, but logic often finds itself at the bottom of the pile in matters of national identity.

Campaign

Main article: Campaigning in the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum

See also: Allegations of unlawful campaigning in the 2016 EU referendum Britain Stronger in Europe campaigners, London, June 2016 Referendum posters for both the Leave and Remain campaigns in Pimlico, London Remain campaign "I'm in" sticker

The official campaign machinery began its grind in October 2015 with the formation of Britain Stronger in Europe, a cross-party coalition dedicated to advocating for the UK's continued membership of the EU. [74] On the opposing side, the 'Leave' camp was a rather less cohesive affair, with two primary rival groups vying for the coveted "official" designation: Leave.EU, which enjoyed the backing of most of UKIP (including its most prominent figure, Nigel Farage), and Vote Leave, which was the favoured choice of influential Conservative Party Eurosceptics. The internal squabbling between these two factions became so pronounced that in January 2016, Nigel Farage and the Leave.EU campaign eventually merged into the larger, if still somewhat fractious, Grassroots Out movement. [75] [76]

The Electoral Commission finally intervened in April, officially designating Britain Stronger in Europe as the official 'Remain' campaign and Vote Leave as the official 'Leave' campaign. [77] This designation came with tangible benefits, including the right to spend up to a rather generous £7,000,000, a free mailshot to every household, dedicated television broadcasts, and a not-insignificant £600,000 in public funds. The UK Government's official position, as declared by David Cameron, was to support the 'Remain' campaign. However, in a rare and rather dramatic exception to the principle of cabinet collective responsibility, Cameron announced that Conservative Ministers and MPs were free to campaign for either side, according to their individual conscience. [78] [79] This decision came after considerable internal pressure for a "free vote" for ministers, effectively sanctioning a civil war within the ruling party. A Government-backed campaign, complete with its own leaflet, was launched in April. [80] Tragically, on 16 June, all official national campaigning was suspended until 19 June following the brutal murder of Jo Cox, a pro-EU Labour MP. [81]

After internal polls revealed that a staggering 85% of the UK population desired more information from the government regarding the referendum, a leaflet was dispatched to every household across the nation. [82] This publication meticulously outlined the government's rationale for believing that continued EU membership was the optimal path for the UK. Unsurprisingly, this taxpayer-funded initiative, which cost a cool £9.3 million, drew sharp criticism from 'Leave' campaigners, who decried it as an unfair advantage for the 'Remain' side, not to mention a wasteful use of public funds and riddled with inaccuracies. [83] During the campaign, Nigel Farage provocatively suggested that a narrow 'Remain' victory (e.g., closer than 52–48%) would inevitably lead to public demand for a second referendum, precisely because the government leaflet had, in his view, allowed the 'Remain' side to outspend their opponents. [84]

In the week commencing 16 May, the Electoral Commission, in its capacity as impartial arbiter, sent a comprehensive voting guide to every household in the UK and Gibraltar. This eight-page booklet, designed to raise awareness, included practical details on how to vote, a sample of the actual ballot paper, and, critically, a full page allocated to both Britain Stronger in Europe and Vote Leave to present their respective cases. [85] [86]

The Vote Leave campaign, in its core argument, posited that exiting the EU would safeguard national sovereignty, enable the implementation of stricter immigration controls, and free the UK to forge independent trade deals across the globe. Furthermore, they highlighted the cessation of weekly membership payments to the EU. [87] [note 1] Conversely, the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign argued that a departure from the European Union would inflict significant damage upon the UK economy and fundamentally undermine the United Kingdom's standing and influence on the world stage, which they contended was inextricably linked to its membership. [90]

Responses to the referendum campaign

Party policies

In the frenetic period leading up to the referendum, a significant majority of the 650 MPs elected to the 2015-17 UK Parliament publicly declared their intention to vote in favour of remaining in the European Union. Specifically, 479 MPs aligned with 'Remain,' a stark contrast to the 158 who publicly committed to 'Leave.'   Leave •   Remain

The following tables meticulously detail the official positions of political parties holding representation in the House of Commons or the House of Lords, the European Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Welsh Parliament, or the Gibraltar Parliament at the precise time of the referendum.

Great Britain

Position Political parties Ref.

Remain [Green Party of England and Wales](/Green_Party_of_England_and_Wales) [91] [Labour Party](/Labour_Party_(UK)) [92] [93] [Liberal Democrats](/Liberal_Democrats_(UK)) [94] [Plaid Cymru](/Plaid_Cymru) – The Party of Wales [95] [Scottish Greens](/Scottish_Greens) [96] [Scottish National Party](/Scottish_National_Party) (SNP) [97] [98]

Leave [UK Independence Party](/UK_Independence_Party) (UKIP) [99]

Neutral [Conservative Party](/Conservative_Party_(UK)) [100]

Northern Ireland

Position Political parties Ref.

Remain [Alliance Party of Northern Ireland](/Alliance_Party_of_Northern_Ireland) [101c [102] [Green Party Northern Ireland](/Green_Party_Northern_Ireland) [103] [Sinn Féin](/Sinn_F%C3%A9in) [104] [Social Democratic and Labour Party](/Social_Democratic_and_Labour_Party) (SDLP) [105] [Ulster Unionist Party](/Ulster_Unionist_Party) (UUP) [106]

Leave [Democratic Unionist Party](/Democratic_Unionist_Party) (DUP) [107] [108] [People Before Profit](/People_Before_Profit) (PBP) [109] [Traditional Unionist Voice](/Traditional_Unionist_Voice) (TUV) [110]

Gibraltar

Position Political parties Ref.

Remain [Gibraltar Social Democrats](/Gibraltar_Social_Democrats) [111] [Gibraltar Socialist Labour Party](/Gibraltar_Socialist_Labour_Party) [112] [Liberal Party of Gibraltar](/Liberal_Party_of_Gibraltar) [112]

Minor parties

Among the diverse array of minor parties, a significant number expressed their support for leaving the EU. These included the Socialist Labour Party, the Communist Party of Britain, the rather dramatically named Britain First, [113] the British National Party (BNP), [114] Éirígí (an Irish republican party), [115] the Respect Party, [116] the Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition (TUSC), [117] the Social Democratic Party, [118] the Liberal Party, [119] Independence from Europe, [120] and the Workers' Party (also from Ireland). [121] A varied collection, indeed, but united in their Euroscepticism.

Conversely, the 'Remain' camp also drew support from several smaller political entities. These included the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP), Left Unity, and Mebyon Kernow (a Cornish nationalist party). [122] [123] [124]

In a display of principled neutrality, or perhaps just strategic ambivalence, the Socialist Party of Great Britain opted to support neither 'Leave' nor 'Remain.' [125] [126] Similarly, the Women's Equality Party maintained no official position on the contentious issue. [127] [128] The Socialist Equality Party, taking a more radical stance, called for an "active boycott" of the referendum altogether, viewing it as a distraction from more fundamental issues. [129]

Cabinet ministers

For the positions of backbench MPs and other politicians, see Endorsements in the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum.

The Cabinet of the United Kingdom, that august body charged with policy decisions and the orchestration of governmental departments, operates under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and comprises the majority of the government's ministerial heads. [130] Following the dramatic announcement of the referendum in February, a clear divide emerged: 23 of the 30 Cabinet ministers (including those regularly attending) publicly supported the UK remaining within the EU. [131] However, Iain Duncan Smith, a prominent voice in favour of leaving, dramatically resigned on 19 March. His replacement, Stephen Crabb, was firmly in the 'Remain' camp. [131] [132] Crabb, already a Cabinet member as the Secretary of State for Wales, was then replaced in that role by Alun Cairns, another 'Remain' supporter, which ultimately brought the total number of pro-Remain Cabinet members to a commanding 25. The optics, at least, were clear.

Business

See also: Opinion polling for the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum § Business leaders

A chorus of UK multinationals, ever sensitive to market stability, voiced their distinct displeasure at the prospect of a UK exit from the EU, citing the inevitable uncertainty it would unleash. Giants like Shell, [133] BT, [134] and Vodafone [135] were among those who publicly weighed the pros and cons of a British departure. [136] The banking sector, predictably, was one of the most vocal advocates for remaining within the EU, with the British Bankers' Association succinctly stating the obvious: "Businesses don't like that kind of uncertainty." [137] RBS issued dire warnings of potential economic damage, [138] while HSBC and foreign-based heavyweights like JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank openly speculated that a Brexit could force them to reconsider their operational domiciles. [139] [140] Experts from Goldman Sachs and the City of London's policy chief warned that these factors could severely undermine the City's pre-eminent status as a European and global leader in financial services. [141] In February 2016, leaders from 36 of the prestigious FTSE 100 companies, including Shell, BAE Systems, BT, and Rio Tinto, formally declared their support for remaining in the EU. [142] Furthermore, a significant majority—60%—of the memberships of both the Institute of Directors and the EEF (the manufacturers' organisation) also favoured staying. [143]

Many UK-based businesses, including the ubiquitous Sainsbury's, adopted a posture of steadfast neutrality. Their concern was palpable: taking a definitive side in such a divisive issue risked alienating a significant portion of their customer base, potentially leading to a damaging backlash. [144]

Richard Branson, the ever-outspoken entrepreneur, confessed to being "very fearful" of the ramifications of a UK departure from the EU. [145] Alan Sugar, another prominent business figure, echoed similar anxieties. [146]

In a counter-argument, James Dyson, the founder of the eponymous Dyson company, articulated in June 2016 that the imposition of tariffs, should the UK leave, would be less detrimental to British exporters than the appreciation of the pound against the Euro. He pointed out that since Britain maintained a substantial £100 billion trade deficit with the EU, tariffs could, paradoxically, become a significant source of revenue for the Treasury. [147] Dyson further argued that the 28-country bloc was not, in fact, a true single market, citing the persistent differences in languages, electrical plugs, and legal frameworks among member states. He also highlighted that the fastest-growing markets for British innovation lay outside the EU. [147] Engineering powerhouse Rolls-Royce Holdings communicated to its employees that it also preferred the UK to remain in the EU. [148]

Surveys conducted among large UK businesses consistently revealed a strong majority favouring the UK's continued EU membership. [149] However, the sentiment among small and medium-sized UK businesses was considerably more divided. [149] Polls targeting foreign businesses indicated that approximately half would be less inclined to conduct business in the UK post-Brexit, while a mere 1% suggested they would increase their investment. [150] [151] [152] Two automotive giants, Ford and BMW, issued warnings as early as 2013 against Brexit, predicting it would be "devastating" for the economy. [153] Conversely, in 2015, some other manufacturing executives, speaking to Reuters, expressed confidence that they would not close their plants if the UK left the EU, though they acknowledged that future investment might be jeopardized. [154] The CEO of Vauxhall Motors stated that a Brexit would not materially impact its operations. [155] Similarly, Akio Toyoda, CEO of the foreign-based Toyota, confirmed that irrespective of the Brexit outcome, Toyota would continue its manufacturing operations in Britain, as it had done for years prior. [156]

Exchange rates and stock markets

In the week immediately following the conclusion of the UK's renegotiation (and particularly after Boris Johnson dramatically announced his support for leaving the EU), the pound plummeted to a seven-year low against the dollar. Economists at HSBC issued grim warnings that it could fall even further. [157] Simultaneously, Daragh Maher, head of HSBC, suggested that a decline in Sterling's value would inevitably drag the Euro down with it. European banking analysts also pointed to Brexit anxieties as a primary driver of the Euro's weakening. [158] When a poll in June 2016 indicated a 10-point lead for the 'Leave' campaign, the pound promptly dropped by another one percent. [159] In a bizarre counter-narrative during the same month, it was announced that the value of goods exported from the UK in April had seen a month-on-month increase of 11.2%, hailed as "the biggest rise since records started in 1998." [160] [161] A momentary glimmer of hope, perhaps, or merely statistical noise in a sea of uncertainty.

The pervasive uncertainty surrounding the referendum result, compounded by a cocktail of other global factors—rising US interest rates, stubbornly low commodity prices, sluggish Eurozone growth, and anxieties over emerging markets like China—collectively contributed to a period of heightened stock market volatility throughout January and February 2016. [citation needed] On 14 June, polls indicating an increased likelihood of Brexit sent the FTSE 100 tumbling by 2%, wiping £98 billion off its value. [162] [163] However, as if on cue, subsequent polls suggesting a swing back towards 'Remain' saw both the pound and the FTSE recover some of their losses. [164]

On the very day of the referendum, in a testament to the market's fickle optimism, sterling briefly touched a 2016 high of 1.5018 for £1, and the [FTSE 100](/FTSE_100) also climbed to a 2016 high, buoyed by a fresh poll suggesting a victory for the 'Remain' campaign. [165] Initial results, indeed, seemed to confirm a 'Remain' vote, and the pound held its value. However, the moment the result for [Sunderland](/City_of_Sunderland) was declared, revealing an unexpected and significant swing to 'Leave,' the mood shifted dramatically. Subsequent results appeared to reinforce this trend, and sterling plunged to 1.3777, its lowest level since 1985. The following Monday, when markets reopened, £1 sterling sank further to a new low of $1.32. [166]

British economists Muhammad Ali Nasir and Jamie Morgan offered a nuanced perspective, differentiating between the inherent weakness of the Sterling due to the UK's precarious external economic position and the additional role played by the palpable uncertainty surrounding Brexit. [167] They reported that during the referendum week, leading up to the declaration of the result, the exchange rate depreciation deviated from the long-run trend by approximately 3.5%. However, the immediate impact on the exchange rate was a more dramatic 8% depreciation. Furthermore, they observed that over the entire period from the referendum's announcement, the exchange rate fluctuated wildly around its trend, with a particularly pronounced effect stemming from the markets being "wrong-footed" at the precise moment the unexpected outcome was revealed. [167] A clear illustration of how sentiment, not just fundamentals, can dictate market movements.

When the London Stock Exchange opened for business on the morning of 24 June, the FTSE 100 plummeted from 6338.10 to 5806.13 within the first ten minutes of trading. It clawed its way back to 6091.27 after a further 90 minutes, eventually recovering to 6162.97 by the close of the day's trading. The following Monday, however, saw the FTSE 100 resume a steady decline, losing over 2% by mid-afternoon. [168] Across the Atlantic, upon opening later on the Friday after the referendum, the US Dow Jones Industrial Average shed nearly 450 points, or approximately 2.5%, in less than half an hour. The Associated Press starkly labelled this sudden worldwide market decline a stock market crash. [169] Investors in global stock markets collectively lost an astonishing sum, exceeding the equivalent of [US$](/US$)2 trillion on 24 June 2016, marking it as the worst single-day loss in history, in absolute terms. [170] By 27 June, these market losses had swelled to an eye-watering US3 trillion. [171] [Sterling](/Pound_sterling), meanwhile, hit a 31-year low against the [US dollar](/US). [172] Even the UK's and the EU's sovereign debt credit ratings were downgraded to AA by Standard & Poor's. [173] [174]

By mid-afternoon on 27 June 2016, sterling remained at its 31-year low, having shed 11% of its value in just two trading days, and the FTSE 100 had surrendered a staggering £85 billion. [175] However, in a testament to the market's resilience, or perhaps its short attention span, by 29 June, the FTSE had miraculously recovered all the losses incurred since markets closed on polling day, and the value of the pound had begun a cautious ascent. [176] [177] A dizzying rollercoaster, indeed.

European responses

The referendum's outcome was, predictably, met with widespread approval from Europe's far-right political factions. [178] Marine Le Pen, the leader of France's Front national, famously described the potential for a Brexit as being "like the fall of the Berlin Wall," going on to declare that "Brexit would be marvellous – extraordinary – for all European peoples who long for freedom." [179] This sentiment, however, was not universally shared across the Channel; a poll conducted in France in April 2016 indicated that 59% of the French populace favoured Britain remaining in the EU. [180]

Dutch politician Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom, was quick to suggest that the Netherlands should emulate Britain's example, proclaiming: "Like in the 1940s, once again Britain could help liberate Europe from another totalitarian monster, this time called 'Brussels.' Again, we could be saved by the British." [181]

Polish President Andrzej Duda lent his weight to the 'Remain' cause, expressing his support for the UK staying within the EU. [182] Similarly, Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip issued a rather unusual appeal, asking all citizens of Moldova residing in the UK to engage their British friends and persuade them to vote for continued EU membership. [183]

The Spanish foreign minister, José García-Margallo, wasted no time in making his country's intentions clear, stating that Spain would demand control of Gibraltar "the very next day" following a British withdrawal from the EU. [184] Margallo further upped the ante by threatening to close the border with Gibraltar if Britain left the EU. [185] A stark reminder that some historical grievances run deeper than European unity.

Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström, on 11 June 2016, warned that if Britain exited the EU, it would inevitably trigger referendums on EU membership in other countries. She also shrewdly observed that if Britain stayed, other countries would then feel emboldened to negotiate, request, and demand their own "special treatment." [186] Meanwhile, Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka suggested in February 2016 that the Czech Republic would initiate discussions on leaving the EU if the UK voted for an exit. [187] The domino effect, it seems, was a widespread concern.

Non-European responses

International Monetary Fund

Christine Lagarde, the formidable managing director of the International Monetary Fund, issued a stark warning in February 2016. She cautioned that the mere uncertainty surrounding the referendum's outcome would be detrimental "in and of itself" to the British economy. [188] In a swift counter-punch, 'Leave' campaigner Priti Patel dismissed Lagarde's concerns, recalling a previous, allegedly incorrect, warning from the IMF regarding the coalition government's deficit plan for the UK. Patel asserted that the IMF "were wrong then and are wrong now." [189] A classic case of selective memory, perhaps, or a strategic deflection.

United States

In October 2015, United States Trade Representative Michael Froman made it abundantly clear that the United States held no particular enthusiasm for pursuing a separate free-trade agreement (FTA) with Britain should it choose to depart from the EU. This declaration, as observed by The Guardian newspaper, effectively undermined a key economic argument put forth by 'Leave' proponents, who confidently asserted that Britain would thrive independently and readily secure bilateral FTAs with trading partners. [190] Also in October 2015, the United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Matthew Barzun, articulated that UK participation in both NATO and the EU rendered each organization "better and stronger." While acknowledging that the decision to remain or leave ultimately rested with the British people, he stressed that it was unequivocally in the US interest for Britain to remain. [191] In April 2016, a powerful bipartisan statement emerged as eight former US Secretaries of the Treasury, who had served under both Democratic and Republican presidents, collectively urged Britain to remain within the EU. [192]

In July 2015, President Barack Obama publicly affirmed the long-standing US preference for the UK to remain within the EU. Obama eloquently stated: "Having the UK in the EU gives us much greater confidence about the strength of the transatlantic union, and is part of the cornerstone of the institutions built following World War II that has made the world safer and more prosperous. We want to make sure that the United Kingdom continues to have that influence." [193] This intervention, however, did not go down well with everyone. Some Conservative MPs accused President Obama of brazenly interfering in the Brexit vote, [194] [195] with Boris Johnson famously denouncing it as "a piece of outrageous and exorbitant hypocrisy." [196] UKIP leader Nigel Farage went further, accusing Obama of "monstrous interference," rhetorically asking, "You wouldn't expect the British Prime Minister to intervene in your presidential election, you wouldn't expect the Prime Minister to endorse one candidate or another." [197] Obama's intervention also drew criticism from Republican Senator Ted Cruz, who characterized it as "a slap in the face of British self-determination as the president, typically, elevated an international organisation over the rights of a sovereign people." Cruz, ever the opportunist, declared that "Britain will be at the front of the line for a free trade deal with America," should Brexit occur. [198] [199] A collective letter, signed by over 100 MPs from the Conservatives, Labour, UKIP, and the DUP, was dispatched to the US ambassador in London, urging President Obama not to meddle in the Brexit vote, citing the "long... established practice not to interfere in the domestic political affairs of our allies." [200] [201] Two years later, one of Obama's former aides rather tellingly recounted that the public intervention had, in fact, been made at the direct request of David Cameron. [202] A perfectly orchestrated piece of political theatre, then.

Prior to the vote, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, with his characteristic prescience, anticipated that Britain would indeed leave, based on what he perceived as its concerns over migration. [203] Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, expressed hope that Britain would remain in the EU to bolster transatlantic cooperation. [204]

Other states

In October 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared his support for Britain's continued presence in the EU, stating: "China hopes to see a prosperous Europe and a united EU, and hopes Britain, as an important member of the EU, can play an even more positive and constructive role in promoting the deepening development of China-EU ties." Unofficial comments from Chinese diplomats suggested that the People's Republic viewed the EU as a crucial counterbalance to American economic power, implying that an EU without Britain would inevitably lead to a stronger United States. [citation needed] A geopolitical calculation, if ever there was one.

In February 2016, the finance ministers from the G20 major economies issued a collective warning, stating that a UK departure from the EU would trigger "a shock" to the global economy. [205] [206]

In May 2016, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull indicated that Australia would prefer the UK to remain in the EU, but, ever the diplomat, added that it was ultimately a matter for the British people, and "whatever judgment they make, the relations between Britain and Australia will be very, very close." [207]

Indonesian President Joko Widodo, during a European tour, also explicitly stated his disapproval of Brexit. [208]

Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe went so far as to issue a formal statement outlining his "very concerned" perspective on the possibility of Brexit. [209]

Russian President Vladimir Putin, ever the master of calculated ambiguity, stated: "I want to say it is none of our business, it is the business of the people of the UK." [210] His official foreign ministry spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, reinforced this, asserting: "Russia has nothing to do with Brexit. We are not involved in this process in any way. We don't have any interest in it." [211] A statement that, in hindsight, carries a certain ironic weight.

Economists

In November 2015, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, offered a reassuring, if somewhat ominous, statement: the Bank of England would take all necessary measures to support the UK economy should the British people vote to leave the EU. [212] In March 2016, Carney further elaborated to MPs that an EU exit represented the "biggest domestic risk" to the UK economy. However, in a nod to impartiality, he also conceded that remaining a member carried its own set of risks, particularly those related to the European Monetary Union, of which the UK was not a member. [213] By May 2016, Carney specifically warned that a "technical recession" was among the possible adverse consequences of the UK leaving the EU. [214] 'Leave' campaigner Iain Duncan Smith, however, dismissed Carney's comments, suggesting they be taken with "a pinch of salt," and adding the rather fatalistic observation that "all forecasts in the end are wrong." [215]

In December 2015, the Bank of England published a report delving into the impact of immigration on wages. The study concluded that immigration exerted a downward pressure on workers' wages, a phenomenon particularly pronounced among low-skilled workers. Specifically, a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of migrants employed in low-skilled services was found to reduce the average wages of native low-skilled workers by approximately 2%. [216] It's worth noting that the 10 percentage point rise cited in the paper was a larger increase than the entire rise observed in the semi/unskilled services sector between 2004 and 2006, which stood at about 7 percentage points. [217]

In March 2016, Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz articulated a nuanced position: he indicated that he might reconsider his support for the UK remaining in the EU if the controversial Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) were to be ratified. [218] Stiglitz specifically warned that under the investor-state dispute settlement provision, as outlined in the prevailing drafts of the TTIP, governments faced the risk of being sued for lost profits resulting from new regulations, even those concerning public health and safety, such as measures to restrict the use of asbestos or tobacco. [218]

German economist Clemens Fuest offered a compelling analysis of the EU's internal dynamics. He identified a distinct "liberal, free-trade bloc" within the EU, comprising the UK, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, Slovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This bloc, he noted, collectively controlled a significant 32% of the votes in the European Council and consistently opposed the more dirigiste, protectionist policies often favoured by France and its allies. [219] Germany, with its distinctive 'social market' economy, occupied a middle ground between the French dirigiste model and the British free-market approach. From Berlin's perspective, the existence of this liberal bloc allowed Germany to strategically play free-market Britain against dirigiste France. Fuest argued that if Britain were to leave, the liberal bloc would be severely weakened, thereby enabling France to steer the EU in a far more dirigiste direction, an outcome that would be distinctly unattractive from Germany's standpoint. [219] A clear illustration of the complex, often unseen, balance of power at play.

A study commissioned by the Law Society of England and Wales and conducted by Oxford Economics suggested that Brexit would inflict a particularly severe negative impact on the UK financial services industry and, consequently, on the law firms that support it. This could potentially cost the legal sector as much as £1.7 billion annually by 2030. [220] The Law Society's own report on the potential effects of Brexit further noted that leaving the EU would likely diminish the UK's role as a pre-eminent centre for resolving disputes between foreign firms. Moreover, the potential loss of "passporting" rights would necessitate financial services firms to relocate departments responsible for regulatory oversight overseas. [221]

World Pensions Forum director M. Nicolas J. Firzli injected a broader, more philosophical perspective into the Brexit debate. He argued that the entire discussion should be framed within a wider economic analysis of EU law and regulation as it contrasted with English common law. Firzli contended: "Every year, the British Parliament is forced to pass tens of new statutes reflecting the latest EU directives coming from Brussels – a highly undemocratic process known as 'transposition'... Slowly but surely, these new laws dictated by EU commissars are conquering English common law, imposing upon UK businesses and citizens an ever-growing collection of fastidious regulations in every field." [222] A rather pointed critique, to say the least.

[Thiemo Fetzer](/Thiemo