Unionism in Ireland is a political tradition that champions loyalty to the crown of the United Kingdom and the union it represents with England, Scotland, and Wales. Historically, this sentiment was overwhelmingly held by Ireland's Protestant minority. Unionism mobilized significantly in the decades following Catholic Emancipation in 1829, its primary aim being to resist the restoration of a separate Irish parliament. Following the Partition of Ireland in 1921, Ulster unionism, in particular, has focused on maintaining Northern Ireland as a devolved region within the United Kingdom and thwarting the prospect of an all-Ireland republic. The 1998 Belfast Agreement, which brought an end to three decades of political violence, established a framework within which unionists have shared power with Irish nationalists in a reformed Northern Ireland Assembly. As of February 2024, however, unionists no longer constitute the larger faction in the executive, now serving alongside an Irish republican (Sinn Féin) First Minister.
Unionism solidified as a dominant political affiliation in Ireland in the late nineteenth century. It emerged from a coalition of typically Presbyterian agrarian-reform Liberals and traditionally Anglican, Orange Order-aligned Conservatives. This alliance was forged in opposition to the Irish Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893. Bolstered by loyalist labour elements, this broad opposition to Irish self-government coalesced into what became known as Ulster unionism on the eve of World War I. Centred in Belfast and its surrounding areas, this movement was prepared for armed resistance, forming the Ulster Volunteers.
Within the context of the partition settlement of 1921, which granted the rest of Ireland its own statehood as the Irish Free State, Ulster unionists accepted a devolved administration for the six north-eastern counties that remained part of the United Kingdom. For the subsequent fifty years, the Ulster Unionist Party exercised the devolved powers of the Northern Ireland Parliament with minimal internal opposition and largely outside the direct influence of the party-political system at Westminster.
In 1972, the British government suspended this devolved arrangement. This decision was precipitated by escalating political violence, referred to as The Troubles, and a stated need to consider the integration of Catholics into the civic and political life of Northern Ireland. The parliament in Belfast was prorogued, marking a significant shift in governance.
Over the ensuing three decades of The Troubles, unionists exhibited a range of responses to power-sharing proposals put forth by successive British governments, often in consultation with the Republic of Ireland. The 1998 Belfast Agreement marked a pivotal moment, concluding with permanent ceasefires from both republican and loyalist paramilitaries. Under this agreement, unionists accepted the principles of joint office and parallel consent within a new Northern Ireland legislative Assembly and executive.
Relations within this consociational framework, renegotiated in 2006, remained contentious. Unionists, experiencing a decline in electoral strength, accused their nationalist partners in government of pursuing an anti-British cultural agenda. Furthermore, post-Brexit, they voiced strong objections to the Northern Ireland Protocol, viewing it as a mechanism that advanced an all-Ireland agenda. In February 2024, after a two-year withdrawal that had led to the collapse of the devolved institutions, unionists returned to the Assembly to form a government in which they constituted a minority, a decision influenced by new assurances from the British government.
Irish Unionism 1800–1904
The Act of Union 1800
In the final decades of the Kingdom of Ireland (1542–1800), Protestants holding positions in public life increasingly identified as Irish Patriots. Their focus was the Parliament in Dublin. This parliament, operating under a narrow franchise restricted to landed members of the established Anglican communion—the Anglo-Irish "Protestant Ascendancy"—denied equal rights and public office to Dissenters, who were non-Anglican Protestants, and to the Kingdom's dispossessed Roman Catholic majority. The zenith of this parliamentary patriotism occurred during the American War of Independence, marked by the formation of the Irish Volunteers. As this militia paraded in Dublin, the parliament secured legislative independence from the British government in London in 1782, establishing the Constitution of 1782.[1][2]
In the north-east, coalitions of Presbyterian tradesmen, merchants, and tenant farmers voiced dissent against the unrepresentative parliament and the executive based in Dublin Castle, which remained under the control of English ministers via the office of the Lord Lieutenant.[3]: 107–108 With little prospect of further reform and hoping for assistance from republican France, these United Irishmen aimed for a revolutionary union encompassing "Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter"—that is, Catholics and Protestants of all denominations.[4] Their efforts were ultimately thwarted by the defeat of their uprising in 1798, compounded by reports of rebel atrocities against Protestant Loyalists in the south.[5]: 291
The British government, having deployed its own forces to quell the rebellion in Ireland and repel French intervention, opted for a union with Great Britain. The Act of Union, which was difficult to pass through the Dublin parliament, included provisions for Catholic emancipation[6] that were ultimately removed.[7] While a distinct Irish executive was maintained in Dublin, representation, still exclusively Protestant, was transferred to Westminster.
The Irish Parliament was largely unmourned in the Presbyterian north-east. Having consistently rejected calls for reform to broaden representation and address corruption, few lamented its demise.[5]: 292
Catholic emancipation and "Protestant unity"
It took thirty years for the Union to deliver on the promise of Catholic emancipation, allowing Catholics to sit in the Westminster Parliament, and permit a gradual erosion of the Protestant monopoly on positions of power and influence. This presented an opportunity, perhaps missed, to integrate Catholics through their re-emerging propertied and professional classes as a minority within the United Kingdom.[8]: 291 [9] In 1830, Daniel O'Connell, the leader of the Catholic Association, extended an invitation to Protestants to join a campaign aimed at repealing the Union and restoring the Kingdom of Ireland under the Constitution of 1782.
Concurrently, a significant factor in securing emancipation was a fivefold increase in the property threshold for the franchise, which drastically reduced the Irish electorate from 215,000 to 40,000.[10] O'Connell's Protestant ally in the north, George Ensor, observed that this measure severed the link between Catholic inclusion and democratic reform.[11][12]
In Ulster, resistance to O'Connell's appeal was intensified by a religious revival. The New Reformation, with its emphasis on "personal witness," seemed to transcend denominational differences among Protestants.[13] While fostering a "far more conscious sense of separateness from the Church of Rome",[14]: 77 which was itself undergoing a devotional revolution,[15] it also spurred a sense of Protestant unity. The leading Presbyterian evangelist, Henry Cooke, seized this opportunity to advocate for Protestant unity. In 1834, at a Conservative demonstration organized by Lord Roden at Hillsborough, Cooke proposed a "Christian marriage" between the two principal Protestant denominations, Anglican and Presbyterian. By setting aside their remaining differences, they would cooperate on all matters deemed essential for their "common safety."[16]: 254
Presbyterian voters generally favored the reform-minded Whigs or, as they later evolved, the tenant-right and free-trade Liberals.[17][18] However, as the political successors to O'Connell's Repeal movement gained representation and influence at Westminster, Cooke's call for unity gained traction, contributing to the progressive emergence of a pan-Protestant unionism.[13][14]: 134
The Irish party challenge at Westminster and the Land War
Up to and through the devastating Great Famine of the 1840s, successive governments, both Whig and Tory, had largely shirked political responsibility for Ireland's agrarian conditions. The simmering conflict between tenants and landlords reached Westminster in 1852 when the all-Ireland Tenant Right League supported the election of 48 Members of Parliament (MPs) who formed the Independent Irish Party.[19]: 354–355 The "League of North and South," as described by the Young Irelander Gavan Duffy,[20] soon dissolved. In the south, the Church sanctioned the Catholic MPs breaking their pledge of independent opposition and accepting government posts.[21][22] In the north, Protestant tenant-righters, such as William Sharman Crawford and James MacKnight, faced disruptions to their election meetings by Orangemen.[23]
A more significant challenge for unionism emerged in the aftermath of the Reform Act 1867. In England and Wales, this act expanded the electorate, diminishing the automatic conservative inclination towards Irish interests and increasing openness to the "home-rule" compromise that nationalists began advocating. This proposal envisioned Ireland remaining within the United Kingdom, but with a devolved parliament in Dublin holding specific powers granted by Westminster.[24][25] Meanwhile, in Ireland, the introduction of the secret ballot and the expansion of representation for towns reduced the electoral influence of landowners and their agents. This contributed to the success of the Home Rule League in the 1874 general election. Fifty-nine members were returned to Westminster, where they organized as the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP).[19]: 381
During his first ministry (1868–1874), the Liberal Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone attempted a policy of conciliation. In 1869, he disestablished the Church of Ireland, and in 1870, he introduced the Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act. Both measures were viewed by conservative jurists as threats to the integrity of the Union. The disestablishment was seen as a breach of the promise of a single Protestant Episcopal Church for both Britain and Ireland, as stipulated in Article V of the Act of Union—a claim echoed by the Ulster Protestant Defence Association as a breach of contract.[27]: 87 Furthermore, although relatively weak, the provisions for tenant compensation and purchase created a distinct agrarian system for Ireland, diverging from the prevailing English legal conception of property rights.[28]
The Land War intensified during the Long Depression of the 1870s. From 1879, it was organized by the direct-action Irish National Land League, led by the southern Protestant Charles Stewart Parnell.[29] In 1881, in a further Land Act, Gladstone conceded the three F's—fair rent, free sale, and fixity of tenure. Recognizing that "the land grievance had been a bond of discontent between Ulster and the rest of Ireland and in that sense a danger to the union," Irish Conservatives did not oppose this measure.[30] Protestants in the eastern counties had begun to accept into the leadership of the tenant-right movement individuals like the Rev. James Armour of Ballymoney, who were at best ambivalent regarding the Union.[31]: 156–160 In the western parts of the province (specifically in counties Armagh, Cavan, Fermanagh, and Tyrone), even Orangemen had started joining the Land League.[32][33]
The critical shift toward constitutional concessions was solidified in the wake of the Representation of the People Act 1884. This act granted the vote to nearly all male heads of household, tripling the electorate in Ireland. The 1885 election saw the IPP, then led by Parnell, return 85 MPs (including 17 from Ulster, where the Conservatives and Liberals divided the unionist vote).[14]: 135 Gladstone, whose Liberals lost all 15 of their Irish seats, could only form his second ministry with their support in the Commons.
Reaction to Gladstone's Home Rule Bills
In June 1886, Gladstone introduced the Government of Ireland Bill, largely of his own drafting.[34] Unionists remained unconvinced by his inclusion of measures intended to limit the scope of a Dublin legislature and reduce the impact of the popular vote (the approximately 200 popularly elected members were to sit alongside 28 Irish Peers and an additional 75 members elected under a highly restrictive property franchise).[35] Regardless of its composition, they believed that an Irish parliament, potentially influenced by the "American Irish,"[36] would inevitably clash with the "imperial parliament" in London, leading to "complete separation."[37][38]: 186
The upper and middle classes found in Britain and the Empire a broad spectrum of opportunities—in the army, public services, and commerce—from which they feared being excluded if the connection between Ireland and Great Britain weakened or dissolved.[19]: 398–399 This connection was equally vital for those employed in the North's major export industries, such as textiles, engineering, and shipbuilding. For these industries, the Irish hinterland was secondary to the industrial triangle linking Belfast and its environs with Clydeside and the north of England.[39][40] Nevertheless, the most potent articulation of opposition to Irish self-government was encapsulated in the message propagated during a significant revival of the Orange Order: "Home Rule means [Rome Rule]."[42]
In the north, competition arising from the increasing number of Catholics entering mill and factory jobs had already provided the predominantly rural Orange Order with a renewed base among Protestant workers.[8]: 389–396 [43] This pattern was not unique to Belfast and its surrounding areas; Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool, and other British cities experiencing substantial Irish immigration developed similar Orange and nativist political dynamics within wards and workplaces.[44] Unionists, organized under the Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union, actively sought to connect with these movements.[45][46]: 195–196 Following Gladstone's endorsement of home rule, politicians who had previously distanced themselves from the Orange Order now embraced its militant stance. Colonel Edward Saunderson, who had represented Cavan as a Liberal, donned an Orange sash, stating that "the Orange society is alone capable of dealing with the condition of anarchy and rebellion which prevail in Ireland."[27]: 90–91
In February 1886, Lord Randolph Churchill, employing what he termed the "Orange card," assured a large gathering of the Anti-Repeal Union in Belfast that English Conservatives would align themselves with loyalists in resisting Home Rule. He later coined the phrase that would become the rallying cry of northern unionism: "Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right."[46]: 297
Gladstone's own party was deeply divided over Home Rule, and the House of Commons ultimately rejected the measure. In 1891, Ulster's Liberal Unionists, having broken with Gladstone, joined Saunderson's Irish Unionist Alliance, and at Westminster, they adopted the Conservative whip.[47]
In 1892, despite significant internal divisions over the compromised leadership of Parnell, the Nationalists were instrumental in helping Gladstone form his third ministry. This led to a second Home Rule bill. The opposition in Ulster was more organized and vocal than ever before. A large Ulster Unionist Convention was convened in Belfast, organized by the Liberal Unionist Thomas Sinclair, who had previously been critical of the Orange Order.[48] Speakers and attendees emphasized the diverse religious, class, and political backgrounds represented among the 12,300 delegates. The Northern Whig reported that the convention brought together "the old tenant-righters of the 'sixties'... the sturdy reformers of Antrim... the Unitarians of Down, always progressive in their politics... the old-fashioned Tories of the Counties... modern Conservatives... Orangemen... All these various elements—Whig, Liberal, Radical, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Unitarian and Methodist... united as one man."[49]
While acknowledging Catholics with conciliatory remarks, the Convention passed a resolution stating their determination:
to retain unchanged our present position as an integral portion of the United Kingdom, and protest in the most unequivocal manner against the passage of any measure that would rob us of our inheritance in the Imperial Parliament, under the protection of which our capital has been invested and our home and rights safeguarded; that we record our determination to have nothing to do with a Parliament certain to be controlled by men responsible for the crime and outrage of the Land League . . . many of whom have shown themselves the ready instrument of clerical domination.[50]
After extensive parliamentary debate, the bill, which included provisions for Irish MPs, passed the Commons by a narrow margin but was defeated in the predominantly Conservative House of Lords. The Conservatives subsequently formed a new government.
Constructive Unionism
The Conservative successor to Gladstone in 1886, Lord Salisbury, believed his government should "leave Home Rule sleeping the sleep of the unjust."[51]: 418 In 1887, Dublin Castle was granted standing authority to suspend habeas corpus. However, as Chief Secretary for Ireland, Salisbury's nephew Arthur Balfour pursued a different strategy. He implemented reforms intended, by some accounts, to "kill home rule with kindness."[52]
With the specific objective of alleviating poverty and reducing emigration in the impoverished western regions, Balfour initiated a program in the Congested Districts that included public works and subsidies for local craft industries. Under the leadership of Horace Plunkett, a former Unionist MP for South Dublin, a new Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction departed from the practices of previous Irish Boards by declaring its aim to "be in touch with public opinion of the classes whom its work concerns, and to rely largely for its success upon their active assistance and cooperation."[54]: 210 This department actively supported and promoted dairy cooperatives, known as Creameries, which became significant institutions in the development of a new class of independent smallholders.[51]: 421–423
More substantial reforms followed when Salisbury returned to office in 1895, with the support of the splinter Liberal Unionist Party. The Land Law (Ireland) Act 1896 introduced, for the first time, the principle of compulsory sale to tenants, although its application was initially limited to bankrupt estates. "[You would suppose]," remarked Sir Edward Carson, a Dublin barrister and the leading voice for Irish Conservatives, "that the Government were revolutionists verging on Socialism."[54]: 209 Having been compelled to relinquish their control over local government (transferred entirely in 1898 to democratically elected councils), the old landlord class had the terms of their retirement formalized by the Irish Land Act 1903.[38]: 218–219, 233
These measures alleviated, but did not fully resolve, agrarian tensions, even in the north. In 1906, Thomas Russell, MP, the son of an evicted Scottish crofter, broke with the Conservatives within the Irish Unionist Alliance. He was subsequently elected to Westminster from South Tyrone as the champion of the Ulster Farmers and Labourers Union.[55][56] Working with William O'Brien, the MP for Cork City, Russell was instrumental in initiating a program that resulted in the construction of approximately 40,000 one-acre cottages owned by labourers.[57]
During the period of constructive reforms in the 1890s, and preceding the Liberal government's revival of the prospects for home rule, unionists displayed a growing interest in Irish culture. The first Ulster branch of the Gaelic League was established in east Belfast in 1895. Its patrons included the Rev. John Baptiste Crozier and Dr. John St Clair Boyd, both avowed unionists,[58] as well as the Rev. Richard Rutledge Kane, Grand Master of the Orange Order.[59]
However, for many Irish unionists, the tenure of George Wyndham as Chief Secretary was considered "a last straw."[16]: 419 In February 1905, it was revealed that his undersecretary, Sir Anthony MacDonnell, a Catholic, had been involved in devising a plan for administrative devolution that included an Irish council composed of both elected and nominated members. Balfour, then Prime Minister, was compelled to disavow the scheme, and Wyndham, pressured to deny his complicity, resigned.[60] The ensuing public outcry contributed to the Liberal Party's return to power in December.[19]: 418
Catholic unionists
The path of Catholicism towards identification with constitutional Irish nationalism was "far from smooth and immediate,"[61][62] and a tradition of Catholic support for the Union, grounded in the value of stability and empire, persisted beyond the initial home rule crisis. However, this tradition did not share the prevailing unionist conviction that any degree of devolution within the United Kingdom would inevitably lead to separation. Nor did it provide unionism with a counterpoint to the Protestants who individually played significant roles in home-rule and separatist politics.[63]
A small number of Irish Conservatives, drawn from the Catholic gentry (and pejoratively labeled "West Britons" by nationalists),[64] were elected to the Commons prior to the 1884 Reform Act. Sir Denis Henry (1864–1925) occupied a "unique place."[65] When he won his native South Londonderry seat in a by-election in 1916, he became the first Catholic to represent a unionist constituency in Ulster. He retained the seat in 1918, becoming the last Catholic to do so before the future Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.[65] Due to its institutional ties with the Orange Order, the Ulster Unionist Party, as it became known post-Partition, was effectively closed to Catholics.[66]: 71–72
"The Ulster Option" 1905–1920
Unionist labour
In 1905, the Ulster Unionist Council was established to unite unionists in the north, including, with 50 out of 200 seats, the Orange Order. Prior to this, unionism had largely relied on the support of Anglo-Irish aristocrats, valued for their influential connections in Great Britain. The UUC still afforded them a degree of precedence; The 6th Marquess of Londonderry, a descendant of Castlereagh and former Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, chaired its executive. The Council also retained the services of Carson, who from 1892 served as MP for Dublin University and, from 1910, led the Irish Unionist parliamentary party. However, the real political and organizational work was driven by northern employers, marshaled by Captain James Craig, a wealthy director of Belfast's Dunville Whiskey.[67][54]: 226–228
Unlike the southern landowners, who faced political opposition from their Catholic tenants, the manufacturers and merchants of Belfast and its industrial areas could generally depend on the votes of a majority of their workforce. However, the loyalty of the Protestant working class was not unconditional. Many working-class unionists saw no conflict between defending Protestant principles and embracing political radicalism; indeed, these were often perceived as intertwined, as the wealthy were seen as more susceptible to conciliation and betrayal.[68]: 102
Exercising the new workingman's vote, loyalists in Belfast elected their own "Conservative" in 1868, rejecting a mill owner in favor of an evangelical Orangeman, William Johnston, for Westminster. Johnston subsequently championed and voted for labour protection, tenant right, the secret ballot, and woman's suffrage.[69] In 1902, Johnston's successor as MP for South Belfast, Thomas Sloan, was again not the preferred candidate of employers. The campaign of the Belfast Protestant Association candidate was characterized by what opponents deemed a classic display of bigotry. Sloan protested the exemption of Catholic convents from inspection by the Hygiene Commission, arguing that the Catholic Church should not operate as "a state within a state." However, he also criticized the "fur-coat brigade" leading unionism, identifying as a trade unionist. Alongside R. Lindsay Crawford and their Independent Orange Order, Sloan supported dock and linen-mill workers, led by the syndicalist James Larkin, during the significant Belfast Lockout of 1907.[68]: 101–104
In July 1912, loyalists forced approximately 3,000 workers out of Belfast's shipyards and engineering plants. This incident differed from previous expulsions in that it included not only Catholics but also around 600 Protestants, primarily targeted for their perceived support of cross-sectarian labor organizing.[70] The unionist press equated any association with either British Labour or the Irish Trades Union Congress with support for Home Rule. Simultaneously, loyalist workers protested their portrayal as subservient to "big-house unionists." A manifesto signed in the spring of 1914 by two thousand laborers rejected the notion promoted by the radical and socialist press that Ulster was being manipulated by an "aristocratic plot." They asserted that if Sir Edward Carson led the fight for the Union, it was "because we, the workers, the people, the democracy of Ulster, have chosen him."[71] The majority of the signatories were likely members of British-based unions,[72] and they could point to the growing political influence of British labor in reform measures such as the Trade Disputes Act 1906, the People's Budget 1910, and the National Insurance Act 1911. Nationalists did not endeavor to persuade them that collective bargaining, progressive taxation, and social security were principles that could readily gain majority support in an Irish parliament.[73][74]: 21 [75]
Unionism and women's suffrage
At the peak of mobilization in Ulster against Home Rule, during the Covenant Campaign of September 1912, the unionist leadership determined that men alone could not adequately represent the determination of the unionist people to defend "their equal citizenship in the United Kingdom." Women were invited to sign their own Associate Declaration, distinct from the Covenant, which bound signatories to "all means which may be found necessary" and implied a readiness for armed resistance. A total of 234,046 women signed the Ulster Women's Declaration, while 237,368 men signed the Solemn League and Covenant.[76]
Unionist women had been engaged in political campaigning since the introduction of the first Home Rule Bill in 1886.[77] Some were active suffragettes. Isabella Tod, a Liberal who opposed Home Rule and advocated for girls' education, was an early pioneer. Her persistent lobbying through the North of Ireland Women's Suffrage Society ensured that the 1887 Act, which established a new municipal franchise for Belfast based on city status (piloted through the Commons by William Johnston), conferred the vote on individuals rather than solely men. This occurred eleven years before women elsewhere in Ireland gained the right to vote in local government elections.[79]
The Women's Suffrage Society (WSS) expressed reservations about the Ulster Women's Declaration and the Ulster Women's Unionist Council (UWUC)—at over 100,000 members, the largest women's political organization in Ireland.[80] Elizabeth McCracken noted the UWUC's failure to articulate "any demand on their own behalf or that of their own sex."[81] However, by September 1913, McCracken was celebrating a "marriage of unionism and women's suffrage."[82] Following reports that the militant Women's Social and Political Union (WPSU) intended to organize in Ulster, the secretary of the Ulster Unionist Council had informed the UWUC that draft articles for a proposed Ulster Provisional Government included provisions for women's suffrage. Nationalists, conversely, had made no such commitment regarding a Dublin parliament.[83][84]
This alliance proved short-lived. In March 1914, after being confronted for four days by the WSPU, Carson declared women's suffrage too divisive an issue for unionists. Subsequently, a series of arson attacks targeted unionist-owned and associated properties, culminating in Lillian Metge's bombing of Lisburn Cathedral.[85][86] During her subsequent trial, WPSU organizer Dorothy Evans caused a stir by questioning why James Craig, who was then arming Ulster Volunteers with German rifles, was not facing similar charges related to weapons and explosives.[84]
In August 1914, suffragists in Ulster suspended their campaign for the duration of the European war. Their efforts were recognized with the granting of women's franchise in 1918 and, six years after its introduction in the Irish Free State, equal voting rights in 1928. Notably, Dehra Parker became the first and only woman appointed to the Northern Ireland cabinet in 1949.
1912 Home Rule Crisis
In 1911, a Liberal administration once again relied on Irish nationalist MPs for its parliamentary majority. In 1912, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith introduced the Third Home Rule Bill. This proposal offered a more generous framework than previous bills, including for the first time an accountable executive for an Irish parliament.[88] The bill passed the Commons by a majority of ten votes. As anticipated, it was defeated in the Lords; however, due to the crisis triggered by the peers' opposition to the 1910 People's Budget, the Lords' power of delay was now significantly curtailed, meaning Home Rule was set to become law in 1914.
The idea of granting "an option to Ulster" had been discussed for some time. As early as 1843, The Northern Whig argued that if differences in ethnicity ("race") and interests justified Ireland's separation from Great Britain, similar arguments could be made for separating the north and south, with Belfast as the capital of its own "distinct kingdom."[89] In response to the First Home Rule Bill in 1886, Radical Unionists (Liberals who advocated for a federal structure within the United Kingdom) similarly proposed that "the Protestant part of Ulster should receive special treatment . . . on grounds identical with those that support the general contention for Home Rule."[90] Ulster Protestants showed no inclination towards a separate Belfast parliament, as they did not develop a distinct nationalism of their own.[91] However, in summarizing The Case Against Home Rule (1912), Leo Amery insisted that "if Irish Nationalism constitutes a nation, then Ulster is a nation too."[92]: 78
Faced with the eventual enactment of Home Rule, Carson appeared to champion this argument. On Ulster Day, September 28, 1912, he was the first to sign the Ulster Covenant in Belfast City Hall. This document bound signatories "to stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our children our position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom, and in using all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland."[93][94]
In January 1913, Carson declared his support for Ulster's exclusion and called for the enlistment of up to 100,000 Covenanters into drilled and armed Ulster Volunteers.[95] On September 23, the second Ulster Day, he accepted the chairmanship of a Provisional Government organized by Craig. He warned that if Home Rule were imposed, "we will be governed as a conquered community and nothing else."[92]: 79 In April, the Volunteers successfully smuggled 26,000 rifles and 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition from Germany through Larne.[3]: 168
By July 1914, the Ulster Covenant was supplemented by a British Covenant organized by Alfred Milner through the Union Defence League. Nearly two million signatories pledged their willingness to "supporting any action that may be effective" to prevent the people of Ulster from being deprived "of their rights as citizens of the United Kingdom."[3]: 134–135
Partition
The United Kingdom declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914. A few weeks later, the Home Rule bill received Royal Assent, but its implementation was suspended for the duration of the European conflict. With the issue of Ulster's exclusion unresolved, leaders on both sides sought favor with the Government and the British public by committing themselves and their volunteers to the war effort.[96]
This strategy faced challenges from the nationalist side. Militant republicans viewed contingents of republican Irish Volunteers and Connolly's Citizen Army as sacrificing themselves for Belgium while Britain suppressed an Irish bid for freedom on the streets of Dublin in Easter 1916. In the aftermath of the Rising and during a national campaign against military conscription, the IPP's credibility was severely eroded.[97][98]
In the Coupon Election of December 1918, the first Westminster poll since 1910, which saw all men over 21 and women over thirty eligible to vote (tripling the electorate), Sinn Féin largely replaced the IPP in nationalist constituencies. Acting on their mandate, Sinn Féin MPs convened in Dublin in January 1919 as the Dáil Éireann, the national assembly of the Republic declared in 1916, demanding the evacuation of the "English garrison." In the six north-eastern counties, unionists secured 22 out of 29 seats.[99]
Violence directed at Catholics in Belfast, including forced evictions from workplaces and attacks on their neighborhoods, along with a boycott of Belfast goods accompanied by looting and destruction, helped solidify a "real partition, spiritual and voluntary" even before the formal constitutional division.[92]: 99–100 This outcome was viewed by otherwise uncompromising Republicans as, at least for the time being, inevitable. In August 1920, Éamon de Valera, President of the Dáil, expressed support for "giving each county power to vote itself out of the Republic if it so wished."[100]
In an effort to broker a compromise that might still retain Ireland within Westminster's jurisdiction, the Government proceeded with the Government of Ireland Act 1920. This legislation established two subordinate parliaments: one in Belfast for the six counties of Northern Ireland (out of the original nine Ulster counties, as Craig conceded that Sinn Féin would make governance "absolutely impossible for us" in three of them)[101]; and another in Dublin for the remaining twenty-six counties of Southern Ireland. A joint Council was envisioned to facilitate all-Ireland arrangements between the two parliaments.[8]: 503
Elections for these parliaments were held in May 1921. However, the parliament in Southern Ireland effectively became the Dáil Éireann of the Irish Free State, as agreed by the British. Under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the twenty-six counties were granted the "same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada."[102] While not immediately apparent to all parties involved, leading to a subsequent civil war, this represented de facto independence.[103]
Consequently, unionists in Northern Ireland found themselves in the unexpected position of operating within a constitutional framework that was a byproduct of British statesmen's attempt to reconcile the determination of the Protestant population in the North to remain unequivocally within the United Kingdom with the aspirations of the Nationalist majority in Ireland for unity and independence.[104]: 17–18
In a letter to Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Craig asserted that Northern Ireland's acceptance of a home-rule arrangement, which its representatives had not sought, was a sacrifice made solely in the interest of peace.[105] However, no such regret was evident when addressing Belfast shipyard workers, where Craig assured them that once unionists had their own parliament, "no power on earth would ever be able to touch them."[106]
During the debates on the Government of Ireland Bill, Craig acknowledged that while unionists did not desire a separate parliament, establishing "all the paraphernalia of Government" in the six counties might impede future Liberal and/or Labour governments from forcing Northern Ireland into all-Ireland arrangements against the will of its majority.[107] This perspective became dominant, summarized in a 1936 report by the Ulster Unionist Council: "Northern Ireland without a Parliament of her own would be a standing temptation to certain British Politicians to make another bid for a final settlement with the Irish Republic."[108]
Having transitioned from being "Ulster unionists" to "six-county unionists," the group had effectively evolved into "Northern Irish Home Rulers."[109]
Unionist majority rule: Northern Ireland 1921–1972
Exclusion from Westminster Politics
Unionists have consistently emphasized that their victory in the Home Rule struggle was partial. Not only were twenty-six of Ireland's thirty-two counties lost to the Union, but within the six retained counties, unionists found themselves "unable to make the British government in London fully acknowledge their full and unequivocal membership of the United Kingdom."[110]: 9 [104]: 15
Although technically established by the decision of the six-county Parliament on December 6, 1922, to opt out of the Irish Free State, the Government of Northern Ireland possessed some formal characteristics of the Canada-style dominion status granted to the new state in the South. Like Ottawa, Belfast featured a bicameral Parliament, a Cabinet headed by a Prime Minister (initially Sir James Craig), and representation of the Crown by a Governor advised by a Privy Council. These elements suggested not merely a devolved administration within the United Kingdom, but rather a state constituted under the Crown, operating outside the direct jurisdiction of the Westminster parliament.[111]
The impression that Ireland as a whole was being removed from Westminster politics was reinforced by the reluctance of both the governing and opposition parties to organize or campaign for votes in the six counties.[112] The Conservatives were content with Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) MPs adhering to their party whip in the House of Commons, where, by mutual agreement, matters falling within the purview of the Belfast Parliament were not raised. The Labour Party formed its first (minority) government in 1924, led by Ramsay MacDonald, who had served as the election agent in North Belfast for the trade-unionist William Walker in 1905.[113] MacDonald's party had held its first conference in Belfast in 1907. Yet, at the height of the Home Rule Crisis in 1913, the British Labour Party had resolved not to compete against Irish Labour, a policy of deference that continued after 1921.[114]
United by their opposition to the conflict, unionists in Northern Ireland eschewed the fragmentation seen in Westminster politics. Despite its extensive legislative powers, the Belfast Parliament lacked the crucial taxation and spending authorities that might have fostered such party competition. The primary sources of government revenue—income and corporation taxes, customs, and excise—remained entirely under Westminster's control.[66]: 77–86
Stormont government
The statue of Lord Edward Carson in front of Parliament Buildings, Stormont.
Until the crisis of the late 1960s, unionism in Northern Ireland was characterized by effectively single-party rule. For his 28 years in Stormont (1925–1953), [Tommy Henderson], an independent from North Belfast, served as a solitary voice of unionist opposition. In 1938, the Ulster Progressive Unionist Party, led by William John Stewart, attempted to align with him, securing an average of 30% of the vote in ten constituencies that were otherwise considered safe Government seats.[31]: 286 After officially endorsing the Union, the Northern Ireland Labour Party won three seats in 1953. However, for the most part, Government candidates were returned by unionist voters without contest. The Nationalist Party initially refused to take their seats in the first Stormont parliament (1921–25) and did not assume the role of official Opposition for another forty years.[115]
Declared by Craig to be a "Protestant parliament,"[92]: 118 and boasting a "substantial and assured" Unionist Party majority,[116] the Stormont legislature had limited political sway. Real authority resided "with the regional government itself and its administration": a structure "run by a very small number of individuals." Between 1921 and 1939, only twelve individuals served in the cabinet, some for extended periods, and they relied heavily on a select group of senior civil servants.[117]: 116–119 It was in protest against this concentration of power that the Progressive Unionists proposed limiting terms in government to eight years or two parliamentary terms.[31]: 286
Although lacking a definitive political program for a devolved parliament, the Ulster Unionist Party regime did implement an early reform. In accordance with the obligation under the Government of Ireland Act to neither establish nor endow a religion, a 1923 Education Act stipulated that religious instruction in schools would only be permitted after school hours and with parental consent.[66]: 135–149 Lord Londonderry, the Minister of Education, expressed his aspiration for integrated Protestant-Catholic education. However, a coalition of Protestant clergy, school principals, and Orangemen insisted on the necessity of Bible teaching. Craig relented, amending the act in 1925. In the interim, the Catholic hierarchy refused to transfer any schools and prohibited male Catholic student teachers from enrolling in a common training college with Protestants or women.[118] This policy effectively perpetuated the segregation of Protestants and Catholics during school years.
At the conclusion of World War II, the Unionist Government, under the premiership of Basil Brooke (Lord Brookeborough), committed to two significant reforms. Firstly, it pledged a program of "slum clearance" and public housing construction, acknowledging after the Belfast Blitz that much of the existing housing stock had been "uninhabitable" prior to the war. Secondly, the Government accepted an offer from London—perceived as a reward for the province's wartime contributions—to align Northern Ireland's taxation levels with those of Great Britain, in exchange for parity in the services provided. The objective was to gain greater integration within the Union at the cost of some autonomy.[119]
By the 1960s, Unionism was administering a system that diverged from the general conservatism of those who had initially supported the resistance to Irish Home Rule. Driven by the impetus of the post-War Labour government in Britain and supported by British subsidies, Northern Ireland had developed an advanced welfare state. The Education Act (NI) of 1947 "revolutionised access" to secondary and further education. Healthcare provision was expanded and reorganized along the lines of the National Health Service in Great Britain, ensuring universal access. The Victorian-era Poor Law, which had persisted after 1921, was replaced by a comprehensive social security system. Under the Housing Act (NI) of 1945, the public subsidy for new housing construction was proportionately higher than in England and Wales.[117]: 43–49
1960s: reform and protest
In the 1960s, under the premiership of Terence O'Neill, the Stormont administration intensified its efforts to attract foreign investment. Investments in new infrastructure, training programs coordinated with trade unions, and direct grants proved successful in attracting firms from America, Britain, and continental Europe. In its own terms, this strategy was successful: while major Victorian industries continued their decline, manufacturing employment saw a modest increase. However, this development unsettled Protestant workers and local Unionist leadership. Unlike the established family firms and skilled-trades apprenticeships that had formed "a backbone of unionism and Protestant privilege," the new companies readily employed Catholics and women.[117]: 87–89 Among Catholics, however, concerns arose regarding the regional distribution of new investment.
When Derry was overlooked in favor of Coleraine for the establishment of the New University of Ulster, and Lurgan and Portadown were chosen for a new urban-industrial development, some perceived a broader conspiracy. Speaking to Labour MPs in London, John Hume suggested that "the plan" was "to develop the strongly Unionist-Belfast-Coleraine-Portadown triangle and to cause a migration from West to East Ulster, redistributing and scattering the minority to that the Unionist Party will not only maintain but strengthen its position."[120]
Hume, a teacher from Derry, presented himself as a spokesperson for an emerging "third force": a "generation of younger Catholics in the North" dissatisfied with the nationalist policy of non-recognition and abstention. (O'Neill wrote of "a new Catholic intelligentsia," which he believed was the product of the 1947 Education Act, "unwilling to put up with the deprived status their fathers and grandfathers had taken for granted").[121]: 137 [122] Committed to addressing the significant social issues of housing, unemployment, and emigration, they were willing to accept "the Protestant tradition in the North as legitimate" and believed that Irish unity should be achieved only "by the will of the Northern majority."[123] Although they appeared to meet unionists halfway, Hume and his supporters, in what he envisioned as "the emergence of normal politics," presented Unionism with a new challenge.[124] Drawing inspiration from the civil rights movements in the United States, they employed a language of universal rights that resonated widely with British and international opinion.
Since 1964, the Campaign for Social Justice had been compiling and publicizing evidence of discrimination in employment and housing. From April 1967, this cause was taken up by the Belfast-based Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, a broad coalition of labor and republican groups, with the Communist Party veteran Betty Sinclair serving as chair. Aiming to "challenge . . . by more vigorous action than Parliamentary questions and newspaper controversy," NICRA decided to organize a series of marches.[125]: 34
In October 1968, the Derry Housing Action Committee proposed a march in Derry. When a sectarian confrontation loomed—the Apprentice Boys of Derry announced their intention to march the same route—the NICRA executive favored calling it off. However, DHAC proceeded, with activist Eamon McCann acknowledging that the "conscious, if unspoken strategy, was to provoke the police into overreaction and thus spark off mass reaction against the authorities."[126]: 91 A later official inquiry suggested that police actions, including "using their batons indiscriminately," were triggered by defiance of the initial order to disperse.[127] The day concluded with street battles in Derry's Catholic Bogside area. This marked the onset of what is now referred to as "The Troubles," bringing Northern Ireland into the British and international headlines and television news for the first time in decades.
Opposition to O'Neill
In January 1965, at O'Neill's personal invitation, Taoiseach [Seán Lemass] (whose government was pursuing a similar modernization agenda in the South) made an unannounced visit to Stormont. Following O'Neill's reciprocal visit to Dublin, the Nationalists were persuaded to assume the role of Her Majesty's Opposition at Stormont for the first time. These and other conciliatory gestures—including unprecedented visits to Catholic hospitals and schools, and flying the Union flag at half-mast upon the death of Pope John XXIII—provoked the wrath of those O'Neill identified as "self-styled 'loyalists' who see moderation as treason, and decency as weakness,"[121]: 123 among whom was the Reverend Ian Paisley.
As Moderator of his own Free Presbyterian Church, and at a time when he believed mainline presbyteries were being led astray by the Irish Council of Churches towards a "Roman road," Paisley saw himself as following in the footsteps of the "greatest son" of Irish Presbyterianism, Dr. Henry Cooke.[128] Like Cooke, Paisley was acutely aware of the dangers of both "political and ecclesiastical" ecumenicism. Following the Lemass meeting, Paisley declared that "the Ecumenists . . . are selling us out" and urged Ulster Protestants to resist a "policy of treachery."[129]
Many within O'Neill's own party were alarmed when, in December 1968, he dismissed his hard-line Minister of Home Affairs, William Craig[130] and proceeded with a reform package that addressed many of NICRA's demands. These reforms included a needs-based points system for public housing; the appointment of an ombudsman to investigate citizen grievances; the abolition of the rates-based franchise in council elections (introducing "one man, one vote"); and the replacement of The Londonderry Corporation (through which unionists had governed the predominantly nationalist city) with an independent development commission. The broad security provisions of the Special Powers Act were also slated for review.[131]
At a Downing Street summit on November 4, Prime Minister Harold Wilson warned O'Neill that if Stormont backtracked on reform, the British government would reconsider its financial support for Northern Ireland.[125]: 99 In a televised address, O'Neill cautioned Unionists that they could not selectively embrace the United Kingdom only when it "suits" them, and that defying the British government would be reckless. He highlighted the dependence of jobs in key industries like shipbuilding, subsidies for farmers, and pensions on British support, posing the question: "Is a freedom to pursue the un-Christian path of communal strife and sectarian bitterness really more important to you than all the benefits of the British Welfare state?"[132]
With members of his cabinet urging him to call Wilson's "bluff" and facing a motion of no-confidence from Backbenchers, O'Neill called a general election in January 1969. The Ulster Unionist Party fractured. Pro-O'Neill candidates garnered support from Liberal and Labour voters but secured only a plurality of seats. In O'Neill's own constituency of Bannside, where he had previously been returned unopposed, he narrowly defeated Paisley, who ran as a Protestant Unionist. On April 28, 1969, O'Neill resigned.[16]: 163–164
O'Neill's position had been weakened when, focusing on demands not yet met (such as redrawing electoral boundaries, immediate repeal of the Special Powers Act, and disbandment of the Special Constabulary), republicans and left-wing students disregarded appeals from within NICRA and Hume's Derry Citizens Action Committee to suspend protests.[125]: 102–107 On January 4, 1969, People's Democracy marchers en route from Belfast to Derry were ambushed and assaulted by loyalists, including off-duty Specials, at Burntollet Bridge.[133] That night, renewed street fighting erupted in the Bogside. From behind barricades, residents declared "Free Derry," briefly establishing Northern Ireland's first security-force "no-go area."[134]
Tensions had further escalated in the days preceding O'Neill's resignation due to several explosions at electricity and water installations attributed to the IRA. The subsequent Scarman Tribunal concluded that these "outrages" were "the work of Protestant extremists . . . anxious to undermine confidence" in O'Neill's leadership.[135] (The bombers, identifying as the "Ulster Volunteer Force," had first appeared in 1966 with a series of sectarian killings).[136][137]: 25 The IRA did engage in actions on the night of April 20-21, bombing ten post offices in Belfast in an attempt to divert the RUC away from Derry, where significant violence was occurring.[125]: 120
Imposition of direct rule
To the extent that unionists acknowledge inequities in rule from Stormont—Paisley later conceded, "it wasn't . . . a fair government. It wasn't justice for all"—they argue these were a consequence of insecurity fostered by successive British governments' own indecisiveness regarding Northern Ireland's place within the United Kingdom.[110]: 8–9 When the tensions they contributed to in Northern Ireland finally erupted, unionists believe British equivocation proved disastrous. Had they viewed Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom, the Government's response in 1969–70 would have been "fundamentally different." If they had perceived remediable social and political grievances, Westminster would have legislated accordingly. Instead, acts of rebellion would have been suppressed and punished with the full force of the state. According to this unionist analysis, the policy would never have involved containment and negotiation.[104]: 15–16 [139]
The model of Free Derry was replicated in other nationalist neighborhoods in both Derry and Belfast. Sealed off by barricades, these areas were openly policed by the IRA.[137]: 176 [140] In what was reported as the largest British military operation since the Suez Crisis,[141] [Operation Motorman], on July 31, 1972, the British Army eventually re-established control.[142][143] However, this was preceded in the weeks prior by a ceasefire during which Provisional IRA leaders, including Chief of Staff Seán Mac Stíofáin and his lieutenants Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams, were flown to London for unsuccessful negotiations with Northern Ireland Secretary William Whitelaw, acting on behalf of UK Prime Minister Edward Heath.[144]
A common unionist accusation was that Westminster and Whitehall continued to view Northern Ireland, much like Ireland before partition, as "something more akin to a colonial than a domestic problem."[104]: 17 From the initial deployment of troops in 1969, the perception was that of "a peace-keeping operation in which Her Majesty's Forces are not defending their homeland, but holding at bay two sects and factions as in Imperial India, Mandated Palestine, or Cyprus". This narrative reinforced the republican claim that the "insurgence in the housing estates and borderland of Ulster" resembled the Third World wars of liberation, and that Britain's first and last colony would experience "decolonisation . . . as it was in Aden and elsewhere."[92]: 144–145 The analysis of unionism as an expression of settler colonialism was indeed promoted in Britain by left-wing commentators and scholars.[145][146][147]
London's handling of security issues, particularly following the introduction of [internment] at the insistence of Stormont government under [Brian Faulkner], proved detrimental to unionist credibility. In the early hours of August 10, 1971, [342 persons suspected of IRA involvement] were arrested without charge or warrant.[148] Many appeared to have no connection to the IRA; those who did were typically linked to the left-leaning Officials. The Officials had already committed to an unarmed political strategy and, on that basis, would declare a ceasefire in May 1972.[149] Leading Provisionals, some of whom were new to the IRA, entirely evaded the arrests. Unionists blamed poor intelligence on London's refusal to permit no-go areas.[150]
Internment proved to be a public relations disaster for the British Government, both domestically and internationally. It was exacerbated by the interrogation of internees using methods (the so-called five techniques) that were eventually deemed illegal by the UK Government's own commission of inquiry[151] and ruled "inhuman and degrading" by the European Court of Human Rights.[152] Further national and international outrage followed the Army's lethal use of live fire against unarmed anti-internment protesters, with Bloody Sunday in Derry (January 20, 1972) being the most notorious incident.[153]
In March, Heath demanded that Faulkner relinquish control of internal security. When Faulkner resigned rather than comply, as might have been anticipated, the action shattered for unionists "the theory that the Army was simply in Northern Ireland for the purpose of offering aid to the civil power, of defending legally established institutions against terrorist attack." In what unionists perceived as a victory for violence, the Conservative government prorogued Stormont and imposed direct rule, not solely to restore order but "to reshape the Province's system of government."[104]: 63
Negotiating the Irish Dimension: 1973–2006
Sunningdale Agreement and the Ulster Workers strike
[Anti-Faulkner Unionist election poster]
In October 1972, the British government published a Green Paper, The Future of Northern Ireland. This document articulated the enduring principles that would guide the British approach to a settlement:
It is a fact that an element of the minority in Northern Ireland has hitherto seen itself as simply part of the wider Irish community. The problem of accommodating that minority within the political of Northern Ireland has to some extent been an aspect of a wider problem within Ireland as a whole.
It is therefore clearly desirable that any new arrangements for Northern Ireland should, whilst meeting the wishes of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, be so far as possible acceptable to the Republic of Ireland.
Northern Ireland must and will remain part of the United Kingdom for as long as that is the wish of a majority of the people, but that status does not preclude the necessary taking into account of what has been described in this paper as the 'Irish Dimension.'
A Northern Ireland assembly or authority must be capable of involving all its members constructively in ways which satisfy them and those they represent that the whole community has a part to play in the government of the province. . . . [T]here are strong arguments that the objective of real participation should be achieved by giving the minority interests a share in the exercise of executive power.
Faulkner's successor as party leader, James Molyneaux, argued that for most unionists, the primary difficulty was not an arrangement requiring Protestant and Catholic consent. Rather, it was the fact that despite a promise not to share power with parties whose main objective was a united Ireland,[154] Faulkner had committed them to an agreement with "Republican Catholics."[155]
Having drawn support from both the Republican and Northern Ireland, Labour parties, the SDLP aimed to accommodate "progressive Protestants."[156]: 191 However, with the PIRA continuing to capitalize on public outrage over internment and Bloody Sunday, the SDLP faced pressure to present the Sunningdale Agreement as a pathway to achieving Irish unity.[126]: 141 The new Health and Social Services Minister, Paddy Devlin, acknowledged that "all other issues were governed" by a drive to "get all-Ireland institutions established" that would "produce the dynamic that would lead ultimately to an agreed united Ireland."[156]: 205
The Sunningdale Agreement envisioned a Council of Ireland, comprising equal delegations from Dublin and Belfast. This council would include a Council of Ministers with "executive and harmonising functions" and a Consultative Assembly for advisory and review purposes. Unionists feared this structure could lead to them being maneuvered into a minority position. In retrospect, Devlin regretted that the SDLP had not "adopted a two stage approach, by allowing power sharing at Stormont to establish itself," but by the time he and his colleagues recognized the damage they had inflicted on Faulkner's standing by prioritizing the Irish Dimension, it was too late.[156]: 252
Within a week of assuming office as First Minister, Faulkner was forced to resign as UUP leader. A surprise Westminster election held at the end of February resulted in a significant victory for the United Ulster Unionist Coalition, which included the majority of his former party as Official Unionists, alongside William Craig's Ulster Vanguard and Paisley's newly formed Democratic Unionists. Faulkner's pro-Assembly faction secured only 13% of the unionist vote. Arguing that this outcome deprived Faulkner of any semblance of a mandate, the victorious coalition called for new Assembly elections.
When the Assembly affirmed the Sunningdale Agreement in May, a loyalist coalition, the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC), initiated a general strike. Within two weeks, the UWC, supported by the Ulster Defence Association and UVF paramilitaries, effectively controlled energy supplies.[157] Concessions sought by Faulkner were blocked by the SDLP. John Hume, then Minister of Commerce, advocated for a British Army-enforced fuel plan and resistance to "a fascist takeover."[158][159] After Mervyn Rees, the [Northern Ireland Secretary], refused his final request for negotiations, Faulkner resigned. Acknowledging the absence of a constitutional basis for the Executive, Rees dissolved the Assembly.[156]: 242–247
Unionism and loyalist para-militarism
The UWC strike ushered in a prolonged period of Direct Rule and diminished the representative role of unionist parties. While several consultative assemblies and forums were established in subsequent years, the only elective offices with administrative responsibilities were within the scaled-down district councils. At Westminster, unionist MPs contended with governments committed to the principles outlined in the 1972 Green Paper. The initiative in protesting what unionists often perceived as inadequate security responses to republican violence shifted to loyalists.
The primary modus operandi for loyalists was not industrial action. With Paisley's endorsement, in 1977 the UDA and several other loyalist groups attempted to replicate the UWC's success. Stoppages in support of a "unionist wish-list"—essentially a return to Stormont-era majority rule[160]—failed to garner support from essential workers and were ultimately abandoned amid condemnation from the UUP and firm police action.[161] Nor did the ballot box prove effective, although both the UVF and the UDA did establish political wings. Their primary tactic became assassination: throughout the Troubles, loyalists are credited with the murders of 1,027 individuals (approximately half the number attributed to republican paramilitaries and 30% of the total fatalities).[162]
Loyalism, of which the historically rural Orange Order was the archetypal expression, is generally understood as a subset of unionism. It has been characterized as partisan but not necessarily party-political, and in outlook as more ethnic than consciously British—representing the perspective of those who identify as Ulster Protestants first and British second.[163] While loyalism can encompass evangelicals, the term is consistently associated with paramilitaries and, consequently, is often used interchangeably with working-class unionism. These paramilitaries are described as "thoroughly working class."[164] Their influence typically concentrated in working-class Protestant neighborhoods and housing estates, where they compensated for the decline in their earlier role as district defenders by engaging in racketeering and intimidation.[165]
Early in his career, Paisley combined his fiercely anti-Catholic evangelism with an involvement in physical force loyalism, forming Ulster Protestant Action (UPA) in 1956.[166] [Ulster Protestant Volunteers] were implicated, albeit through alleged intermediaries, in bombings intended to "blow O'Neill out of office" in early 1969. However, leaders of the UVF maintain that Paisley had no direct involvement with them; while his rhetoric may have been inspirational, their operations were characterized by tight secrecy.[167]: 29–33 The motivation for killing largely stemmed from secular forces within the Loyalist community.[168] Through the DUP, Paisley ultimately led the majority of his followers into party politics, emerging in the new century as the undisputed leader of unionism.
The relationship between other, at the time more mainstream, unionist political figures and loyalist paramilitaries remains a subject of debate. Paramilitaries denied any political manipulation, yet suggested they could rely on politicians to convey their message. While party leaders condemned loyalist outrages, their attempts to frame these actions as reactive—a response to the grievances and frustrations of the unionist people—effectively utilized sectarian, often random, killings to extract concessions from the Government: "You know, 'if you don't talk to us, you will have to talk to these armed men'."[167]: 18–20 Consequently, the relationship between unionists and loyalist violence remained "ambiguous."[169]
Opposition to the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement
In 1985, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher signed an agreement at Hillsborough with the Irish Taoiseach, Garret FitzGerald. This agreement appeared to grant the Republic a direct role in the governance of Northern Ireland for the first time. An Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, supported by a locally based secretariat, would invite the Irish government to "put forward views on proposals" concerning major legislation for Northern Ireland. Crucially, these proposals would only pertain to matters not under the responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. The implication for unionists was that if they wished to limit Dublin's influence, they would need to abandon their insistence on majority rule and reconsider how nationalists could be accommodated at Stormont.[170]
The unionist reaction, as Thatcher recalled in her memoirs, was "worse than anyone had predicted to me."[171] The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) spearheaded an "Ulster says No" campaign against the Anglo-Irish or Hillsborough Agreement. This campaign included strikes, civil disobedience, and a mass resignation of unionist MPs from Westminster, alongside the suspension of district council meetings.[172] In what was the largest unionist protest since Ulster Day in 1912, over one hundred thousand people rallied outside Belfast City Hall on November 23, 1985. Paisley addressed the crowd, rhetorically asking, "Where do the terrorists return to for sanctuary? To the Irish Republic and yet Mrs. Thatcher tells us the Republic may have some say in our province. We say, Never! Never! Never! Never!"[51]: 758
However, unionists found themselves politically isolated, opposing a Conservative government and facing a Westminster Opposition (Labour) sympathetic to Irish unity. Lacking apparent leverage and possibly seeking to prevent the loyalist paramilitaries from seizing the initiative, Paisley announced his own "third force" in November 1986:[173] the Ulster Resistance Movement (URM), which pledged to "take direct action as and when required." Recruitment rallies were held across Northern Ireland, attracting thousands of participants. Despite acquiring arms, some of which were supplied to the UVF and UDA, the URM never received the call to action.[174][175] By the fourth anniversary of the accord, unionist protests against the Anglo-Irish Agreement were drawing only token support.[172]
In March 1991, the two unionist parties, along with the SDLP and Alliance, agreed to arrangements for political talks concerning Northern Ireland's future.[172] In their submission to the 1992 inter-party talks, the Ulster Unionists indicated a willingness to consider various cross-border bodies, provided they remained under the control of the Northern Assembly, did not involve an overarching all-Ireland Council, and were not designed to evolve towards joint authority. While open to accommodating an Irish Dimension, unionists, at a minimum, sought a settlement rather than an "unsettlement."[176]
Integrationist unionism
As an alternative to devolution involving an Irish Dimension, some unionists proposed that Northern Ireland reject special status within the United Kingdom and revert to what they considered the original unionist objective: complete legislative and political integration with Great Britain. This position was advocated by the British and Irish Communist Organisation (B&ICO), a small, contrarian left-wing group that gained the attention of unionists through their Two-nations Theory of partition and their conditional support for the UWC Strike.[177]
They argued that the British Labour Party had been persuaded that Irish unity was the only viable left-wing option in Northern Ireland, less on its merits than on the superficial perception of unionism as merely the six-county Tory Party.[178] Had Labour actively campaigned for votes in Northern Ireland, they contended, the party might have served as a "bridge between Catholics and the state."[74]: 109 Disappointed by Labour's response and facing internal divisions within unionism (Democracy Now, led by the sole Northern Irish Labour MP—representing a London constituency—Kate Hoey), the B&ICO dissolved its Campaign for Labour Representation in 1993. A broader Campaign for Equal Citizenship, which the B&ICO briefly joined, aimed to engage all three Westminster parties in Northern Ireland but also failed to achieve its objectives.[177]: 496–502 Its president, Robert McCartney, briefly led five "devosceptic"[179] UK Unionist Party MLAs in the 1998 Assembly.
In 2003, the Labour Party Conference accepted legal advice that the party could no longer exclude Northern Ireland residents from membership.[180] However, the National Executive Committee maintained its ban on the Labour Party in Northern Ireland contesting elections, continuing its policy of supporting the SDLP.[181]
In July 2008, under Reg Empey, the Ulster Unionist Party sought to re-establish its historic link with the Conservative Party, which had been severed following the Sunningdale Agreement. With the new Conservative leader David Cameron declaring that "the semi-detached status of Northern Ireland politics needs to end,"[182] Empey announced that his party would field candidates in upcoming Westminster elections under the banner of Ulster Conservatives and Unionists – New Force. This move triggered defections, and in the 2010 election, the party lost its sole remaining MP, Sylvia Hermon,[183] who successfully ran as an independent. This episode underscored the eclipse of the UUP by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a party that combined social and economic populism with an uncompromising unionist stance.[184]
Northern Ireland Conservatives have since contested elections independently. They fielded five candidates in the 2024 Westminster election, collectively receiving 553 votes.
In the lead-up to the 2024 general election, Jim Allister's Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) formed an electoral pact with Reform UK.[185] While Allister was elected as the TUV MP for North Antrim, he defeated the DUP's incumbent MP, Ian Paisley Jr., whom Reform's new leader Nigel Farage had personally endorsed.[186] In Westminster, Allister declined to accept the Reform UK whip.[187]
1998 Good Friday Agreement
SDLP leader Seamus Mallon quipped that the 1998 Belfast, or Good Friday, Agreement (GFA), was "Sunningdale for slow learners."[188][189][190] This was not the perspective of David Trimble, who, as joint head of the new power-sharing Executive, shared the Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) with Mallon. Trimble believed that unionism had secured significant gains that had been denied to Faulkner 25 years prior.
The Council of Ireland, which Mallon's party colleague, Hugh Logue, had described as "the vehicle that would trundle Unionists into a united Ireland,"[191] was replaced by a North-South Ministerial Council. This body was characterized as "Not a supra-national body," with no "pre-cooked" agenda, and was accountable to the Assembly where procedural rules (the Petition of Concern)[192] mandated cross-community consent, thereby providing a "unionist veto."[193]: 1155–1157
For the first time, Dublin formally recognized the border as the limit of its jurisdiction. The Republic agreed to undertake what the SDLP had refused to consider in 1974:[194] to amend its Constitution to remove the territorial claim to the entire island of Ireland and acknowledge that Irish unity could only be achieved through majority consent "democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island." The established nationalist principle that unionists constitute a minority within the state's territory was set aside.[193]: 1152 [195]
In return, however, unionists had to accept that within the new power-sharing framework, securing republican consent was unavoidable. The new Executive would be formed not through voluntary coalition, as in 1974, but by allocating ministerial posts to Assembly parties on a proportional basis. This d'Hondt method ensured that unionists would be seated at the Executive table with those they had consistently labeled IRA-Sinn Féin. In 1998, Sinn Féin, which had been gaining support over the SDLP since the eighties, held 18 Assembly seats (compared to the SDLP's 26) and secured two of the ten Executive departments.
Unionists expressed concern that this power-sharing arrangement was based on a principle that "rendered dangerously incoherent" the UK government's stance regarding the Union.[196] The Agreement emphasized parity between unionism and nationalism, the two "designations" it privileged over "others" through the Assembly's procedural rules. Either designation could insist (via a Petition of Concern) on decisions being made by parallel consent, and they jointly nominated the First and Deputy First Ministers, who, despite the difference in title, held a shared office. "Parity of esteem" was accorded to two opposing aspirations: one to support and uphold the state, the other to renounce and undermine the state in favor of another. While the UK government may have deflected the republican demand for it to actively promote Irish unity, this came at the cost, in the unionist view, of maintaining neutrality regarding Northern Ireland's future.[197][198]
The UK's acceptance of Irish unity by consent was not unprecedented. It had been present in the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and again in the 1993 Downing Street Declaration, where London disclaimed any "selfish strategic or economic interest" in the matter.[199] Unionists were nonetheless unsettled by the republican assertion that the 1998 Agreement had, in Gerry Adams' words, "dealt the union a severe blow": "there was now no absolute commitment, no raft of parliamentary acts to back up an absolute claim, only an agreement to stay until the majority decided otherwise."[200]
In the May 1998 referendum on the Good Friday Agreement, with a turnout of 81%, 71.1% voted in favor. (A simultaneous referendum in the Republic of Ireland, with a 56% turnout, produced a 94.4% majority in favor). The most reliable estimates indicated that all but 3-4% of Catholics/Nationalists voted Yes, while nearly half of Protestants/Unionists (between 47% and 49%) sided with the DUP and voted No.[201]
The DUP's primary objections were neither the North-South Ministerial Council, although it remained a source of suspicion, nor the principle of power-sharing itself. When the new Executive was formed, the DUP secured two ministerial seats, matching Sinn Féin's allocation. The core issue was the continued existence of the IRA as an armed and active organization; republicans were participating in government while retaining the capacity for terrorist action, further bolstered by the release of republican prisoners.[202] In an agreement that called on parties to exert influence over paramilitaries to achieve disarmament, there were no effective sanctions. Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams were free to insist that the IRA operated independently.[203]
In October 2002, at a time when the IRA had agreed in principle but not yet complied with a process for decommissioning their arms, a police raid on Sinn Féin's offices at Stormont suggested that the organization remained active and was collecting intelligence. Trimble led the UUP out of the Executive, and the Assembly was suspended. (No charges were brought as a result of the raid, which centered on Sinn Féin staffer [Denis Donaldson], later revealed to be a government informer, and a public inquiry was deemed not to be in the public interest).[204]
Democratic Unionists enter government with Sinn Féin
In October 2006, the DUP and Sinn Féin reached an agreement in the St Andrews Agreement, paving the way for Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness to be nominated as First and Deputy First Ministers by a restored Assembly. For the UUP's new leader Reg Empey, this breakthrough was merely the GFA "for slow learners." However, while acknowledging compromises, Paisley declared that Northern Ireland was "turning a corner." He argued that the IRA had disarmed and that Sinn Féin had offered support "for all the institutions of policing," signifying that Northern Ireland had "come to a time of peace."[205]
After thirteen months in office, Paisley was succeeded as First Minister of Northern Ireland by his long-time DUP deputy Peter Robinson.[206][207] Robinson, and [Arlene Foster], who followed him in office from January 2016, maintained more strained relationships with McGuinness and Sinn Féin than Paisley had, ultimately leading to a breakdown. Citing "DUP's arrogance" concerning various issues, including the mismanagement of a financial scandal, McGuinness resigned in January 2017. Sinn Féin refused to nominate a successor, rendering the devolved institutions unworkable. Assembly elections were subsequently held on March 2, 2017. For the first time in the history of Northern Ireland as a political entity, unionists failed to secure an overall majority in the region's parliament, holding 45 of the 90 seats.
It was not until January 2020 that a deal was brokered (New Decade, New Approach) to restore the Assembly and persuade Sinn Féin to nominate their new leader in the North, Michelle O'Neill, as McGuinness's successor.[208]
The withdrawal of support within the DUP for Paisley's conciliatory leadership did not result in a lasting split over the party's decision to enter into an Executive with Sinn Féin. In the Assembly, Paisley's former lieutenant, [Jim Allister], became the sole Traditional Unionist Voice MLA, protesting an "enforced coalition" that placed those determined to subvert the state "at the heart of government."[209] In the 2024 general election, Allister was elected as the Member of Parliament for North Antrim, defeating the incumbent Ian Paisley Jr. This seat had been held by a member of the Paisley family since the 1970 general election.
Unionism as a minority bloc
Unionist demographics
The demographic shifts in Northern Ireland have become a significant concern for unionism. Following the loss of the North Belfast seat to Sinn Féin's John Finucane in the 2019 election—a seat previously held for nineteen years by her deputy Nigel Dodds and never before won by a nationalist MP—Arlene Foster attributed the outcome to demographic changes, stating, "The demography just wasn't there. We worked very hard to get the vote out... but the demography was against us."[210] A Sinn Féin election leaflet used in the preceding 2015 campaign against Dodds highlighted the changing ratio of Catholics to Protestants in the constituency (46.94% to 45.67%), with a direct appeal to Catholic voters: "Make the change."[211]
Demographically, the proportion of people in Northern Ireland identifying as Protestant, or raised Protestant, has declined from 60% in the 1960s to 48%, while those raised Catholic have increased from 35% to 45%. Only two of the six counties, Antrim and Down, now have substantial Protestant majorities, and only one city, Lisburn, among its five official cities. A Protestant majority in Northern Ireland is now largely confined to the suburban areas surrounding Belfast.[212][213] Consequently, unionist representation has diminished. The combined unionist vote, falling below 50% in elections since 2014, reached a new low of just over 43% in the 2019 and 2024 Westminster polls.[214]
However, the decline of unionist electoral strength has not necessarily translated into a proportional increase for nationalism. Overall, there has been "no comparable increase in the nationalist vote mirroring the decline in the unionist bloc."[215] Despite symbolic victories, such as securing the largest number of Westminster MPs in 2019 and Sinn Féin becoming the largest party in Stormont in 2022, the combined nationalist vote at 40% remains below the 42% achieved in the 2005 United Kingdom general election.[214]
Surveys indicate that approximately half of Northern Ireland's population identifies as neither unionist nor nationalist. Those who eschew these labels (with over 17% also declining to state a religious affiliation) tend to be younger and less likely to participate in Northern Ireland's still largely polarized elections.[216] It remains the case that few Protestants vote for nationalists, and few Catholics vote for unionists.[217] However, they do vote for other parties, including those that do not prioritize Northern Ireland's constitutional status.
The primary alternative party is the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland. In 2019, Alliance more than doubled its vote share in the Northern Ireland-wide May European elections from 7.1% to 18.5%, and in the December Westminster election from 7.9% to 16.8%. Competing in the 2022 Assembly election against a full spectrum of local parties, Alliance secured 13.5% of first-preference votes and, through vote transfers, nearly a fifth of the Assembly seats.
According to exit polls from the 2019 Westminster election, the surge in Alliance's support drew from both former unionist and former nationalist voters. In that election, 18% of Alliance's new supporters indicated they had voted DUP in the previous contest, and 3% had voted UUP. Twelve percent had voted for Sinn Féin, and 5% for the SDLP. The party also gained a quarter of all individuals who had not voted two years prior.[218] Alliance maintains neutrality on the constitutional question, but a January 2020 survey suggested that in a post-Brexit border poll, twice as many of its voters (47%) would favor Irish unity over remaining in the United Kingdom (22%).[219]
Since O'Neill, who personally campaigned in Catholic households during the last Stormont parliamentary election,[220] there have been calls within unionism for it to broaden its appeal beyond its traditional Protestant base. During his tenure as DUP leader, Peter Robinson spoke of not being "prepared to write off over 40 per cent of our population as being out of reach."[221] Surveys have indicated that in a border poll, between a quarter and a third of Catholics might vote for Northern Ireland to remain in the UK.[222] While anti-partition sentiment has strengthened post-Brexit,[223] there may be a significant number of Catholics who fit the description of "functional unionists": voters whose "rejection of the unionist label is more to do with the brand image of unionism than with their constitutional preferences."[224] It remains the case that only 0.5% of DUP and UUP members identify as Catholic—a mere handful of individuals.[225]
Defence of unionist culture
The cross of St. Patrick superimposed on the Scottish Saltire with a six-county star, the Red Hand of Ulster, and no crown: this design, variously used by Loyalist groups, represents an independent or distinctly Ulster-Scots Northern Ireland identity.[226]
By disclaiming any "selfish or strategic" British interest, the 1994 Downing Street Declaration effectively stipulated that "there could no such thing as disloyalty within Northern Ireland." The competing aspirations of nationalism and unionism were deemed to hold equal validity.[227]
Unionists accused nationalists of interpreting this new "parity of esteem" as justification for a policy of "unrelenting harassment."[8]: 63 Trimble spoke of needing to counter an "insidious erosion of the culture and ethnic national identity of the British people of Ulster," systematically pursued by "the Provisional IRA and its fellow travellers";[228] Robinson spoke of a "fightback" against the "unrelenting Sinn Féin campaign to promote Irish culture and target British structures and symbols."[229]
Unionists alleged a "pan-nationalist [SDLP-Sinn Féin] front" was manipulating public order powers to ban, reroute, or otherwise regulate long-standing Orange marches. For Trimble, the critical flashpoint was the [conflict at Drumcree] (1995–2001);[230] for Robinson and Arlene Foster, it was the similarly protracted Ardoyne shop-front standoff (2013-2016) in north Belfast. A decision by the formerly staunchly unionist Belfast City Council in 2012 to reduce the number of days the Union Flag was flown from City Hall,[231] was also interpreted as a move in a broader "cultural war" against "Britishness," triggering protests.[232]
The most significant issue in inter-party talks proved to be language rights. On Good Friday, April 10, 1998, Prime Minister Tony Blair was surprised by a last-minute demand for recognition of a "Scottish dialect spoken in some parts of Northern Ireland" which Unionists considered their "equivalent to the Irish language."[233] By insisting on parity for Ulster Scots or Ullans, Trimble believed he was engaging the nationalists on their own cultural ground. Unionists argued that nationalists had "weaponized" the Irish language issue as "a tool" to "batter the Protestant people."[234]
The DUP's first Minister of Culture, Arts and Leisure, Nelson McCausland, argued that prioritizing Irish through a language act would constitute an act of "ethnic territorial marking."[235] His decision, and that of his party colleagues, to oppose Sinn Féin's demand for a standalone Irish Language Act, partly by insisting on compensatory provisions for Ulster Scots, became one of the primary, publicly acknowledged, obstacles in the three years of intermittent negotiations required to restore the power-sharing executive in 2020.[236] Other unionists disagree, arguing that the "positive ethnic, religious or national special pleading" inherent in the parades, flags, and language counter-offensive[170]: 14 risks defining unionist culture as "subaltern and therefore ripe for absorption into Irish culture as a 'cherished' minor tradition."[8]: 60
The 2020 New Decade New Approach agreement promised both the Irish language and Ulster-Scots new Commissioners to support their development,[237] but did not grant them equal legal status. While the UK government recognized Ulster Scots as a regional or minority language for the "encouragement" and "facilitation" purposes of Part II of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages,[238] it assumed the more stringent Part III obligations for Irish concerning education, media, and administration. However, New Decade, New Approach did take a step regarding Ulster Scots that it did not take for Irish speakers: the UK government pledged to "recognise Ulster Scots as a national minority under the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities."[237]: 49 This is a second Council of Europe treaty whose provisions had previously been applied in Northern Ireland to non-white groups, Irish Travellers, and the Roma.[239]
To the extent that unionists identify with Ulster Scots and use it as a marker (as suggested by the reference to "the Ulster Scots / Ulster British tradition in Northern Ireland" in New Decade, New Approach),[237]: 34 they are, "in effect," defining themselves as a scheduled ethnicity.[239]
In 2022, despite unionist objections—who, in protest against the Northern Ireland Protocol, continued to block the restoration of devolved power-sharing—the legislation envisioned in New Decade, New Approach was enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Identity and Language (Northern Ireland) Act[240] received royal assent on December 6.[241][242]
Brexit and the Northern Ireland Protocol
While the UUP concluded that "on balance Northern Ireland is better remaining in the European Union,"[243] in the lead-up to the UK's June 2016 referendum on the future of UK membership in the European Union, the larger DUP, which also presented itself as a pro-business party with strong farming support, actively campaigned for Leave.[244] At a time when Sinn Féin was citing the cross-border, all-island economic activity facilitated and supported by the EU as a further argument for Irish unity,[245][246] there was a sentiment that Brexit would, among other benefits, restore a degree of "distance" from Dublin.[247][248]
When Northern Ireland voted to Remain by a margin of 12% (along with Scotland, the only UK region outside London to do so),[249] the DUP argued that the Leave vote represented a UK-wide decision[249] that could only be honored by the UK "leaving the European Union as a whole," with its "territorial and economic integrity" intact.[250]
In June 2017, the party's ten MPs provided crucial support for Theresa May's Conservative Government in an otherwise hung parliament.[251] However, their confidence and supply agreement did not prevent May from returning from Brussels at the year's end with a proposal that would see Northern Ireland, uniquely, continue under a common EU trade regime with the Republic of Ireland.[252]
United behind the Dublin government, the EU 27 had determined that the interests of the Northern Ireland peace process were "paramount." To avoid the "step backwards"—symbolically and psychologically—that a "hardening" of the Irish border would represent, Northern Ireland was to remain in regulatory alignment with the European Single Market and behind the Customs Union frontier. This arrangement would allow necessary physical checks on goods to be relocated to air and sea points of entry.[253]
Arlene Foster protested that the risks of a no-deal Brexit would be preferable to this "annexation of Northern Ireland away from the rest of the United Kingdom."[254] She was supported by prominent Brexiteers. Boris Johnson told the 2018 DUP conference that the EU had made Northern Ireland "their indispensable bargaining chip": "if we wanted to do free trade deals, if we wanted to cut tariffs or vary our regulation then we would have to leave Northern Ireland behind as a semi-colony of the EU . . . damaging the fabric of the Union with regulatory checks . . . down the Irish Sea". He deemed it an "historic mistake."[255] Privately, Johnson expressed frustration that the focus on Northern Ireland's sensitivities was a case of "the tail wagging the dog."[256] Within three months of succeeding May in July 2019, he amended her withdrawal agreement, removing the Irish Backstop not in its core provisions—Northern Ireland would still serve as a customs entry point for the EU—but by discarding the suggestion that the UK as a whole might accept an interim regulatory and customs partnership to avoid differential treatment for Northern Ireland.[257]
Unionists acknowledged a sense of "betrayal."[258][259] Johnson's Northern Ireland Protocol was described as "the worst of all worlds."[260] Citing the free-trade provisions of the Act of Union, current and former unionist leaders pursued a judicial review. In June 2021, the Belfast High Court ruled that while a conflict with the Act of Union existed, Parliament's sovereignty in approving the implicitly amending Protocol rendered it lawful.[261]
With the Prime Minister secure in his "Get-Brexit-Done" mandate from the 2019 UK general election, the DUP's final recourse was to invoke the Good Friday Agreement. Johnson had made one concession: the Northern Ireland Assembly would be required every four years to renew the region's new dual-border trade arrangements. However, this renewal would be by simple majority vote, excluding the possibility of a Petition of Concern and thus a unionist veto.[262] For the DUP, this constituted a violation of the Good Friday Agreement, which they argued stipulated that any proposal to "treat NI differently to the rest of UK" must be based on parallel unionist and nationalist majorities.[263] Citing "the total disregard of this principle," in February 2022, the new DUP leader, Jeffrey Donaldson, withdrew Paul Givan as First Minister, leading to the collapse of the Assembly and executive.[264]
Two years later, on the basis of government assurances that the Protocol (and the supplementary 2022 Windsor Framework) would be implemented without routine checks on internal trade with Great Britain and would be accompanied by measures promoting East-West (i.e., UK) movements over North-South (EU/Irish) movements of goods and services, the DUP agreed to the restoration of the Assembly.[265] On February 3, Michelle O'Neill (Sinn Féin) and Emma Little-Pengelly (DUP) were sworn in as First and Deputy First Ministers of a Northern Ireland executive in which, holding 3 of the 8 ministerial departments, unionists constitute a minority for the first time.[266]
Unionist political parties
A flowchart illustrating the political parties that have existed throughout Northern Ireland's history, leading up to its formation (1889 onwards). Unionist parties are highlighted in orange.
- Irish Conservative Party (1835–1891)
- Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union (1885–1891)
- Liberal Unionist Party (1886–1912)
- Irish Unionist Alliance (1891–1922)
- Ulster Unionist Party (1905/1921–present)
- Conservative and Unionist Party (1912–present)
- Commonwealth Labour Party (1942–1947)
- Protestant Unionist Party (1966–1971)
- Democratic Unionist Party (1971–present)
- Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (1973–1978)
- Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (1974–1981)
- Volunteer Political Party (1974–1975)
- United Ulster Unionist Party (1975–1984)
- Progressive Unionist Party (1978–present)
- Ulster Popular Unionist Party (1980–1995)
- Ulster (Loyalist) Democratic Party (1982–2001)
- UK Independence Party (UKIP 1993–present)
- UK Unionist Party (UKUP 1995–2007)
- United Unionist Coalition (1998–2012)
- Northern Ireland Unionist Party (1999–2008)
- Traditional Unionist Voice (2007–present)
- NI21 (2013–2016)