Battle Of Brandywine

The Battle of Brandywine, also occasionally referred to as the Battle of Brandywine Creek, unfolded on a grim September 11, 1777. This engagement, a pivotal moment in the ongoing American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), pitted the fledgling American Continental Army under General George Washington against the seasoned British Army commanded by General Sir William Howe. Their confrontation took place near Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania, a location that would soon become synonymous with strategic miscalculation and a desperate fight for survival.

Remarkably, the Battle of Brandywine saw more troops engaged than any other single battle of the entire American Revolution [5]. It was also a test of endurance, stretching for an unrelenting 11 hours of continuous combat, making it the second longest single-day battle of the war, surpassed only by the later Battle of Monmouth [5]. As General Howe meticulously orchestrated his advance to seize Philadelphia, then the symbolic and administrative capital of the rebellious colonies, his British forces delivered a decisive blow, comprehensively routing the Continental Army. This forced Washington and his troops into a hasty withdrawal, first to the relative safety of Chester, Pennsylvania, and subsequently northeastward, closer to Philadelphia itself.

Howe's ambitious campaign began its maritime phase on July 23, 1777. His army departed from Sandy Hook, New Jersey, situated across New York Bay from the already occupied New York City on the southern tip of Manhattan Island. After a voyage that surely tested the patience of both men and horses, they made landfall near what is now Elkton, Maryland, specifically at the "Head of Elk" where the Elk River empties into the northern reaches of the Chesapeake Bay, near the southern mouth of the Susquehanna River [6]. From this point, the British Army commenced its northward march, encountering and easily pushing aside American light forces in a series of minor skirmishes.

General Washington, ever keen to offer battle on his own terms, strategically positioned his army behind Brandywine Creek. However, Howe, with a better grasp of the local topography and likely superior intelligence, executed a classic flanking maneuver. While a contingent of his army conducted a feint directly in front of Chadds Ford, drawing Washington's attention, the bulk of Howe's forces embarked on a lengthy, circuitous march that ultimately crossed the Brandywine far upstream, well beyond Washington's perceived right flank. Due to a critical failure in American scouting and intelligence gathering, Howe's formidable column remained undetected until it had already positioned itself dangerously in the rear of Washington's right wing. In a desperate, belated response, three American divisions were hastily redeployed to form a defensive line against the British flanking force, congregating near the Birmingham Friends Meetinghouse and School, a local Quaker establishment.

Following an intense and bloody struggle, Howe's flanking wing eventually shattered the hastily formed American right wing, which had been spread thin across a series of hills. Simultaneously, Lieutenant General Wilhelm von Knyphausen launched his frontal assault on Chadds Ford, effectively collapsing the American left wing. As Washington's army began to stream away in disarray, he personally rallied elements of General Nathanael Greene's division. These reinforcements valiantly held off Howe's advancing column just long enough for the bulk of the American army to make a more organized escape northeastward. The critical rear-guard action was skillfully managed by Polish General Casimir Pulaski, whose cavalry bought precious time for Washington's retreat [7]. The profound defeat at Brandywine, coupled with the subsequent British maneuvers, left Philadelphia exposed and vulnerable. The British, capitalizing on their victory, marched into the city unopposed two weeks later on September 26, where they would maintain control for a full nine months, until June 1778.

Background

Main article: Philadelphia campaign

The strategic prelude to the Battle of Brandywine was a logistical saga in itself. In late August 1777, after what must have been an agonizing and protracted 34-day journey, a Royal Navy fleet, a veritable armada of over 260 ships, finally deposited approximately 17,000 British troops onto American soil. This formidable force, under the command of the British General Sir William Howe, landed at the head of the Elk River, nestled at the northern extremity of the Chesapeake Bay. This landing zone, near present-day Elkton, Maryland, was then known as Head of Elk, and it lay a considerable 40–50 miles (60–80 km) southwest of the American capital, Philadelphia. The disembarkation itself proved to be a significant logistical headache; the narrow river neck was notoriously shallow and plagued by thick mud, slowing the process considerably and perhaps offering Washington a fleeting moment of relief, however slight.

In response to the British landing, General George Washington had meticulously positioned his American forces, numbering approximately 20,300 men, in a defensive line between the Head of Elk and Philadelphia. From the vantage point of Iron Hill, near Newark, Delaware, a mere 9 miles (14 km) to the northeast, his troops were able to reconnoiter the British landing. However, the unexpected delay in the British disembarkation meant that Howe, rather than establishing a typical, static camp, pushed his troops forward with uncharacteristic speed. This rapid movement unfortunately rendered Washington unable to accurately gauge the precise strength and disposition of the opposing forces, a critical intelligence failure that would prove costly.

Following an initial skirmish at Cooch's Bridge, located just south of Newark, the British troops continued their relentless march northward. In response, Washington prudently abandoned a defensive encampment he had established along the Red Clay Creek near Newport, Delaware, opting instead to confront the British at Chadds Ford. This particular site held immense strategic importance, being the most direct and viable passage across the Brandywine River along the primary road connecting Baltimore to Philadelphia. On September 9, Washington, believing he had secured his position, deployed various detachments to guard other potential fords both upstream and downstream from Chadds Ford, his intention being to funnel the British attack directly into his prepared defenses. Specifically, General John Armstrong, commanding a force of roughly 1,000 Pennsylvania militia, was tasked with covering Pyle's Ford, situated 5.8 miles south of Chadds Ford. Chadds Ford itself was secured by Major Generals Anthony Wayne's and Nathanael Greene's divisions. Major General John Sullivan's division extended the American line northward along the Brandywine's east banks, occupying the elevated ground north of Chadds Ford, supported by Major General Adam Stephen's division and Major General Lord Stirling's divisions. Even further upstream, a brigade under the command of Colonel Moses Hazen was positioned to cover both Buffington's Ford and Wistar's Ford. Washington, with a confidence that would soon be shattered, felt assured that the entire area was adequately secured against any British advance.

Meanwhile, the British forces consolidated their strength at the nearby village of Kennett Square [8]. General Howe, possessing a far superior understanding of the local terrain and likely benefiting from local loyalist intelligence, had no intention of engaging in a costly, full-scale frontal assault against Washington's well-entrenched American defenses. Instead, he opted for a sophisticated flanking maneuver, a tactic he had employed with devastating success during the Battle of Long Island. Approximately 6,800 men, under the direct command of Wilhelm von Knyphausen, were ordered to advance and engage Washington's troops at Chadds Ford, creating a crucial diversion. The larger segment of Howe's army, a formidable force of about 9,000 men, led by Charles, Lord Cornwallis, embarked on a lengthy march north. Their route took them first to Trimble's Ford across the West Branch of the Brandywine Creek, then east to Jefferis Ford across the East Branch – two critical fords that Washington, due to his "poor understanding of the area and lack of credible reconnaissance," had tragically overlooked. From there, Cornwallis's column would turn south, executing a wide envelopment that would position them directly to flank the unsuspecting American forces [9].

Battle

• See Battle of Brandywine order of battle for a detailed list of the regiments and organizations of both armies.

British advance

Map of the Brandywine battlefield (1830 engraving) The Battle of Brandywine, September 11, 1777

The morning of September 11 dawned shrouded in a heavy, concealing fog, a meteorological gift to the British that would prove disastrous for the Americans. Amidst this low visibility, Washington found himself inundated with a torrent of contradictory reports regarding British troop movements, unfortunately reinforcing his initial, and ultimately incorrect, belief that the main British thrust would be a direct assault on Chadds Ford.

Knyphausen's Column

At precisely 5:30 a.m., the combined British and Hessian forces, under General Knyphausen, began their deliberate march east along the "Great Road"—a path now recognized as Route 1. Their objective: the American positions where this road intersected Brandywine Creek. The first shots of this momentous battle rang out about 4 miles west of Chadds Ford, near Welch's Tavern. Elements of Maxwell's Continental light infantry engaged in a spirited skirmish with the British vanguard, primarily composed of the Queen's Rangers, a battalion of loyalists. The British, however, pressed their advance, soon encountering a more substantial Continental force entrenched behind the sturdy stone walls on the grounds of the Old Kennett Meetinghouse. The battle raged throughout the mid-morning around this venerable meeting house, an ironic backdrop where the pacifist Quakers continued, with remarkable resolve, to hold their midweek service. One Quaker, later recounting the surreal scene, observed with a detached calm, "While there was much noise and confusion without, all was quiet and peaceful within" [10].

From the contested grounds of the Meetinghouse, the fight continued relentlessly for another three miles, pushing ever closer to the strategic heart of the American defense at Chadds Ford along the Brandywine Creek. Though the British ultimately succeeded in dislodging and pushing back the American defenders, it was not without a significant cost, as their vanguard suffered heavy losses in the prolonged engagement.

Cornwallis's Column

The primary British column, a formidable force under the command of General Cornwallis—and notably accompanied by General Howe himself—had initiated its march from Kennett Square even earlier, at 5:00 a.m. Howe, having benefited from crucial intelligence provided by local loyalist sources, was well aware of two unguarded fords situated further upstream, beyond the natural forks of the Brandywine. This audacious 17-mile flank march was a grueling undertaking, requiring approximately 9 hours to complete. The British force finally emerged on the unsuspecting American right flank at around 2 p.m., taking a well-deserved, if brief, respite on Osbourne's Hill, a commanding position that offered a sweeping view north of the main Continental Army encampment.

Upon receiving belated but critical intelligence from Colonel Bland's scouts, Washington, finally grasping the gravity of the situation, issued urgent orders to Sullivan. Sullivan was to assume overall command of Stirling's and Stephen's divisions, in addition to his own, and rapidly march north to counter the impending British flank attack. As these American divisions scrambled to form their defensive lines north of Dilworth, Howe, without hesitation, launched his assault. Sullivan, now burdened with the overall command of the army's right wing, temporarily left his own division under the charge of Preudhomme de Borre, with instructions for de Borre to shift his position to the right, aiming to establish a crucial link with Stirling's and Stephen's divisions. The American lines were initially arrayed from left to right as Sullivan, Stirling, and Stephen. As the British lines advanced, the formidable Hessian Jaegers threatened to envelop the American right, compelling Stephen and Stirling to adjust their positions further rightward. Howe's initial, perhaps overly cautious, delay in attacking inadvertently bought the Americans precious time, allowing them to position some of their forces on the elevated ground near Birmingham Meetinghouse, roughly a mile (1.6 km) north of Chadds Ford [11].

By 4 p.m., the full weight of the British attack commenced. The elite British Brigade of Guards, striking with precision, caught de Borre's division on the American left by surprise, before they had managed to fully form their ranks. This immediate disarray quickly escalated into a complete rout of de Borre's entire division. Initially, Stephen's and Stirling's divisions managed to hold their ground with remarkable tenacity, bolstered by a well-placed battery of artillery on a knoll between their respective positions. However, the relentless pressure from the British light infantry battalions, effectively supported by the Jaegers, eventually forced Stephen's division to fall back. A subsequent, devastating bayonet charge delivered by the British grenadier battalions, driving through the American center, similarly compelled Stirling's division to retreat. It was at this critical juncture that the young Marquis de Lafayette had only just arrived, joining Stirling's beleaguered division, when he received a wound while heroically attempting to rally the rapidly retreating troops.

Washington and Greene arrive near Dilworth

As the battle teetered on the brink of complete collapse, around 6 p.m., Washington and Greene arrived with desperately needed reinforcements, their objective to stem the British tide, which now ominously occupied Meeting House Hill. Washington, in a moment of grim council, conferred with Greene and Knox, the latter being his formidable head of artillery, in the austere yard of the William Brinton house [12]. The situation was dire; the 2nd Battalion of Grenadiers was rapidly closing in on their position, augmented by the arrival of a fresh reserve brigade, the 4th British Brigade. A decision was made: Knox would deploy his artillery to slow the inexorable British advance, buying precious minutes. Greene's reinforcements, combined with the fragmented remnants of Sullivan's, Stephen's, and Stirling's divisions, formed a new, tenuous line south of Dilworth. With a desperate courage, they succeeded in holding off the pursuing British for nearly an hour, a critical delaying action that allowed the beleaguered remainder of the American army to initiate their retreat. As darkness finally descended, offering a merciful cloak to the chaos, Greene's division at last began its march to Chester along with the rest of the exhausted army. The British army, their own forces fatigued and disoriented by the deepening night, were unable to mount an effective pursuit. The Americans, in their hasty withdrawal, were compelled to abandon many of their precious cannons on Meeting House Hill, a grim testament to the battle's ferocity, as almost all of their artillery horses had been killed in the fighting.

Knyphausen's final attack

Location of Stirling's Division on the ridge (i.e. Birmingham Hill) just west of Birmingham road (looking west). The British Grenadier battalions attacked from right to left, ultimately forcing Stirling to fall back with a bayonet charge.

Simultaneously, upon receiving intelligence of Cornwallis's successful flanking attack, Knyphausen launched his decisive assault against the now critically weakened American center across Chadds Ford. This coordinated strike proved devastating, shattering the divisions commanded by Wayne and William Maxwell, forcing them into a rapid retreat and compelling them to abandon most of their artillery pieces. Armstrong's militia, which had remained unengaged in the earlier fighting, also made the prudent, if inglorious, decision to retreat from their positions. Further to the north, Greene dispatched Brigadier General George Weedon's troops to establish a crucial covering force on the road just outside the town of Dilworth. Their desperate mission was to hold off the British long enough for the remainder of the Continental Army to complete its withdrawal. The deepening night once again proved a reluctant ally to the Americans, bringing the British pursuit to a standstill, which then allowed Weedon's exhausted force to finally retreat. The defeated Americans, a weary and battered column, eventually made their way to Chester, with the majority arriving by midnight and stragglers continuing to trickle in until the early morning hours. Despite the profound defeat, the American retreat was, by many accounts, remarkably well-organized, largely thanks to the efforts of the Marquis de Lafayette. Though himself wounded, Lafayette managed to establish a crucial rally point, which facilitated a more orderly disengagement before he finally sought treatment for his injury [13].

Losses

Nation Makers by Howard Pyle depicts a scene from the battle. The painting hangs in the Brandywine River Museum.

The official British casualty report, a document usually as understated as it is precise, detailed 587 casualties. This grim tally included 93 killed, broken down into eight officers, seven sergeants, and 78 rank and file. Another 488 were wounded, comprising 49 officers, 40 sergeants, four drummers, and 395 rank and file. A mere six rank and file were listed as missing and unaccounted for [3]. Notably, only 40 of these British Army casualties were Hessians, suggesting their contribution was perhaps less costly in terms of direct engagement [14]. Historian Thomas J. McGuire, with a hint of skepticism, notes that "American estimates of British losses run as high as 2,000, based on distant observation and sketchy, unreliable reports" [3]. One might wonder about the reliability of "distant observation" in a battle shrouded by fog and chaos; it's almost as if wishful thinking played a part in the counting.

7th Pennsylvania Regiment's historic Brandywine flag

Conversely, most accounts of American losses emanated from British sources, adding another layer of historical interpretation. An initial report by a British officer recorded American casualties at more than 200 killed, approximately 750 wounded, and a considerable 400 prisoners taken, many of whom were themselves wounded. A member of General Howe's staff, perhaps eager to bolster the victory, claimed that 400 rebels were buried on the field by the victors [15]. Another British officer, providing a slightly different figure, wrote that, "The Enemy had 502 dead in the field" [3]. General Howe's official report to the British colonial secretary, Lord George Germain, offered a somewhat more conservative, yet still substantial, estimate, stating that the Americans "had about 300 men killed, 600 wounded, and near 400 made prisoners" [3].

A definitive casualty return for the American army at Brandywine simply does not exist, and no official or unofficial figures were ever publicly released by the Americans themselves. The closest thing to a concrete figure from the American side comes from Major General Nathanael Greene, who estimated that Washington's army had lost somewhere between 1,200 and 1,300 men [16]. On September 14, three days after the battle, approximately 350 wounded Americans were transported from the British camp at Dilworth to a newly established hospital in Wilmington, Delaware. [17] This detail suggests that of the "near 400" prisoners reported by Howe, a mere 50 or so had surrendered unwounded. If General Greene's overall estimate of total American losses holds true, then the American forces suffered between 1,160 and 1,260 men killed, wounded, or who simply vanished during the battle. The British also managed to capture 11 of the 14 American artillery pieces, a significant blow to Washington's already limited firepower. Among the distinguished American wounded was, of course, the Marquis de Lafayette, a poignant symbol of the sacrifices made.

Beyond the immediate battlefield losses, an additional 315 men were recorded as deserters from Washington's camp during this particularly trying stage of the campaign [18]. A testament, perhaps, to the demoralizing effect of such a decisive defeat.

Aftermath

Washington had, in a candid assessment, committed a serious error in leaving his right flank dangerously exposed. This strategic blunder could have led to the complete annihilation of his army, had it not been for the desperate, valiant, and ultimately successful delaying actions by Sullivan, Stirling, and Stephen's divisions, which bought invaluable time. As evening approached, in spite of Cornwallis's early start on his flanking maneuver, the majority of the American army managed to slip away, bruised but not broken. In his report to the Continental Congress detailing the battle, Washington, ever the master of morale, stated: "despite the day's misfortune, I am pleased to announce that most of my men are in good spirits and still have the courage to fight the enemy another day." One must admire the man's ability to spin a crushing defeat into a mere "misfortune."

The British and American forces continued their intricate, deadly dance around each other for the subsequent several days, marked by only a few additional encounters. These included the inconclusive Battle of the Clouds on September 16, a skirmish curtailed by a torrential downpour, and the brutal night assault known as the Battle of Paoli on September 20–21. Meanwhile, hundreds of miles to the north, a far more significant development was unfolding: the Battles of Saratoga, which would deliver a crucial victory over a British force that General Howe was, ironically, supposed to join. His diversion to Philadelphia would have profound strategic consequences.

In a practical, albeit somewhat desperate, preparation for the inevitable fall of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania's Supreme Executive Council issued an urgent order. Eleven significant bells in the city, including the iconic State House bell (now famously known as the Liberty Bell) and the bells from Christ Church and St. Peter's Church, were to be taken down and removed from Philadelphia. The explicit aim was to prevent the British Army from seizing them, melting them down, and casting them into munitions for use against the very people they symbolized. The Liberty Bell, a potent symbol of nascent American independence, was transported to Allentown, where it was hidden for a tense nine months beneath the floorboards of the Zion United Church of Christ in the city [19].

The Continental Congress, facing the imminent occupation of its capital, was forced to abandon Philadelphia. It relocated first to Lancaster, for a single, hurried day, before moving again to York, where it would continue the arduous work of governing a nation at war.

On September 26, 1777, the British forces, having achieved their immediate objective, marched triumphantly into Philadelphia, unopposed.

The legacy of the Battle of Brandywine extends into the modern era, with eight contemporary Army National Guard units (the 103rd Eng Bn [20], A/1-104th Cav [21], 109th FA [22], 111th Inf [23], 113th Inf [24], 116th Inf [25], 1–175th Inf [26], and 198th Sig Bn [27]) and one active Regular Army Field Artillery battalion (1–5th FA [28]) tracing their lineage directly back to American units that participated in this battle. In total, there are thirty current U.S. Army units whose historical roots extend back to the colonial era, a testament to the enduring continuity of American military tradition.

Battlefield preservation

The Brandywine Battlefield Historic Site stands today as a designated National Historical Landmark, a solemn testament to the pivotal events that transpired on this ground. This historic park, meticulously owned and operated by the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, encompasses a vital 52 acres (21 ha) near Chadds Ford, within Delaware County, Pennsylvania, forming a crucial segment of the larger battleground where the Battle of Brandywine was fought.

Beyond the official state efforts, the American Battlefield Trust and its dedicated partners have undertaken significant initiatives to safeguard this hallowed ground. As of mid-2023, their collective efforts have successfully acquired and preserved an impressive expanse of more than 187 acres (0.76 km 2 ) of the battlefield, ensuring that future generations can walk the fields where a nascent nation fought for its very existence [29].

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Birmingham Friends Meetinghouse in 2017

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The battlefield today, south of Meeting House Hill

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View from the top of Osborne's Hill looking southeast toward the American positions

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George Washington's headquarters

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Monument to Lafayette and Pulaski at Birmingham Cemetery

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Stone Wall at Birmingham Friends Meetinghouse. Forward defenses of the American right wing.

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Hill overlooking Sandy Hollow, where Gen. Stephen's Division deployed on the far right flank of the Continental Army. The Jagers attacked from the right side of the photograph, while the light infantry attacked from the current-day tree line, at the left and center.

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Mass grave containing the remains of soldiers from both armies at Birmingham Friends Burial Grounds